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

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HISTORY

OF THE

REIGNS OF LOUIS XVIII.

AND

CHARLES X.

BY

EYRE EVANS CROWE,

AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF FRANCE," "THE GREEK AND THE TURK," ETC.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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THE HISTORY

OF

THE REIGNS OF LOUIS XVIII.

AND

CHARLES X.

FROM 1815 TO 1830.

CHAPTER I.

CONTEST AND DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE KING—ADVICE OF FOREIGN COURTS—SECOND MINISTRY OF THE DUKE OF RICHELIEU—LAW SUSPENDING THE LIBERTY OF THE PERSON—ELOQUENCE OF FOY—NEW LAW OF ELECTION—MADIER DE MONTJAU—ROYER COLLARD—FALSE AND PAINFUL POSITION OF MODERATES.

It is unavoidable in a people, newly called to a participation in public affairs, and endowed with freedom to discuss and influence them, that they should be guided more by passion than by reason, and by strong personal sympathies and antipathies rather than by fixed principles and wisely-contemplated aims. It is scarcely attributable to any mercurial or highly-sensitive character in the French, that after such a quarter of a century as they had spent, they should have been struck more by horror and hate or by admiration and respect, for the revolution and for Napoleon on the one hand, and for the old revived Monarchy and the Bourbons on the other, than that they should have weighed and compared the relative advantages of the two systems. Certainly the moderate liber-

ties, which had been enjoyed during the last three years, the freedom of the press and of letters, the eminent position created in the Representative Assembly of the nation for the statesmen and orators of every way of thinking, their rights and privileges so new to the French, joined with the large development afforded to industry and material interests, ought to have rendered the French more grateful or more considerate towards their wise and well-intentioned monarch, and less wrong-headed, so many of them, in celebrating and praising the majesty of the Empire as preferable to the mild and constitutional rule under which they lived.

But there are times, when nations, as well as individuals, live in ideality and sentiment, when they loathe the real and turn from the rational, and when even politics is looked upon as a kind of poetry in which heroism is indispensable, in which liberty is not prized, except in the attitudes of extravagance and distortion, and material prosperity itself is contemned as the satisfaction of a vulgar appetite. The biggest children in this respect were the Royalists, who instead of taking the country and circumstances as they were, elements out of which, Heaven knows, a system amply conservative and sufficiently aristocratic might have been formed, would on the contrary not only build up a new edifice of government, but a new French people to govern. Chateaubriand the poet, neglected and flung into ultra-Royalism by Decazes and Louis XVIII., was the politician, who, at this time, drew up the programme of what the party desired and intended, now that government had fallen into their hands. General Foy could make no more bitter or overwhelming denunciation of the designs of the retrograde

party than by reading this programme. It not only demanded the change of the law of elections, so as to throw entire control and influence into the hands of the wealthy proprietors, but it demanded, what the French public most abhorred, the immobilization of landed property, by the abrogation of the law compelling its division amongst heirs, and the substitution for it of entail in favour of the eldest born. Religion too was to be placed on its old pedestal, predominant over education, and tabooed against criticism. Centralization broken up, and clergy and aristocracy raised each to a power equal with the Government or its functionary class. It was in pursuit of this Utopia, that the ultra-Royalist party set forth in Parliament: it was this that they blazoned and celebrated in the mingled prose and verse of their publications. In opposition to this restored royalty of Louis XIV., the Liberals, or Independents, as they as yet styled themselves, drew and held up a picture, quite as ideal and untrue, of the Revolution and the Empire, taking the glory of the latter, the freedom and emancipation of the former, glossing over the crimes of 1792 and the tyranny of 1804, but holding the Bonapartist régime as glorious and rightful, whilst that which existed was disgraceful and usurping.

It may be easy for an Englishman, accustomed to the working of constitutional machinery, to come to the conclusion, that Louis XVIII. needed no more than to allow his law of direct election to produce its last result, and return, as it threatened, a decidedly liberal majority to the Chamber. Accepting so great a fact as the result of free opinion and free election, and acting upon it according to constitutional rules to form a liberal ministry, com-

posed of such men as Foy and Perrier, and the Doctrinaires, such of them as would enter into the combination, the King would have thereby rendered his name popular, demonstrated that his dynasty was not incompatible with the national party and sentiment, and would infallibly have silenced and thrown into disuse and disrepute all that mass of Bonapartist exaggeration and falsehood, which hitherto succeeded in depicting Napoleon as the hero of democracy, the Bourbons as the restorers and champions of aristocracy. The tenure of office by such men as Foy, Perrier, and even Laffitte, for ever so short a time, would have made them acquainted with the difficulties and responsibilities of Government, and compelled them to look at public affairs from the side of the throne and the administration, as well as from that of the people and of progress. Such experience is alone sufficient to infuse a large dose of conservatism into the most headstrong Liberal, provided he has the sense and talent to appreciate and discern things as they are. And afterwards the Bourbons, instead of surrounding themselves with a mere coterie of interested men, seeking to recover lost positions and lost advantages for themselves, would have rallied round the throne the true capacities of the country, and amongst them the representatives of the middle, the industrious, and capitalist classes. All those, in fact, whom the Orleans dynasty made their friends, Louis XVIII. might have had on easier terms. But all this, which seems such obvious wisdom, and such self-evident truth to us of the middle of the century, was, in 1820, by no means clear to Louis XVIII. He saw plainly and foretold emphatically the self-destruction to which the ultra-Royalists were tending. He accordingly

resisted them, and kept power from falling into their hands, as long as he found a mere functionary Government, such as that of Decazes and Pasquier, capable of holding its ground, and balancing the Liberals against the Royalists, without throwing influence and predominance into the former. But when he saw the Liberals gradually gaining the majority in Parliament, and at the same time not moderating their tone or their acts, but indulging daily in panegyrics of the Revolution and of Napoleon—thus carrying on not merely a constitutional opposition to the Ministry, but a revolutionary antagonism to the dynasty, committing personal outrage upon the King and his family by the election of such men as Grégoire—then Louis feared lest he might, like his unfortunate brother, when he intrusted the ministry to Roland and the Girondists, be giving up himself and his throne to the Foys and Perriers, as preparatory to the re-erection of the revolutionary scaffold and the simultaneous downfall of the Crown itself, along with its would-be moderate and powerless minister. That Louis was wrong, there can be now no possibility of doubting. But a wise man might have erred, as he did; and when the too natural rage and terror of the Count D'Artois, of all the royal family and their followers, after the murder of the Duke de Berri is taken into account, one can scarcely censure the King for leaning more to the Conservatives, satisfying the grief and the entreaties of his brother, and recurring to a Ministry, which he might consider able to check the rapid and menacing advance of a party, apparently so hostile to the dynasty and so indulgent to its rivals, as the French liberals of the day.

There was another influence brought to bear upon

Louis XVIII., which he could not altogether set at nought. This was the opinion and counsels of the great governments, kings, and statesmen of Europe, who had set him on the throne, and who had so lately been induced to withdraw their army of occupation, on the assurance that the government of France was powerful and stable. The events of Germany had alarmed the potentates of Austria and Russia. The outburst of Spain had filled them with fears not only for the Peninsula but for France itself, where there were abundant elements for an imitation of Spanish mutiny and democracy. Metternich had proposed a joint representation of all the Courts to France, which Lord Castlereagh dissuaded him from. And although Sir Charles Stuart, the British ambassador in Paris, had faith in Decazes, and dreaded the consequence of ultra-Royalist reaction, still the English Cabinet, and even the Duke of Wellington, as we have seen, recommended Louis to become reconciled to the Royalists, rather than go with the Liberals.

If Louis erred, therefore, he erred by the advice, not merely of many despots, but of the constitutional statesmen of England.

Moreover the King hoped not to give up all. He peremptorily refused admitting into the Cabinet the councillors of his brother. He insisted on recalling the Duc de Richelieu who had governed so long, in manifest mistrust of the ultra-Royalists, who had indeed consented to gratify them by changing the electoral law, but who might be expected to hold firm against them on other important points. In this the King was mistaken. The electoral law was the pivot upon which parties turned. The present electoral law, which gave the franchise to all who paid three hun-

dred francs of annual taxes, would inevitably produce a Liberal majority, and for no other reason, than that the ultra-Royalists were a minority in the nation. The constitutional principle commanded the King to follow at least a majority like this, elected by the propertied class. If the King could not trust them, there was no class to be trusted, and a constitution itself could only have worked as a deception, and been preserved as a semblance, not practised as a reality. In giving the Royalists or the Duc de Richelieu power to alter the electoral law in such a manner as to produce a Royalist majority, the King inevitably placed himself in the hands of that majority, even more irrevocably than his continuing to govern with the present electoral law would place him in the hands of the Liberals. It was making over the Government to the Count d'Artois, however, moderate and fair he might at first promise and appear. And as to the Duc de Richelieu, who was a mere cipher in constitutional and domestic politics, he, by accepting office, was merely placing a convenient stepping-stone for the ultra-Royalists to cross upon at their leisure to the conquest of office and authority, and to the permanent seizure of the Government.

The Duke de Richelieu seemed aware of this. When the Duke Decazes (the King had already presented his ex-minister with a ducal coronet, and appointed him ambassador to London) first came to ask him to resume his old post of Prime Minister, Richelieu exclaimed, "That it was too much to demand such a sacrifice of him; that he could not have the repose of his life disturbed; and that he would never again accept office." His friends, Lainé and Rayneval, came to repeat Decazes' request, no longer in the King's name, but in their own. Richelieu's acceptance

of office was of course the reappointment of all his friends, and he could not deny them this natural gratification. He refused, however, to undertake the ministry, unless the Count d'Artois would frankly promise his support—thus admitting to what Parliamentary party he looked. Monsieur gave the promise, which of course he never intended to be more than limited and temporary support. The great object with the ultra-Royalists was to obtain the repeal of the electoral law, which was to transfer majority and power to them. This the Duc de Richelieu and his friends, criminally as constitutionalists, and suicidally as politicians, undertook.

This condition being complied with, the Duke de Richelieu accepted the post of Prime Minister, which he occupied as President of the Council. Foreign affairs, no longer so important as under his previous ministry, the Duke left in the hands of M. Pasquier, who had been so influential in demonstrating the necessity of a change in the electoral law. M. de Serre, absent at the time, was continued in his office of Minister of Justice, and M. Simeon was appointed Home Minister. Neither of them were men in whom the ultra-Royalists had confidence. But to conciliate them, and give them guarantees, the under-secretaryships in both departments were given to Ultras, Portalis and Baron Cappelle: the latter was entrusted with the *personnel* in the department of the Interior; in other words, with the appointment of prefects and functionaries. So that from the very first, the Duke de Richelieu gave up the chief patronage and political management over the departments to the Count d'Artois. These ultra-Royalist nominations of course compelled such men as Guizot and Villemain to resign, as Royer Collard had done some time

before. The Doctrinaires were indeed ejected from all offices. At first they remained silent labourers in the Conseil d'Etat, and more ambitious ones in their professorial chairs. But as even their philosophy was a kind of opposition to the thenceforward retrograde spirit of the dominant faction, they were soon ousted from the adminstration, and silenced in their University places. The Restoration thus came to quarrel with the intelligence as well as with the liberties of the nation, giving to the former that popular vigour and support requisite to make it formidable, and at the same time giving to the Liberals, as auxiliaries and allies, those thinkers and philosophers, who represented the maturity of the national mind, whilst the Royalists expressed but the fatuity and puerile extravagance of a retrograde party.

The most unfortunate position, however, was that of the ministry from which M. Decazes had escaped. The leading speakers had to support, in the Chamber, the very laws and that line of policy which in 1815 and the subsequent year they had combated and denounced. The first proposal, that for the suspension of the laws guaranteeing, however imperfectly, the liberty of the person, opened the whole question of Ministerial changes, of the King and M. De Richelieu having shaken off every semi-liberal supporter, and having delivered over the Government to a party, bent not merely on temporary rigours, but upon a gradual reintroduction of the régime of absolutism. M. Pasquier was the chief Ministerial champion. Though ingenious and able, he made but a very poor resistance to the eloquent and overwhelming attacks of such adversaries as Foy and Constant. Foy was searchingly true and magnificently prophetic. He denounced the Ministry, as ignorantly asking for arbitrary power, which they would

not be allowed to wield themselves, or keep in their own hands. There was a party superior to theirs, dominant in the Court and in the provinces, to which every functionary would look, and in whose retrograde spirit the Government would be carried on, and these severe laws put in practice, whether Ministers desire it or not. What was the use of such tyrannical power, unless it was exercised, and how could it be exercised against individuals, without information respecting their thoughts and actions? These informers would undertake to supply, and the new laws called into existence, a new class and profession, that of the informer. In the provinces every one who had been guilty of a liberal act, or of one which could be construed as such, would be denounced; and the country would be divided into two parties, the accusing and attacking on the one side, that defending the traditions, principles, properties, and anything that had taken root within the last half century upon the other. Moderate and middle parties would disappear; for there would not be even safety in belonging to them, and civil war thus commenced, in however severe a manner, the nature, the inveteracy, and the inevitable result of the struggle, however prolonged, could not but be foreseen.

In opposition to such arguments, Ministers could but take the ungracious theme of representing France as largely participating in the crime of Louvel, or at least in too many instances expressing approbation of it. These arguments tended to consider and to treat the French as frenzied individuals, who required coercion and the strait waistcoat. Benjamin Constant eloquently repelled the injustice, depicting France as an utter stranger to the monomania of an assassin, progressive in the ways of

industry and tranquillity, until Ministers chose to bring in the whole country guilty of the assassination of an unfortunate prince.

Ministers asked for these exceptional powers as a mark of confidence. But who are the Ministers, asked Constant, but men who have already executed the most severe laws, with complaisance and zeal, for that very military despot whom they now denounce? It would be something, if those on the ministerial bench could come forward with pure hands and say, that they had never been guilty of an arbitrary act, nor signed a cruel order, nor encouraged spies, nor acted the part of informer in order to exile and imprison patriots.

Such apostrophes were chiefly directed against Pasquier. General Foy, more Imperialist and more prudent than Constant, avoided accusing the Bonapartists. He even spared the Ministry, and represented them not so guilty as weak, and as certain to be instruments of other parties more retrograde and more designing. Ministers must lean to one side or to the other, said Foy; they must either take the position of representing current ideas and general interests, or they must fall back to lean on that ultra-Royalist body, which is too weak and too insignificant in the country to resist or to govern without the aid of foreigners. "It was only by the support of foreign soldiers," continued Foy, "that they were able to subject the country to the *terror* of 1815. But for foreign armies at that time occupying the soil of France, there would have been an hundred insurrections." Here the ultra-Royalists in the Chamber broke into loud murmurs and denials. "Do you think," repeated Foy, addressing them, "that, were it not for your foreign allies, we should have,

like cowards, put up with the insults and the outrages heaped upon us by a handful of wretches (*misérables*) whom we had seen grovelling in the dirt for the thirty years previous?"

This rude and unwarrantable apostrophe of Foy made all the Royalists start up in commotion. They called him an *insolent* fellow. He added, that he had himself suffered outrages, such as could only have been possible under foreign bayonets. He had hoped to see such times and such acts impossible of return; but the policy and the persons, now resuming sway in the country, would bring all back once more.

The reproach of *misérable*, and the rejoinder of *insolent*, occasioned a duel between M. de Corday, relative of Charlotte Corday, and General Foy. The latter received his adversary's fire, discharged his own pistol in the air, and then with the nobleness of his character, apologized for confounding in an epithet the informers and oppressors of 1815 along with those honourable men, who as Royalists had never lost or deserved to lose respect. This apology which was no more than due, was nevertheless very ill received, and unfavourably judged by the Liberals, who would now listen to no terms with the royalists, save those of war to the extreme.

The law suspending the liberties of the person, passed by 134 votes against 115, the junction of the Ministerialists with the Royalists securing this majority. The inutility of the law was proved by the circumstance of its not being made the least use of, neither conspiracy nor danger of any kind menacing, until they were produced by the retrograde acts of the session. The law, suspending the liberty of the press, and re-establishing the censorship,

was more efficient, although it called forth less resentment and passion. It would almost seem that the Chamber of Peers, which had been foremost in provoking the fall of Decazes and the change of the electoral law, was alarmed at the extent of the menaced reaction. The Commission, whom it chose to report upon the law of the press, objected to its more severe enactments, and recommended the modification of them. It even sought to abate the rigour of the censorship by subjecting it to a Commission of Revisal or *surveillance*. When brought before the Chamber of Deputies, all the chiefs of the Liberal party regarded it as an infraction of the Charter, as a flagrant breach of the contract between prince and people, and of the peace which prevailed betwixt them. Lafayette declared frankly, that it set men free from their promise of allegiance, and left no option but to look to force and to measure it. As long as Government was strong enough, it would enforce its tyranny and succeed; the moment the people found themselves strong, they would resist and overturn the Government. This plain speaking, taken for rhodomontade, but unfortunately true as well as just, merely exasperated the Ministerialists and Royalists.

It was in this debate that the Doctrinaires seized the opportunity of declaring their hostility to the Government. Camille Jordan denounced it in an eloquent speech; and said that his objections and his fears were not provoked so much by this law or by that, as by the new spirit which evidently meditated a change in every law and in the whole system of administration, and commenced an era of coercion and force exercised upon even the enlightened public, instead of founding a constitutional government on

their intelligence and support. Royer Collard gave more philosophic reasons for his opposition. He said that the present Government placed itself at the head of a party to go forth and combat anarchy and faction. For his part he saw no symptom of either in the nation. He saw them merely in the Government, and introduced by Government into the Chamber. The Ministry seems to have no force of its own and no consciousness of any. Instead of dominating parties and making use of them, Government has either let them escape its influence, or has undergone their denunciation. The electoral ordonnance and law of M. Decazes planted the royal standard in the midst of the nation. But where was it to be looked for now? There was no united will, no clear aims. They were assisting at the funeral of the public liberties. No one could tell why, or point out what kind of Government was to succeed. With respect to the present motion, Ministers ought to be compelled to make use of the laws which exist, and amend them if necessary, instead of having recourse to the clumsy and barbarous expedient of knocking the brains out of all liberties, whether of freedom or of the person, merely because they did not know how to devise a plan reconciling liberty with restriction.' He proposed with M. de la Bourdonnaye merely voting the law for a few months. Ministers, however, carried their measures; and thus after brief enjoyment of the liberty of the press, which served but to enhance the public enjoyment of it, and determination to recognize it, the censorship was re-established. At the moment the organ of even the great parties ceased to appear. The "Minerve" was published no more. Even the "Conservateur," in which Chateaubriand wrote, was discontinued, not so much

from fear of the censors, as that the Royalist party would no longer support an organ which accepted constitutional principles. The political philosophy of Bonald and De Maistre, who preferred the restoration of the ancient monarchy and its States-General, were now to be brought forward; and, strange to say, amongst the names of those who were to write a new "Conservateur" of this kind appears that of Lamartine. The Liberal journals were, at the same time, obliged to furl their sails, to diminish their numbers, give up their warmth, and abandon argument as prohibited. Opposition took refuge in epigram. The "Minerve" could no longer fire its monthly cannon. But Beranger could pour forth his weekly song, in which the Bourbons were ridiculed and their Ministers execrated; and the pithy rhyme fed public indignation for the time as powerfully as the daily or monthly diatribes of the press.

The denying to public opinion its expression, and to private life its security, were not sufficient for the ultra-Royalists. To obtain a majority in the Chamber of Deputies was their vital object: and they judged at once, that the new electoral law, which M. Decazes had concocted and introduced, would by no means be sufficient for their purpose. That Minister, as has been told, proposed to remove the elections from the capital of the department to the *chief-lieus* of the districts, for he proposed to add to the 258 Members elected by district colleges, composed of the tax-payer of 300 francs, 172 men to be chosen by departmental colleges, composed of the tax-payers of 1,000 francs, and elected by the district colleges. Half of the 1,000 francs was to be paid in land-tax. There was to be open voting instead of ballot; and the whole of the

Chamber was to be elected at once for five years. In proposing this considerable change in the law, the former Minister explained his purpose to be to counterbalance that exclusive influence which persons of small and moderate properties exercised in the elections; not to destroy their influence, but to raise up another in the soil. As, however, the rich men, who were to compose the departmental colleges, were themselves subject to the election of the district colleges, the more obnoxious might be set aside, and the middle class would have a portion of a vote in the election of the upper class. Such was the compromise that the King and M. Decazes had devised, and which they hoped might still allow sufficient force and development to the middle-class party to counterbalance the ultra-Royalists; and this compromise Louis XVIII. never ceased to regret that he did not hold by.

But it did not satisfy the supporters of the new Ministry; and the Duke de Richelieu's Cabinet took counsel more of the Count d'Artois than of the King. Count Simeon, the Home Minister, presented in April an altogether new scheme, which was a return to the mode of election which had prevailed previous to the celebrated and popular ordonnance of M. Decazes, and which abolished direct election altogether. According to the ultra-Royalist plan, the district electors in each local college were to elect as many candidates for the deputation as the department was entitled to return. In addition, there was to be a departmental college, formed of the highest tax-payers, to the number of one-fifth of the electoral body, and these were to select amongst the candidates those who were definitively to be returned to the Chamber. It was impossible to withdraw in a more barefaced way from the

middle class those electoral rights which had been extended to them, and which they had used during three years without any disturbance to the public tranquillity, to the complete cessation of conspiracy, but to the erection of a band of eminent Parliamentary chiefs: after having permitted and favoured whose elevation, to degrade them was the height of imprudence.

The mere announcement of an electoral or indeed, anti-electoral law, so hugely retrograde, so rashly defiant, awoke a storm in the Chamber. M. de Girardin rushed to the tribune, no one knew for what purpose; but the Royalists were so fearful of an indignant protest from him, that they raised a tumult to prevent him speaking. Even Ravez, the President, aided them. Girardin's object was to question the right of the minister to withdraw a law, like that of M. Decazes, already in the hands of a Parliamentary Committee, to substitute another. From the commencement of the sitting till its close Girardin could not make himself heard, so great was the tumult, so incessant the interpellations, so fierce the choler, and loud the insults on either side. Yet Stanislas de Girardin was one of M. Decazes' prefects, a ministerialist hitherto, and one who, in concert with the Doctrinaires, and almost every man of intelligence, abandoned the new Ministry, and went over to the side of opposition. In the hands of this class, indeed, lay the power of deciding the question between exaggerated Royalism and Constitutionalism. A functionary party, however, hesitated to stand up in direct opposition to the king and his Government, so that the doctrinaire proposals were at first rejected; but when increase of popular excitement awoke fears for the public tranquillity, then men turned round at the last against the

ultra-Royalists, and forced them, as will be seen, to a compromise.

The obnoxious project of law being, as usual, referred to a Commission, the mind of the public, and of the Chamber, became at once seriously excited. Although no individual deputy had what is called the initiative, or could originate either motion or debate, there was one sitting in the week devoted to the consideration of petitions, which, when addressed to the Chamber, were examined by a Commission; and such as were thought worthy of being produced or discussed were submitted to the House. The Committee of Petitions was still free, as yet inspired by the spirit of the popular party about to be crushed. It, therefore, brought before the Chamber a petition from a functionary, M. Madier de Montjau, a Judge of the Royal Court of Nismes. The writer of this petition denounced to the legislature a Directory Committee, consisting of ultra-Royalists, which existed in Paris, and gave as proofs two circulars which had reached Nismes from this committee; the first written immediately after the murder of the Duke de Berri, announcing that the catastrophe could not fail to produce the fall of the favourite Decazes, but that the Royalists of Nismes were to exert themselves as if Decazes was already fallen. He would be torn from the ministerial seat, said the circular, if the King did not consent to banish him. Further orders and funds were promised. During the days which followed this circular Judge Madier denounced, those ultra-Royalist cries and threats were heard throughout the streets of Nismes, which in 1815 had been the signal of the massacre of Liberals and Protestants. But in a few days another circular arrived, ordering calm and quiet instead of agita-

tion. "We have gained a decisive victory in driving out Decazes," said the circular, "and the Ministry now forming may render us important services. Let hostility, therefore, disappear, and calm be restored. Let addresses be got up. It is to be regretted that the Liberals have got the start of us in this respect, and that their addresses are written with infernal cleverness. Let ours be numerous; let every village sign them; and, with the sentiment of grief for the murdered prince, let the demand for vengeance be heard." The petitioner announced that he was ready to state the name of the person who brought these missives to Nismes. The respectable Judge who denounced these intrigues declared that what alone preserved Nismes from a repetition of the disgraceful scenes and murders of 1815 was the military garrisoning the town. Strenuous efforts had been made by the occult party to get this garrison changed, so as to turn over all power in Nismes to the National Guard, which had been so organized as to have fanatic Catholics and Royalists for officers and men. The petitioner himself had, by the advice and the accounts he had forwarded to Paris, hitherto prevented the withdrawal of the garrison. Now he despaired of continued success in this respect, unless the Chamber interfered. Trestaillon and Truphemie, the chiefs and perpetrators of the massacres of 1815, M. Madier denounced as still unpunished; and he demanded their trial before some other court and some other jury than those of Nismes. The denunciation of such facts by a magistrate so highly placed—facts, the truth of which Count St. Aulaire, deputy for the department, corroborated, excited the terror and indignation which may be well supposed; and all eyes were turned on the Count d'Artois,

or upon those who had intrigued in his name to supersede the more mild and constitutional Government which had hitherto prevailed. The ultra-Royalists, however, had no need of conspiracy. The weakness of the King and of the Duke de Richelieu was opening to them the legal and parliamentary path to power. Judge Madier de Montjau was summoned to give up his proofs or authorities. This he refused. The authors of the circular which he denounced were, he declared, also the authors of the famous *Note Secrète* addressed to the sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle, endeavouring to persuade them not to withdraw their troops from France. When the writer of such a note (M. Madier evidently alluded to M. de Vitrolles) was allowed to go unprosecuted and unpunished, he thought it idle to denounce him as the author of the circular to the assassins of Nismes. The affair then ended in Judge Madier being reprimanded for his zeal and for his refusal to complete his denunciations.

It was General Foy whose eloquent voice and original ideas opened the solemn debate on the new law of elections. His vein of argument was, that the ultra-Royalists were frightened by spectres of their own creation, by symptoms of democracy which they had provoked. The extravagance in a revolutionary sense which they denounced had been merely the result of their extravagance in a counter-revolutionary one; and if mad Royalism would subside into what was rational and fair, mad Democracy would do the same. Majorities from popular elections, argued the General, were the produce of contradiction and resistance. Thus, if in peaceable times the chief of a government should conceive the idea of managing parliament by means of a host of functionaries, the electoral

body would reply by excluding all functionaries as deputies interested in voting away the public money, not economizing it or controlling its proper use. If there has been a revolution which has recently destroyed fortunes, disturbed high positions of society, interrupted the use of capital, the electors will not fail to try and set matters right by conservatism in an opposite direction. If, on the contrary, there has been a despotism which has brought the ruin of itself and the degradation of the country by the abuse of arbitrary power, then the elective body will turn naturally to the champions of liberty, as their representatives. If a country has been conquered and invaded, trodden under foot, and ransacked by foreign armies, popular heroes will inevitably be selected from amongst those who have fought those foreigners and invaders. "The present electors of France," said Foy, "are its one hundred thousand proprietors. They may waver from one side to another, as fear or admiration may suggest; but do not imagine them capable of an act of suicide, of anything which would overthrow monarchic government and representative institutions. Such an electoral body cannot be without the true conservative instinct, certain of ever applying an antidote to any poison, and sure to make sound elections prevail the moment that pernicious ones display their tendencies."

It would be difficult to express a larger amount of political wisdom in fewer or more forcible words. And when we consider that these are the ideas and the effusions of a man new to political life, and called unexpectedly from military command to senatorial eloquence, the moderation and justice of the remarks, so superior to the extravagance of either extreme party at the time, and so far in advance

of French political experience at that epoch, fills one with admiration for General Foy.

The orator then entered into a history of the efforts to effect an alteration in the electoral law. The first attempts were made by the late Minister, as soon as he found that the action of that law threatened the duration of his government. He proposed certain changes: they were referred to a Commission, of which he, General Foy, was a member, and Royer Collard the reporter. The Commission, however, admitting that a recent catastrophe and the effervescence of the time rendered it advisable to conciliate the too ardent partizans of monarchy and strong government, still adhered to the opinion that the two fundamental principles of the old electoral law should be maintained, these being direct election and the equal rights of all voters paying 300 francs, the amount fixed for the franchise in the Charter.

The ministry was in the meantime overthrown in the agitation caused by a lamentable catastrophe. The law was withdrawn from the Commission, which had spent two months nearly in considerations and discussion; and all of a sudden, a new project of law, putting the national progress back to the fearful and arbitrary epoch of 1815, was presented by a new Ministry in a spirit of reaction against freedom and in defiance of opinion. M. Lainé, the reporter of the new Commission, showed himself as hostile to the principles of the old electoral law as he had once been zealous in their behalf. Expressing the sentiments of the minority of the second Commission, General Foy denounced the new system of election by the richest proprietors of each province as but the renewal of the old war between the Tiers État and the lords of the

soil, which the Revolution had once settled, and which it would come to settle again, were the popular behest set aside. "Take care," exclaimed he, in conclusion, "how in opposition to the laws of fate itself you place political power elsewhere than in those classes which unite moral influence with material force. To place the throne in France on the sole support of the aristocracy, would be to recommence the Revolution and betray at once the Crown and the people."

M. De La Bourdonnaye, on the part of the ultra-Royalists, made but one objection to the law, which was, that it called the electors who paid 300 francs to have any part in the elections. His party would have deputies chosen exclusively by a few of the most rich, the only portion of the population which should be trusted with choosing representatives of the Commons. It would be idle to waste words on the ravings of insanity. Yet these were the principles, such the avowals, of the party now in the ascendant.

No debate which took place before or since offers so complete a picture of the different parties and the various talent which composed the Chamber. It is curiously characteristic of the people and the epoch, that none of the speeches delivered on this occasion made so deep and universal an impression as that of Royer Collard. Strange that at a time when the manifest tendency of political events went to discredit and set aside the middle party both in parliament and in the nation, that the orator of the middle party should still have commanded a far greater degree of attention, and carried away a far greater meed of applause than the more eloquent denunciations of Foy, or the more shrewd and practical reasonings of

Villèle. But the French in their political education were still very much at the student stage. They loved theory, could pause in admiration of philosophic disquisitions on the nature of government, and were carried away by enthusiasm at the time for the apparent profundity of that which they afterwards came to slight and stigmatize under the name of the *Doctrine*. In fact, whilst much that Royer Collard uttered was marked by sense and eloquence and high views, there was much also of the palpably absurd. Thus, part of the veteran Professor's so much admired oration is an apotheosis of Legitimacy, or in other words, of Divine Right, "as the noblest apanage of the human race, the most profound and fruitful idea of modern society. There was nothing but barbarism until nations came to acknowledge a right, and this first right was the legitimate principle of sovereignty." Yet at the very moment of this aimless and mistaken panegyric a party of retrograde politicians had got hold of this very idea, in the reverence and furtherance of which they were proceeding to stifle public liberties, sacrifice all popular rights, consign the country to ignorance and stagnation, risking the permanent security of the country and the existence of monarchic government itself in their frantic and visionary attempt. To this legitimacy of the monarch Royer Collard opposed or appended the legitimacy of popular right expressed and concentrated in a representative assembly. On the union of these two legitimacies the orator based the Charter. It is with difficulty one comprehends the immense applause and high reputation bestowed upon these ingenious and fantastic theories. That a public actually threatened with being deprived of its liberties could pause to listen to the

philosophic sophist who dissected, rather than defended, their liberties, does certainly rather excite the smile of wonder than of admiration.*

M. Pasquier on the part of the Ministry, proved himself an able champion. He mocked the argument, on which Royer Collard, and indeed all the opponents of the new measure laid such stress, that of its destroying the equality between citizens and between electors, promised by the Charter. "Pretty equality," exclaimed M. Pasquier,

* The following extract from this famous speech of Royer Collard's will give some idea of its tenour.

"The difference between the sovereignty of the people, and the constituted sovereignty of free governments is, that in the first there is nothing but persons and wills, in the other there are rights and interests. Individualities disappear; all rises from the particular to the general; society passes altogether into the government. There, and there only is sovereignty to be found, for there alone its interests have their organs, and its rights their guarantee. Such is our government. The moral unity of society breathes there in the hereditary monarch. The legitimate king is not a person. It is not an institution, but the universal institution in which all others are placed. Two distinct powers concur together with the king to the exercise of sovereignty. This grand fact, never before remarked, this eminent fact dominates deliberation. It attests, that in entering into the government, society has never been considered as homogeneous, nor rights and interests as the same. In the theory of the Charter there is plurality of interests, that is to say, that with interests common to all, there are others not common to all; in other words, there is difference, or inequality, in social conditions. Inequality results from great superiorities of every kind; glory, birth which is but the perpetuation of glory, property or wealth, so far as it is, like glory, a dignity, a force, or an empire exercised over men. What is the Chamber of Peers but inequality sanctioned by law, consolidated, erected into a social power, and so rendered inviolable and immortal? Admirable artifice, by which vanquished privilege has been transferred from society which it oppressed, to the government which it strengthens! Magnificent prerogative! that inequality has not received for its own sake, nor for its defence alone, but for the protection of all society, because inferiorities, having nothing to desire beyond their own maintenance, the power, whence they emanate, becomes the great principle of stability and the guarantee of common preservation."

The perusal of this extract sufficiently explains the meaning of the word *Doctrinaire*.

"which gave the privilege of the franchise to merely 100,000 payers of 300 francs direct taxes!" There was nearly as much inequality in bestowing a privilege upon 100,000, as giving it to 20,000 out of a population of thirty millions.

Villèle pleaded that the franchise was an aptitude, not a right. It was not the fairness of the law, but the wisdom and expediency of the result that was to be looked to. The law in vigour for the last three years favoured towns at the expense of the rural population and interests, represented moveable rather than landed property. Political privileges had always been so distributed as to rest chiefly in sure hands. To bestow it upon any other principle, was the path to anarchy and revolution.

Ternaux, the well-known manufacturer, observed, that the 10,000 privileged payers of the highest taxes did not possess one-fifteenth of even the landed property of the country; that they did not pay one-sixth of even the land tax itself, being one-third of the amount of the entire contributions. The interests and ideas they represented, were not therefore those of a real, but of a supposed class, forming nothing more than a political and Court coterie.

The debate on the measure as a whole being exhausted, the consideration of the successive clauses commenced. It was then that Camille Jordan, although in the last stage of ill health, resolved to unite all the votes he could in favour of an amendment establishing direct election. This amendment simply established direct election of one deputy in each district. At the same time another member proposed that district and departmental colleges should elect candidates for each other to select from. There was a ballot as to which motion should have priority. That of Camille Jordan obtained it by one vote, and that vote was given

by M. Chauvelin, who in a state of great infirmity, caused himself to be carried to the Chamber, an act of devotion which the people of Paris gratefully acknowledged by surrounding his chair as it was carried back and forwards with acclamations. Camille Jordan had been unable, from sinking health, to take part in the previous debate. He reserved all his strength for the introduction of his amendment, in supporting which he denounced the law, "as the most imprudent and most fatal that ever was proposed in the councils of a monarch, since those councils of fatal memory which caused the destruction of the unfortunate House of Stuart. Attached to the principle of legitimacy, full of personal gratitude to the reigning monarch and devotion to the Crown, I consider it a sacred duty to resist a law, which must produce a deplorable divorce between the nation and the august family now at its head." Lainé, courageously, not happily, endeavoured to do away with the impression made by the speech of his former friend. The electoral law, he declared, must be sacrificed to the monarchy, or the monarchy to the electoral law.

M. Pasquier too again raised his voice to implore the Chamber to trust to what was called the aristocracy, that is the great proprietorial class, who were the truest friends and defenders of liberty and popular rights. A murmur of derision from the Left met these assertions, and some voice probably hinted, that the nation had a sample of how chary such gentlemen were of popular rights, by the conduct of the Royalist Chamber of 1815. "It was the Hundred Days and the Bonapartist resurrection," rejoined Pasquier, "that could alone have produced the Chamber of 1815 and its acts." "No," replied General Foy, when he was able to get an opportunity to speak, "the

Chamber of 1815 was not the consequence of the Hundred Days. The Royal Family certainly suffered expulsion at that epoch; but as to the aristocracy, it remained unmolested, whilst the blood of those, who defended the soil, empurpled the battle-field of Belgium. The aristocracy lost nothing, not one of its members suffered even the loss of a hair of his head. And yet it came afterwards to extend between the people and the throne the armed hand of the foreigner; and dyed the sceptre of our Kings in blood. (Here the Royalists broke forth with cries of *Order!*) "I have spoken," continued Foy, "of the excesses of the aristocracy. Ill betide those who recognize themselves as the persons I accuse. I spoke of the spirit of that aristocracy, which overthrew France and scattered mourning through every family—that aristocracy, which showed itself in 1815, which has existed ever since, and still exists—an aristocracy which never rests, and which always conspires."

Amidst such fierce apostrophes and tumultuous scenes the debate proceeded. Camille Jordan's amendment, certain of being rejected, as it did not increase the number of the Chamber, and gave little promise of checking or modifying that majority of the Liberals, of which the yearly progress was the bugbear of the moment, was allowed to drop. And the first clause of the law, establishing the principle of their being two colleges, of district and department, passed on the 3rd of June, by 130 votes against 125.

It was during the debates and votes upon this law, that the Parisians, who had rather welcomed than otherwise the Bourbons in 1814 and 1815, first began to show the discontent which had already grown into aversion, and which under Charles X., was to become execration, by ovations

to Liberals, groans and disapprobation for the Royalist deputies, and an inclination to come to blows and skirmishes with the troops. Whilst the electoral law menaced those possessed with the franchise, holding only in distant and possible prospect the ejection from the Chamber of such men as Foy and Constant, to whose voices the public had been accustomed, the fettering the press by the censorship brought to every person, every morning, the fact of the tyranny exercised over opinion, and the privation of what had become every man's enjoyment. During the last debates, the chair in which M. Chauvelin was carried to and from the Chamber, attracted the attention and applauding acclamations of the crowd. The Liberal journals appeared without any account of the circumstances; the censorship suppressed their articles. The Royalist prints misrepresented and calumniated, under the permission of the same censorship. This rendered the ovation to Chauvelin more marked and enthusiastic. In the midst of these demonstrations outside the Chamber, on the first day of June, a number of police out of uniform, and armed with bludgeons, attacked the crowd, especially those who were loud in favour of Chauvelin. They beat them; and a variety of combats ensued, in which the military or guard took more or less part, always to protect the police, and to arrest the more forward of the public. Chauvelin himself was nearly knocked out of his chair; whilst one of the soldiers of the guard, more animated than his comrades, fired his loaded musket at a young student, named Lallemand, who was merely guilty of having cried, *Vive la Charte!* The Royalist journals announced the following day that the unfortunate student had tried to disarm a soldier. His father wrote to contradict the report; the

censorship prohibited his letter appearing. It was read by Laffitte in the Chamber of Deputies. Both he and Camille Jordan denounced the interference of the police agents disguised, whose premeditated collision with the crowd occasioned the disturbance, and who did not shrink from insulting Liberal deputies. Camille Jordan declared, he had himself seen these agents issue from the neighbouring barracks, and retreat to them. Other members complained of the indignities they had suffered. One bore witness to having seen a carriage containing Constant and Casimir Perrier pursued by a band of forty of these ruffians of the Royalist police, who were loud in expressing their disappointment, and their determination that they should not again escape.

It is painful to think, that this appeal to brute force, and the employment of it in the streets after so many years' cessation of such revolutionary expedients, should have been first made by the King's Government, and at a time when the Home Minister of that Government was Lainé. The students, and that portion of the Parisians who were more interested in petitions and were in the habit of crowding around the Chamber, endeavoured on the 4th to meet the bludgeons of the police, by the old expedient of an émeute and a rising of the fauxbourgs. Indeed, if discontent had been a longer time awakened, had there been organization and foresight, a formidable and successful insurrection would have been the consequence; but the Parisians were unused to such concert or such efforts. Nevertheless a numerous crowd assembled, and marched in procession along the Boulevards to the distant fauxbourgs, with the intention of exciting the people to march upon the Tuileries. The intention was so openly mani-

fested, that the military and police were soon assembled to resist the expected insurrection; and a body of cavalry followed the insurgents to the quarter of St. Antoine. But the insurrection which was to overthrow the Bourbons was not ripe, and whatever ardour or indignation existed at the moment was considerably cooled and put in disarray by a copious shower of rain. The would-be insurgents fled to escape a wetting ran for shelter to arch and portico, and the dragoons coming up charged and dispersed the few who remained collected in the middle of the street.

This reappearance of the old turbulent and well-known tactics of revolution, however in the first instance provoked, was not the less alarming. To the partizans of the Count d'Artois, they seemed but fresh reasons for persisting on repression. But the more moderate men, such as Richelieu and Pasquier, and the more conscientious like De Serre, who admitted the necessity of keeping what they considered the revolutionary party down in Parliament, felt all the evil and inconvenience of awakening it in the country. These Ministers had asked for severe laws, in order to satisfy the Ultras, but they felt great reluctance to execute them. The summoning of the public and the street to take part in the conflicts of the Chamber was repugnant to them; but scarcely less repugnant to them were the means which it seemed unavoidable to employ to resist and put down these democratic movements. Ministers, therefore, became more passionate in their harangues to the Chamber, but more uncertain and wavering in the resolves and the discussions which they held together. And there was not one of them, who would not have escaped from obloquy and

difficulty if he could have done so, not one of the Cabinet who did not envy the situation of Decazes or Dessolles, withdrawn from the strife.

There can be no situation so painful as the moderate and middle course in times of great excitement and passionate extremes. Retired from active duties, strangers to administration, and confining their efforts to the silent vote or dignified attitude of the senator, it may be possible to retain character and influence. But when a De Serres or a Lainé, after having joined in the onward career of a liberal party, feel conscientiously called upon to turn and resist as dangerous that very progress which they aided and invited—when men do this not merely as senators, but as ministers, as the agents and instruments in both cases of political advance and then of Government repression, the attempt becomes as painful as it is powerless The obloquy is too great for even the noblest and the purest character; and the result of all such changes to the men and to the cause is such, that one is compelled to proclaim political consistency and straightforwardness as the first of laws for public life, as of principle for public conduct.

The position of Lainé, De Serre, and Portalis, in resisting the not unprovoked turbulence and clamour of the Liberals within and without the walls of Parliament, was rendered still more painful by the mute reproaches of the King. Although his infirmities prevented the monarch from mingling with his people, still the present effervescence and agitation of the capital could be perceived from his palace windows. The barrack from which the police issued to attack the crowd was in his view, the charges of cavalry, the shouts of the mob, the cries of

"*Vive la Charte!*" substituted for that of "*Vive la Republique!*" could not be concealed from him. The monarch reproached the Minister with having provoked all these symptoms, and brought back the first scenes and commencement of a revolution. During the year of Decazes' administration no such symptoms had appeared. His plans of reforming and amending the electoral law, without destroying its main principle, would have accomplished all that was required in the way of conservation, without awakening the popular mistrust. When the Minister represented to the King the alarming state of the capital, he replied by the observation that he ought to have continued the policy of his friend Decazes. He frequently pointed to the position of the ex-minister, while being in his Cabinet, and exclaimed in the hearing of his present Minister, "What a friend and statesman had I there!"

If upon quitting the Royal closet, and having endured the King's reproaches for the want of moderation, the Ministers encountered in their passage any other of the members of the Royal family who inhabited the château, they were assailed by fears and by reproaches of a different kind. It had been discovered that the poor Duchess of Berri, at the time of her witnessing her husband's melancholy death, was pregnant. The announcement dashed the guilty hopes of those who rejoiced in the crime as the extinction of the elder branch of the Bourbons; and ruffians were found to attempt to complete the previous act of murder by destroying the hope of posthumous offspring. With this aim lighted petards were flung at night under the arches of the Tuileries, beneath those apartments where the Duchess of Berri resided. At the same time the trial of Louvel proceeded before the Court of

Peers. Although it was found impossible to connect his crime with any political party or accomplices, still his revolutionary fanaticism exasperated the terror and the passions of Royalism. It did not appear that Louvel ever read the journals of the day. The same impulse which prompted him to await Louis XVIII.'s landing at Calais in order to sacrifice him, was the same monomania which never ceased to occupy his mind until he slew the Duc de Berri. The one idea possessed him, and overmastered his reason. Louvel seemed incapable of any other. Religion, futurity, his own interest or fate in this world or the next, appeared altogether effaced by the one feeling that inspired him. Louvel died fearlessly, consistently, without bravado of any kind. The vanity which formed so large a portion of Fieschi's nature was not perceivable in Louvel. It is astonishing to find so firm, so prolonged, so daring and criminal a purpose, actuate a man without any high or comprehensible principle or sentiment beneath it. Louvel seemed not to care for liberty, not to be attached to a republic, not to know what was constitutionalism. He conceived France to be disgraced by the conquering feet of the foreigner; and he accused the Bourbons, most unjustly, with this. The stupid pride of wishing to see his country dominant, though for no good or great aim, seemed alone to actuate him. Never was the powerful instrument of an iron will put more completely in the hand of stupidity and ignorance.

The sentiments provoked by such a trial at such a time, combined with the execrable attempts on the life of the Duchess of Berri, excited the Royalists to the extreme of violence. Had the police and the troops been at the time under the control of an authority as moderate as such

men as the Duc de Richelieu and M. de Serre desired to be, these troubles would have been appeased, and an important compromise earlier reached respecting the electoral law; but the barracks of the capital were now filled by the Royal Guards, the *Gardes du Corps*, and other regiments, which partook of the fanaticism of the Royalist party. These, when on duty in the streets, showed neither moderation nor mercy, and were frequently carried away to charge into inoffensive groups, and ride down women and children. Acts of this kind, which could no longer be denounced in the press, were therefore brought forward and attested each day at the commencement of the sitting of the Chamber; and the introduction of such topics threw the Assembly into the same scene of confusion and collision which prevailed in the streets.

The Duke of Richelieu, alarmed by a state of things which seemed the prelude to civil war, and stung by the reproaches of the King, at length engaged his colleagues to try some kind of a compromise on the subject of the electoral law. M. de Serre, who had been absent when the Cabinet had so largely altered the spirit of the law, who had adhered to this change since, indeed, but who evidently entertained doubts, if not of its wisdom, at least of the expediency of passing it, against a public resistance so animated and so menacing, as well as against the avowed opinion of the Sovereign, took an opportunity of declaring that the Ministry were not irrevocably bound to the project as presented. No one, however, he complained, made any intermediate proposition. A deputy, M. Courvoisier, had attempted this by an amendment, admitting the existence of the two colleges, those of district and of department, each electing their candidate independent of the other.

When first proposed, this motion had met with no favour from either side; but now reproduced, Ministers grasped at it as a compromise, and all the members, who were anxious for peace, welcomed it, as satisfying the popular demand, with the preservation of direct election, and Royalist exigencies by the addition of 179 members, to be elected by the most wealthy and most aristocratic, not out of any list, but of their own choosing. Strange to say, one of the most important conditions or consequences of this amendment struck at first neither its mover nor its seconder; and the discussion was drawing to a close, when some one asked whether those highest tax-payers, who constituted the departmental college, might first vote for the district deputy, and then a second time for the deputy of the department. M. Courvoisier, the originator of the amendment, declared that such was not his meaning. Ministers declared that they had considered this to form part of the proposition; it, indeed, offered the only chance of its being supported by any of the Royalists. The amendment, withdrawn by Courvoisier, was taken up and re-proposed by a member of the Centre; and the functionary party evidently rallied to it, as a return to the ideas of Decazes, and as the best compromise which could be effected. It was still denounced by the Liberals of the Left, and with equal vehemence by the Ultras of the Right. It passed, however, by 135 votes against 66, which shows that even the Doctrinaires and all the moderates of the Chamber accepted it. The remaining clauses of the project, or the vote of the whole of it, presented no difficulties, at least within the Chamber. It soon became law, and was known as that of the *Double Vote*.

CHAPTER II.

DISCONTENT OF THE MILITARY—PLOTS—BIRTH OF THE DUC DE BOURDEAUX—VILLÈLE AND CHATEAUBRIAND—DE CORBIÈRE—RICHELIEU OFFERS PLACE TO VILLÈLE—POLICY OF ALEXANDER—INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERVENTION—INSURRECTION OF SPAIN AND NAPLES—DEFECTS OF THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION—BREACH BETWEEN RICHELIEU AND THE ROYALISTS—QUESTION OF EDUCATION—DEATH OF NAPOLEON.

One of the important truths established by the history of the Bourbon restoration is the utter powerlessness of secret conspiracy in modern times and civilized countries, and the irresistible force of public opinion, left to itself to find the ways, instruments, and opportunities of working its will upon those who daringly defy or imprudently reject it. One of the effects of the subversion of the electoral equality granted by Decazes, was to convince the more extreme Liberals of the Chambers of the inutility of parliamentary effort in opposition, and the expediency as well as duty of continuing resistance to the Government of the Bourbons by schemes for their forcible overthrow. When ultra-Liberal politicians arrived at this ill-judged but too natural conclusion, they found themselves provided with ample means and abundant instruments for carrying it into execution. The army, with the exception of the privileged corps in Paris, contained numbers, of officers and sub-

officers at least, who were strongly disaffected. Much of this was the result of natural causes, want of consideration, of promotion, of hope. Gouvion St. Cyr and Decazes had striven to remove or diminish this discontent, and give the old officers a fair share with the new in such advantages as peace admitted; but this system had been discontinued and broken up. Paris was thronged with officers, vegetating on half-pay, and now witnesses of how the most liberal and respected members of the army and the Chambers were outraged by the Royal Guard and other regiments of the Court. Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio, was one of those who had been exposed to their insults. The feeling and position of officers and soldiers tempted them to conspire, when a Government had shown itself inimical to both. When the same Government was execrated by every citizen, denounced by every print, stigmatized as treacherous to all liberty in the country, when the griefs of the civilian were thus added to the resentment of the soldiers, mutiny and conspiracy became self-suggested. Thus, the troubles, collisions, and cruelties, witnessed in the streets of Paris during the debates on the law of election, inspired several officers with the idea of a military conspiracy, which, should it succeed, was certain of the approbation and adhesion of the public.

The closing of the army as a profession, especially to those of Imperial leanings or connections,—officers suspected of which were mercilessly set aside by the Minister of War, Latour Maubourg,—drove these men to seek their livelihood in other callings. Whilst the Dukes and Marshals vested the fruits of their economy in mines, forges, or manufactories, in which, by-the-by, they were rarely successful and generally bankrupt, officers with

lesser capital and grades opened such establishments as bazaars. One of these, in the Rue Cadet, became the resort more of conspirators than purchasers. Military insurrection was soon planned there; and the scheme was communicated to Lafayette.

This veteran of the Revolution had joined in the formation of a kind of committee, consisting of Voyer d'Argenson, Kœchlin, Manuel, Dupont de l'Eure, Merilhou, Corcelles, Beausejour, Rey, and Tarayre. They formed the first council of insurrection, which afterwards became absorbed in the larger and more popular association of the Carbonari. Their early efforts went to affiliate students and civilians in their plot, so as not to leave it to the execution of military agents alone. The soldiers knew no rallying cry, save that of Napoleon II. But civilians who were driven to the extremity of conspiring, by the prospect of such a prince as the Count d'Artois ascending the throne, felt that the truly liberal cause might not be improved by the substitution of the son of Napoleon. If the Count d'Artois resembled the English James II., when Duke of York, France possessed a Prince of Orange in the Duke of Orleans. And if the latter wanted the high and heroic qualities of him who delivered England from the Stuarts, he had recommendations which William had not. He was a Bourbon and a Frenchman, unbound by foreign sovereignty or foreign politics. Manuel was from the first an avowed Orleanist; and if such men as Dupont, or Lafayette preferred a republic, it was with no fanatical or unbending obstinacy. The name of the Duke of Orleans was, however, employed without his sanction; and the few thousand pounds, which the Directing Committee disposed of in these years, was the fruit of private

subscription, and not of any princely convention. Europe was then rife with plots and insurrections. That of Spain, which had commenced in a mutiny at Cadiz, had terminated in a revolution at Madrid. An imitation of the movement had met with equal success in the kingdom of Naples. Could not the French assert their liberties as well as Spaniards or Italians? Accordingly a crude conspiracy was concocted, to break out simultaneously in the distant garrisons and in the capital. The fortress of Vincennes was to be closed and seized, the Faubourg St. Antoine occupied and fortified. Several legions were in the conspiracy. Marmont first discovered the plot, warned the Government of it, and proposed to arrest the chiefs. Some of the Ministers recommended that the insurrection should be allowed to break forth, and then signally repressed; but Marmont's idea of prevention was seconded by the Duke of Richelieu as more humane. The chief officers of the conspiracy were arrested, and the peace of the capital preserved, without any startling explosion, or, indeed, any patent symptom of a dangerous conspiracy.

Soon after the failure of this plot, fortune seemed to make amends to the Bourbon family for its recent bereavement by the posthumous birth of a son to the unfortunate Duke of Berri. The prince was born on the 29th of September, 1820, and was hailed with the greatest enthusiasm and exultation by the Royalists, as well as the Royal family. He received the title of the Duke of Bourdeaux; and the great cities of the kingdom, which, not many years previous, had presented a magnificent cradle to the King of Rome, paid the same tribute in 1820 to the future heir of the Bourbons. This same cradle may still be seen in the remote corner of a deserted palace, and

certainly, as an exemplification of the perishability of political hopes and sovereign grandeur, in these days, few objects can be found so striking or so suggestive.

Ministers took advantage of the moment of Royalist exultation, consequent on the birth of the Duke of Bourdeaux, to issue the proclamation for the elections. These were to consist of the 172 new country members, to be elected by the college of departments, besides the one-fifth of the members for districts—making in all 224 new members. The list of the deputies returned by the departments seemed more to befit a House of Peers than a Chamber of Deputies. It is a perfect galaxy of noblesse and territorial titles. More than one-third of those newly elected had been members of the *Chambre Introuvable* of 1815, since so fortunately set aside. The district elections were, from the evident ascendancy of the Royalist party, for the future very much of the same colour. The immediate result of the election was the admission of MM. De Villèle and Corbière to the Cabinet, as well as M. Lainé.

It is very remarkable how enthusiastic and sentimental, and consequently extravagant, parties (especially of ultra-Royalist or Tory principles), are apt to fall under the lead of men totally devoid of either sentiment or enthusiasm; who adopt the prevailing cry and colour of the party from some frigid process of reasoning peculiar to themselves; and who, preserving their coolness and sagacity in the midst of the general blindness and fury of those around them, command by these means an involuntary kind of respect. Becoming at first the men of business of the party, having its experience, directing its manœuvres, and doing its arithmetic, they contrive at last to outstrip those who,

with far more of eloquence and genius, pretended to the lead; and finally, setting aside such competitors, end by acquiring undisputed ascendancy over their party. Some maintain the opinion, that persevering dulness and cunning mediocrity will always, in Constitutional and Parliamentary Governments, have the advantage over more brilliant qualities. When, under the reign of Napoleon, Villemain, struck by the power and wisdom of English senators in debate (he alone of French men of letters having the liberty of perusing their speeches, in order that he might draw up a summary for the Emperor), confessed to the Grand Master of the University, Fontanes, that it was a proud and a noble system of Government to live under: "Take care," observed Fontanes, in reply, "under such a master as the Emperor, talents like yours are sure to be in the foremost rank, and be nobly rewarded; but introduce a constitutional government, and men of genius, like you, will be immediately outstripped by plodders, like Bedoch, or intriguers, like ——." Although by no means agreeing with the interested theory of Fontanes, one must admit that mediocrity will often outstrip genius in public affairs, nay, even in the public and political estimation of a free people. English examples abound, from Bolingbroke and Oxford to Canning and Castlereagh. France, at the epoch we write of offers a notable example in Chateaubriand and Villèle.

Chateaubriand, with his pen the most eloquent man of his age, and in addressing Parliament scarcely less so, was as enthusiastic for the creed of royalty as the greatest zealot could require; and yet he desired, at least at first, to wed the monarchical principles to those of popular liberty. Nothing could be more wise or more true than

his political views and recommendations in 1814 and 1815; but both Talleyrand and Louis XVIII. took an insufferable dislike to a man whose intellectual superiority was offensive to both. Decazes imbibed their dislike; and Chateaubriand was flung back upon the ultra-Royalists, and compelled to share their extravagance with their opposition. Whilst Chateaubriand came, with all the brilliancy of his literary reputation, and the eloquence of his pen, to the support of the Bourbons in Paris and at Ghent, and whilst his very reputation and pretensions excluded him from office, Villèle was obscurely, humbly, but sedulously, making his way. He spoke upon all questions with sense, made himself master of difficult ones, and is one of the few examples of a man becoming expert at finance, and able to discuss the details of administration, before he had been able to force his way into office. Whilst Chateaubriand, with the prevalent improvidence of genius, thought that he could stand alone, and neither form a party nor join one, trusting to the mere force of his solitary genius, Villèle saw, from the first, how much a cipher was the cleverest politician, without a party around or behind him. He, therefore, joined the ultra-Royalists, and without ostensibly or at first assuming the lead, he acquired it by degrees and without effort, all the difficult tasks of opposition falling to him. Not only was Villèle conscious that he had need of the following of a party to be anything, but he deemed one mind or man not enough to pursue and accomplish the ambitious aims of personal ascendancy. He, therefore, associated with himself a friend, an *alterum me*, a politician similar to himself in mediocrity, in perseverance, and in cunning. This was M. de Corbière.

So much having been said of Villèle, it may be added that he was by no means the representative of any noble or time-honoured family, which had signalised itself or him in emigration, or in the councils of Royalism. He was cast young upon the island of Bourbon to seek his fortune, and he at once found it in the service of a wealthy planter, whose estate he managed, and whose daughter he afterwards married. Returning to France with an honourable independence, he purchased an estate near his native city of Toulouse, became one of the most active country gentlemen of the district, and mayor of the town. In this capacity he was able to render service to the Bourbons; but it did not enable or excite him to prevent the murder of Ramel. In the earliest epoch of the Restoration, Villèle published a pamphlet containing his objections to the Charter, and to Constitutional Government altogether. He, at the same time, sympathised with those who thought a modification of the old Constitution, and a resuscitation of the States of the three orders, the fittest system for France. Being returned deputy for Toulouse, his life of business, of mercantile and colonial experience, served him; and he soon took a lead in the Royalist party, not by paying court to the Count d'Artois, so much as by distinguishing himself in committees and debates, as an indefatigable, clever, experienced politician, always stopping short of extravagance, never indulging in flights of imagination, and employing, as an orator, the sober prose and cold logic of the party, of which he left the brilliant apostrophes and poetic flights to Chateaubriand.

The colleague whom Villèle honoured with all his confidence, M. de Corbière, had, one should have thought, not

one quality which would have led to his adoption of the cause of aristocracy, except the calculation that small talents would go further in such a party, and that it was likely to be the successful one. Corbière was a Breton lawyer, simple and rude, like the race, in manner, style, and taste. He might, indeed, have voted in the Convention, and even in the Committee of Public Safety, with Robespierre, so simple were his habits, limited his intelligence, so worshipful was he of authority in those who held it, and merciless in wielding it himself. Corbière worshipped Royalty in fact just as Roland did the Republic. In his office, as Minister of the Interior, he played the despot, and would no doubt in a Reign of Terror have been a Terrorist. Devotion to reigning ideas, and obstinacy in following them out, would under both systems have rendered him useful. Villèle's friendship made Corbière Home Minister. When he placed his cotton pocket-handkerchief and snuff-box on the council-table before him, and placed his elbows on either side of them, Louis XVIII. was as astonished and as shocked as Louis XVI. was at Roland's shoe-strings. But as Corbière was not only the *fides Achates* of Villèle, but a disciple of the prevailing party, Louis XVIII. bowed to this double merit. One of the noblest and most respected philanthropists in France, the Duc de la Rochefoucault Liancourt, criticised the Home Minister's management of the prisons, by transferring their control to his subordinates, and discountenancing country gentlemen and philanthropists for interfering. Corbière retorted angrily by depriving the Duke of half a score of gratuitous places, which he filled from benevolence and with the most intelligent philanthropy. But such a Minister as Corbière detested every member

of the aristocracy who possessed intelligence, influence, and independence.

When the Duke of Richelieu was commencing the elections, and giving the Royalists full rein in the management of them, these being the presidents of the colleges, the writers of his circulars, the chief managers in short, the King asked the Duke "how he proposed to escape being carried away by the torrent of a party which he thus swelled?" The Duke of Richelieu replied, that he had the Count d'Artois' word, and entertained full confidence in his own independent position. The monarch said no more. When the elections were over, and had terminated in the return of Royalist deputies with few exceptions, it became evident, that so strong a party giving support to the Administration must have members in the Cabinet. The Duke of Richelieu showed how he measured and appreciated Villèle and Corbière, by offering the first the management of the Indirect Taxes, and to Corbière the Ministry of Public Instruction, with seats in the Cabinet. Villèle immediately declined, M. de Richelieu not sufficiently appreciating his importance; but he accepted for his friend Corbière, who, being one of the most ignorant and meanest-minded of men, was installed in that chair of educational administration, which Fontanes and Royer Collard had successively occupied. The mere act evinced how little the Duke of Richelieu knew of the duties or prospects of domestic administration.

In fact, the year of the second Ministry of the Duke of Richelieu was, like its Parliamentary Session,—that of 1820–21,—completely barren and null. It produced no measures or decisions of any importance. The Prime Minister had no system, no political views, save of those

existing, and holding power for the day. When M. Decazes and the King directed the Administration, they took thought, and devised measures for maintaining a middle position between contending and extreme parties. The Duke of Richelieu could now do no more than allow Government to drift to the Royalists. Indeed, this seemed to be the desire of Lainé and of Pasquier, as of course it was of Villèle and Corbière. The former, therefore, folded their arms in acquiescence; whilst the latter, assuming an attitude of honouring the Ministry by their presence, without being responsible for its timid and neutral policy, merely besought its friends to spare the Cabinet for the time, in gratitude for the services which it had just rendered.

The first business of the session, the Royal speech being of signal nullity, was the usual demand of provisional or supplementary credit. A new ultra-Royalist champion, General Donnadieu, memorable for his blind zeal and bloody executions at Grenoble, rushed to the tribune the first time it was open to him, to denounce the Duke of Richelieu, as a minister quite as objectionable as Decazes, and Messrs. Villèle and Corbière for giving their adherence to him. The Duke of Richelieu, as Prime Minister, had introduced the famous law of direct election, and thus fostered the growth of the Liberal party. To allow him to hold office, wield patronage, whilst the ultra-Royalist Generals and partizans, whom he had set aside, like General Donnadieu himself, were in a kind of disgrace, were treason not to be comprehended or pardoned. No sooner had Donnadieu poured forth his ultra-Royalist denunciation, than a new liberal deputy, Etienne, as distinguished for his wit as Donnadieu for his fanatic stupidity, uttered similar reproaches against the men who had abetted Decazes

in giving direct election, accomplishing the destruction of it merely to serve the interests and secure the majority for the ultra-Royalists. Villèle rose in answer to both; but it was rather as the patron and the excuser of M. de Richelieu, than as his champion or his colleague. Villèle said, he had made war against things not against persons; and provided he obtained the guarantee that true monarchic principles required, he cared not for the men, or rather he was grateful to those, whoever they were, who were instrumental in procuring so great a good to the country.

If the Government, which enjoyed exclusively the initiative, or the power of making motions and introducing laws into the Chamber, brought forward at present nothing but insignificant propositions, it was not merely owing to the circumstance of the Ministry being of no party itself, and one evidently of transition; but it was also due to the circumstance, that all Europe was at the time occupied less by questions of internal regulations and laws, than by the revolutions which had broken out in the south of Europe, and which had already given rise to a dangerous spirit of excitement and imitation in the north. It so happened that the kings against whom their armies had mutinied and their people risen were both Bourbons, both linked by similarity of circumstances and family ties to Louis XVIII., their power forming the complement of Bourbon policy and influence for which Talleyrand had laboured at Vienna.

It was imperative upon the French Court and Government to assume a position and fix upon a policy to be followed, with respect to these new revolutionary constitutions and authorities beyond its frontier, and as the great Powers of Europe were neither fully agreed, nor altogether united, it became an important question for French poli-

ticians. The most conservative Court ever since 1815 was that of Vienna: its Minister, Prince Metternich, from the first mistrusted the Emperor Alexander's fancy for constitutions and for satisfying popular desires. The Prussian Court and Prince Hardenberg were in the same sentiment; whilst Alexander, not formally opposing, but bent on thwarting both, reproached these German statesmen as illiberal, accused them of producing the discontent and disaffection they complained of, and did his utmost to obstruct what was Metternich's grand idea, the establishment of a German Confederation, with a strong central power to enforce submission from the people of the several states, as well as to organize military means of defence. The Russian Emperor, who desired to see Germany permanently divided into three empires, those of Austria, of Prussia, and of the Lesser States, instead of forming one, made use of Wurtemberg, and other small powers attached to St. Petersburgh, to oppose the plan of Metternich. And the Czar invoked popular rights in Germany, as he did in the Ionian Islands, for the purpose of thwarting and criticising what he did not shrink from stigmatizing as the tyrannical government of those countries.

Even when the revolutionary outburst took place in the south, what the Czar aimed at was less to put down these military insurrections than to form a league of all European countries, over which Russia should preside, just as Austria did over the federation of German Courts. It was the same to Alexander that a country was near to him, or remote from him. The love of domineering or dictating was even greater with regard to the remote country, for this marked his power. Thus some of the statesmen of Portugal and Brazil, not content with English councils or aid,

had recourse to Russia, and pleaded that in 1814 and 1815 an alliance had been formed between all European states, which obliged the different Governments to aid and guarantee each other's inviolability and existence. This doctrine of the Portuguese diplomatists pleased Alexander vastly. He replied that such had been always his idea; and in truth it was the idea of the treaty of the Holy Alliance. He said that he had proposed this system of mutual and reciprocal aid and guarantee; but that England was decidedly averse to it, and even France far from consonant.

Here then sprang up what has ever since proved the principal source of division in general on European politics between different governments; some, with Russia at their head, claiming a right of intervention in all cases to put down popular disturbance and military insurrection, or dynastic changes; the other, in which England stood alone, denying and deprecating both the right and the expediency of foreign intervention, as incompatible with the independence and progress of European countries. To be sure, it was to English Tories, to whom fell the duty of protesting against the righ of uni versal intervention, especially when exercised by a Holy Alliance of sovereigns; and they in resisting it pleaded the impossibility of getting their Parliament to agree to or tolerate such a principle. And thus the despotic Courts, becoming accustomed to what they could not but consider the insincere protest of England, began to make small account of English advice or remonstrance in their acts of repression. Alexander, however, denied that it was his purpose to intervene always for illiberal purposes. He still abetted the granting of constitutions by princes, though he set his face, and was ready to march his armies,

against any change or constitution which a froward people or mutinous army should obtain by violence. Even these liberal leanings or pretences ceased to influence Russian policy or inspire Russian arrangements, when Alexander perceived that the representative assembly of Poland strongly partook of that spirit of opposition and extreme liberalism which then stirred the south. The Poles, in fact, rejected all the proposals of Alexander's Ministers for improvement or reform; and the Emperor was obliged to dismiss the obstinate and froward Polish deputies with reproaches. When to such symptoms were added the graver one of disaffection and mutiny in one of his regiments of Guards, the entire fabric of liberal and constitutional policy built up in Alexander's imagination tottered and at last fell, giving way to the rude necessities and the angry wilfulness of despotism.

Under such auspices were held the Congresses of Troppau and Laybach.

It must ever be a subject of the greatest regret, that the constitution formed by the Spaniards themselves, and adopted by the northern Italians, should have been of that decidedly democratic character which admitted of monarch only in name. The circumstance of the captivity of the king and prince, the nullity of their noblesse, and the knowledge how effectual the pure French democracy had proved in defending its country, had suggested the constitution of Cadiz. It is to be regretted, that some English general or envoy had not the influence and address to induce the Spaniards to adopt an organization more in accordance with the constitutional monarchies as they existed. The Spanish Liberals might thus have had the support of England and of France; and King Ferdinand

would not have had the pretext for setting aside constitutional government altogether. At the great epoch, when the duty of defending the national independence devolved upon the Spanish people, the nobility brought neither influence nor exertion, neither capacity nor even zeal. The pre-eminence which they claimed in name they could not support in reality; and they were set aside by the middle and professional class, which conducted the war of independence at the head of the peasantry. If the Spanish aristocracy failed to maintain its ground, it was not so with the Spanish Church, of which the democratic parties, the monks, showed themselves zealous champions and able officers. But their ideas and education, far from leading them to harmonize with or revere the supremacy of the citizens in Junta or in Cortes, made them on the contrary erect a standard of their own, which was anything save that of civil liberty. Out of such strange and incongruous elements it was difficult to say what kind of a constitutional edifice could be built; and if Louis XVIII. had a difficult task, Ferdinand, as a constitutional king, would have had a more impracticable one.

Had Ferdinand, as despot, shown the commonest prudence, a revolution against him would have been impossible. The noblesse, such as they were, annihilated during the popular struggle, of course clung to the throne. The Church too adhered to him, menaced as it was by the civic party, which could not leave all the privileges and even the soul of the country monopolized by an ignorant priesthood. The officers of the army, had gratitude and attention been shown them by the Crown, would have remained faithful to it; and the middle classes must have been thus kept in order. But the monarch was as ignorant and as

frantic in his absolutism as the *Exaltados* were in their democracy.

The turbulence of Spain causing similar effervescence in Portugal, and affecting the independence and fate of the European colonies in South America, strongly interested both England and France. But when the Spanish revolution led to a similar movement in Italy, the Austrian government began to fear lest the conflagration should reach its own dominions. There was this peculiarity in the Neapolitan revolution, that it was the result almost altogether of the secret societies, called Carbonari. Wherever indeed a middle class has outgrown in numbers, wealth, and intellect, that system of tyranny which sovereigns and priesthoods are so inclined to think eternal, they naturally form secret societies. The inquisition which crushed them in Spain, was crushed by them in the Low Countries. In France and Germany the societies survived as Freemasons. In Italy they flourished under the mysterious name of Carbonari. The dominant idea there was to liberate the country from the oppression of foreigners. Opposed to the French yoke, whilst it weighed upon the country, it was afterwards turned against Austrian domination. As the secret societies of the Carbonari existed during Murat's reign, Ferdinand and his Court from Sicily encouraged them in their frowardness and their plan of secret rebellion. The return of Ferdinand and of the Bourbons was welcomed by them at first; and, in return, the King tolerated and patronized the organized body of the Carbonari: nay, when the police of his kingdom were unable to cope with the numerous bands of brigands which infested it, Ferdinand's government could do no better than appeal to the armed citizens of the kingdom, not formed into national guards,

but in Carbonari *ventas*, to march against and to exterminate the brigands.

It was impossible for the middle and professional classes not to entertain a contempt for such a government, however mild, lazy, and *lazzarône* it might be. A Carbonari *venta* denounced it, as worthy to share the fate of the government of Ferdinand of Spain; and in obedience to this sentence a cornet and a subaltern officer, Minichini and Morelli, hoisted the standard of revolt at Nola. The soldiers were of the same mind as was the general commanding the province, Pépe. This officer soon entered Naples at the head of his troops. As there was no one to defend or advise the King, so there were none whose counsel would be listened to by the insurgents. The English envoy living at the court of Naples considered the government of Ferdinand not only paternal but liberal. He marvelled how any people could be discontented with it.* He was not a man likely to exercise any wholesome influence; and indeed the English government, which had allowed the Sicilian constitution, its own gift, to be extinguished by the King, was no patron for the Neapolitan to

* "So paternal and liberal a government was never known before in these kingdoms," writes Sir William A'Court from Naples, July 5th; "with more severity and more distrust, a different result might have been obtained; but it was fated that an excess of liberality here should lead exactly to the same end as an excess of an opposite nature in Spain. The spirit of sectarism, and the unheard-of defection of an army well paid and clothed, and wanting for nothing, has caused the ruin of a government popular (notwithstanding the late events) with the great mass of the people, and which will hereafter be long and deeply regretted; and it is not unworthy of remark, that these sects owe their origin to the very government they have now so much contributed to overthrow. They were sanctioned and encouraged as an engine the most likely to sap the power of the French, then in possession of the country. The scheme took root more deeply than its inventors intended; who have lived to reap the bitter fruits of their short-lived policy."—'*Castlereagh Correspondence.*'

look for. Had the English government insisted on the maintenance of the Sicilian constitution, and made it the condition of restoring the King, the Neapolitan might have adopted, and England would have have had an attached country and a kindred constitution in South Italy. But Austria would not tolerate such an arrangement. Metternich had insisted, that the King on his restoration should grant no institutions to the Neapolitans which would contrast with its own despotism in Lombardy. The English Tories, who worshipped Metternich, feared to contradict him; and thus was lost the noblest of opportunities and the most legitimate of causes, for introducing a moderately liberal government into Italy.

The successful insurgents of Naples knew nothing better than to proclaim the Spanish constitution of 1812; a form of government which, leaving the monarch nothing but a bare veto, can never be consented or sworn to by a sovereign, unless in durance and hypocrisy. Nothing could have happened so unfortunate for Europe at the time than this reappearance of complete democracy, assuming the garb of constitutional monarchy. This latter system of government counted many friends even amongst the aristocratic classes. The English and French had grown, the one glorious, the other tranquil under it. Russia had strong leanings to it; the treaties organizing Germany sanctioned it; and the Prussian monarch would have been brought to introduce the representative element into his government, if Spain had not recommended the absurd experiment of the French Constituent Assembly, that of the placing a monarch at the head of a pure democracy, and expecting him to be either sincere, adroit, or successful in such a position. The result was to make Russia the anta-

gonist of all constitutions, to terrify Prussia from entertaining the idea, to paralyze England, from the timidity of its Tory councillors, and the equally powerless ill humour of Mr. Canning. It became also one of the main causes of strengthening and accelerating that reaction in France which the murder of the Duc de Berri had commenced, and to which the ministers of the Duc de Richelieu's Cabinet, with the Chambers their electoral law had brought upon them, could no longer offer any effectual resistance.

Whatever were the wrongs or imprudence of the Neapolitans in their revolution, and in the constitution they had adopted, the attitude assumed towards them by the Sovereigns assembled at Laybach was monstrous and revolting. They began by announcing their intention not to treat or have any intercourse with such revolutionists, and they summoned the King to attend the Court or Congress at Laybach. This was a mere trick, a preliminary, to get the King into their camp, whilst an Austrian army marched to put down not merely revolution, but all liberty. This, as we before observed, was not the Russian idea, even yet. "Why," asked a Russian state paper of that time, "did not the Spanish and Neapolitan Governments give institutions capable of insuring the tranquillity of their subjects?"* Count Capo D'Istrias as well as the Chevalier Ansted were at that time Russian diplomatists, who abetted liberal opinions and constitutional government, in opposition to Counts Nesselrode and Metternich, who were for decided absolutism and repression. Capo d'Istrias was, no doubt, led to take this liberal policy by the insurrection in Greece then arising, and for which he hoped to win Alexander's

* Castlereagh Correspondence, Third Series, vol. iv. p. 321

favour, in lieu of his enmity. Pozzo di Borgo wavered between. At first liberal, he no sooner saw the imperial mind gradually coming to point to absolutism, than he anticipated the move in that direction and took the side of despotism.

Although the English ministry refused to join the Holy Alliance of Alexander's suggestion, they were not opposed to Austria's putting down the revolution at Naples by an armed force. This concession, made by Lord Liverpool's Cabinet, sadly weakened the protest which Canning made subsequently to the French intervention in Spain. But it was the idea of the English Cabinet, that Austria ought to have done this of itself, *proprio motu*, instead of making itself the herald and instrument of an European league. "Metternich," said Lord Castlereagh, "has essentially weakened his position by making it an European instead of an Austrian question. He might have had the same European countenance upon a much more intelligible case of interference. He would have carried public opinion (especially in this country) much more with him, had he stood simply upon the offensive character of a Carbonari government to every Italian state, than embarking himself on the boundless ocean on which he has preferred to sail. In placing his effort boldly on its strong Austrian grounds, Russia and Prussia might have infused the general interest into their declaration of adherence, without debating the main question to their own remote interest. But our friend Metternich, with all his merit, prefers a complicated negotiation to a bold and rapid stroke."

The Duc de Richelieu behaved as well as so weak a Ministry could do, in the complication. Whilst the

* Castlereagh Correspondence, Third Series, vol. iv. p. 341.

Count de Blacas, the king's ambassador at Naples, who necessarily repaired to Troppau and Laybach, supported those absolutist opinions of which he was the champion; the Duc de Richelieu sent the Count de Caraman with more precise instructions, to hold a middle course between Russian persistence or intervention and English obstinacy. The new Paris Ministry naturally feared that the principle of intervention, once established with respect to Naples, would then be applied to Spain, and would produce the greatest embarrassment in Paris. It was to be regretted, that whilst the language of the British minister or agent at Congress was all that could be desired, the line of argument taken in the debates of the English Parliament, openly in favour of Russian and Austrian pretensions, and in contradiction to the diplomatic language of England, together with the apparent success of their argument on the British Parliament, completely neutralized and did away with all the good of the written protests of Lord Castlereagh. The apparent liberalism of the British Cabinet, and its protest against the principle of intervention, were thus set down as mere hypocrisy.

These events, with the attitude of the different Courts, —the constitutional governments idly protesting or silently acquiescing, whilst Austria marched to the extinction of the Neapolitan,—stirred up France and its Chamber. Moreover, among the French, it was no very large number of them who took any interest in the struggles for internal liberty; the suspension of the freedom of the press galled the townsfolk, but there were millions who did not feel the privation. The franchise or the laws of arrest, as interpreted or nullified by the Royalists, might raise the indignation of those informed in political matters; but the

multitude took small interest in such topics. When, however, revolution burst forth in countries adjoining France, in countries once conquered and occupied by the French, once ruled by imperialist dynasties, and when thus the old antagonism of absolutism and democracy was seen in action, with all the stirring events and circumstances of the old French revolution, then the minds of all classes, from the legislator to the peasant, were stirred by such struggles and catastrophes. The cause of popular democracy promised again to be triumphant. The Bourbon family, who seemed everywhere to head the retrograde system in revolutionized countries, were again threatened with expulsion or extinction; and of course there arose rash hopes and exultation in Liberal circles, fear and indignation in those of the Royalists; thus anything like parliamentary discussion became impossible.

No law or business of importance being brought before the Chamber, and no deputy having the power to make a motion, which on any subject might have produced a regular debate, and vented all the passion and accusation arising out of it, opportunities were seized daily, either of petition or strong words of Ministers to apostrophize or provoke them. The circumstance of their obtaining a majority by the recent changes of the elective law, instead of rendering the triumphant Royalists forbearant, on the contrary gave reins to their insolence; and the Liberals could scarcely open their mouths, either in approval of the foreign Liberals, or in allusion to the Revolution and the Empire, without being called to order and denounced as criminals, for uttering sentiments, in which nevertheless the whole body of the French people joined and sympathized. One is sorry to observe in these debates, that the utmost violence

of speech and arrogance of manner, not only marked the language of La Bourdonnaye and Donnadieu, but were almost equally remarkable in the mouths of Pasquier and De Serre, those Ministers who three years before were as vehement in the very opposite sense. To the credit of the Doctrinaires it may be observed, that they remained silent spectators of the violence on either side of them. Camille Jordain had disappeared, borne to an early yet not untimely grave, at an epoch when great intellectual superiority, joined with moderation, had become useless, and no longer commanded attention.

There was another subject, in addition to that of Spanish and Italian revolution, which also interested the whole French nation—this was the purification of the army. Gouvion St. Cyr, the colleague of Decazes, had formed what was considered a democratic or imperialist army; one-third of its officers raised from the ranks, and the grade undisturbed unless by court-martial. Moreover, St. Cyr had set aside ultra-Royalist zealots, such as General Donnadieu, and he restored the Bonapartist officers to the army. Latour Maubourg, in his subsequent administration of the War Office, laboured in a precisely contrary direction. In changing the departmental legion into Royalist regiments, he had the reappointment of officers; and he took advantage of this to get rid of either Liberals or those who were Imperialists, substituting for them, as far as he was able, Royalists and Body-guards of the king. As the army in Spain and Italy had been the spring of revolution, it was determined to obviate the possibility of such an event in France, and Latour Maubourg energetically proceeded to render Royalism predominant in the army.

This reaction in the army gave increased vehemence to military orators in the Chamber; the Imperialist speakers almost using the language of challenge, while the Royalist officers were not slow to answer. On one occasion, General Foy called the tricolor cockade glorious. Neither M. Dudon, nor M. Castellabajac, nor even M. de Marcellus could bear such an innocent and simple truism. The latter said, the tricolor had accompanied Louis XVI. to the scaffold. Manuel replied that the white cockade had presided over the massacres of St. Bartholomew ages since, and those of Nismes in the present day. The ultra-Royalists had proceeded so far, that they could not tolerate the simple expressions and natural incidents of debate. A President of any firmness of character might have taught both sides the folly of such absurd impatience. But the most difficult thing to find in France is a grave and impartial President of an assembly. M. Ravez who occupied the chair was incapable, from fanaticism as well as timidity.

One of the most violent scenes of this stormy and do-nothing session was that in which Manuel denounced Labourdonnaye as another Marat. Labourdonnaye had declared his convictions to be those which he entertained in 1815. Manuel reminded him that he had declared in that year the only means of safety to be terror, and that he insisted in pursuing all who had taken part in the government of the Hundred Days with the sword and the executioner. "These sentiments," said Constant, "which M. de Labourdonnaye uttered in 1815, and which he repeats and resumes to-day, were the same which were uttered in 1793, by one who demanded half-a-million of heads—by Marat." It may be conceived what a storm was raised by such an allusion.

Far from acting as arbiters or assuagers of such violence, Ministers adapted themselves to all the extravagance of the extremes, and that not only in manner but in doctrine. Thus when Foy and other Liberals demanded to be informed of the part which the Fench Government had taken in the conference and conclave of Laybach, Pasquier tried to close their mouths with the strange declaration, that peace and war appertained to the King, and that all foreign policy leading to peace or war was not for the Chamber to inquire into, unless a demand for funds was made. France, the Minister declared, had assumed a dignified position at Laybach; but what that position was, M. Pasquier declared the Chamber had no right to ask, and he, as Minister, no intention to tell. This, from a man who had courted the Liberal majority for several years, was revolting and absurd. The violence of M. de Serre was equally great. During the discussion on the budget of the department, a moment when of all others a Minister should remain calm under all attacks, and meet them with constitutional explanations, M. de Serre commenced by a denunciation of all his Liberal opponents, as professors of anarchy, and as men seeking an opportunity to push anarchy into action. The trial of those accused as participators in the late conspiracy was then proceeding, and M. de Serre no doubt alluded to Lafayette. At such an accusation the chiefs of the Left rose tumultuously, and demanded that the Minister of Justice should follow up such misconduct by prosecution. De Serre, who was carried away by passion, merely replied that he considered the frenzied reproaches of the Liberals as an honour to him. The Liberals might have remained silent, for other parties had undertaken the task of humbling such recreant and trimming Liberal-conser-

vatives as Pasquier and De Serre. This scene took place in June. Far, however, from similar displays rendering the Royalists more reconciled to M. de Richelieu and his friends, the attacks of the Royalists became more violent and insulting against them than even against the Liberals. They openly reproached Pasquier with not only having served Napoleon, but with having changed opinion six times since he became a Minister of Louis XVIII. When Pasquier in reply asked, whether it was the aim of the ultra-Royalists to exile from power and place nine-tenths of Frenchmen, it was rudely replied, that at least they would get rid of such men as him. Such was the recompence which, within six months of the desertion of Decazes and of the Liberal party, and of their betrayal of the electoral law, the Duc de Richelieu's friends obtained from the ultra-Royalists, to whom they had sacrificed literally King and constitution. On hearing these attacks, which, if Villèle and Corbière did not make, they at least listened to in silent complacency, Casimir Perrier exclaimed in full Chamber, that the alliance between the Ministry and the Royalists was broken, and the schism could not fail to become manifest by a speedy disruption of the Government. The ultra-Royalists were conquerors, who naturally looked forward to the enjoyment of the fruits of victory. The conjecture of Perrier was perfectly just. A very little time did bring about the disruption he predicted, and the open as well as virtual withdrawal of Villèle and Corbière from being subordinate to the Duc de Richelieu, and from adhesion to his Ministry.

The Royalist party, triumphant in the elections, and led by the Court, which clustered, not round the King, but around the Count d'Artois, were not contented with having the army and its commands newly organized in a Royalist

spirit, nor yet with having full power over the nomination of prefects, through the Baron Capelle, working Secretary of the Home Department. They were not complete masters of the department of either justice or foreign affairs, held by De Serre and Pasquier, who, however ardently and firmly Royalist in the Chamber, resisted the Ultras in the administration. Moreover, M. de Corbière, in the department of education intrusted to him, was opposed and obstructed by his council, as well as by his subordinates.

It is curious to contemplate the striking contrast afforded by the provisions of two great countries for national education. In England such establishments were the work of time, built up independently of the Government; whilst in France, being of recent erection, they were rendered by Napoleon as dependent for direction as for resources on the Administration of the day. In England the university, with its auxiliary and favoured schools, was he chartered path to p ofessional and political eminence and success, and was formed on the principle of making the wea hy pay dearly on their passage through it; the education of the middle and lower classes was left, the former to chance, the latter to nullity. In France, the idea of Napoleon was, like that of Russia, to have a university forming a functionary class, and in forcing the entire youth of the middle and lower classes through it, to give to all the ideas and habits of a functionary or military generation. Whilst in England all the high university places and influence were monopolized by men connected with the dominant caste in church and in society; in France there was no such independent position. The only paid places of eminence and independence were that of the Institute and some of the high

professorships, poorly remunerated, but highly revered for the talents and proficiency necessary to fill them.

The universities in both countries secured a great monopoly. In England, however, whilst they excluded the middle class by the high price which they put on first-rate education from pretending to it, the middle class was left free to give itself the intellectual, the religious, and the political education which it pleased. Full advantage was taken of that liberty; and a generation has arisen and is arising, so perfectly free from university discipline and ideas, yet so fully equal to them in information and intellectual powers, that the high and aristocratic schools of Oxford and Cambridge have nothing left to them but to come down from their eminence, and conform to the wants and ideas of middle life, unless they propose to toil on in exclusive inutility till they are swept away.

In France, Napoleon established that there should be no education except in his lyceums and his universities. He subjected all private teachers and all establishments for that purpose to heavy fines, and even then he obliged them to send their classes to the university professors. This severe system was not ill-judged for some of Napoleon's aims. He prevented the Royalists from giving their children any education if they did not like the Imperial system, which had so much of the Revolution in it. He at the same time kept the clergy from having undue influence in the schools: whilst as no ultra-religious or fanatical creed was inculcated, on the other hand no deistical or profane creed, so common in revolutionary liberalism, was allowed.

In the later years of the Empire, Napoleon, as we have on a former occasion explained, allowed, through the

influence of Fontanes, and the appointment of such professors as Royer Collard, Villemain, and Guizot, the principles of at least spiritual and intellectual philosophy to be taught; and in the first years of the Restoration, these were expounded and illustrated to the great enthusiasm and enlightenment of youth. But the two extreme parties beset the university, as they beset the state, with joint recrimination and demands, of which, in the case of the university, it would be difficult to deny the justice. Both claimed freeedom of education. Both demanded for parents the right to rear their children in the principles or the schools they pleased. Philosophers like De Tracy claimed the right of giving a merely utilitarian and secular education to the boys. Poorer families demanded the liberty of intrusting their young to priests.

It was a sore perplexity to such liberal men as were the *Doctrinaires*, to know what to recommend under such circumstances. Supporting the university and its power was certainly to maintain a tyranny and a monopoly, yet to abandon it was to give up the middle and upper class either to Voltairian or Jesuit teaching. Without great power or prospect of maintaining it, they could not carry on the university system between the two hostile extremes, and so Royer Collard abandoned the task altogether. The younger Doctrinaires, or disciples of M. Royer Collard, had, as was seen, not followed his example of wise retreat. They had supported Decazes in his vain attempt to prolong his system of political balance, and they had even aided him in modifying his electoral and press law. But they had not followed Pasquier and De Serre in their support of the Duc de Richelieu. And M. Guizot has given his reason why his party separated from M. de Serre, and

how their opinions differed from his, in some paragraphs which depict the sentiments of both parties.

M. de Corbiere lost no time after his appointment in making over all the power that he could to the clergy. He issued an ordonnance, dated February, 1821, in which he declared religion, monarchy, legitimacy, and the charter, the new bases of education. All the colleges of each diocese were placed under the superintendence of the bishop or the vicar-general, who was to demand of the Council of Education what changes they would advise. Private schools and establishments approved of by the university might enjoy the advantages of colleges, and any clergyman might take pupils without paying the usual university dues.

But it was the education not merely of the rich which was the object of the political ambition of the clergy. At that time there had passed from England into France the usage of an invention, which, though calculated to extend education among the masses, strangely became the object of favour to one party and animadversion to another. This was the system of Bell and Lancaster, that of mutual instruction of the elements of education communicated from the young to the young in schools, and consequently at an expense so diminished as to be almost nothing. The plan was greedily taken up by the liberal party in France, which of course had everything to hope for themselves, as well as for their cause, by the education of the lower orders. It was resisted, however, by the clergy, as not conferred by themselves, and not administered in conjunction with the religious principles which they might not have other opportunities of inculcating. In the Budget of 1821, there was a small vote of 2,000*l.*, which recalls the parsimonious

grants for education in England, for the purpose of primary instruction. The clerical party demanded, and the Royalist councils proposed, to suppress even this sum, as understood to be expended in the profane and irreligious promotion of mutual instruction. Some of the officials pleaded that it went to the support of schoolmasters, and not of scholastic teaching. "There are 25,000 parishes in France," exclaimed a member, "of what use can a vote of two francs be for each parish?" M. de Corbière, however, declared that the vote must be maintained, for Government had come to an understanding on the subject with the Friars of Christian Teaching. As this was the title worn by the Jesuits, the Minister's words announced no less than a compact concluded between his party and the resuscitated order.

One of the discussions on the subject of the university and its management is worthy of notice, as having been the occasion of a singular prophecy uttered in the heat of oratory by Benjamin Constant. He was complaining that M. de Corbière had directed a general persecution against all lay professors, especially in the provinces, for the purpose no doubt of getting rid of them, and of filling their places exclusively with ecclesiastics. "Your object is," said he, "to stifle everything like secular education by persecuting all teachers who are not priests. But after all,"—turned the orator upon himself,—"why am I so vehement, or why do I take this so much to heart? All these plans for subvr ting the education of the country, and bringing about a result so contrary to the nature of things and the spirit of the age, cannot last. Before ten years are past, if ten years are necessary for the university regulations to produce any fruit," (Constant was speaking in July 1821,) "the ultra-Royalist and priestly party, which

is plotting all this counter-revolution and building up the edifice of priestly influence, will have disappeared from the face of the country, and all that it has built, and all that it has purposed, will have been crushed and been swept away with it." This was met by laughter from the Right; to which Constant rejoined by, "Yes, in less than ten years the authors of this scheme will have disappeared from the political scene, and their names will only escape opprobrium by being swallowed up in oblivion." M. de Serre had the weakness and the misfortune to denounce this prophecy as defamation. It was nothing but simple foresight.

It is surprising that a Minister of such genius as De Serre, or so much cleverness as Pasquier, should have persevered in the mistake of hoping to continue the intermediate and balancing policy of Decazes, after they had really flung the whole of electoral and parliamentary power to one side. The Royalists formed the majority; and yet the censors of the Home Minister, M. Simeon, were as severe in prohibiting and erasing their ultra-Royalist and other furious diatribes, as if the priests and the Royalists were not masters of the minority. The question of the censorship came on for debate. The law required prolongation. During the discussion, the Royalists were more furious than even the Liberals; and it required all the efforts of Villèle to prevent his friends from destroying the censorship altogether, so grossly had it been misused, so sweepingly had it been applied to all parties. Having saved the Ministry from being defeated in this, as on most other points, Messrs. de Villèle and Corbière felt they had shown enough of forbearance and gratitude to the Duc de Richelieu and his colleagues for their aid in

overturning the electoral law. More they refused to do. And no sooner was the session over, than the Royalist Achilles and Patroclus retired together to their tents, without any formal resignation, but sufficiently rendering it apparent, by their conduct, that the patronage and protection which they extended to the Duc de Richelieu had reached their term, and that he might look to them henceforth either as his antagonists or his successors.

The umpire of political struggles at the moment was the Count d'Artois, who was all but master. The King, in weak health, soothed and rendered acquiescent by his new friend, Madame du Cayla, offered little opposition, and ceased to be a rallying point for the ambitious to look to. The Duc de Richelieu himself, when menaced by the retirement of Villèle and Corbière, had recourse to the Count d'Artois, who told him he had done nothing for the Royalists. "What can I do more than give them the power of overthrowing me to-morrow?" rejoined the Duke. "They will not do that," said Monsieur, "but you must become more monarchic." What the Count d'Artois meant by the Ministry becoming more monarchic, he explained more fully in demanding the Home Ministry for Villèle, and that of Public Worship along with the University for Corbière. Embassies were also to be given to Chateaubriand and Vitrolles. Moreover, Monsieur demanded the dismissal of Pasquier, who, as well as De Serre and Lainé, had become odious to the Royalists. Such was the result, such the guerdon, of their turning and tergiversation. It was these men whose exertions had turned the murder of the Duc de Berri so to the advantage of the ultra-Royalists, as to transfer to them parliamentary majority and place. The ultra-Royalists,

in gratitude, were throwing the heads of the political traitors to the public. What the Count d'Artois was unblushing enough to ask, M. de Richelieu felt to be too much humiliation to grant. He would not give the Home Department to Villèle, nor would he allow the Foreign Department to pass into any other hands than his own. His determination to reserve these two departments, broke up the negotiation for the time. Politicians separated, and politics were suspended for the autumn.

During the recess came tidings of the death of Napoleon. Writers complain that the news was received coldly by the King. He was aware that what endangered his government and dynasty was, not so much the living Napoleon as the extravagance of his own ultra-Royalist partizans, who were so zealously bent upon setting the nation and the national spirit against them, that whatever was antagonistic to them would acquire force enough for resistance at first, for triumph at last. A more timid prince, a weaker or more unpromising cause than that of the Duke of Orleans at that time could not be imagined; and yet the followers of the Count d'Artois and the extravagance of his party, soon came to realize the prophecy of Constant, and rendered all the powerful bulwarks, which legitimacy possessed or might have erected in France, as so much straw to be wafted away by the wind of popular indignation. The death of Napoleon, on his rock, can scarcely be said to have taken away a living competitor to the throne. In remoteness and impossibility, Napoleon was dead already for that purpose. But his fate added the climax to that universal sympathy for his person, his great exploits and great qualities, which were now generally identified with liberal hopes, national

sentiments, and with the one predominant popular feeling of contempt and aversion for the Bourbons. The hero had, in fact, been vanquished, his power and prestige destroyed; but as the martyr and the saint, the object of popular commiseration, admiration, and idolatry, Napoleon survived; and successive governments and dynasties of France have gone to pieces before the presence of his memory and his remains, rather than before any more potent enmity or more substantial obstruction. Nor was the Nemesis which his fate awoke and perpetuated completely satisfied, till the opportunity occurred of raising an heir of his name to the throne, and thus accomplishing the great popular expiation and reparation of the age.

Such a spectre did not haunt the Royalist mind. Whilst the news of the death of Napoleon ran in whispers through the crowd, and when the circumstances of his lonely burial, under the escort of foreign bayonets in a distant isle, were reported and lamented, Nôtre Dame and the Tuileries resounded with the fêtes, and ceremonies, and rejoicings, which accompanied the baptism of the infant Duke of Bourdeaux. That the last and only scion of a family, so tried by misfortune, should have survived amidst the terror of his father's assassins, and the multiplied attempts by explosion to work upon the widow the same extinction which Louvel's dagger had brought upon the unfortunate Duke, was wonderful, and gave some right to the Royalists to consider that prince on whom their hopes reposed as "the child of miracle." That child survives. It is not the living representative of the race that is wanting, but the entire party, with its high-flown ideas and scheme of government from above; with its

brilliant writers, its historic name, its aristocracy, its high priesthood, its resuscitated fanaticism and loyalty combined. Its servile bands of squires in Parliament, and of chevaliers in privileged classes, have all disappeared like a dream, a melancholy instance of the utter vanity of attempting to reconstruct the past once more upon the foundation of the present.

Yet in 1821 the Royalists or ultra-Royalists had succeeded in subduing almost every enemy and every resistance. They had become masters of the King and the Chambers: their influence in the provinces, supported by the priesthood, by functionary and by temporal lords, was predominant. The members of the old army were conspiring perpetually indeed, but always with bad success. As to public opinion, however inevitable its tendency in a direction hostile to high church and high state ideas, to absolutism and even Toryism, still this was disputed by an almost equal amount of genius and talent on either side. Fashion, too, came to lend its aid as of wont to the aristocratic cause. All the high ranks and upper circles of society were Royalist; and they were marked, not merely by splendour and arrogance, but by the wit, the genius, the accomplishments of women not inferior to the dowagers and duchesses of the olden time. Unfortunately, whilst courtly society thus rose up again in all its former splendour, and more than its wonted intellect, another class of society arose in direct antagonism to it. The wealthy houses of the Court bankers, or the illustrious Generals of the Empire, in the Chaussée d'Antin, opened also the folding-doors of their saloons to poets, journalists, philosophers, more powerful than those writers in the saloons laid before him the wants, the ways, and the ideas of

people. And whilst a pamphlet of Chateaubriand or an ode of Lamartine might circulate in the gilded saloons of the Faubourg St. Germain, a song of Beranger, or a Messenienne of Delavigne, or a printed speech of Foy, might begin their circulation in the saloons of Laffitte; but this was merely the commencement of their passing from hand to hand and from mouth to mouth through every house, and every province, and every knot of students or of citizens throughout the kingdom. It was the whim, the spite, or the aim of a coterie, contending against the mighty passions and convictions of the national mind.

CHAPTER III.

LOUIS XVIII.—MADAME DU CAYLA'S INFLUENCE OVER HIM—HIS SYSTEM—ITS MISTAKE IN LEANING ON A FUNCTIONARY, NOT A MIDDLE CLASS.—ROYALISTS GAIN GROUND—NEGOTIATION WITH VILLÈLE—AMENDMENT TO ADDRESS CARRIED BY OPPOSITION—VILLÈLE FORMS A MINISTRY—VIOLENT OPPOSITION WHICH IT EXCITES.

However disinclined the historian may be to allow to Louis XVIII. the possession of transcendent ability or high intellect, that he was a man of great good sense and prudence cannot be denied. His position and infirmities, indeed, afforded him but little scope for the exercise and useful development of these faculties. After brief experience of Court life, rather than of politics in youth, exile and misfortune made him a recluse in manhood; and when he reached the throne he was unable to judge or form a knowledge of the world, save through the narrow windows of his apartment or his Court, and from such superannuated specimens of humanity, as circumstances or etiquette allowed to enter his closet. The King's attachment to M. Decazes apparently arose from the charm which he found in youth and novelty, and in the ideas of the new world and of the rising generation, with which the monarch had not before come in contact. M. Decazes was accused of exercising a kind of sorcery over the King, because he

France, such as the Revolution had made it. And Madame du Cayla was introduced to supersede Decazes in the King's closet, in order that she might present him with an altogether new set of ideas, and with a representation of things, not as they were, but as the sacerdotal party would have them. The mode in which Madame du Cayla performed her task, is minutely described in the memoirs of her friend, the Abbé Liautaud.

"It would be difficult to imagine," say these memoirs, "all the cares and minute attention which it was necessary to employ, in order to strip the King of all his own ideas, and to furnish him with altogether a new set, so as, in fact, to reconstruct and reorganize his brain, as it were, as well as his heart, his faculties, and his affections."

The King was, however, rather soothed and amused, than convinced by his new friend. When she ventured to write to him a long letter on the political direction, which, in Madame du Cayla's opinion, he ought to take, the monarch took no notice of it. Circumstances and the progress of parties effected and accelerated those changes which Louis could no longer struggle against. And ill health and female blandishments merely led him to accept more tranquilly those ministerial changes which offended his conviction and hurt his pride.

The attempt made by Louis XVIII., and commenced by him soon after his second restoration, was the wisest, perhaps, that constitutional monarch could conceive, that of founding a government between extreme and contending factions, one of which aimed at restoring the old monarchy of the last century, supported by church and aristocracy, with only so much of the representative system as would of the aristocracy, because they possessed the ears of the

favour the prevalence of the party and the success of its scheme: the other extreme, enraged by such preposterous views and extravagant demands, appealed to every sentiment and interest which had sprung up during the last half century to combat them. It flattered the Bonapartists and the Jacobins; it claimed the support of the emancipated peasant and of the commercial class, endowed with equality of rights by the Revolution. The first move of the Government of the Restoration was unfortunate in making use of a mode of election, which excluded the middle and independent classes, and thus allowed the return of an exclusively ultra-Royalist and reactionary Chamber. The return of such a Chamber gave strength, spirit, and ambition, to the ultra-Royalist party, which, had there been free and popular elections from the first, would never have been so powerful. The fault was sought to be remedied by M. Decazes and the King in the restoration of direct election; but it was too late. The extreme parties had been formed; and to establish an intermediate one was more difficult than it would have been at the first. The King and M. Decazes set more resolutely than wisely about the experiment. Even the franchise of three hundred francs' taxation was too high, and did not admit the middle commercial class of the country.* Instead of founding an intermediate party on the representation of these, as well as of the more liberal of the rural classes, M. Decazes filled the central or ministerial benches of the Chamber with functionaries—professional functionaries, not men who had become so by

* I am convinced that in the 100,000 electors, under the law of direct election, the commercial class cannot be counted for more than one-twelfth.—*Guizot, Du Gouvernement de la France.*

their parliamentary influence, but who had been bred to it under the Empire, and who made place a profession. Such a body is an anomaly in representative government, to the prizes and paths of which parliamentary talent will always aspire. It excites far more envy than it can afford assistance. Men who have had place from youth up have seldom any principle beyond that of preserving their position. They are ready to lean to the right or to the left, to turn, to bend, but have no thorough conviction, no persuasive force, and inspire little confidence and no esteem. Parties to wield power in representative government require to be young, to be renewed, to have been out of office, and to touch the mother-earth of public opinion by being flung upon it. So that, even an intermediate and middle party, however wise at one time, requires to be remodelled and reformed, to disappear and to be resuscitated, in order to wield the influence of a dominant party.

This was precisely the operation which circumstances and the natural play of representative government was accomplishing. The leaders of that middle party, which had just come forward under the King's auspices to carry on the government of the country, had, however, either worn out their influence and respect, or had deserted their position. Those who had imagined that they could carry on the government on the balancing principle of Decazes, by placing the point of the balance more to the right and nearer to ultra-Royalism, found they had made a great mistake; for they had forfeited even the right to expect tolerance from the Liberals, or had not earned even that by their obsequiousness to the Ultras. M. Lainé had deserted and gone over altogether to the latter. M. de Serre had indulged in the most violent attacks upon the

Left without conciliating the respect of the Right.* M. Pasquier, the chief speaker of the present Ministry, had by his last speech completed the decisive rupture with the Royalist majority, which conceived a fervent hatred for him amounting to proscription. Deprived at the same time of any shred of popularity, M. Pasquier, unable to procure his re-election, now appeared as a member of the Chamber of Peers. Whilst the man of business of the middle party thus became worn out and depopularized, its more thoughtful and philosophic members, known by the name of Doctrinaires, suffered from the same disadvantage, from having made too many concessions to the retrograde party without fruit or gain to their own. And although the disappearance and destruction of the middle party in the Chamber are attributed by the chief Doctrinaire writers to the acts of the Richelieu Ministry,* they are no less attributed to the unsteadiness of several of the Doctrinaire party themselves, M. Guizot included, who meant to tamper with the electoral law, and who stood firm in a main degree in the weakness and vacillation displayed by the men of business of the middle party.

The elections, which as usual took place late in autumn, revealed to a greater extent the weakness of the ministerial body. The electors, under the new law, were either exultant or extreme ultra-Royalists or Liberals, indignant at their influence having been nullified, their ideas proscribed and the progress of the nation thrown back by the electoral law. Fanatics for religion and monarchy were returned in a great majority, angered rather than resisted by fanatics who, in resentment, vowed inveterate enmity to both. The ultra-Royalists were not slow to appreciate the

* Page 96 of Guizot, *Du Gouvernement*.

immense augmentation of their power; but the Duc de Richelieu was slow to admit it. Proud, though short-sighted, he could not bring himself to believe, that he had been entreated by both the King and his brother to take the place of M. Decazes in order merely to occupy it for a few months, and then transfer it to the ultra-Royalists. Yet this was precisely the part which the Count d'Artois had destined the Duc de Richelieu to play. It was inexpedient to inform the Duke of this too bluntly, for the King also flattered himself that he might, by means of the Duke, still maintain some independence of his brother's party. The fear thus was, in expelling the Duc de Richelieu too rudely, to alarm and offend the King, who, however ill and averse to business and political quarrels, and however soothed and reconciled by Madame du Cayla to the introduction of sacerdotalism into the government, still believed in the existence, if not of Decazes, at least of his balancing policy.

When a short time previous to the opening of the Session, M. de Villèle returned to the capital, the Duc de Richelieu lost no time in waiting upon him, and endeavouring to learn what might be the condition of his renewed adhesion to the Cabinet. What Villèle really desired was the highest office in the Cabinet, but he could not bluntly tell the Duke to be gone, and make way for him. He was offered the Marine department and refused it.

"What do you want, M. de Villèle? at last exclaimed the embarrassed Prime Minister. "You do not intend to force the King's hands and overthrow his Cabinet?"

"Oh, good Heavens! no," exclaimed the mild Villèle, as if such a thought was most repugnant to his mind. "We shall remain neuter and support you as long as you

proceed in a monarchic direction. The moment you quit that direction we shall oppose you. I have no personal ambition, and am only anxious to serve the cause of monarchy."

Monarchy was the cant word with Villèle, as the most revered name was the cant word with Cromwell, who was serving the Lord when he decapitated Charles. Villèle was serving the monarchy while endeavouring to trip up the Duc de Richelieu.

"But remember," added he to the Duke, "however neutral myself, I cannot restrain my friends, whose exaggeration and folly I cannot master. You will be attacked by Salaberry, Castelbajac, and Delalot. I shall not, indeed, join in any such attacks, unless you lean to the Left."

Such was the ambiguous refusal of alliance, and denunciation of hostility, made by Villèle to the Minister. The latter appealed and complained to the King, who saw the excessive demands of his brother's party, and felt still inclined to resist them. In a council of Ministers, held under the presidency of the King, it was decided to brave the Parliament, and commence the Session, without acceding to the terms of the ultra-Royalists. The Duc de Richelieu and his colleagues proposed to diminish the weight of taxation, especially that upon land, and to bring forward at the same time a number of salutary and liberal measures, which were sure to command the approbation of the public. King and Ministers forgot that, by the change which they had wrought in the electoral law, they had excluded the public from the Chambers, and given it over to a party which, greedy for power, and certain of it, were not to be satisfied by trifling boons. As to the public

outside the doors of the Chamber, gagged as the press was by the censorship, what means were there of appealing to it, or of inspiring even the middle class with confidence in a Government so weak, so vacillating, and so treacherous?

The same false hopes, and wrong appreciation, led some of the Duc de Richelieu's colleagues, at this time, to apply for succour to the Left. They deemed themselves magnanimous in offering an embassy to General Foy. But the Duc de Richelieu had put it out of the power of the Liberals to aid them. He had crushed them by his change of the electoral law; and unless he could undo what had been done in that respect, he left the Liberal side in Parliament as powerless to defend themselves as to succour a ministry of the middle party.

The King opened the Session in the Louvre, whither peers and deputies were summoned, and where Louis was able to be rolled in his easy chair. The royal speech was insignificant. It contained not a paragraph on which the Opposition could propose an amendment. But the Royalists were impatient; they selected for the commission of the address the most furious partizans; and these, in answer to the royal announcement "of a hope that accord between the Powers would accomplish in the East what religion, policy, and humanity required," replied, "by the expectation that peace would not be purchased by sacrifices incompatible with the honour of the country and the dignity of the Crown." Never was insult more gratuitous or more monstrous, when applied by ultra-Royalists to the Duc de Richelieu; for, if foreign policy was not dignified and independent enough, it was surely in fear of that Royalist and Conservative reaction which was now predominant.

The mere proposal to address such an observation from

the Chamber to the King called forth the loud remonstance of Ministers, especially when the document was read to the deputies with closed doors. Although the French press could not give a report of the discussion, it became public through the correspondents of the English journals. Of 274 members present, 176 voted for an address so injurious to the monarch, 98 alone opposed it. The majority (said the "Débats" of the following day, announcing the fact) was composed of members of the Left and of the Right united; and the "Moniteur," afterwards commenting upon this fact, declared that, "were this alliance possible, such words as religion, country, honour, and society, must in France be devoid of sense." In truth, the very ultra-Liberals were delighted at the amendment; it expressed their opinions exactly; and the Right so worded it as to catch their votes, although Royalist writers and orators explained the paragraph by asserting, that they were as indignant as the Liberals themselves at the coldness shown by Ministers to the cause of the Greeks, then in insurrection against the Sultan. When the address was presented to the King, his Majesty replied:—

"I know the address you bring me. In exile and persecution I upheld my rights, as well as the honour both of my family and the French name. On the throne, surrounded by my people, I am indignant at the idea of my being thought capable of sacrificing the honour of the nation or the dignity of the Crown."

This just rebuff only increased the indignation and rudeness of those ill-mannered gentlemen, whom the Count d'Artois had set, like dogs, to bait his infirm brother and the tottering Ministers of the day. Instead of admitting the reply of the King to have been provoked by their own

insolence, they declared that it was entirely owing to the fact that the meaning of their words had been misrepresented to his Majesty by Baron Pasquier.

The fury on both sides was now at its height. The King, grievously insulted, proposed to dissolve the Chamber; but this implied an ordinance or *coup-d'état* for electing another on different conditions,—an extreme to which M. Pasquier might have proceeded, but the Duc de Richelieu would not entertain the idea. In the midst of the ministerial embarrassments, M. de Serre proposed to come forward with measures more Royalist than the Royalists themselves, and thus bid against the leaders for the majority. In headlong pursuit of so idle and preposterous a scheme, M. de Serre moved in the Chamber the prolongation of the censorship, with the augmentation of the numerous severe penalties and restrictions which already galled the press. As if to prove, at the same time, the sincerity of the Government, the prosecution against Beranger was pressed, and that celebrated *chansonnier* condemned for offences against morality to three months' imprisonment. By his motion, De Serre imagined that he was sure to at once cause the dissolution of that alliance between the ultra-Liberals and ultra-Royalists, which overwhelmed and outnumbered the ministerial votes. He altogether erred in his calculation. It was not the Liberals who first denounced such liberticide laws, but the most furious of the ultra-Royalists, M. Delalot, who exclaimed against Ministers for seeking to stifle public opinion. "They want to break a majority," he exclaimed, "which they have failed in rendering servile. They wish to reverse the law of elections, to commence a government by ordinances, and obtaining from the Chamber five years longer the power

of gagging the press, they hope to extinguish truth. Darkness is what they require in order to accomplish their designs; but they shall not escape justice. Their heads shall pay for their misdeeds."

The inability and incapacity of Ministers to overcome their enemies, and face the storm either in the Chamber or the public, became at length manifest to the King. He was at the same time closely beset by Madame du Cayla and the religious party, who, in their narrative of these events, give themselves all the honour of success. They had little influence in reality. Their efforts to convert the monarch to political religion, whilst they left his heart untouched by religious sentiment, were as futile as they were interested. But Louis saw that the last rag of that banner which he had raised under Decazes—the flag of a middle party—had been blown to pieces, and there was nothing left for him but to surrender, unless he was prepared to dissolve, and to issue ordonnances. For this he wanted both the courage and the instrument; and, moreover, he was struck by the humble attitude, and the moderation, affected or real, of M. de Villèle. That chief had refused to join in the vote of the ungenerous address; and in conversation not only with M. de Richelieu, but on one memorable occasion with the King, instead of espousing the extravagance of ultra-Royalism, he did not scruple to mock them. A partizan on the benches of Opposition, he was a courtier at the palace. The King conceived just hopes, that such a man would not make himself the instrument of the extravagant plans of the ultra-Royalists more than was necessary to the retention of power; and that the Crown would probably find in such

a Minister a more efficient protection against ultra-Royalism than either M. de Richelieu or Decazes himself afforded.

At last, after keeping the Court, the Chamber, and the country in much incertitude, the King, on the 13th of January, 1822,—the fête of Henry Quatre,—came to the resolution to surrender to his brother. After paying the Duc de Richelieu the empty compliment of asking him to draw up the list of a new Ministry, the Count d'Artois was called in to signify who were the Ministers of his choice. He at once named Villèle and Corbière for the Finance and the Interior. The Prince's intention was to keep the Duc de Richelieu at the head of Foreign Affairs, but the duke absolutely declined. Madame du Cayla's lawyer, M. de Peyronnet, was appointed Minister of Justice. He was a young man, of the bar of Bordeaux, who, as public accuser, had displayed the utmost vehemence in the prosecution of military conspirators. The two selections which M. de Villèle made from the ranks of the high *noblesse*, to fill places in his Cabinet, fully evinced his aversion for extravagant or ultra zeal, even in favour of monarchy. These selections were Mathieu de Montmorency, to succeed the Duc de Richelieu in Foreign Affairs, and M. de Clermont Tonnerre, to occupy the Marine Department. M. de Montmorency was well known as the first member of the French nobility who, in the memorable sitting of the Constituent Assembly, came forward to disclaim the distinctions and privileges of his order. He had served with Lafayette in America, and fled with him from Jacobin vengeance. He had returned to France under the Empire, but refused in any capacity to serve Napoleon. He then formed one of that tacit

opposition to imperial despotism which grouped around Madame de Stael and Madame Recamier; but he had taken a deeper tint of piety than was general in that intellectual circle. Attached to the court of the Duchess d'Angoulême, he enjoyed all the confidence of the Count d'Artois, with that of the priestly party, whilst, from antecedents and education, he could not be supposed to be absorbed in fanaticism like the zealots.

Villèle feared to take on himself the yoke of that powerful party, which possessed the confidence of the priesthood, and of all the royal family, except the King. He could not avoid admitting members of it into the Cabinet. Chateaubriand had hopes of being the prominent person so admitted; but for some reason or other friends and foes were both anxious to send so talented, yet restless, a partizan to a distance. At the commencement of 1821, when Villèle and Corbière joined the Cabinet without prominent place or official position, Chateaubriand was flattered by all as the great mover, the negotiator, the arranger; and with this sop to his vanity, they despatched him as ambassador to Berlin, not without promises of being included in the ultimate Cabinet as soon as the provisional one was dissolved. Hence, no sooner did Chateaubriand learn the retreat of Villèle and Corbière from the side of the Duc de Richelieu than he hastened to share their fate, as he pretended, and to return from Berlin. His first step was to present a note to the Count d'Artois, advising a comprehensive Ministry, with one member taken from the Doctrinaires of the Left Centre, and one from the independent members of the Right Centre. With these he recommended the restoration of freedom to the press, and the presentation of a municipal law. But the liberalism of the noble Viscount took care

not to touch the electoral law, or modify its strict exclusion of all, except the wealthy territorial class. Chateaubriand was got rid of by his being appointed to succeed M. Decazes in the embassy to London. Mathieu de Montmorency was considered a safer representative of that religious and sentimental party in politics which stood already in rivalry by the side of Villèle. M. de Clermont Tonnerre was of similar opinions, and he was of the same class as M. de Montmorency. The War Ministry was conferred upon one of the most insignificant of Napoleon's Marshals, Victor, Duke of Belluno, who sufficiently manifested his desires to the army by the reappointment to commands of Generals Donnadieu and Canuel, renowned for their conduct at Grenoble and at Lyons.

It is a proof how completely and how perseveringly the Constitutional principle was set aside and neglected in France, that this Ministry,—the result of parliamentary victory,—still did not introduce to office the genuine ultra-Royalist chiefs. Villèle was the only personage raised to power in consequence of his parliamentary influence. The rest were recommended by the Count d'Artois as members or leaders of that new society called the Congregation, which was to regenerate France, and render it subject and reconciled to the dynasty, by rendering religious interests the permanent rule of policy, and by directing the whole power and patronage of the State so as to secure the esteem and predominance of the religious party. The heinousness and depth of this religious conspiracy has, no doubt, been much exaggerated by Liberal writers. According to them, the Congregation, as it was styled, was no less fanatical, vindictive, and reactionary than the Inquisition itself,—as great an enemy of modern

freedom, and as fully prepared to employ the most cruel and sanguinary measures to accomplish its purpose. But, in truth, the Congregation was founded and directed by men more silly and simple than cruel and astute. They saw the liberal Opposition call to its aid the philosophy of the Revolution. They saw that when the censorship of the rigid laws relating to the press forbade all freedom of writing on the affairs of the day, the Liberal party deemed that it could best propagate its opinions, and oppose those of its oppressors, by issuing cheap editions of Voltaire and Rousseau, and resuscitating those writers who had destroyed the ancient monarchy to oppose the modern politicians who sought to restore it. The Court, therefore, looked to the propagation of a kind of sentimental Catholicism,—such as Chateaubriand had imagined, and Lamennais developed,—in order to vanquish that infidelity which the Liberals exhumed, and which was so closely linked with disloyalty and contempt for all the men, measures, and institutions of the Bourbon monarchy. It was a huge mistake, to hope and strive to resuscitate a past century, when the present time offered ample elements of its own for constitutional monarchy, and for its moderate and legitimate influence, as well as for the re-erection of a religious belief, and a religious worship, in harmony with the wants, the ideas, and the awakened and unprejudiced intelligence of the age.

On the formation of the Ministry, Louis XVIII. addressed the following note to M. Decazes:—

"At last M. de Villèle is triumphant. I know very little of the men who enter the Cabinet with him. But I believe them to be sufficiently reasonable, and have enough of good sense not to give in blindly to all the follies of

the Right. As for myself, I annul myself henceforth, and accept the consequences of constitutional government, not so completely, however, as to prevent me from defending my Crown, in case my brother should expose it to risks."

M. de Villèle's triumph was indeed complete. No sooner was he installed in office, than that central party in the Chamber, composed of functionaries who had successively supported Decazes and the Duc de Richelieu, transferred at once their allegiance to the new Ministry, and insured it with the Royalists an overwhelming majority. And yet, notwithstanding all the noise made in the previous contentions of party,—notwithstanding the fierce denunciation of Messrs. Pasquier and De Serre by the Ultras, and of the Ultras by Messrs. Pasquier and De Serre,—no change of policy seemed to ensue from the substitution of the one for the other. No new measures were introduced to sustain the monarchy, which had been the object of M. de Villèle's anxiety. The Session continued, or rather reopened, and yet the new Royalist party which thus seized upon power had no new law to introduce, no new principle to establish,—nothing, in fact, beyond a change in the *personnel* of office to effect.

The only subject which Parliament was called upon to consider or discuss was the press, that interminable question, which recurred year after year, and which the Royalists themselves, with all their power, had never been able to settle satisfactorily. Whatever was the infatuation, and however mistaken the views and hopes of the ultra-Royalists, it could not be denied that they were men of strong and enthusiastic convictions, who believed not only in the expediency of their policy, but in the truth of their prin-

ciples and the right of their demands. They were, therefore, eager for publicity, desired nothing better than to be allowed free appeal, and they were indignant when over-careful Ministers debarred them from the use of the press, the pulpit, or the tribune. Their most powerful writer, Chateaubriand, was ever vehement and consistent in demanding the liberty of the press. And whilst more cautious statesmen, like Villèle, saw that in the great struggle of publicity, the Democrats, and Imperialists, and Liberals had far the best of it, the ultra-Royalists believed that the preacher, orator, and writer, were making daily progress towards the firm conversion of the French to the monarchy of Louis XIV. and the religion of Loyola. They were, therefore, as indignant at the censorship, which gagged them, as the Liberals themselves could be. M. de Serre, in proposing a prolongation of it, had merely displayed his total ignorance of the state of feeling and opinion, even amongst the parties which he hoped to conciliate; and the very first act forced upon M. de Villéle, when he became Minister, was to declare that the censorship should be discontinued and formally abrogated.

It was necessary to compensate this waiving of the right of prevention by increased severity on conviction. M. de Peyronnet, the new Minister of Justice, a man bred up in the inveterate school of public prosecutors, undertook this task, which he feared not to announce as a "labour of love." Under his direction two laws occupied the first month of the Session—one a modification of M. de Serre's law for the police of publications; the other for the especial intimidation of the daily press.

The law of 1819, introduced under the influence of M. Decazes, condemned writers who committed offences

against the cause of religion and morals to small fines and short imprisonments. It was proposed now to swell the term of imprisonment to five years, and the fine from hundreds of francs to thousands. And these penalties were to be awarded, not merely for outraging, but even deriding the *religion of the State.* Any other religion might be mocked with impunity. The law of M. Decazes subjected to punishment those who insulted or impugned the constitutional authority of the King. The ultra-Royalists now erased the word constitutional. They also inflicted penalties upon writers, who excited hatred or contempt of a class. This covered the aristocracy and the priesthood. M. Decazes left the jury to pronounce upon such offences; the jury was now abolished for prosecutions of the press. The judges alone were to try and give sentence.

It may be imagined what a storm of protest and indignation was excited by each of these enactments. The Liberals, in their impatience, would not tolerate M. Decazes or M. de Richelieu; they had even aided the ultra-Royalists to overturn the latter, and now the full nature of the yoke which was to be imposed on the nation, became manifest. To throw off this yoke the Opposition no longer looked to Parliament, but to the people; and, accordingly, their writings and their remonstrances were addressed less to the Chamber than to the public, through the reports of the press, in order to make fully known the monstrous tyranny of the party, which had succeeded in monopolizing and persisted in abusing power against the will both of the people and of the Crown.

M. Royer Collard, on this occasion, uttered one of his most remarkable speeches. It was not particularly applicable to the restrictions of the press, but the special purpose

was to demonstrate how completely the reverse of the French social state and progress were the principles and efforts of the Ultras. "The ancient state of society," said Royer Collard, "has perished under the blow of the Revolution, with all its institutions, authorities, classes. Society has been reduced to powder. The population was left, nay increased, but it was a population of individuals. No Frenchman could pretend to more. Centralization had sprung from this, and naturally, for when there was no authority, no civism, no secular claims or rights, power must emanate from the Government. Thus have we become a people of *administrés*, under the hand of irresponsible functionaries, centralized themselves in the power of which they are the ministers. Society was bequeathed, in this state, to the Restoration. Public servitude, without any alleviation except generosity of manners, without other consolation than the immortal honour of arms, such was the heritage to which Louis XVIII. succeeded, transmitted to him by the Empire which had itself inherited them from the Revolution. The Chamber," continued the political philosopher, "constituted the government, but has not yet reconstituted society, which has no power of resistance but in the press. The only arm, the only guarantee, the only enlightenment and safeguard of that society consists in the press." M. Etienne, in a previous speech, had shown that the people had been deprived of, indeed had never enjoyed, representative advantages or rights. The press was the only liberty the people had enjoyed, and without this all the charm of public liberty was lost. To destroy the press under the pretence of controlling the democracy, was to pretend to tread down French society and the French name.

For democracy, as it was called, was everywhere, in industry, in property, in the laws, in recollections, in man, in things. The middle class enjoys that leisure, that intelligence, that independence, which the classes above it once monopolized. Some might complain of this; but the generous and Christian man must rejoice at the extension of such large advantages to a wider class. As to democracy, it had conquered all that it could ask, and, consequently, was no longer to be feared; except by those who sought to compress its power and control its rights, to deny it the smallest portion of political influence, and would now shut out from it even the common measure of intelligence which the press affords?"

The discussion of the law, article by article, gave rise to the most fierce and personal debates. The Opposition proposed amendments to the several clauses against those who might deride the religion of the State. The law, they said, was far worse than the tyranny of Louis XIV., for under it Pascal durst not have published his "Provincial Letters." As to Voltaire he could only have existed in prison. The blotting out of the word *constitutional* was the subject of another debate, which was remarkable by M. de Villèle's declaring that he regretted the erasure of the word. The clause punishing those who excited hatred against a class, opened of course the old quarrel between aristocracy and democracy, between the Revolution and the emigrants. It was difficult to avoid personal allusion to Mathieu de Montmorency, the first, who, in 1789, gave up at once, on the part of the French nobility all their distinctions and privileges as a class, and who now came forward as Minister, not only to re-establish these old distinctions, but to defend them even from

criticism by all the rigour of penal laws. M. de Montmorency defined the part which he had taken in the law, by asserting that classes could not be dispensed with, and that as physical science classed the objects of nature, political science could not but distinguish different classes of men. As to his acts when member of the Constituent Assembly, M. de Montmorency dropped a veil upon these as the errors of his youth, for which he made amends by the most unbounded declaration of loyalty and devotion to the King. M. de Montmorency said that he was not one of those who could boast of having never erred or never having deceived himself. He was once as sincere in admiring the Revolution, as he was now in condemning it and retracting his former opinions. In 1789, he had not derived from history that experience, which the sight of a revolution and its dread consequences afforded him. He had not then seen its crimes, its misfortunes, its anarchy, its terrors, and military despotism. These things, too, made a full impression on his mind, when the Restoration came through the kindness of Heaven to establish a new order of things. "It was then," said M. de Montmorency, "that I found in the King and his party inexhaustible goodness and forgiveness, which I can only but pay by the devotion of a life."

This solemn declaration of M. de Montmorency called forth one, almost as remarkable, from another member of the ancient nobility, who had emigrated in 1790, and who had not returned to the country until 1800. This was the Comte de Thiard. He repeated and adopted the words of M. de Montmorency of being sharer in the first illusions of the Revolution and of having been disgusted and driven into exile by its results. "But when I

returned," said the Comte de Thiard, "and saw France radiant in the midst of Europe with immortal glory,—when I saw the triumph of its soldiers, the conquest of its genius, its fields better cultivated, its manufactures flourishing, its commercial and industrious classes respected, its citizens all equal before the law, claiming no other privileges than those of merit, and furnishing the administration, the army, and science with eminent men who were the glory of their age,—then I could not but adopt with sincerity and enthusiasm the principle and the cause which had led to such great results."

Each moment the orators on each side lost sight of the question in debate to plunge into the abstractions of political morality. The Royalists insisted that they were alone worthy of legislating and governing, because they had never been untrue to the King. The Liberals replied that true loyalty was that shown to the country and to its soil. Louis XVIII., passing the frontier to go to Ghent, released every Frenchman, according to General Foy, from his allegiance. M. Manuel followed this up by asking how that could be a crime which was an universal and unavoidable sentiment, the repugnance with which every Frenchman, in 1814, viewed the return of the Bourbons? Such home truths, so monstrously contradictory of the theories of those in power, threw the Royalist orators into convulsions of rage. There was a common-sense view of all the questions, which both sides might have taken, and in which they might have been sufficiently agreed for the maintenance of, and respect to, the constitutional throne. But the ultra-Royalists would tolerate nothing short of their own extravagant and absurd views of loyalty and religion, to resist and combat which it was necessary to

take the old revolutionary ground of scouting priesthood and monarchy. And the only issues from such fierce and irreconcileable discussions were to retain the naked tyranny of absolutism on the one hand, or to shake off all by an effort of revolution on the other.

The final vote of the law took place in the midst of a loud tumult, the Left refusing to take part even by a negative in the transaction. Each member of the Opposition protested. Lafayette, in addition to his protest, appealed to the energies of the French people. In a Chamber of 356 members it was carried by no more than a majority of 219.

In the Chamber of Peers the opposition to the law assumed a far more moderate tone, but scarcely less reprobatory of the law and the spirit which dictated it. M. Portalis was the reporter of the Commission which examined it, and he fully joined in the opinion of M. de Serre and of those of the middle party, who considered that the taking away the jurisdiction of offences of the press from the jury, and giving them over to the Judges, would have the bad result of making political partisans of the Judges. The Peers, through the report, then expressed a hope that such jurisdiction, if at present taken from the jury, would be restored to it as soon as a law could be framed, regulating the appointment of jurymen, at present so anomalous. In this opinion M. de Villèle, in the previous debate on the press, had professed his acquiescence. The Chamber of Peers also inserted the word *Constitutional.* But, nevertheless, the law was solemnly denounced by the most eminent of the peers, by the Duc de la Rochefoucault, by Prince Talleyrand himself, who treated it as a breach of the promise of 1814, and by Count Molé.

"Napoleon," said Count Molé, "as he took his departure for his last campaign, observed to me, that after his disappearance or fall, revolution and revolutionary ideas would resume that onward course which his power alone had interrupted: the Revolution, said Napoleon, is just like a book which one has laid by with a mark between its pages, and of which the reading is resumed when more serious interests and occupations cease to command attention. One might liken it less to a book than to a torrent, which must flow on, and for which all hands must sink a deep and safe channel: without this it will soon form in its fury a channel for itself, and cover its whole course with devastation and ruin." Continuing the figurative style, Count Molé showed, that free institutions, or freely elected Parliaments, and a press without restrictions, would act as channels for carrying off the torrent, which, without this, would one day wash away the foundations of the throne. Unfortunately those who had then seized power, could perform none of these great conservative duties. They had monopolized electoral power, and then tyranny and oligarchy could only be supported by rendering the press as abject and servile as the electoral body. In doing this, the party in power were substituting the mockery of a representative Government for the real one, and allowing free Chambers and elections in name merely. This might not be re-establishing the ancient régime; but in truth it was establishing something far worse, something infinitely more hypocritical, more tyrannical, more vile, and more perishable.

Such opposition as this, maintained with moderation and talent, in which Imperialist recollections or revolutionary tendencies were veiled under true constitutional

principles, had a far more powerful and salutary effect than the wild bursts of passion and appeal to insurrection which broke from the opposition members of the Lower Chamber. But notwithstanding the respect with which Royer Collard was listened to, the influence of the Doctrinaires was disowned, and the language as well as the press of moderation was powerless. The standard of constitutional opposition thus thrown down in the Chamber of Deputies was hoisted again in that of the Peers, and became a very sensible and important check upon the proceedings and extravagance of the Ultras.

The second law, that respecting the daily press exclusively, which was introduced after the passing of the first, bore strong marks of the originality of M. de Peyronnet's mind, and his talents for absolutism. Here he first introduced the clause, that a journal might be suppressed for its *general tendency*; in other words, if the Government considered an organ of the press to have a tendency to disturb public peace, to bring religion or the King's authority into disrespect, they might prosecute it before the Royal Court, and the judges might suspend the journal. As by the same law no new journal could be established without the King's permission, the two clauses placed the entire press at the mercy of the Government, which, strange to say, made a merit of abolishing the censorship. Yet even the censorship might, by the new law, be re-established at all times by simple ordonnance during the interval of the Parliamentary session. M. de Villèle, indeed, partly owned that if he gave up the censorship and substituted repressive penalties, it was that the censorship had been *usé*, in other words, unpopular with all parties, and that for this reason alone it

was necessary to supply its place. On one of the days of the debate, a Liberal member having risen to read a violent diatribe against the censorship, and also against the severity of the law of 1819 relating to the press, there was a great clamour from the members of the Right against these denunciations. "The strength or violence of these arguments are not mine," observed the speaker, closing his note-book; "they are taken word for word from a speech of M. de Villèle on the subject of former elections." Both the measures for punishing free opinion even in books, and annihilating it in journals, passed the Chambers, and served as the inauguration of the Ultra reign. In such results did the factious liberalism of M. de Chateaubriand's friends evaporate.

To deprive a nation of its liberties excites less odium than to attempt to force its convictions. It was, perhaps, the chief element of Napoleon's success, that, whilst he extended the sceptre of despotism over France, he never undertook to force its belief, to inculcate new principles, or to make the age advance or recoil under the pretence of rendering it wiser. If he established religion, it was more for outward form and visible institutions, leaving men free to worship or refrain, by repressing rather than encouraging the zeal of the priests. The infidel and materialist philosophy of the Revolution Napoleon disliked, but he did not persecute it. He left spiritualists and materialists to fight out their battle; and had the same liberty been left, after the Restoration, to religious and irreligious, without politics or the State interfering more than Napoleon did, religion would have gained ground under such capacities as Chateaubriand, and Lamennais, and Frayssinous; and such men as Cuvier, Villemain, and

Guizot, would have lit up the way by their intelligence, and facilitated the extension and the triumph of truth.

But the ultra-Royalists would accept no philosophic aid in the restoration of religion. They would not have it as the result of free intellectual progress: they began by preventing all discussion, and closing the mouths of adversaries by their rigid penalties against all who should outrage, that is, question religion, or excite hatred against a class. Giving up the hope of trusting the grown-up educated class, they directed their attention towards making converts of the lower class, by missionaries and missions, as well as obtaining empire over the young by transferring all grades of education to the priesthood. The Jesuits were installed in the university, from which lay professors and rectors were one by one expelled. The system of mutual instruction was scouted. Primary education was discontinued, except when conducted by the curates and the clergy. Parents were everywhere informed that education for their sons could only be obtained by complete conformity and obsequiousness to the priesthood. And as they taught a political education in praise of ultra-Royalism and in laudation of the Bourbons, the Government system of education and its managers, instead of enticing the youth of the population to their lessons, actually repelled and rendered them hateful and hostile. The missionaries, by their novel proceedings and attractive ceremonies drew crowds. But the majority of these soon began to mock, and then it became necessary to call in the police, in order to send to prison those who objected, or to ride down and sabre them, where the crowd was great and menacing. Scenes such as these took place in the very centre of Paris, in the Church of the Petits Pères, close to the Palais

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Royal, a quarter thronged with that class of metropolitan idlers, which it must have required some peculiar eloquence and careful argument to interest in mysteries, for which they had never learned reverence. The Presidency of the Council of Education, held formerly by Fontanes, and lately by Royer Collard, was now given to Frayssinous, Bishop of Hermopolis, and he sedulously set about the substitution of ecclesiastics for laymen. The most eminent men and most able professors were driven from the chairs which they had occupied with talent and success, merely because they were laymen.

Liberal writers are fond of representing this as the result of a conspiracy; and as they themselves were deeply engaged in occult deliberations and councils for overturning the dynasty, so they represented the Royalists and the priesthood as forming a secret association for superseding all other opinions by rigid Catholicism; and they then depict the Congregation as something similar to Carbonari. The Congregation entertained no plot, however, beyond that of coercing the Government, and employing its power and patronage to inculcate and impose religious belief and the habits of piety. Though not a conspiracy it was a tyranny, and a very stupid and demoralizing tyranny. Every mean and time-serving Frenchman soon discovered that the way to advance and obtain favour from the Government was to affect piety. All such persons, accordingly, paid court to the Congregation, received the sacrament with sanctified demeanour, and qualified for loyalists and favourites of the existing Govern-

* I remember Botta, the historian of modern history, expelled from the chair he occupied at Rouen, and thus deprived in his old age of this his only support.

ment by hypocrisy. By their side were numbers who were by no means inclined to sedition, or who would not have deserted their commercial and other occupations to conspire against the Bourbons; but these, if they refused to submit to the priest and forswear the free-thoughtedness of their education and that of their fathers, were set down as revolutionists and anarchists, and punished as local authorities knew well how to do. There was no medium. And all who would not go the length of sacerdotalism, were driven to take refuge with the Carbonari, and with the large liberal mass in a permanent state of resentment and conspiracy against the Bourbons. It is needless to say what immense harm was inflicted on the cause of religion, as well as of morality, by thus driving the people into extremes, and by compelling even the youngest to take part in quarrels beyond their years. For even a boy could not avoid either getting under a Jesuit, or, in repugnance of his lesson and his system, being drawn to the revolutionary schools and teachers in matters of religion as well as politics and all else. This state of things and of men's minds, the historian may be allowed to add, he has not copied or inferred from books, but witnessed and observed during a long residence in France, and a daily intercourse with every class of society throughout this period.

CHAPTER IV.

VILLÈLE; HIS MODERATION, HIS FINANCIAL SYSTEM—HIS ECONOMY DISTURBED BY THE SPANISH REVOLUTION—FERDINAND AND THE MODERADOS—THE TRAPPIST'S CAPTURE OF URGEL—INSURRECTION OF MADRID—CONGRESS OF VERONA—PROPOSALS OF, AND INTERVENTION—MONTMORENCY RESIGNS—CHATEAUBRIAND, AS MINISTER, PRECIPITATES INTERVENTION—PASSION IN THE CHAMBER—EXPULSION OF MANUEL.

THE greatest of all political curses is the rule of a minority, which despairs of maintaining its ascendancy by any other modes than those of repression, of violence, and intimidation. The arbitrary tyrant, who employs such means and acts upon such motives, is fearful in his vengeance and his caprice. He is not ubiquitous, however, and multitudes are safe from the eye of the tyrant by not attracting his notice; but the tyranny of a political party, exercised under the name and with the power of constitutional government, is felt by all, for it comes in contact with all, in the business and in the pleasures of life; in devotion, in litigation, and in the universal struggle for ambition or eminence, for wealth or for any of the prizes of interest and fortune. If Bonapartist despotism oppressed and benumbed, it at least weighed upon all equally, and prevented one opinion or party preying upon another. If, therefore, it suspended activity, it gave repose. But

the ultra-Royalist reaction irritated as well as oppressed. It set one portion of the people to provoke and prey upon the rest. It disturbed the parish and intruded into the family, as well as monopolized the Government and revolutionized the State. Yet nothing surprises us more than the impunity and apparent success which attended these ultra-Royalist attempts, as well as the ridiculous failure of the efforts made by even Ministers to resist or to obstruct their progress.

It is difficult to imagine a statesman less formed to act the chief of such a tyranny and such a reaction, than M. de Villèle. Without enthusiasm, because without any deep convictions, refusing to conceive or to contemplate the pure views and visionary aims which actuated so many of his party, Villèle's principle was to take care of the present, and leave the future to provide for itself. Whatever use he made of the ultra-Royalists in ascending to power, he showed every disinclination to employ or court those zealots when there; and although Chateaubriand pointed out the danger to him of a Royalist opposition, he preferred braving one to making colleagues of such men as Delatot and Labourdonnaye. To the ultra-religious party, grouped around the Count d'Artois, Villèle was as averse as to the more absolutist and aristocratic partizans; but he was compelled to be more obsequious to them. They had, in truth, got possession of almost every ministerial department, so that patronage or advancement was only to be gained through them; but Villèle hoped to control them in those matters of general policy, over which as Prime Minister he had superior influence. In drawing up and discussing the laws regulating the press, which formed the chief business of the first session of his Ministry, he seemed to be guided by a wish to satisfy the Royalist expectations

and demands, without executing or exaggerating them. No liberal amendment, which did not menace his power, excited his repugnance or his ire.

His chief attention was turned to finance, the department of which he specially undertook. Hitherto the budget had merely been voted for the current year, which always led to hurry and embarrassment at the commencement of the session, which took place before Christmas; and often the greater part of the revenue was raised, before it was fully discussed and voted. Villèle brought the session of 1821 to a close in the Midsummer of that year, and after causing one-fifth of the deputies to be re-elected, as was still the law, he opened what was called the session of 1822, which was dedicated to the budget of the ensuing year. Hitherto the Finance Ministers of the Restoration as of the Empire, were men either of official education and routine, or else capitalists, more connected with the commercial than the agricultural class of society. Villèle was from habit of life, thought, and connexion, a country gentleman. In the statement prefacing the budget of 1818, the ordinary expenditure of which amounted to thirty millions sterling, it was mentioned that about two-thirds of these were paid by land. The ordinary expenditure had expanded to thirty-six millions, and the portion of it furnished by the land, if not increased, was still most onerous. The electoral law had, indeed, been no sooner changed, and the agricultural party placed in a majority in Parliament, than their very first cry had been for loans to agriculture, prohibitions of all foreign products affecting prices, and alleviations of direct taxation. Villèle's policy ran completely in this direction; and the prohibitive system under the care of M. St. Cricq, received full development during

his Ministry. Villèle was not only the French country gentleman, but had been reared as a French colonist, consequently colonial interests were as dear to him, as those of the domestic landowner. Laws were accordingly passed to secure to the French colonist the monopoly of the sugar supply, notwithstanding the increase of price which must ensue. Foreign corn and cotton were more rigidly excluded. Peace had already enhanced the general prosperity. Every tax was each year more productive and money more plentiful. And Villèle indulged in the usual dream of Prime Ministers—to be able to reduce the interest upon the debt, through which, and by the increased production of existing taxes he hoped to lighten, if not take off, the burdens which weighed upon land, and upon that class which supported his government, and were sincere in seeking to establish the Bourbon monarchy.

Previously, and when in opposition, Villèle had professed principles and views very much corresponding to our own old Tories. He wished to diminish, if not destroy, centralization, and to replace the action of Government in the provinces, by that of the landed proprietors, as well as by municipal bodies in towns, formed also upon the basis of property. In connexion with these principles, he had opposed the conscription law and the regular army, proposing to replace at least a portion of the latter by a militia, and thus to organize France for territorial defence, not for political or ambitious offence. Such ideas, far too advanced for the time, Villèle subsequently abandoned And he was no sooner minister of France, than he imbibed or assumed the instincts and tendencies of all who have been in that position, which are to centralize and augment the powers of Government.

But events began to press soon after Villèl. assumed the reins of administration, of a nature to disturb all his plans of economy, his hopes of financial prosperity and domestic peace. The Spanish revolution reared itself beyond the Pyrenees as a formidable enemy, progressing in a sense directly opposed to the more pacific, but not less decided revolution, which the courtier, the priesthood, and the would-be aristocracy had achieved for themselves in France. The dominant French party knew but one mode of meeting hostile opinions, that of physically crushing, and violently repressing them. Having no idea of political tolerance towards their opponents at home, they were led to put the same principle in practice with regard to opposition from abroad. And the first word, and the first idea, of the Royalists in Paris was to march across the Pyrenees, and chastise the Spaniards, as a nation bound to be subservient to France, and as a people which had no right to form a line of policy, or adopt a system of government, at variance with the idea and the principle prevailing in Paris. New to political life, utterly ignorant of the phenomenon of the working of free and popular government, they could not perceive, that in any country left to itself the democratic principle or party, if not in concurrence with the condition of society, with the wants and tastes of the people, will very soon excite disgust, create enmity, and raise a domestic resistance, which is alone sufficient to put it down or to arrest it; whilst the result of foreign interference has merely the effect of interrupting the natural tendencies of every country and every society to right itself. The Royalists were determined to put down the Spanish revolution by force; the government of the Holy Alliance were anxious and urgent that it should

do so. M. Villèle, however resisting and reluctant, was still obliged to go with the sentiment of his party, and at least prepare the materials of armed power by an increase of the military establishments as well as of the navy.

Napoleon had an excuse to urge in alleviation of his rapacious conduct towards Spain; this was the incapacity, the corruption, the infamy, the utter vileness, and worse than worthlessness of the royal family of the country, of King Charles, of his Queen, and of a son so worthy of them as Ferdinand. A great deal may be said for absolute government in certain countries; but it is indispensable that the monarch who wields such power should at least be endowed with an average amount of sense and of humanity. The Spanish Bourbons lived the life and displayed the qualities of the wild beasts of the desert, without their courage. They were ferocious, sensual, treacherous, headlong, merciless when the strongest, pusillanimous in the presence of a stronger power. Christianity with them was merely a cloak for sensual indulgence, and an incentive to the spilling of blood. Of government they had no more idea than the tiger that lords it in the jungle. To give or leave such rulers to any nation, whatever their rights, is a crime, a folly, and a sin.

Such were the beings for whose restoration so much noble English blood was spilled, fortunately with higher aims and results than the delivery of Spain to Ferdinand. Could we have known him, not even Lord Liverpool would have enthroned him, when his breach of promise and his imbecility at last provoked a revolution which was not achieved, as so often asserted, by a small portion of the army in one corner of the Peninsula, but by general risings throughout the kingdom. The Constitutionalists, who

threw off the chains of the galley-slave to re-enter the Cortes, had the same excuse as Napoleon for not trusting Ferdinand. They shrunk from dethroning him, but it was impossible to intrust him with the powers of a constitutional King, such as this was understood in France or England. For the Liberals to trust him with any power was to deliver their own heads to the executioner. The democratic extravagance of the Spanish constitution was to be regretted, but anything more moderate was impossible with such a prince.

The base treachery and ferocious ingratitude with which Ferdinand on his return to Spain in 1814 had treated all those who by their councils, their arms, or their energies, had aided in liberating the Peninsula, and thereby restoring the monarchy, warranted on their part every precaution. Indeed, the state in which the administration and the treasury, and every public department, were found by the Revolution, alone warranted the transfer of the crown to some prince of the family capable of wearing it. This, however, would only have precipitated hostilities on the part of France and the Eastern powers, who held to the indefeasible right of the monarch, and who deemed Europe to be once more abandoned to the revolutionary principle, if even a change of succession like that of the English throne was allowed to be consummated.

The French Government, even under the administration of the Duc de Richelieu, had shown its hostility to the Spanish Liberals. It collected a body of troops on the French side of the Pyrenees, under the pretext of preventing the yellow fever, which raged at Barcelona, from spreading into France. The Spanish finances being absolutely null and unproductive, the Cortes felt obliged to

come upon the clergy, which had monopolized every territorial source of riches, and rendered the formation of wealth or the collection of a revenue impossible. The members dispossessed seized the musket or sword, and flew to the mountains, where they raised the standard of the Faith. The Constitutionalists attacked them, and drove them several times within the French frontier. This they were allowed to cross by the French commanders, and permitted to march round in order to re-enter Spain by some other point. The hostility of France was evident, as well as the complicity of the King with these attempts to restore his absolutism.

Such bad faith and antagonism had the effect of depriving the Moderates, or *Moderados*, as they were called, of power and influence, and rendered it difficult for them to maintain order and protect the monarch against the party, which was swelled to exaggeration and which breathed resentment. Yet in the Extraordinary Cortes, which closed in the first week of 1822, the *Moderados* triumphed. A ministry was formed, of which Martinez de la Rosa was the chief, and this ministry displayed both courage and success in combating the violent partizans of Riego and of the Communezo. In the provinces it was more difficult, especially in Andalusia, where the spirit of the free population was evinced by the usual fervour of that province; but still a great portion was faithful. The cause of constitutional monarchy had an able military commander in Morillo; and very rational and well-founded hopes existed that Martinez de la Rosa and Toreno might have accomplished the working of the constitution, and the reconciliation of it with the monarchy, if the insurrection of the Royalists and Clergy, and the bad faith of the King, had

not precipitated the Revolution, and transferred all power and confidence to the extreme democrats.

It was in the spring of 1822 that the Royalist insurrection, after having been several times routed and suppressed, burst out with renewed violence, and evidently with fresh resources, in Catalonia. The decree of the Cortes, limiting the numbers of convents and of the clergy, and cashiering, it was calculated, upwards of seventy-three thousand ecclesiastics, was then coming into operation, and was alone sufficient to furnish forth an Army of the Faith. The citizens of Pampeluna, who took part with their clergy, were disarmed and very roughly treated by the troops. The ministry expelled by the Communezos were not always able to proceed in the government with the moderation of its name and character. Two great convents in Catalonia, those of Poblet and Escornalbou, became the centre of an insurrection. But the armies of the constitutional monarchy vigorously defeated these attempts; and pursuing an army of insurgents to Cervesa, where they had their head-quarters, a stubborn resistance on the part of the latter led to their defeat, as well as to the total destruction of the town and its inhabitants. Similar attempts were made in other parts of the kingdom. The King had gone to Aranjuez, and announced his intention of proceeding for the ceremonies of Easter to Toledo. No doubt this was connected with a plan for his joining, and his being carried off by, the insurgents. But they at first met with nothing but defeat; and Ferdinand was obliged to return to Madrid to close the stormy session of the Cortes.

Amongst the monks turned adrift from their convents, by the constitutional decrees, was a Trappist, Maragnon by name, who had been in former times a soldier. He

resumed his old vocation, and was soon recognised as chief by a band of insurgents. The Trappist retained his monastic garb; and on horseback or on foot, he marched to the combat with the crucifix in one hand and his whip of discipline in the other. In this guise the Trappist, with other chiefs, attacked Urgel, an archiepiscopal residence and fortress in the north of Catalonia, precisely the head-quarters which an Army of the Faith should desire. The Trappist marched in the night to the assault of Urgel, followed gallantly by his band, which braved the fire of the besieged. Their guns were not sufficiently numerous or prepared for so unexpected an attack. The Trappist carried the citadel and all its forts by storm, capturing in them, what was valuable to his party, some sixteen hundred stand of arms and sixty pieces of artillery. The Constitutional soldiers, captured in the performance of their duty, were mercilessly shot by the Trappist, who hoisted the standard of Absolutism and of the Faith in Urgel.

This feat of arms was achieved on the 21st of June; and on the 30th the King proceeded to close the session of the Cortes. The quarrels between the troops of the line and the regiments of the Royal Guard in the capital were frequent. The tidings of the capture of Urgel had now come to exasperate parties. On the return of the King from the Cortes to the palace, some blows were exchanged between the populace, which shouted "Vive Riego," and the Royal Guard. One of the officers of the Guard, considered a Liberal, exerted himself to restrain his men; in the struggle he was slain by them. The murder of Landaburn, as the officer was called, soon became known throughout Madrid, and awakened such resentment, that

the citizens forming the Militia and National Guards collected in great force, posted themselves in the square fronting the royal palace, evidently in menace and distrust, and bivouacked there for the night.

The Guards within the palace barricaded the doors; and as a law had already passed for dissolving the Royal Guard, destroying its privileges of grade and pay, and reducing its soldiers to the same rank as the line, that corps felt an interest in the restoration of the old monarchy. No doubt the monarch emboldened them in holding out. Meantime General Morillo had persuaded the militia to withdraw from their position before the palace; but his efforts to cause the two regiments of the Guards to withdraw were fruitless. The militia, in consequence, again assembled on the Plaza, and some regiments of the line came to support them. Another day passed in this state of suspense. In the night the remainder of the Guard, consisting of four regiments, fearing they might be imprisoned and disarmed in their barracks, resolved to march out of the city to a position beyond the walls. General Morillo endeavoured to bring them to reason and to obedience to the Constitution: they answered by cries of "Long live the absolute King!" They begged of him to head them in annihilating the *Descamisados*, and when he refused, they proposed to compel him by force to remain with them. Upon his resistance they let the General go, and marched off to occupy the royal residence of El Pardo.

There were thus two camps of ultra-Royalists, one in the Palace of Madrid, another in that of El Pardo, both watched and besieged by a Constitutional army, which every day increased, and every day wore more the aspect

of a revolutionary one. The Ministers and Morillo, however moderate, could not but declare against the Guards, and demanded of the King orders to march upon them and suppress them. This the King refused. The Guards insisted on the abrogation of the decree which abolished their privileges, and at the same time required the *epuration* of the Madrid Militia, or the expulsion of democrats from it. Such demands were not to be entertained. Still the King would not lend his authority against his Guard. In this contest Ferdinand threw away his only hope of safety, or of continuing in alliance with the Constitutionalists; for he so disgusted the Moderates, and even Morillo, that all with one accord made a vow never to serve him, or if possible come in contact with him. Martinez de la Rosa declared he would never put his foot within the palace; and even Morillo, so inclined to be Royalist, was compelled to take part with the National Guard against the Palace. At one time attempts were made to conciliate the King by offering to obtain such modifications to the constitution as would give him more power, and be more satisfactory to his pride. But even after some of them had been agreed on, his Majesty drew back and declared that nothing but absolute power would satisfy him.

Such was the state of things, when, on the morning of the 7th of July, the regiments of Guards stationed at El Pardo quitted that palace before daybreak, and entered Madrid in three separate columns, the central one directing its course upon the palace, the other two taking streets on either side of it, so as to arrive, one at the Puerta del Sol, the other at the gate of St. Vincent. All three found large bodies of troops and militia, commanded by Morillo himself, by Ballastèros, and Alava, ready to receive

them. One of the divisions was altogether routed, and its commander captured. The corps which approached the Puerta del Sol was repulsed from it, but was able to fall back upon the central column, which, with more success, had cleared the Place Mayor, and gained an entrance to the palace. Here they were soon obliged to shut themselves up. The remainder of the Guard with his Majesty were soon besieged there by an overwhelming force, of which the artillery would have soon laid open the palace. The Guards could not have defended it against the troops, commanded by all their known Generals, and supported by the populace. Ferdinand, therefore, felt compelled to hoist the white flag from the summit of the palace, and surrender. Some bodies of the Guard managed to cut their way through and escape northwards, no doubt to join the insurgents.

French Royalist writers have sought to establish an identity between the days of the 10th of August in Paris, when the Tuileries was invaded, and the 7th of September at Madrid, when the royal palace was reduced; but no two events could be more dissimilar in their causes or their circumstances. The 7th of September was produced exclusively by Ferdinand's acts and obstinacy. Full time and opportunity were allowed him to escape from the danger, and avoid precipitating the revolution. The chiefs of the moderate party stood around him, showed him the way, and pointed out the necessity. He spurned and alienated them; and by his foolish conduct put it out of their power to serve him or to save him for the future. Immediately after the surrender of the palace, not only did Martinez de la Rosa and the Moderados confess themselves to be impossible, but even Calatrava and the constitutional Exaltados declined office, perceiving their inability

to calm or to check the excited passions of the ultra-democrats. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given to Evariste San Miguel, and the other offices to men whose names inspired the people with confidence. Even Morillo, whose conduct had been most exemplary, was obliged to resign the captain-generalship of the capital and the provinces around it, and withdraw, with every man of moderate aims, into retirement.

The counter-revolution, having thus failed in attaining its ends in the capital, except so far as by precipitating the Government into the democratic extreme, it might hope the more easily to create a reaction in favour of the other, the efforts of the Royalists were concentrated in the north-eastern provinces, bordering upon France. Considering Ferdinand as a prisoner since the events of the 7th of July, the insurgents established a Royalist regency, in the name of Ferdinand the Seventh, at Urgel, in September. The regency consisted of the Marquis of Malta Florida, President, of the Archbishop of Tarragona, and the Baron d'Erroles. At first the faction had some success, and captured Mequinenza. But as soon as Mina organized the Constitutional army in Catalonia, he attacked each of the insurgent chiefs and those of the regency, defeated them wherever he met them, drove them from all their strongholds, forced them to evacuate first Urgel and afterwards Puycerda, and drove them—D'Erroles, Quesada, and the redoubtable Trappist —to take refuge, with fifteen thousand of their troops and followers, in France.

Whilst the Spaniards within their own frontiers thus decided on which side lay the will and the force of the people, the Sovereigns of eastern Europe proposed to meet the ambassadors of those of the west at Verona to take

into consideration the circumstances of the Spanish revolution. One personage came to that Congress, boiling with anti-revolutionary zeal, and eager to employ the sword and bayonet in putting down what had become his bugbear—military insurrection. He, who in 1814 had been so ultra-constitutional as to make the Count d'Artois and Louis XVIII. the subject of his ridicule, who could not then address a civil word to the ultra-Royalists, and who preferred unbosoming himself to Lafayette, was now far more ultra-Royalist than the king of France or than Prince Metternich, chiding the scruples and timidity of both. "The Emperor of Russia," writes Chateaubriand, not very intelligibly, "had a strong will (*l'âme forte*), but a weak character. Fickle from this cause, he had become as ardent a Royalist as he had been a Liberal. When introduced to him in Paris, he took me for an Ultra, and would not converse except on matters of religion. At Verona, having become Ultra, he shunned me as a Liberal."

The sentiments and conduct of the Minister of Austria are portrayed by the same writer:—"Prince Metternich, affecting to be Russian while detesting Russia, prattled about war without having any wish for it. He praised our success in Spain for the power it would give our army; and equally dreaded our reverses for the strength these would give to the cause of revolution."

There is little doubt the feelings of Prince Metternich were precisely the reverse. He dreaded to see the French Government assemble an army, or launch it into campaigns, lest so much disaffection, as was known to pervade officers and soldiers, should produce a mutiny, like that of the Isle de Leon, and thus present France as an ally, not a foe, to the Spanish revolutionists. Alexander himself had the

same expectations; but he hoped from this would arise the necessity of his being again called in, and becoming once more, without much cost or risk, the arbiter of France and of Europe. These fears were shared by M. de Villèle and by King Louis himself; and they were aggravated by the knowledge that the English Cabinet was adverse to French military intervention in Spain, and would be undoubtedly prone to take advantage of any reverse or disaster to France to avenge or retaliate for such unfriendly conduct.

The directions, which M. de Villèle drew up for the plenipotentiaries whom he proposed to send to Congress, enjoined them to avoid either the promise of intervention or the demand of succour. The Prime Minister insisted that France and its Cabinet should be left completely independent, to deal with Spain as it saw reason to do; and that all that was to be asked was, that the other Powers would consent to recall their ambassadors from Madrid whenever France thought it fit to recall hers. But Sovereigns did not meet in Congress to be content with so petty a determination as this. M. de Villèle was Prime Minister, and Louis XVIII. was King; but the majority in the Chamber belonged to the Count d'Artois and the ultra-Royalists, who had nominated M. de Montmorency to the post of Foreign Affairs. How to restrain or to neutralize an agent so powerful, and of opinions so contrary to theirs, as M. de Montmorency, was a difficult task for M. de Villèle and for the King. His Majesty, to increase Villèle's authority, had declared him formally and officially Prime Minister at the commencement of these negociations. In this capacity he drew up instructions to M. de Montmorency, who, in the first instance, was only to proceed to Vienna.

Villèle, at the same time, made choice of one to supersede the presence and neutralize the policy of M. de Montmorency at Congress. This was Chateaubriand, of whom, indeed, both the Prime Minister and the King were distrustful. But Chateaubriand, from his post in London, pleaded hard to be allowed to go to Verona; and in his letters requesting this, he professed such friendship for Villèle, such confidence in him, and made such a show of taking him for a political leader, that the Minister, also aware of Chateaubriand and Montmorency's mutual dislike, resolved to make use of the former to represent the moderate ideas of the King and the Prime Minister at Verona, in case M. de Montmorency should show himself the mere representative of ultra-Royalist zeal.

The conduct of M. de Montmorency at Verona was precisely what M. de Villèle feared. Instead of confining himself to his written instructions, he not only demanded that the Great Powers should recall their ambassadors simultaneously with France, but asked them for both moral and material succour in the event of war with Spain—an eventuality which M. de Montmorency frankly considered as a certainty. The French negociator represented the circumstance of any outrage to the King or royal family as being a fair *casus belli*. To this Prussia and Austria answered with their usual reserve—Russia with its wonted zeal and precipitation. The Duke of Wellington, on behalf of England, abstained from joining in any way in resolves which, becoming known to the Government of Spain, would only add to its embarrassment, by exasperating its people, and produce those very dangers to the royal family which it pretended to remove.

Few topics were more fully or more passionately de-

bated than this French invasion of Spain, and the right of intervention on which it was founded. Questions of abstract right are, however, of very little use to discuss in politics; their being proved or disproved ever so demonstratively never weighing much with those who have the will, or the power, or the interest to decide. The ultra-Royalists, who considered the sacro-sanctity of the monarch, and the undefined nature of his authority, to be something divine, were ready to march into Spain as on a crusade. They considered right or liberties emanating from the people as heresy and profanation, and they marched to crush it, as their ancestors marched to massacre the Albigenses.

The most active promoter of this war, the man who chiefly contributed to precipitate it, and who has not shrunk from laying bare his motives, avowed these to have been no other than to raise the Bourbon dynasty in France up to the same pedestal which had supported the greatness of Napoleon. France was humiliated by the events of 1815, and the Bourbons with it. To raise it from that humiliation, and, in doing so, to give a French government once more the command of an army—by that army to subdue Spain, with total recklessness as to what might be the result to Spain, provided it remained submissive to France, and chained to its policy—and then to let loose this army upon Europe, in order to undo the treaties of 1815,—such was the dream of this dangerous and adventurous politician; who, in the conception and gradual realization of it, was necessarily compelled to deceive every one with whom he came in contact—his friends, his sovereign, the French statesmen who employed and trusted him, as well as the foreign statesmen and princes with whom he conversed or

negociated. By the account which M. de Chateaubriand gives of himself, and vauntingly too, he was for this year, which he considered the glory of his name, a continual and living lie, deceiving, duping, sacrificing, and overthrowing everything that came in his way—cause, country, friendship, peace. Had he been even a sincere Royalist, a worshipper of monarchy, and a believer that kingly authority alone could bring happiness to a country and an age, one might still understand him; but even this faith Chateaubriand disowns. He makes the admission (from him so powerful to produce its accomplishment) that Royalty is amongst the human institutions that time will sweep away; and that the utmost that can be done for monarchy is to set it up and establish it for a time. Yet, in the same volume in which he avows this, he excuses the iniquitous invasion of Spain, and the re-establishment of the tyranny of Ferdinand, on the plea that it was necessary for the grandeur of the Bourbons of France!! If Machiavel made light of principle, and was ready to sacrifice it as well as life and liberty, it was at least to a purpose; but here was the sacrifice of all perpetrated and preached without any purpose whatever beyond the momentary gratification of the vanity of an individual politician.

M. de Montmorency returned from Verona with the draft of those despatches which the Allied Governments proposed sending to Madrid, together with one from France to the same purport. No one augured anything but defiance in answer, which would afford the pretext that M. de Montmorency and the crusaders desired. But Villèle was agitated by other fears and considerations. The Urgel regency had been beaten and driven over the

frontier by Mina. The funds had fallen; commercial speculations were interrupted. Where were resources to be found for a war which all rational persons regarded as folly? The Duke of Wellington, at the same time passing through Paris, saw the King and his Minister, and, making use of dissuasive arguments against the war, offered the mediation of England. The only reply, a very true one, that the French Minister could give to such a proposal was, that there was really nothing to mediate about. It was, therefore, declined; but Villèle still hoped that strong representations made at Madrid by France and by England conjointly, would bring the ruling powers there to something like reason, and that concession might be made to the monarchic principle which would calm the irritation of the French ultra-Royalists. M. de Montmorency was coldly received by the Monarch and the Minister to whose instructions and intentions he had paid so little regard. The notes which he had brought from Verona were not despatched. A more conciliatory note, drawn up by the King and by Villèle, addressed to the Comte de la Garde, was substituted instead of the original French one; and M. de Montmorency at once resigned.

M. de Villèle would not have provoked and produced the retirement from his Cabinet of one who so fully possessed the confidence of the Comte d'Artois and the ultra-Royalists, if he had not the means of soothing their anger by the appointment of Chateaubriand in M. de Montmorency's place. Chateaubriand he still believed to be a participator in his moderate views, or, at least, one who, professing political attachment to the head of the present Government, would not be the man to thwart, betray, or

precipitate it into a dangerous policy, as Montmorency had done. Villèle little knew that, at the moment, Chateaubriand, left alone at Verona, had made use of his opportunities to ingratiate himself with the Emperor Alexander, to associate himself with the ideas of that monarch, and to use far more strenuous exertions than M. de Montmorency to fling France and force Villèle and the King into an invasion of Spain.

The prompt act of the confiding Villèle was to appoint M. de Chateaubriand to be a Minister of Foreign Affairs; and the moment the Viscount found himself in that seat, beyond the power of Villèle to displace him abruptly, he displayed himself as the zealous partizan of open war, the echoer of the most furious demands of the ultra-Royalists. His diplomatic correspondence with Spain assumed all the insolence of provocation: his retorts upon England were full of mockery and defiance; and Villèle found that instead of a conscientious, honourable, obstinate, and dull opponent in the Cabinet like Montmorency, he had given himself, in the person of his supposed follower and friend, a violent, unscrupulous, and talented rival.

It is difficult to imagine anything so devoid of sense, right, or reason, as the summonses addressed by the "Three Gentlemen of Verona" to Spain. Their demand was, that the people of that country should once more submit themselves to the will of Ferdinand, without spending one consideration upon the character of the monarch, or the indubitable use he would make of his power. To tell men who had escaped from wild beasts to walk back into their dens was as merciful and as reasonable as what the Great Powers demanded. The Spanish Minister, appointed as he had been on the morrow of a

popular insurrection, which had been wantonly provoked by the folly and treachery of Ferdinand, could make no answer except one of defiance.

The French note, although more moderate in tone, was equally indefensible in argument, and impracticable in its demands. "A constitution, that the King had neither recognised nor accepted, had been imposed upon him by a military insurrection." Such was the accusation of France: to which the Spanish Minister replied, that the present constitution was that under which Spain had fought and achieved her independence against Napoleon, to which Ferdinand owed his crown, and Europe itself, in some degree, its liberation; that the Great Powers had recognised that constitution; that King Ferdinand had been traitorously advised to set it aside; and the consequence was, that his government was so imbecile and so odious, that a revolution was achieved, not merely by the soldiers, but the acclamations of a whole people. Changes and reforms always left classes discontented with them. The enemies of liberty in Spain had shown themselves powerless, but they would not have even excited disorders if the French Government, by its army of observation, its threats, and its encouragement, had not fanned the flame of dissension and civil war. Instead of France having anything to demand of Spain, Spain, on the contrary, had to demand the removal of a hostile army from its frontier, and of authorities openly fanning sedition within its frontier. "The despatch of the French Government," concludes the Spanish rejoinder, "offers friendship and kindness in case that its demands are complied with; but this is conveyed in hypothetical and amphibological expressions which it would be quite idle to analyze."

The sarcasm of *amphibologique*, applied to the words of a despatch drawn up chiefly by Louis XVIII., rather nettled that personage, who piqued himself upon his style. The despatch merely alluded to those counsels which the French and English ambassadors were to press upon the Spanish Cabinet, those of modifying the constitution so as to bring it into some resemblance with that of France. Villèle was emboldened to make the demand, by knowing that such changes had been negociated amidst the outbreak of September; but they had been even then scouted by Ferdinand. In such arrangements the character and good faith of the monarch were everything. The same constitution, sworn to and administered by even Louis XVIII., was quite a different thing from the same constitution accepted by the Comte d'Artois, and still more different when the monarch was to be Ferdinand, to whom oaths were of no force, who had condemned, by his sole will and word, the most able men in his dominions to the punishment of galley-slaves for the sole crime of being Constitutionalists, and whose increased ire would infallibly send them to the scaffold the moment he had the power. To uphold, as the wise men assembled at Verona did, that all institutions or liberties for Spain were profanation and crime, unless they had been conceded and accepted by this man, was one of those monstrous absurdities considered conservative, and quoted as the precepts of a political gospel. The Spanish demagogues may have been frantic and unreasonable, but they could not be more so than the kings and statesmen who undertook to teach them, and who did cram down their lessons at the point of the bayonet—with what result time has since fully shown.

At all events, however possible any modifications of the

constitution might have been at the commencement of the year, when Martinez de la Rosa was in power—when he still commanded a majority in the Cortes, and had General Morillo Captain-General of Madrid, with power over the soldiery—it was vain to demand these modifications of a Minister situated as Evariste San Miguel, and still more vain to hope that such an inveterate Tory as Sir William A'Court could make any sincere or effectual efforts to obtain them. The King and Villèle, therefore, failing in their tardy attempts to avoid war by rendering the Spanish Government moderate and constitutional, several months after they had allowed the moderate and constitutional party to be crushed, were obliged to abandon their opposition to the war, and to give full reins to the bellicose ardour of Chateaubriand.

Thus closed the year 1822: Chateaubriand, master of the foreign policy of the Cabinet, dragging the King and Villèle with him into war, secure of the majority of the Chamber, and the support of the Count d'Artois and the Royalists. The first use which this Minister made of his free hands and his full powers was to expedite a despatch recalling the French Ambassador from Madrid. The language was overbearing and insolent. He accompanied it by another, in which he professed to interpret the previous offer of accommodation. This characteristic epistle is as follows:—

"*Paris, January* 18*th*, 1823.

"In transmitting the King's orders for your demanding your passports and quitting Spain with your Legation, it is my duty to give you some explanation respecting those expressions which General San Miguel found to be amphibological in the letter of M. de Villèle.

Those expressions can only be ambiguous for those who do not understand them. But that the enemies of France may not say that you quitted Madrid without your Government making its meaning perfectly well known, I will explain myself.

"In order to restore order in Spain and re-establish security in France, as well as other continental States, there exists a mode as simple as it is efficacious. All shall be considered terminated on that day when Ferdinand VII. is able, by himself and of his own authority, to make the necessary modifications in the constitution granted by his Most Catholic Majesty. Moreover, our King is of the opinion that it would be fitting to publish a general amnesty for all political acts, from 1812 to the present time. All Spaniards should be bound to submit to the new order of things; which, by the return of the foreign ministers to Madrid, will receive the only sanction and guarantee of which such an act is susceptible on the part of foreign governments. This happy change will preserve peace between France and Spain. But it is evident that it cannot take place so long as you remain at Madrid. Fifteen days will have elapsed from the time that the Legations of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have left, until your reception of this letter, during which time you have not been listened to. Lord Fitzroy Somerset and Sir William A'Court will not have been more successful. It is evident, therefore, that your presence at Madrid, as a means of conciliation, is perfectly useless; whilst your withdrawal is necessary for the preservation of peace; since it alone can authorize the collection on the frontier of a hundred thousand men whom we purposely keep in readiness. When his Royal Highness, the Duke d'An-

goulême, who is to command this army, shall have reached the bank of the Bidassoa, King Ferdinand may present himself at the head of his troops on the other side. The two princes may then have an interview, which will, perhaps, be followed by a treaty of peace, by constitutional modifications, and by the amnesty, which the King of France desires. We shall esteem ourselves happy to have contributed to the re-establishment of the monarchy and the reconciliation of Spain with Europe. Such are the sentiments of the French Government. It does not pretend to impose any form of government upon any people; but it cannot regard as legitimate and stable, institutions emanating from an illegitimate power."

What M. de Chateaubriand here proposed was simply that Spain and its monarch should imitate what had been enacted at Naples, where another Ferdinand, after a world of oaths, was allowed to meet his brother-sovereigns, and who returned at the head of their troops to grant no institutions whatever, but merely to play the part of executioner and gaoler. Having thus dictated a rupture with Spain, Chateaubriand was allowed to announce it to the French Chamber in the paragraph of the King's speech, which concerned foreign affairs.

This address, spoken on the 28th of January in the Louvre, began by representing the prosperous state of the national finance.

"We enter upon the year 1823 with a balance of forty millions over the credits allotted for the past year. France owed to Europe the example of a prosperity, that people cannot obtain without a return to religion, to legitimacy, to order, and to true liberty. France offers this salutary example at present; but Divine justice

permits, that after having so long inflicted upon other countries the terrible effects of our discords, we should be ourselves exposed to the danger which similar calamities have produced in a neighbouring country. I have done all in my power to guarantee the security of my people, and to preserve Spain herself from extreme misfortune. The blindness with which my representations, made at Madrid, have been rejected, leaves me few hopes of preserving peace. I have ordered the recall of our minister. One hundred thousand French, commanded by a prince of my family, by him whom my heart delights in calling my son, are ready to march, invoking the name of St. Louis, to preserve the throne of Spain to a grandson of Henry IV., to preserve that fine kingdom from ruin, and to reconcile it with Europe. If war is inevitable, I will do my utmost to restrict its limits and shorten its duration. It is undertaken solely to conquer that peace which the state of Spain renders impossible. Let Ferdinand VII. be free to give his people those institutions which they can hold only from him, and which in insuring their repose would dissipate the just inquietude of France, from that moment hostilities will cease. I take before you, Messieurs, the solemn engagement."

This announcement of war from the royal mouth gave rise, of course, to very animated debates in both Chambers. That in the Peers, where the Cardinal Archbishops took their seats, was the first to attract public attention by the appearance of the principal speeches in the shape of pamphlets. That of Prince Talleyrand was the most remarkable. With great dignity the veteran politician reminded his readers, or hearers, that he had been called by Napoleon to give his opinion upon an invasion of

Spain, and that he displeased the power of that day by declaring that it would prove as futile as it is iniquitous. "The present war," said the Prince, "is that of a mere party in France pitted against a whole nation in Spain. It was not a dynastic question. It was merely the rivality of the old aristocracy and privileged classes, who thought they might crush liberty and equality in Spain, and effect there the counter-revolution which they could not accomplish in France."

"Let us recollect," exclaimed M. Molé, "what rendered the French Revolution invincible: it became so when its cause was identified with national independence. Parties, once in motion and in action, are no longer answerable for what they may do. Crime with them often becomes a necessity."

It is remarkable, and it gives the full measure of Chateaubriand's sincerity and veracity, that he gave an account of the speech of Talleyrand as if he heard it. "I did not answer it," adds Chateaubriand, "for it seemed to me as if the shade of Bonaparte was about to rise and repeat the terrible contradiction he had already given to M. de Talleyrand." The truth was that M. de Talleyrand did not speak his speech at all, and, it is believed, did not even write it. It merely appeared in print as having been spoken; and the emotion which Chateaubriand attributes to himself on hearing it can be no other than pure imagination.

The language of opposition in the Lower Chamber was naturally more vehement. The speech of De Villèle faithfully portrayed the situation in which he was placed. For whilst one-half of it described the reluctance and the slow degrees by which he had been driven into war, the latter half boldly assumed the responsibilities of the

belligerent Ministers, and defended its policy by the argument that it was necessary. The words used by the Minister have been much disputed. They no doubt admitted, and with justice, that it was necessary for France either to break with Europe or to march into Spain. The Opposition construed his words to be, that the Government had only the alternative of attacking the Spanish revolution on the Pyrenees, or defending it on the northern frontier of France.

"If France alone," exclaimed General Foy, taking the Minister's words for a theme, "if France, in her independence, was engaged in a duel with Spain, I should lament the calamities of a war that is absurd—that is, without justice or morality, without glory or profit. I should lament these calamities, but at least I should foresee the end of them. But this is not the state of things. The war is not a French war—it is but the echo of Prussian and of Cossack resentments. It is not we who have lighted the fire, nor is it in our power to quench it. Ministers hope to make us believe that they are acting with perfect liberty. But facts speak louder than they. The secret and subterranean war which has so long been carried on against Spain now bursts into menaces and open hostility. What has Spain done to provoke them? Herself nothing, as Lord Liverpool has told you. There have been more seditions, and conspiracies, and trials, and executions in France than in Spain during the last year. The Ministers themselves did not till very lately consider war as necessary. The change of their opinion is not to be sought in what has happened at Madrid, but what occurred at Verona. French intervention is not a French act. It is the triple alliancethat forces the Government; that alliance

being itself impelled by the turbulent faction which has become master of France."

Whilst General Foy thus tore from off the origin of the war the curtain, of which the Minister himself lifted a corner, M. Royer Collard came forward to expose the fallacy of those political dogmas which the ultra-Royalists put forward, and which M. de Villèle in his despatch, and the King in his speech, had presented as the law to which every European country must submit.

"What is this motive of intervention," exclaimed Royer Collard, "but the plain declaration that governments alone have imprescriptible, eternal, natural rights, of which the origin is not of this earth, and that the people, on the contrary, have no other than acquired rights; that if governments do not concede to a people their rights, the people can have none? In other words, that governments existed before society did, and that society is the child of government." M. Royer Collard went on to say, "that he would not waste time in proving the absurd enormity of such theories. He would merely say, that they were not French, and were belied by the history of the country, as well as repudiated by its sense and its pride. The French were a docile nation; but they had never abdicated their just participation in influencing the administrations of their time. The French, like other nations, had rights which they held from nature and from the Creator, not from any king or race of kings. Such a theory of Divine right, or such a war as the present founded upon it, was never conceived in the royal thought. It belonged to a party, which, never regarding the Restoration save in the light of a chastisement inflicted on the country, had laboured incessantly to make it be felt as a humiliation

to the people. Ill repressed, weakly resisted, this absolutist party has made itself master everywhere, and perverts everything—the Charter, the administration, the representative system. It perverts religion itself, by calling it to preach and sanction those vindictive passions which are the negations of Christian charity."

This remarkable speech of Royer Collard was the opening of the second debate on the affairs of Spain; a debate occasioned by the demand of a credit of a hundred million of francs for the expenses of the war. It commenced on the 24th of February, and lasted several days. Almost every eminent man spoke. In the course of it, Chateaubriand made an elaborate defence of his policy. He began by the principle of non-intervention, which he declared to be sacred and incontrovertible. No country ought to interfere in the affairs of another country. He made this assertion, however, merely to destroy it, by adding the exception, where a country's essential interests were compromised. As every Government was to be the judge of when or how its interests were compromised, of course every Government had the right of intervention. The orator has given the measure of the value which he attached to such rights or such reasonings, by declaring in his Memoirs that they could not interrupt a statesman in his purpose. After this notable exordium of sophistry and insincerity, M. de Chateaubriand supported his policy by the conduct of England in the revolutionary war, when it renounced peace "to pursue a policy on the principle of justice." England then intervened too late to save Louis XVI. and his Queen.

Revolutionary France gave birth to a Convention: may not revolutionary Spain do the same? You say, we en-

danger the King by intervening too soon. Did England save Louis XVI. by deferring its intervention? The history and death of Charles I. and Louis XVI. are already too many examples. Another great judicial assassination, and the precedent will be established, as well as the jurisprudence of popular vengeance upon kings.

This was the strong point of the Minister's argument—the similarity of Ferdinand's situation to that of Louis, and the necessity of preventing a regicide. With respect to the opinion, not of past English ministers, but the present, M. Chateaubriand was unfortunately able to quote the words of a recent speech by Mr. Peel, "declaring Austria fully warranted in its invasion of Naples." To prove that the interests of France were seriously compromised, the Minister asserted that Spain, under the constitution of Cadiz, would infallibly drift to a republic; and that then France, instead of having a prince of the same family beyond the Pyrenees, would have a hostile government. This would compel France, in case of war, to divide its armies, and guard its southern as well as its northern frontier. This, M. Chateaubriand said, was not to be endured. The most successful part of the Minister's speech was that in which he defended the Government from being the mere instrument of the Holy Alliance. He denied that any policy was dictated from Verona, and quoted the Emperor Alexander's words, "that there should be no longer separate policies for nations, but a joint-policy of all countries against revolution."

Manuel could only rise on the following day to answer Chateaubriand. The Royalists were already so exultant at the effect of the Minister's eloquence, that they considered the mere act of Manuel's rising to answer it a

piece of insolence. The orator of Opposition began with great calmness. He saw the country rushing to war to crush and to avoid the consequence of revolution in a neighbouring country; but counter-revolution, that is, the state of things it would introduce, was just as full of insecurity and trouble. France was about to undertake to replace Spain in the position it was in when the revolution broke out; that is, in a position which naturally produced a revolution, and which required it as a remedy. As long as the invading army remained in Spain, it might maintain this tyranny; but it could not remain for ever, and when it was withdrawn, revolution, like nature, would resume its right. When was a revolution in favour of liberty ever put down? It might be momentarily crushed, but the genius of liberty which produced it could never be destroyed. Like Antæus, it always gathered strength from defeat and from prostration.

"The aim proposed by such a war," continued Manuel, "is to replace Ferdinand in his former authority. We have seen what use he made of it before. He incarcerated all the talent, all the bravery of his kingdom, the men to whom he owed everything. His government was atrocious."

Here the members of the Right rose up to call Manuel to account for describing the government of Ferdinand as atrocious.

"Your great plea," continued Manuel, "is, that you want to save Ferdinand and his family. I warn you not to renew the circumstances, which, in other times, conducted to the scaffold those victims for whom you manifest such a lively interest."

This allusion to the fate of Louis XVI., and the declaration that it was owing to the threats of the Royalists,

raised the passions of the Right to the highest pitch; and Manuel, perceiving the pain he inflicted, and the ire that he roused, returned more than once to the same image and the same assertion.

"It was the protection given by France to the Stuarts," continued Manuel, "which led to the destruction of those princes. Their protection was clandestine, no doubt, but it encouraged the Stuarts to brave public opinion. Hence the hostility of that opinion, and the misfortune which the Stuarts might have avoided had they trusted to their own nation. The Royal dynasty of France owed its most serious danger to the same cause, the invasion of the soil of the country by foreign armies. It was then that revolutionary France, feeling the necessity of defending itself by new force and by a fresh energy"—

Manuel was not allowed to finish his sentence. His words were answered by a simultaneous explosion from the benches of the Right, all exclaiming that it was the apology of regicide. "They hastened to interrupt him," says Lamartine, who is sufficiently favourable to the Royalists, "in order to have the right to execrate him." Their clamour was directed to the President, whom loud vociferations adjured to put down and punish the blasphemer with all his authority. M. Ravez, who held the presidential chair, seemed as much thunderstruck as the Left and Central sides of the Chamber by an outburst which seemed premeditated. Nevertheless he addressed Manuel, and reproaching him with having characterised the assassination of the martyr king as merely a measure inspired by fresh energy, called him solemnly to order. Whilst the Opposition rose to deny that Manuel had used such words, the ultra-Royalists rose to exclaim against the call to order as

an insufficient punishment, and to demand the expulsion of the bold speaker as an act of justice and expiation. Manuel demanded permission to explain. The clamourers declared that they would not give him the opportunity. The Opposition insisted, that the express rules of the Chamber gave a member the positive right to explain his words. Even such a man as Hyde de Neuville exclaimed, "We will suffer no justification!" At length the President made his voice heard above the storm, reproaching the Chamber with being incapable of any dignified or calm resolve at that moment, and that as President he could do no other than respect the standing rule. Ravez then put on his hat and suspended the sitting. As the hope of its being immediately reopened with decorum was vain, the President dismissed the members to the committee-rooms. The Right obeyed. The Left remained in their seats, where Manuel, who had during the whole time remained at the tribune, joined them. And whilst the Royalists in one of their committee-rooms were discussing and resolving to exclude Manuel from the Chamber, he was engaged in writing a letter addressed to the President, completing his obnoxious phrase, and denying the gravity imputed to it.

The letter was as follows :—

"MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,

"THE state of irritation of a part of this Assembly makes me fear I may not be able to find in the present sitting a moment of silence to finish the expression of a thought which, I trust, will find none to condemn it from the instant that the way in which it was my intention to terminate it is known. The Minister of Foreign Affairs alleged as a motive for the war, the necessity of preventing in Spain a

catastrophe similar to that which stained the French and English revolutions with blood. I replied, that the means proposed would augment, not diminish these dangers; and I brought forward as proof, the events which led to the overthrow of the Stuarts and the death of Louis XVI. I asked, could it be forgotten, that this misfortune was preceded by the armed intervention of Prussians and Austrians? and I stated as a fact, known to all the world, 'that then revolutionary France, feeling the necessity of defending itself by new force and by a fresh energy'—Here I was interrupted. Had I been permitted to proceed, my phrase would have been, 'that revolutionary France feeling the necessity of defending itself by new energy and force, put its masses in movement, excited its popular passions, and thus brought on terrible excesses and a deplorable catastrophe in the midst of a generous resistance.' No one more than myself is resigned to the prejudices and the violence of a portion of this Chamber, of which I have combated the principles and the efforts, believing them dangerous to the interests both of the throne and of the nation. But I ought not to be deprived by interruption and by a tumult, which you yourself admitted to have no foundation in justice, of the right of being heard before sentence is passed on me. I cannot allow even to bad faith to suppose, that I could cowardly shed insult without motives or interest on the misfortunes of those august victims, whose fate affected every generous heart. When I have spoken, I shall brave the judgment of the passionate, as I shall tranquilly await that of just men.

"MANUEL."

After the suspense of an hour, the President again took

the chair, and Manuel walked from his seat to occupy the tribune; but he was assailed by cries of "Down with the regicide!" "Expel the wretch!" Despairing of being allowed to address the Chamber, Manuel presented his letter to the President. The tribune was immediately occupied by M. Forbin des Issarts, who proposed the expulsion of Manuel. The Right supported the demand by cries of "To the vote." Manuel again made an effort to speak, but they would not hear him. Several voices then said, that a proposal had already been made, and a commission named. The President declared the standing rules to be, that a proposition must first be given to the President, by him communicated to the Committee, which might discuss it, and then a debate might ensue in the Chamber. The President then proposed to read the letter which Manuel had addressed to him; but even to this the ultra-Royalists would not listen, and the sitting was adjourned to the following day.

At the opening of the sitting, M. de Labourdonnaye formally proposed that the Chamber should make use of its right to judge offences committed by any of its members in the sittings of the Assembly, and should expel M. Manuel, deputy of La Vendée. In order to obviate the excuses and explanation of Manuel, and his denial of having used, or being about to use, any phrase defensive of regicide, Labourdonnaye said that he did not demand the member's expulsion for any particular phrase, but for the whole tenor of his speech and tendency of his principles. Anything so monstrous was never heard since the days of the Convention. To expel a member for the tendency of his speech was to put an end to constitutional government altogether.

Manuel, an orator and a politician often too extreme, but who, in the present case, had the sympathies and support of every moderate man in the country, defended himself with courage and with eloquence, declaring that he did not think any eloquence would appease the storm, or any argument convince his enemies, who having the majority, were determined to use it for the exclusion and oppression of every antagonist. They had tried to cancel his election for La Vendée, and, having failed, they had recourse to the present supplementary manœuvre. The idea of his lauding regicide was absurd. Who could have an interest in recommending it? who could allude to it but as a crime, and a danger to be dreaded and avoided? "For myself," said Manuel, "I was by my age and profession, a stranger to that great crime. I was with the armies at the time, in which, you pretend, French honour then took refuge. The antagonist who denounces me for a speech so innocent, that he dared not read or repeat it,—himself spoke words infinitely more criminal at this tribune. He called the Charter *an odious guarantee*, and yet you listened to him with patience.

M. Labourdonnaye said he was alluding to Spain.

"You pretend," said Manuel, "that by the peculiar word *Charter*, which has no application to Spain, you meant the constitution of the Cortes, not the Charter of this kingdom. What man can put faith in so manifest a subterfuge?"

The proposed expulsion of Manuel threw even the Spanish question into the shade. Ministers in vain abstained from voting, and deprecated so much violence. A party more powerful than they forced the Chamber

to display in its own disputes that appeal to violence, not reason, which they were compelling the administration to employ with regard to Spain. The proposal for expelling Manuel came on for debate on the 3rd of March. The Count de St. Aulaire, father-in-law of M. Decazes, opened the debate by a speech in favour of Manuel. He was followed by Royer Collard. The Moderate party, in fact, were more forward than the ultra-Liberals in deprecating and deploring the extremes to which the Royalists were proceeding. "Recurrence to violence instead of law," said Royer Collard, "when it is employed by a people, is called insurrection; when put in practice by State against State it is called *intervention*; when resorted to by a Government, is called by the French a *coup d'état*. The expulsion of Manuel is nothing but a *coup d'état*." M. Hyde de Neuville rose afterwards to obviate a difficulty which alarmed the more astute Royalists. The permanent exclusion of Manuel would necessitate the convocation of the electoral colleges which nominated him, and their being summoned to a new election. They might re-elect Manuel, and this would occasion another conflict. To avoid this, M. Hyde proposed to limit Manuel's exclusion to a year, and thus leave him the dormant, though expelled member for La Vendée. This opened a fresh subject of debate. The determination of the Right to vitiate the right of election, and to deprive even the electors of La Vendée of their right, being evident before the debate was exhausted, Manuel terminated it, by declaring, that recognizing no trace of right or justice in these proceedings, he would yield to force only. The proposal of M. Hyde Neuville, for exclusion for the remainder of the

session being put to the vote, was carried by the usual majority.

The excitement within and without the Chamber was at its height. The passions of the public were roused; there was not yet that simultaneous feeling, that confidence in each other, and determination to brave all hazards, which urge a people to commence, and enable it to accomplish, a successful insurrection. It requires that a people, like that of Paris, should be frequently tried, several times provoked, and that it should be worked by degrees to a catastrophe of that kind; for kings and dynasties cannot work their own ruin at once: it requires time, a long perseverance in fatuity, and a frequent repetition of blunders to destroy a monarchy. The violent injustice, the bootless extravagance, of the ultra-Royalists were preparing the way; exercising, drilling, and training the Parisian public to its great and final act of vengeance on the party, and upon the dynasty identified with it. The expulsion of Manuel was one of the acts, one of the provocations, which led to their final discomfiture. And yet, what was its object? What gain was there in expelling Manuel from the Chamber? In the same way the whole force of the State was directed towards suppressing the Spanish Cortes, and re-endowing Ferdinand with absolute power, thereby establishing the principle that power and freedom should only emanate from a King; but, in both cases, the apparent success was far more than counterbalanced by the terrible popular discontent, by the fire (which it merely covered over, but did not extinguish) which broke forth in a few years later, at a time when the extravagant and reactionary party had worn itself out, and had disgusted

the more moderate and rational of their own party. The triumph of an extreme party is nothing more than defeat disguised and ruin adjourned.

On the following day, before the Chamber was opened, guards were placed at all its entrances, with orders not to allow the entrance of Manuel. He glided in, however, unperceived, and he soon made his appearance clothed in his deputy's costume, seated amongst the colleagues of the Opposition. Great commotion ensued, and anxious consultation between the President, the Ministers, and the members of the majority. The President summoned M. Manuel to withdraw. "I announced yesterday," was the deputy's reply, "that I would only yield to force; and I come to keep my word."

The President then ordered the assembly to withdraw to the committee-rooms. All obeyed the injunction, save Manuel and the members of the Opposition. After the lapse of another hour, a number of *huissiers*, officers of the Chamber, came to read to M. Manuel, a written order of the President that he should withdraw. Manuel observed that it was illegal. The *huissiers* then withdrew, and returned with a piquet of men in uniform; they were National Guards and Veterans. It was customary for them to be on duty at the Chamber. They were saluted by an outcry from the deputies around Manuel. "The National Guard," exclaimed Lafayette, "execute such an order!"—"You are our protectors,—not our oppressors!" exclaimed another. The National Guards showed manifest signs of disliking the duty on which they had been sent. Still an officer of the Veterans besought Manuel to spare the troops the necessity of employing force. The officer,

who was a major of Veterans, received in answer an apostrophe from General Foy. He immediately withdrew, and returned with an order from the President to employ force. The captain of the National Guard present was accordingly ordered by him to effect the seizure and expulsion of Manuel. The captain reiterated these orders to the serjeant, Mercier by name, who kept a trimming-shop in a popular quarter, and who was by no means prepared to act the gens-d'arme. He therefore, hesitated, and the National Guards evidently approving this hesitation, he declined. The officer of Veterans quitted the hall amidst the loud applause of the Opposition benches.

In a few minutes about thirty policemen, under the orders of M. de Foucault, made their appearance. Foucault recommended the deputies not to resist the order of the Chamber, and the efforts of the National Guard.

"Don't calumniate the National Guard," exclaimed Lafayette: "it has refused to be the accomplice of the crime you are about to commit."

Foucault then summoned Manuel and his friends three times to obey, and then gave orders to the police to '*empoigner cet homme.*' It is impossible to translate the vulgar brutality of the expression. Foucault immediately seized Manuel by one arm, the police seized the other, held his collar, and began to drag him along. His friends for a short time resisted; but at last Manuel made signs to them that it was useless, and he allowed himself to be led out of the hall.

Sixty-nine deputies of the liberal party followed Manuel to the house of M. Girardin, when the following protestation was drawn out:—

"We the undersigned, deputies of the departments, declare, that we cannot behold without profound indignation and grief, which it is our duty to make known to all France, the illegal act, contrary to the rights of the Chamber, those of the royal prerogative, and all the principles of representative government, destructive of the integrity of the national representation, and violating in the person of a deputy the guarantees insured to all, as well as the right of both electors and citizens. We declare in the face of the country, that the Chamber has exceeded its legal sphere and the limits of its mandate. We declare that the doctrines professed by the Commission which proposed the exclusion of one of our colleagues, and in pursuance of which the measure was adopted, is in idea subversive of social order and of all justice; that the principle set forth in the report of the Commission, on the unlimited and retroactive authority of the Chamber, was but the same subversive principle which marked the epoch of odious crime; that the monstrous confusion of the powers and functions of legislators, accusers, reporters, jury, and judges, is a proceeding without example on any other occasion; and that the protecting forms, by which the law covers the humblest persons accused, and that even the vote of members by turn of roll, which in great circumstances alone can guarantee the independence of votes, were rejected with turbulent and passionate violence. Considering the resolution of the third of March against our colleague as the first step of a faction to place itself by violence above all forms, and to break through all the checks established by the fundamental compact; convinced that this first step is but the prelude to a system

which is leading France to undertake abroad an unjust war in order to consummate a counter-revolution at home, and to open our territory to foreign troops; not willing to render ourselves the accomplices of the misfortunes which this faction must draw down upon the country;—we protest against all the illegal and unconstitutional measures taken recently for the exclusion of M. Manuel, deputy of La Vendée, and against the violence which tore him from the Chamber of Deputies."



CHAPTER V.

VARIETIES OF DESPOTISM—THAT OF THE BOURBONS—THE REACTIONARY — CARBONARI PLOTS, THAT OF BEFORT —CONSPIRACY AND DEATH OF GENERAL BERTON—TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF THE FOUR SERJEANTS OF LA ROCHELLE.

THE various kinds of despotism observable in modern times are either the military autocracy, the lubber tyranny, or the reactionary one. The meanest, if not the most offensive, is the lubber kind, where a monarch or a court, sunk in ignorance, in luxury, and corruption of all kinds, assumes the attributes of the Pagan deity, whose sole task was self-indulgence, whilst the sole duty of mankind was obedience. That cruelty and fanaticism may be found to aggravate the maleficence of the lubber tyrant need not be observed. The Bourbon princes, especially in southern climes, upon the throne or in the palaces of Spain and Naples, afford the most perfect specimens of kingship reduced to this its most abject and revolting kind.

The military autocracy, very different from the lubber tyranny, is full of activity and glory. It has an aim and an impulse which spreads life through the whole body politic, from the sovereign on the throne to the peasant who is torn from the plough and compelled to be a hero. If

the country, so headed and so ruled, be surrounded by powerful and grasping neighbours, be not of magnitude to maintain its independence peaceably and respected, such a general armament and organization of a country is but the pursuit of self-preservation. Prussia, under the great Frederic, might have framed these pleas for the necessity of soldierdom and conquest. A state of overgrown frontier, of ample territory and resources, clothing itself permanently in this armour and attitude of war, such as Austria and as Russia have done, is a monstrous perversion of policy, and an idle development of mere martial force to the hindrance or destruction of that which is the true foundation of martial force—wealth, numbers, cultivation, and resources. But the gigantic efforts of France begat those monstrous armies, and gave them at first the pretext of necessary defence. With military autocracy may be joined, in some degree and for a certain time, views and plans for the internal development and amelioration of a country. But such schemes of raising a country in the scale of civilization and in material prosperity, by uninformed despotism, must be short of aim and brief in duration. The middle and industrious classes will not thrive without freedom, and countries possessed of the latter will always shoot ahead of the best-regulated despotism, and leave it, after a lapse of years, less prepared, even for war, than the country and the government which never contemplated the necessity of fighting till that necessity came. Still, with all its drawbacks, military despotism affords much to gratify the pride of a people, and especially of the peasant, and fosters that nationality and love of country, which prompt all to endure privations and make sacrifices, even the sacrifice of liberty, for the sake of the advantages

and the eminence which an active and powerful government may give.

The despotism which the court and counsellors, aristocratic and sacerdotal, of the French Bourbons, either conceived or sought to establish, was neither the lubber specimen of the south nor the soldier kind of the north. It was the reactionary, — the most irritating, intolerable, and impracticable of all; for history has never yet recorded the success of an attempt to restore the past. To change the ideas and convictions of a people, even by compelling them to adopt the progressive instead of the retrograde and the stationary, has been found impracticable. Joseph II. tried it with no wonderful success. Mind will not be coerced; and nothing but extermination and the substitution of one race for another, as Mahomet practised in Asia and the House of Austria in Europe, can effectually change the creed and confiscate the intellect of a people. The sacerdotal party in France was now bent on nothing less than this. They had at length succeeded in getting possession of the government, concealing their complete control over it by the form, but not the reality, of a representative system. They had got the press into their power, silenced that of their antagonists, and had offered the richest prizes to talent employed in their cause. The patronage of the Government, not merely in the church and university, but even in all branches of the administration, was in their gift or under their control. The sole overt opposition was to be found in the Liberal minority of both Chambers; and not so much in the votes as in the speeches, of which it was impossible to prevent the publication. They had the liberal and educated society of towns throughout France,

of which the spirit became decidedly anti-dynastic. They had the songs of Beranger, which he durst no longer print, but which circulated not the less.

Such means of opposition, however, did not satisfy the impatience of those determined to shake off tyrannical and reactionary government. As the Royalists were generally supposed to have entered into a secret association, by means of which they had succeeded in getting possession of the King and the Government, so the disaffected classes had established what they considered a counter-association in the Carbonari. What was to be its use or aim was not very apparent. Under a rule of complete and middle-age despotism, in which a suspected or obnoxious person might be laid hold of by the Government, and flung into a prison to appear no more, it was necessary to conceal even one's sentiments, to plot and contrive vengeance in secret even before emancipation or revolution could be attempted. Such was the association of citizens which secretly tried, condemned, and executed by assassination, the instruments or officers of an obnoxious government. Such was the Vehmgerichte. But French citizens could entertain no projects of assassination, whilst revolution, only to be achieved by the multitude of the working classes, was not to be accomplished by those constituting the middle and educated ranks which wanted numbers and hardihood for the purpose. The use of the Carbonari, therefore, was chiefly confined to the upper circles and *ventes*, consisting of men of some rank and property, who furnished funds and gave countenance and courage to lesser conspirators. These were sought for in the army, in which secret associations under the name of *Ventes* of Carbonari, or clubs of *Chevaliers of*

Liberty, were found eager to fling off the command of *emigré* officers, of colonels who had never seen service, and of a system inglorious and inimical to the soldier. The Liberal historian of the Restoration, M. de Vaulabelle, was peculiarly initiated and informed of all the secrets and doings of the Carbonari of this period. He has narrated them at great length, dividing them into conspiracies of the south, of the east, and of the west. Without entering so much or so minutely into the detail of events, which, however they mark the period, did not exercise any conclusive influence over events, we shall select two or three of the most striking of these abortive conspiracies, and show with what ease and good fortune such formidable attempts in the midst of a mutinous army and a disaffected population were defeated, working more harm to the Government by inflaming its passions, and precipitating its course, than by any immediate check or obstruction offered to its power.

We have mentioned the design of several officers, chiefly on half-pay, and residing in Paris, to seize upon Vincennes, and raise an insurrection of the popular faubourgs against the existing Government. The plot discovered by Marmont was stifled by him before it could break forth. Consequently, although the number of accused amounted to upwards of seventy, the proofs were scant. The trial of the prisoners was referred to the Chamber of Peers, of which the ultra-Royalists alone were inclined to regard the conspiracy in a heinous or a serious light. The conduct of the military authorities at Lyons and Grenoble had created a feeling of incredulity with regard to plots, and of disgust towards informers and those who provoked a revolt; and when the prisoners were brought before

the Peers, more odium and animadversion were heaped upon the witnesses than upon the accused. This was so evident that the Procureur-general, first employed to conduct the prosecution, resigned the task. It was taken up by De Peyronnet, and the zeal he displayed in it was one great cause of his subsequent promotion to hold the Seals of Justice. Brigadier Merlin, Colonels Fabvier, Caron, Pailhes, and Deutzel, were amongst the accused. The Peers set these free at once, for want of any evidence against them. The chief movers of the plot were the officers Nantil and Berard, of whom the former had escaped. The line of defence was to represent these both as police-agents, who had suborned and incited the rest in order to betray them. The supposition was false: the plot and its originators were serious and sincere; but from former experience of such crimes and their exposure, these allegations were considered so probable that they overwhelmed the two unfortunate officers with odium. Both were tempted to come forward, and by a general and frank avowal vindicate themselves by implicating their friends and party. Berard was with difficulty kept from it, especially when Colonel Fabvier, in open court, charged him to his face with having been the first to make overtures to him through an intermediary. M. de Peyronnet, who descried the trick, and wanted to establish and expose it, attacked Fabvier with his usual violence, and asked him to prove the truth of what he said by naming the intermediary whom Berard had employed. Fabvier refused: Peyronnet accused him of perjury and charged him with ignominy. Fabvier replied that the life of a soldier like him would answer such an accusation. As to what was honourable or ignominious he should go

to a better school to learn than to that of M. de Peyronnet, who was the first to open the gates of Bordeaux to the English soldier and to welcome the national foe. This was sufficient, even in the grave assemblage of Peers, whilst yet the Duc de Richelieu's government lasted, to obtain Fabvier a triumph over M. de Peyronnet. The Peers condemned the colonel to a fine of a hundred francs! And Fabvier was publicly congratulated for the boldness and felicity of his defence even by such men as Prince Talleyrand.

The leniency of the Peers (there were but five of the accused condemned to some years' imprisonment), and the impunity of the conspirators of 1821, certainly emboldened those who were acquitted to renew their attempt. Many of those who had lost their grades in the army received employment from Messrs. Kœchlin and d'Argenson in those manufactories of Alsace, where they were in the vicinity of the garrisons of Befort and New Brisach. Mulhausen, Thann, Colmar, with indeed all the valley of Alsace from Strasbourg to Bâle, as well as the adjoining villages of the Vosges, abound in manufactories, and contain an industrious and artizan population. Amongst these the Carbonari *ventes* had made wonderful progress; and the contagion spread with equal rapidity through the regiments, in which, since the ultra-Royalists gained the ascendancy, a more hostile spirit to the old army was daily more manifest. Towards the close of 1821, as the Duc de Richelieu's ministry was tottering, and the Count d'Artois coming into supreme power, all the garrisons of the east of France were ready for explosion. Those of New Brisach and Befort were to commence by hoisting the tricolor, secure both fortresses, and then march on

Colmar. Mulhausen, an open town, as well as Epinal, was prepared to rise when the garrisons of Metz and Strasbourg would follow the movement. The entire east of France, with its three most important fortresses, having thus declared against the Bourbons, to reduce them by a military force became impossible, and not a doubt could be entertained of the accomplishment and completion of the military revolution.

But to this well-concocted military plot there was no military head, officers at that time universally looking to the countenance and support of those who were popular representatives, and had constitutional rank. The control, the power of giving the signal of insurrection, was reserved to the high authorities of the Carbonari, and of the committee of political men identified with it. Lafayette, D'Argenson, Manuel, Dupont de l'Eure were these leaders; and the military men required that these should be present to give their sanction, and assume at least the civilian lead by forming a provisional government, and assuming the old authority of the directorate. But these future directors, possessing the honesty and sincerity which Barras wanted, were without the resolution and address of that famous chief; thus verifying the remark of Guizot, that the men of the Revolution, whenever they had preserved their honesty, were totally deficient in talent, whilst if they had acquired experience and displayed ability, honesty was unknown to them and corruption was their only atmosphere. The military conspirators of Alsace had fixed upon the night of the 29th of December to make their movement, and demanded of their Parisian friends to sanction it by their presence. When this was announced in the high revolutionary council of the capital, Lafayette

declared himself ready, but Manuel hesitated. He objected to be thus at the disposal of young and perhaps hare-brained officers; and instead of himself and Lafayette instantly setting forth, and by their presence giving the signal of explosion on the appointed day, he proposed sending Kœchlin and D'Argenson to Mulhausen, where they possessed large manufacturing establishments, to see if the project was ripe, the purpose serious, and the prospects promising.

This hesitation of Manuel proved fatal to the success of the military revolution. Lafayette had not the earnestness, the power of will to overrule it; and whilst Kœchin and D'Argenson proceeded on their mission, Lafayette retired to his country-seat of Lagrange to celebrate the anniversary of the death of his wife.* Meantime, Voyer D'Argenson, the headlong orator, was affected with some portion of Manuel's mistrust; for even after arriving and being assured of the readiness of the conspirators, he deferred despatching word to Lafayette and Manuel. The officers of the different garrisons, finding themselves thus unsupported from Paris, were compelled to defer the hour of their enterprise. Some began to think themselves betrayed, or at all events experienced the very natural fears that a conspiracy deferred was a conspiracy discovered.

Whilst the elders of the Carbonari plot were allowing it to smoulder and to be extinguished for want of activity, the younger portion was in rapid motion, all eagerness and expectation. The two Scheffers and young Corcelles had

* It was Christmas-eve, on which Madame de Lafayette had died of a disease caught whilst she was the companion of her husband in the prison of Olmutz.

hurried from Paris; Joubert and Bazard, original chiefs and founders of the Carbonari, were already on the spot. But where was Lafayette? where Manuel? The officers spoke of abandoning the project. Joubert and the Scheffers dissuaded them. The latter promised to bring Lafayette without delay, and in time for the breaking out of the insurrection on the 1st. Joubert brought Carrel, then a young officer, with him to Befort, for the purpose of announcing to his comrades at Brisach the presence of Lafayette. Arnold Scheffer in the mean time returned to Paris, and gave such information to Manuel and Dupont, as left the former without a pretext for delay. They set off, as did Scheffer himself, along with Colonel Fabvier, who was to take the command. Lafayette, accompanied by his son George, was already on the road to Befort before them, accompanied by his servant Bastien. Lafayette had tried to dissuade the latter from an enterprise, where all risked their heads. Lafayette himself considered death on the scaffold for such a cause a worthy termination of his proud career. Bastien thought it equally his duty and his honour to accompany his master.

During the afternoon of the 1st of January, 1822, the officers of the garrison of Befort made preparation for this attempt. One of them, Manoury, commanded the guard of the principal gate. The conspirators in the barracks then communicated to the non-commissioned officers, that the army was about to rise to dethrone the Bourbons; that the soldiers could not fail to obey such an order; but that as yet it was merely necessary to tell them to have their knapsacks made up, flints in their guns, and every thing ready for a start or an action. The adjutant, Tillier, gave this command formally, which was obeyed without a

question, and the officers in the plot then assembled in a neighbouring room at a kind of banquet, over which Colonel Pailhes presided. It is sufficiently significant of the way in which the army was managed, that all the Royalist officers, those attached to the Government, had lodgings in the town, and knew nothing of what was happening in the barracks; until a serjeant who had leave of absence for a day, and who was not warned of the plot, happened to return and remark the order, 'to be upon the alert.' Having to report himself to his captain, he mentioned the circumstance by chance. The captain would not believe it, but thought it best to go and ask an explanation of the lieutenant-colonel. Both puzzled, repaired to the commandant, Tourtain. He hastened to inquire. Meeting four of the officers of the plot together, their manner and known tendencies excited his suspicion, and he committed them to the custody of Manoury; proceeding without loss of time to the barracks to issue counter orders, to muster the troops, and defeat whatever was meditated. The serjeant, in the mean time, had informed adjutant Tillier of his conversation with his superior officers, their consequent surprise, their activity, and that of the commandant. Tillier immediately ran to inform Colonel Pailhes and the assembled officers, that their plot was discovered. All was instant alarm. Some ran to the barracks to see whether it was not too late to inform and to gain the soldiers. It was too late. The troops had been kept from any knowledge of the plot, and to appeal to them was now idle. All that was left for the officers implicated was to fly, and as Manoury had guard of the gate, that at least was easy. The discomfited officers then encountered Joubert, Scheffer, and Carrel in the suburbs, recounted their disaster; and the cares of

all were immediately turned either to their own safety, or to that of Lafayette and the members of the Supreme Council, who, if they reached Befort, would be implicated beyond all hopes of safety.

Fortunately for Lafayette and his son, their carriage was encountered by young Corcelles, and the general compelled to turn aside to Gray, where he had a friend, and from whence he was able to return without attracting attention to Paris. Manuel, who had not proceeded so far, was equally fortunate in getting timely warning. Kœchlin and D'Argenson also returned to their homes at Mulhausen. A carriage which George Lafayette had lent to Joubert, was seized by the police, and sealed up in a coach-house; but Kœchlin succeeded at night in abstracting it, and carrying it off to be burnt on the other side of the Rhine. Adjutant Tillier was arrested in Switzerland, together with one of his serjeants most implicated, named Wattebled. The latter, at the moment of arrest, blew his brains out. Colonel Pailhes was also arrested, as well as Paulin; Manoury escaped, as also did Buchez.

A sad underplot or adjunct of this conspiracy was an attempt made by Colonel Caron to raise a body of insurgent military to march upon Mulhausen, and deliver the prisoners of Befort. The troops and the non-commissioned officer, with whom he tampered, and who offered to aid him in the enterprise, were mere agents of police, who lent themselves to betray him; and Colonel Caron was, in consequence, seized in the full act of treason, condemned and shot. The Opposition in the Chamber of Deputies made full use of this disgraceful police triumph to throw discredit on the plot of Befort, which had been only too serious. Notwithstanding the great number of persons engaged in it,

both civilians and soldiers, however Government was unable to obtain proofs or to make out facts sufficient to form a conclusive accusation. None of the secrets or the persons of the Carbonari fell into their hands. The trial did not take place for several months, and then terminated in a condemnation to five years' imprisonment of Tillier and Pailhes, and of two others, with the acquittal of nineteen others. Thus the most formidable insurrection that menaced the Bourbons failed indeed of success, but baffled all the efforts of Government either to reach the principal movers of it, or even to procure the severe punishment of their principal instruments.

If conspiracy against the Bourbons failed in the east of France, where the entire population was incensed and excited, and where whole regiments, with their officers, sympathized with the feelings of the people, success was still less likely to be obtained in other parts of France, where the population was more indifferent, or was rendered so by a dislike of Bonapartism. Such was the case in the south of France. There the lower classes, either from revolutionary leaning and traditions, or from obedience to the suggestions of the priesthood, were opposed to Imperialism. The citizen class was discontented there, as elsewhere, and was ready in consequence to organize spirit and numbers in Carbonari *ventes*: the feeling extended to some few officers; but it was remarkable at this epoch, and an indication of the caution of the French army, that it was only when surrounded by a decidedly malcontent and Imperialist population, that any large body or numbers of the military embarked in insurrectionary enterprises. The Carbonari agents, Arnold Scheffer at the head of them, were nevertheless anxious to

redeem the failure of Befort by a more successful movement at Marseilles. One or two officers were gained, but before any mature plot could be formed, the officer, Captain Vallé, first won over to the Carbonari, venturing to open his mind to a comrade, was denounced by him as a police agent, who sought to tempt and betray him. Vallé was in consequence arrested, and his life was the forfeit of his folly.

Simultaneously with the rising of Alsace and the insurrectionary movement at Befort, the chiefs of conspiracy in Paris reckoned upon an equally important manifestation upon the Loire. The anti-Bourbon feeling was nowhere stronger than in the towns upon that river, and adjoining, or indeed surrounding, the old royalist province of La Vendée. The civil war which had raged there, which had arrayed the peasantry under one banner and the townsfolk under another, had left a deep-rooted feud; and whilst the peasants of the Bocage still worshipped and idolized them, not merely the citizens of Nantes, Anger, Tours, Saumur, and the towns of the region, but the cultivators round them, breathed no sentiments save those of ridicule and hatred for everything connected with the government and the system of the Bourbons. There is no better example of the feelings which prevailed amongst the middle rustic class than is found expressed in the writings of one of them, Paul Louis Courrier, farmer and vine-owner, who cultivated the fields which he inherited from his father at Luynes, who paid his thirteen hundred francs of yearly taxes, but who, for all that, could never succeed in getting himself inserted in the list of electors for either town or country—no, not even under the administration of M. Decazes, notwithstanding the provisions of the Charter and the pretence of representative rights.

The Liberals and anti-Royalists of the Loire had not waited for the importation of the Carbonari rules and name to form an association against the dynasty. A native of Saumur, a surgeon of the old Imperial Guard, had made one of a band of officers, all decorated with the Legion of Honour, who before the return of Napoleon from Elba had commenced a military club. Considering the Legion of Honour as well as its decoration disgraced, they styled themselves *Chevaliers de la Liberté.* The association and its name died away after the final discomfiture of the emperor. In 1820 the inhabitants of Saumur gave a dinner to Benjamin Constant, deputy for the neighbouring department of La Sarthe. His being so bespoke the political feeling of the region. A military school, then existing at Saumur, was filled with Royalist youth, probably from La Vendée: these students crowded to insult Constant and his hosts. The authorities no doubt favoured the proceedings. The Liberals were indignant; and Grandmesnil, the ex-surgeon of the Imperial Guard, who was one of them, proposed to renew his old association of the "Chevaliers de la Liberté." It could not be called secret, for it very soon comprised the whole country, and its avowed aim was in accordance with such a large admixture of members. It professed to struggle for the Charter, to reverse the tyranny imposed on the nation by the change in the electoral law, and to deliver the King from the yoke of counter-revolution. Benjamin Constant was never a conspirator; but certainly these principles were taken from his mouth, and were worthy of being struggled for by every means. But the fault of such large associations is, that whilst some are prepared to go all lengths, and incur all risks, others are glad to make one of a liberal

and popular association, on the understanding that it is to be without violence and without risk.

Lafayette, who never looked very closely into things, and who confided and conspired with the same *bonhommie* that he showed in all the affairs and habits of life, considered the "Chevaliers de la Liberté," when he heard of their organization, just as good for instruments as the Carbonari for the great purpose of the day. With equal abundance of simplicity and lack of sagacity the Liberals of the Loire considered Lafayette as an accomplished conspirator, and as the ablest man to hold the threads and guide the movement of their vast revolutionary association. It is sufficiently demonstrative that the French had altogether passed the age of conspiracy, and were unfit for it, when they selected for the chief of an enterprise, which required the ruthless mind, the iron hand, and the unscrupulous audacity of the middle ages, one of the most amiable, most gentlemanly, most vague and vacillating, though certainly one of the most honest of political amateurs. No man has been so much praised in words as Lafayette; and, in truth, it would be difficult to find a more perfect character, a more conscientious man, one nobler, braver, more disinterested, more patriotic. Lafayette is the very Grandison of politics; so much so, that not to look up to and admire him argues something wrong, something defective in the judgment. And yet it is impossible to contemplate Lafayette without experiencing that a feeling of slight and of ridicule mingles with the very large amount of esteem and admiration which his name inspires. When we see that a man so virtuous and so brave, so intelligent withal, should have spent his life straining after military, civil, patriotic, revolutionary, and anti-revo-

lutionary aims, and that he never attained or accomplished any one of them, one is reduced to the painful alternative of concluding, either that he had altogether mistaken his times, or that his age and contemporaries were unworthy of, and unfit for, him.

Lafayette and the Parisian Committee were not slow to order an insurrection on the Loire. It was to take place simultaneously with that of Alsace. But a list of brother-conspirators, found in the pocket of one of the cavalry students, who happened to be killed at a fire, awakened the suspicions of his superiors, and occasioned the arrest of the chiefs of the plot. It was of course deferred; and when it was again resumed, it was once more rendered abortive by some of those initiated into it betraying what they knew to the Government. After the failure of the Befort affair, indeed, there were more conspirators inclined to betray than ready to revolt. The people of Nantes then told those of Saumur that they had too many chiefs and too many men who knew everything in their association. They recommended the selection of a chief, and one presented himself in General Berton. He was an Imperialist officer, most harshly and unjustly treated by the War Ministers of the Restoration. When the proposal was made to him, he did not hesitate to accept it. It was first agreed, that at the head of the united "Chevaliers de la Liberté" of the district he should proclaim in the market-place of Saumur that the reign of the Bourbons was at an end, and a Provisional Government already established. Thus, though prepared to cry, "Down with the Bourbons!" they were unprepared to proclaim a name or assume a more than a vague and Provisional Government in its place—not the way certainly to render general or

successful an insurrection which must have depended on the masses for its accomplishment.

Moreover, when it came to the point, several of the worthy citizens of Saumur, although they had taken the oath of staunch conspirators, objected to come forward the first. If the standard of revolt were first raised in the country, they would join it, they said, but preferred not raising it themselves. Berton was accordingly persuaded to commence the work of dethroning the Bourbons, not with some grandeur at Saumur, but with most unpromising pettiness in the little village of Thouars. Thence he was to march with his army of peasants and river boatmen on Saumur, whose inhabitants to a man would join him. Berton consented, and on the 24th of February raised the standard of anti-Royalist insurrection at Thouars. A distribution of arms and proclamations was made. Lafayette, Foy, Constant were proclaimed to be members of the Provisional Government. But when, after having spent the morning in these pompous acts, Berton proceeded to march from Thouars upon Saumur, not more than thirty men ranged themselves behind the general to form his army. It was nearly six o'clock before Berton arrived within view of Saumur. The cavalry school and some soldiers were drawn up, and fired behind the bridge, to oppose him. The General halted. The "Chevaliers de la Liberté" hesitated. The party defending the town had not even the pretext for delivering it up; for the insurgents would not advance or charge, nor would the National Guards, who were all in the conspiracy, venture to assemble and give directions, as their numbers gave them full power to do. A bold advance upon the bridge would have rendered Berton master of Saumur, and every town on the Loire would

have risen. But fate, or their own incapacity, paralyzed during this momentous year the enemies of the Bourbons, legion as their enemies were; and gave to this dynasty so numerous a series of escapes, that its chiefs deemed their cause henceforth proof against all insurrection.

Berton and his band retreated from their position before the bridge of Saumur, not having penetrated into the town, which was full of their friends. Such a retreat was of course a dispersion. The police brought in seven hundred and sixty prisoners. One of these, a young serjeant, was tried by court-martial immediately, and shot. Six weeks later a group of the insurgents were tried before a jury at Saumur, which unanimously acquitted them. Berton was not captured till the month of May. Even then, so zealous were the peasantry in secreting him, that he was only captured through the treason of an officer named Woelfeld, who was a Carbonaro, and who associated himself with the General solely for the purpose of betraying him. A new insurrection was planned and proposed at Saumur, for which Woelfeld offered the support of the comrades of his regiment. The day was fixed. The General's friends as well at Woelfeld took their precautions. But it so chanced that Berton, accompanied by one friend, who was maimed from the kick of a horse, came to the rendezvous alone, whilst Woelfeld arrived with four of his comrades, all well armed. The opportunity for capturing Berton and obtaining the reward seemed too promising to Woelfeld, who presented his musket at Berton, supported by his four comrades. The General was compelled to yield, having no one near him but his lame friend. Woelfeld instantly sent to the garrison for succour. Berton, on his part, was momentarily

expecting his friends, Grandmesnil of the number, who hoped to meet Woelfeld and his regiment prepared for insurrection. It was a chance which party should succeed. One moment Woelfeld, hearing the sound of a horse, rushed out and shot its rider, who happened to be a gentleman of the neighbourhood. Berton continued to address exhortation and reproach to Woelfeld and his comrades. At length Grandmesnil and his friends arrived, but unarmed and unprepared for conflict. They perceived the body of the gentleman slain, and guessed what had happened. Still, though unarmed, they were the most numerous, and might overpower Woelfeld. But as they were about to make the attempt, fifty carabineers approached to Woelfeld's succour, and Grandmesnil and his friends, having barely time to throw themselves into a boat and to escape, left the insurrection once more even uncommenced, and its chief, General Berton, a prisoner.

Few events of the year awaken more interest than the trial of Berton, not only because of his rank and of the fate which threatened him personally, but because one of his accomplices, it was said, had confessed the entire plot, with the part taken in it by Lafayette and the Parisian chiefs of the Carbonari. This was Beaudrillet, one of the proprietors of the neighbourhood, who had sheltered Berton. It was the circumstance of his leg having been broken by the kick of a horse which had led to Berton's trusting himself at Allier, where he was captured, instead of holding aloof. Immediately after their capture, the prisoners were treated with the greatest severity, and stripped of their vestments under pretence of search. Their interrogatory was equally menacing. Beaudrillet, suffering from his broken limb and rude treatment, lost

courage, and confessed everything. He recounted the circumstance of his journey to Paris with Grandmesnil, their interview with Lafayette, and the encouragement which they received from him. Thrown back into prison, Beaudrillet confessed to his comrade, Delalande, who had been captured with him, that he had made a clean breast of it to the magistrates. "How!" cried Delalande, "you have betrayed Lafayette, and have brought him to the scaffold without saving yourself!" Beaudrillet at once admitted the greatness of his folly and the enormity of such a crime. "You can only redeem it," suggested Delalande, "by describing the person whom you thought was Lafayette as quite a different person from Lafayette, and thus account for your mistake." Beaudrillet promised this, and had the constancy and courage to keep his promise.

The person who had accompanied Beaudrillet to Paris, had introduced him to Lafayette, and initiated him in the plot, was Grandmesnil, the ex-surgeon of the Imperial Guard, the founder of the *Chevaliers de la Liberté*, upon the Loire. He was one of those who had escaped. Beaudrillet's first confession had pointed him out as the person who had acted under Lafayette and the other Parisian conspirators. M. Mangin, the Procureur-general, had made use of this testimony to accuse four Liberal deputies of having originated this plot, of which Berton was the scapegoat and the victim. It seemed to be the caprice of fortune, in this memorable year, to bring each party, both the Bourbons and their enemies, to the very verge of destruction, and yet save both at the last moment by an accident or a device which savours more of melodrama than history. The failure of the Befort plot, was of this kind; it was the merest chance that Lafayette was saved

both then and now in this affair of Berton's by a similar hazard. Grandmesnil had fled, and lay hidden in Paris. The utmost exertions of the police were directed towards his seizure; and Grandmesnil, confronted with Beaudrillet, could scarcely have contradicted or concealed the complicity of Lafayette. It became, therefore, the care of the chief conspirators to get Grandmesnil conveyed out of the country. M. de la Pommeraye offered to accomplish this; and it was agreed that Grandmesnil should meet La Pommeraye in the hall called that of the *Pas Perdus*, which the deputies traversed on their way to the Chamber. The least likely place for a man pursued by the police, to haunt, was thought the safest for the interview. M. de la Pommeraye met Grandmesnil there, and led him through some of the less-frequented corridors and staircases. Here he bade him wait for a time; but bethought him on the instant, that the best place for him to wait would be in one of the deserted tribunes, as the galleries of the Chamber are called in France: the debate being uninteresting, the tribune was empty.

It happened that on that very morning, the requisitory, or act of accusation on Berton's case, was published by the *Moniteur*. In this the Procureur-general brought the charges not merely against those engaged at Saumur, but against Lafayette, and Constant, Laffitte, and Foy. Laffitte called the attention of the Chamber to it, and demanded to be put on his trial. The Minister defended the Procureur-general by alleging that these charges against certain deputies sprang from the testimony of a witness who deposed to Grandmesnil's being in connection with these deputies. To this a member of Opposition could find no better reply than to denounce Grandmesnil as an

agent paid by the police to provoke others to rebellion. George Lafayette had quitted the body of the Chamber in order to go up and speak to Grandmesnil, whom La Pommeraye had left in the gallery. He was entering it, when he perceived Grandmesnil start up and stride down the benches to the front with the intention of crying out that he was no agent of police. George Lafayette had only time to seize him, and had some difficulty in pacifying and leading him away.

When the trial took place, the examination of Beaudrillet was looked to with much anxiety. He admitted that he had been with Grandmesnil to Paris, and had been introduced by him to a person whom Grandmesnil called Lafayette, and who told them to have good courage. But when asked for a description of Lafayette, Beaudrillet represented him as small in stature, not above fifty, and dark, with dark whiskers, in all, the contrary of Lafayette, who looked his seventy years, who was fair, with a flaxen wig, and never wore whiskers. Thus the complicity of the deputies remained unproved. Berton and four of his companions were condemned to death. His last words before the Court were remarkable: they detailed the merciless and brutal way in which they were treated in prison, at first in irons, and when the police took them off, the guard in command caused them to be tied with cords, no doubt to win a character for zeal. "It is no longer to infernal deities," said Berton, "that human lives are sacrificed, but to the steadily pursued aim of procuring honours and rewards for courtiers and place-hunters:" 'sed dulce et decorum est pro patriâ mori.' The condemned persisted on the scaffold with constancy, one of them, Saugé, exclaiming, *Vive la République!*

The Befort conspiracy was chiefly interesting to the members of the several associations engaged and compromised in it: the public knew little how imminent was the revolution, and how singularly it failed. In Berton's case, it was again the politicians, rather than the people of France, whose sympathies were awakened. But the case of Bories, or of the four serjeants of La Rochelle, went home to the sympathies of the people everywhere, from the youth of those parties and their humble rank, contrasted with their educated minds and elevated ideas. The story of how they ever engaged in the plot has been related by one of them, a private soldier named Lefevre; nor could the most cultivated intellect in the country have expressed itself with more nobleness, refinement, or simplicity.

The 45th regiment, to which Bories belonged, had been composed, in 1816, of soldiers disbanded from the Imperialist army of the Loire, and although many of them had subsequently quitted the regiment, they communicated to it a spirit which is not easily forgotten or effaced. The War Ministers of the day, however, thought that they had sufficiently provided for the loyalty of the regiment by filling it, and especially the higher grades of it, with ultra-Royalist officers; but this, of course, only increased the disaffection in the ranks. In 1821, the regiment came to make part of the garrison of the capital, and was quartered in the barracks of the *Pays Latin*, as the students' quarter is called. Bories, a young soldier from the town of Villefranche, who had risen to be serjeant in the regiment, and who, under the old management of the army, would soon have been an officer, came in contact with a schoolfellow who was studying medicine. Their view of politics agreed,

and the student introduced Bories to a Carbonari *vente*. The young serjeant entered into the association with zeal; and as his regiment, especially the privates and non-commissioned officers were of the same opinion, a vente was soon formed in the 45th. So important a fact was soon known to the members of the *Haute Vente*, and Bories, like Grandmesnil, was introduced to M. Laresche, and by him to Lafayette.

Early in 1822, the regiment was ordered away to La Rochelle. It was at the very time of the Befort and Saumur conspiracies; and the greatest hopes were entertained by the Liberals that their Carbonari association, propagated through the different regiments, would end by raising the whole army against the Bourbons. The departure of the regiment was thought a fitting occasion for the civilian members of the central *vente*, that of the district of Paris in which the regiment was quartered, to give a banquet to the chief members of the military *vente* of the 45th. The members of the central *vente* consisted of a lawyer, a physician, a schoolmaster, and a person in a public office. After the usual toasts and speeches, the parties separated. The regiment took its route for La Rochelle; but in a quarrel with some Swiss soldiers, Bories got into a scrape, and was put under arrest. He was then obliged to delegate to others the charge of communicating with the Carbonari of the different towns through which the regiment passed; and the young serjeant was moreover imprudent in opening his mind, especially to some of his comrades, whom the commanding officer had suborned to draw his secrets from him. Those secrets amounted to neither more nor less than the fact of Bories being affiliated to the Carbonari, and having aided

in the creation of a *vente* from amongst the private and non-commissioned officers of the regiment. Bories was conveyed to prison, nor was he allowed the opportunity of committing any more overt acts of treason.

Meantime his comrades at liberty, more imprudent than himself, had accepted the offer of a banquet made by the Liberals at Niort: all that was said at which banquet reached the commanding officer through the means of the police. Serjeant-major Pommier succeeded to Bories as President of the regimental *vente*. No sooner had the 45th reached La Rochelle, than Pommier, in his new office found himself in contact with General Berton, then concealed in the neighbourhood, and who was already raising a new insurrection. Excited by his revelations and exhortations, Pommier convoked the chief members of the military *vente* at a village near Rochelle. Besides Pommier, there were two other serjeants, Goubin and Goupillon, recently admitted. Pommier informed them of the presence of Berton, and the probability of their being now called into action, but he gave no details. Goupillon, the new member, proposed to rise at once, and implicate the regiment in insurrection. The following morning, Goubin and Pommier were arrested. Goupillon, frightened, confessed to a comrade his readiness to tell all. Brought to the commandant, he did so, and General de Toustain became fully informed of every particular respecting the military *vente*. The same evening, Raoulx, another serjeant, was arrested with Lefevre just as they had quitted Berton in the house of the President of the central *vente* of La Rochelle.

The circumstance of their capture transmitted to Paris made a great impression upon the Government and its law

officers. Baffled as they had been in the affair of Befort and elsewhere, and unable to penetrate the secrets of the association, which put in motion all these insurgents, they were delighted in having at last stumbled, not only upon a military *vente*, but a civilian one. For Pommier and Goubin, informed that Goupillon had revealed every circumstance within his knowledge, resolved to imitate him and earn similar impunity by disclosing each what they knew. The Parisian police then became acquainted with the banquet given by the central *vente* in Paris to the military brethren. And accordingly, the lawyer, the surgeon, the clerk, and the schoolmaster, were arrested, and along with the serjeant arrested at La Rochelle, were comprised in one vast account for Carbonari conspiracy and treason.

The vices of a system of public prosecutors, appointed by a political party, seeking to serve it rather than the ends of justice, and eager to redeem the escape of the really guilty by the over-severe punishment of the semi-culpable, was never more fully shown than in the present instance. The Procureur-generals put forth all their powers of eloquence and dilatation. Marchangy, a poetic rather than forensic genius, was charged with drawing out the requisitory; and the little information which he acquired respecting the Carbonari, he swelled out into a pompous and detailed history of these secret associations, more with a view to produce an effect, than to establish either truth or the guilt of the accused.

The Crown lawyer's requisitory established, indeed, the one only merit of the Carbonari, if merit it was—the secresy with which they were enabled to cover their presiding and central body. For the only conspirators or

associates which could be reached by all the influence of the Crown and Government, were the humble individuals of the central *vente*. One of these, Henon, the schoolmaster, imitated the serjeants, who confessed all they knew. But even with his aid the Government was not able to fasten complicity upon any of the well-known members of the *Haute Vente*, several of whom were, indeed, in Court, acting as advocates for the defence.

The Minister of Justice was determined to punish those who did fall into his hands with the utmost rigour. Capital sentences were demanded against twelve of those implicated, although some of these were so slightly so, as to make such a demand monstrous. As they had joined in no insurrection, their sole crime was that of having been enrolled among the Carbonari, and there was the greatest diversity of opinion, of purpose, and of zeal, in the different localities and the different groups of the association. The trial took place in Paris, and as the crime for which the Procureur-general demanded capital punishment was that of the majority of the rich citizens, the interest and excitement were great, as may be supposed. It was impossible to obtain from the jury the condemnation of civilians and brother citizens for their merely appertaining to the association. The prosecutor, therefore, limited himself to demanding the condemnation of the four serjeants, whose crime, as military men, was no doubt greater in joining such an association. But a court-martial would have been their proper tribunal. The aim of the Minister was to parade them before the civil court, to expose the whole secret of the Carbonari organization, show them as the instruments and victims of it, and make a public example, by their execution, of the

crime and danger of being initiated in these secret societies. And had the trial been conducted as a regular judicial proceeding, without the Crown-advocate and judge coming forward as political partizans, the staid, solemn, and impressive order of justice, even in all its severity, would have a salutary effect. But the result of the trial, as it was conducted and terminated, although it no doubt struck a blow to the Carbonari, left at the same time a profound irritation and aversion to the dynasty and to the ultra-Royalists in the breast of the Parisians,—an aversion, which endured and rankled for seven or eight years longer, and at length found its ample satisfaction in 1830.

A verdict of guilty was returned against the four serjeants of La Rochelle, as they were called, Bories, Pommier, Goubin, and Raoulx. The determination to execute the sentence was announced from the first, indeed that was apparent in the inveteracy of the Procureur-general. It was a defiance flung in the teeth of the Carbonari, who, numerous and potent, embracing the whole kingdom in their association, and counting more partisans than the Government itself in the capital, had only to be united, courageous, and sincere, in order to save their brethren about to be immolated.

To allow their execution quietly to take place, to permit them to perish for the crime of merely belonging to an association which comprised so many eminent and brave men—an association which itself aimed not only to overturn the dynasty and to change the system of government, but even to pass sentence of death upon those hostile or traitorous to it:—for a secret society, aiming at these great ends, and assuming these high prerogatives, to allow four young soldiers, whom it had entrapped and enlisted into

its service, to be executed, was not only a fresh stigma of cowardice upon every Carbonaro, but a sentence of ridicule and shame against the association altogether.

Yet so did things take their course. A number of schemes for saving the young serjeants were set on foot. Gaolers were bribed; a sum of 3,000*l.* was raised to be given to the keeper of Bicêtre. But this as well as all other schemes failed, and the day arrived for execution. Government ordered it to take place on the Place de Grève before the Hotel de Ville. The committee of the Carbonari summoned the members of the association to attend the passing of the prisoners from the Conciergerie to the Grève, a passage which allowed every opportunity for a rescue. But the conspirators shrunk from an attempt so bold, and the four young serjeants marched unrescued to the scaffold, on which they perished with all the constancy and dignity which became the political victim. As to the Carbonari, shame was so deeply stamped upon their front by their inaction and pusillanimity, that the redoubtable association may be said to have perished upon the scaffold of Bories.

CHAPTER VI.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF THE FRENCH ARMY ENTERING SPAIN —FABVIER'S ATTEMPT DEFEATED—OUVRARD AND HIS CONTRACTS —INVASION OF THE PENINSULA—SURRENDER OF CADIZ—LIBERATION OF THE KING—HIS VINDICTIVE MEASURES—EXECUTION OF RIEGO.

THAT the reign of the elder Bourbons lasted so long in the face of this great and increasing unpopularity with every class, and the deep discontent of the army, was chiefly owing to those habits of military discipline and civil obedience which Napoleon, during the few years of his vigorous government, had established. When Fouché, for his own purposes, in 1814 or 1815, frightened the King and the Allies with the threat of seeing the revolutionary mob of 1792 once more invade the streets, he tried to excite terror by a mere bugbear; for not only had the Revolution, but its very tradition been buried. The people knew not how to set about insurrection; and as to the army, although its thoughts were for several years those of disaffection, its habits and its acts obeyed what they could not disown or shake off, discipline and military subordination. Although no army can be raised or

organized on more popular principles than the French, and although in none does a soldier retain so much of the citizen, still there is a marked *esprit de corps*, a strong spirit of attachment to the army as a body and a class, which makes every soldier go with his fellow, and which renders anything like civil war, or the array of legion against legion, impossible. Every member of the French army feels that that would be the destruction of its privileges, its advantages, its weight: and the French soldier, who on several occasions would not have shrunk from treason against the state, recoiled from attempting treason against the army as a body. It is this, and not any reckless disregard of freedom or of principle, which has kept the army true, or at least obedient, in these later times, to him who filled the place and exercised the authority of the executive.

What saved the Bourbons too was, that they had no living pretender. The Duc de Reichstadt, in the hands of Austria, may be said never to have existed. There was no person, no prince, no name which could be presented to the soldiery, and therefore it was impossible to address those masses, or do more than insinuate treason by secret associations amongst the officers, especially the non-commissioned; the danger, indeed, being in the collection of any very large body of the French soldiers, such as the hundred thousand which were considered requisite for the subjugation of Spain. For here it was possible for every soldier to ascertain the sentiments not only of his comrades, but of other corps; and when once the universality of the sentiment was known to be hostile to the government, its expression in the shape of insurrection was obvious and inevitable. This was the true danger that Chateaubriand and the ultra-Royalists braved—he

carried away by his personal, they by their party ardour. And certainly they either chose their time well, or else the great good fortune which defeated every combination and every effort hostile to the Bourbons, and which cherished and favoured every circumstance and every effort for giving them a fair chance of re-establishing their dynasty on a solid basis, presided also over their violent determinations to crush the liberties of the Peninsula.

Any such attempt at an earlier date would have been fraught with much greater danger. An assemblage of a hundred thousand French soldiers in any of the previous years, and especially for the purpose of again invading Spain, and of putting down its popu ar assemblies and its constitution — could not have been hazarded without almost the certainty of an explosion. But the year 1822 had been marked by the signal failure of five or six military conspiracies for the overthrow of the Bourbons. In every part of France had such attempts been made, with and without civilian aid, by officers of rank here, by numbers of non-commissioned officers possessing the full confidence of the soldier there. If some officers hesitated, others displayed the utmost boldness and decision. The Liberal party and the old Bonapartist faction had lent their aid in every way by their councils, their system, and their contributions to this attempt. Yet all had failed; all had recoiled upon their authors, bringing them to ruin and the scaffold. In the trials which ensued, the action of the Carbonari association was laid bare; not merely its criminality in the eyes of the Royalists, but its incompetency in the view of disaffected parties themselves. Of these conspiracies, too, it was the military members who paid the forfeit of their lives. The civilians,

in general, escaped, whilst the prime movers, whatever their courage and readiness, still so managed as to escape detection and elude accusation. Not only did the chief conspirators display a want of skill and of all those qualities requisite for making a conspiracy successful, but the whole body of the Carbonari, in allowing the sacrifice of the four serjeants of La Rochelle before their eyes, without an effort to save them, had covered themselves with disgrace. And the feeling of the military, especially for civilian conspirators, towards the end of 1822, amounted to a degree of contempt fully equal to that which they might have felt for the Bourbons themselves. It was thus that the ill-conceived and ill-directed efforts of the Carbonari and the secret societies during 1822, followed by their failure and exposure, rendered possible that assemblage of an army upon the Pyrenees, and its employment against the Spanish Constitutionalists for the cause of French ultra-Royalism. Had the habits of popular or civilian insurrection either been preserved since the Revolution, or had the people grown as mature for such, as the succession of arbitrary and unpopular acts by the government of Charles X. rendered them, the invasion of Spain would have been equally dangerous. For it required half the effective force of the French army; and when a hundred thousand soldiers crossed the Bidassoa into Spain, there were but a hundred thousand left to garrison all the great towns and fortresses of France.

When the Duc d'Angoulême was appointed Generalissimo of this large army, it was felt that a more experienced hand was requisite to direct its movements. General Guilleminot, who had been chief of the staff under Davoust, was chosen for the purpose, and clothed with the

title of Major-General.* M. De Vitrolles selected him. The General was already at Bayonne marshalling the different corps towards the point of invasion, when the Duc d'Angoulême set out for the army on the 15th of March. In a very few days afterwards the police had warnings, which led them to search the baggage of certain officers proceeding to head-quarters. Suspicions were excited by the places in several diligences for successive days having been taken and paid for by the same person. These were the diligences of Bayonne. The police stopped one of them at a short distance from Paris, and amidst the baggage found a trunk, addressed to Major Lostende, principal aid-de-camp of General Guilleminot, and full of Bonapartist ensigns, the eagle of a regiment, buttons with the stamp of the Imperial uniform, tricolors, cockades, and scarfs; all the paraphernalia, in short, of a military mutiny.

The War Minister, Victor, Duke of Belluno, who has left an account of these proceedings, not for the purpose of exculpating himself from the charge of Bonapartism (there could be no doubt of his ultra-Royalism), but to explain his relation with the famous contractor, Ouvrard, was roused from his bed by the police with the tidings of this alarming capture. It struck a panic throughout the palace, and into the Cabinet. Victor himself, whose loyalty was not questioned, but whose sagacity and foresight were apparently at fault, was compelled to quit the War Office, and proceed in haste to Bayonne, to supersede General Guilleminot, inquire into his conduct, and undertake his

* Guilleminot's previous rank was that of Lieutenant-General. The rank of Major-General in the English service is expressed in French by the term Brigadier. The word *Major-General*, applied to Guilleminot, meant chief of the *Etat Major*, or Staff.

duties of military minister to the Duc d'Angoulême. Viscount Dijeon was put into the War Office.

The Carbonari had been again at work. Exasperated by their discomfiture in every attempt of the preceding year, and anxious to redeem their failure, they could not but lay hold on an opportunity so favourable as the collection of a large army upon so illiberal a mission. Some historians connect with it the project, entertained by the Liberals, of sending Benjamin Constant, in order that he might give to Spanish Liberals the benefit of his advice, and act as a link between them and the party of the Left in the French Chamber.* But Benjamin Constant was no Carbonaro, and disliked conspiracy. His councils would have been simply constitutional; and parties both in France and Spain had then reached such extremes, that constitutional action was no longer of use. Force, artifice, conspiracy, to overreach and overwhelm, became the object of both parties, and Benjamin Constant was no gladiator for such an arena. Instead of thinking of him, the high *venta* of the Carbonari took into their councils and employed the *men of action*, as they styled their officers, ready to employ the sword, rather than either tongue or pen. There were sufficient numbers of them already prosecuted or condemned, *par contumace*, for conspiracies in the last or during previous years, to form a little regiment. These collected beyond the Pyrenees; the most daring and adroit not fearing to pass to the French side of them, to penetrate into the encampment of the invading army, and even take up their abode within its quarters. It would appear from the account of Vaulabelle, and those in the secret of the

* The Duke of Orleans, being asked to supply funds for sending Benjamin Constant on such a mission, refused to advance any money.

Carbonari, that the officers, even the superior officers, of the French army were very far from discountenancing the efforts of the disaffected. They refused, indeed, to join in them, or at least to lead the way; but most of them professed every desire that a revolution should succeed, and hinted that if commenced by others they would not prove averse. The general conversation of the army and camp was anti-Bourbon. The opposition papers were those which circulated and were favoured; and Beranger's songs, one of them written for the occasion, were universally familiar. The fact, indeed, of Fabvier and other proscribed officers living in the quarters unnoticed and unbetrayed, is a proof of the tolerance and sympathy which their presence excited.

The discovery made in the baggage of Major Lostende, and the unexpected arrival of the Duc de Belluno at Bayonne to supersede General Guilleminot, and delay the invasion until the Government could be more certain of the troops, filled the conspirators with alarm, rendered a great many officers who had listened to them more circumspect, and induced others, now that the conspiracy, like that of Befort and Saumur, seemed to have fallen within the cognizance of the Government, to acquaint their superiors with all they knew and all they surmised. The Duc d'Angoulême himself, anxious to enter upon the part of hero, made light of the discoveries of the police and the fears of the Council. Always jealous of his authority, he looked upon the arrival of the War Minister to replace Guilleminot as a kind of slur upon his own supremacy. He had full confidence in his Major-General, and was indignant at his being replaced without any consultation with the Generalissimo. The Prince at

the same time consulted Guilleminot and the other officers on whom he most relied; and all agreed that the conspiracy was more in opinion that in act—more in doubt, debate, and indifference on the part of some of the army, than in actual readiness for rebellion. They recommended, therefore, at once entering upon the campaign, and putting the army in movement. The first success, which could not fail to attend the march, would, they thought, more effectually extinguish disaffection than either severity or inquiry. The Prince, therefore, represented to Ministers in Paris that he had full confidence in Guilleminot, and insisted on retaining his services; that there were no grounds for such a panic, nor for the changes which betrayed, and would tend to create it. He demanded, moreover, the permission to enter immediately on the campaign, and to send back the Duke of Belluno to his office. The remedy proposed for the disaffection of the army was not found so feasible. Upon inquiry, no preparations were made for the advance of so large an army into a strange territory. Under the Empire such a movement chiefly required military preparation. Provision the troops knew how to procure for themselves; but the present was a campaign to be undertaken in a country considered friendly, and the population of which it was necessary to render so. It was part of the plan of Chateaubriand that the French army should pay its way, and pay largely, so as to create friends, not foes—welcome, not resistance. The Minister seemed to have a misgiving that the French Commissariat were far from organized. He wrote on the 23rd of March to Guilleminot a despatch, containing the proclamation which the Generalissimo was to issue to the Spaniards, and in it he spoke of pressing the War Minister about

the provisions. The letter of the Foreign Minister displays a total ignorance of the conspiracy which had been discovered, of Guilleminot's recall, or of the War Minister's journey, although the Duc de Belluno started from Paris on the very day the Foreign Minister's letter was dated; so completely was Chateaubriand kept, or did he keep himself in the dark? about what passed in the other departments of the Government. He avers this, indeed, in his Memoir, that none of his colleagues cared for foreign affairs, and that he never meddled or understood anything domestic. On the other hand, the War Minister and the Intendant-General had had their activity benumbed and their preparations retarded by the reluctance of the finance department to furnish funds, or its Minister to believe seriously or to prepare resolutely for war. That a campaign so directed and entered upon should have been crowned with success is one of the miracles of the time.

There was, however, at the time a wizard at Bayonne, who, by means incredible to functionaries, those mere machines of a centralized system, offered to extricate the General from the peril of keeping his army stationary in France, and to set it in motion without any of the enormous machinery and preparation which the Commissariat demanded. This was Ouvrard, the dealer in millions, who maintained that an enterprise, to be feasible, must be colossal, and to be practicable, ought to seem impossible. We have seen Ouvrard suggest to the Duc de Richelieu that system of credit which enabled him to rid France so soon of its army of occupation. In operations of this kind Ouvrard no doubt at times made very large profits; and as he lived at a fabulous rate of expenditure, owned palaces and domains, and gave fêtes such as royalty could not vie

with, the functionary class, and their chiefs the Ministers, were inveterately jealous of Ouvrard. They could not tolerate the idea of a capitalist undertaking and executing those enterprises of finance and of supply, which with their routine they could not manage. They, therefore, always found Ouvrard in default, were always bringing in some huge bill of arrears, or some reproach of defalcation; so that the capitalist passed his life between the palace and the prison, entertaining the great one moment with his wealth, they seeking to extract it from him by vindictive processes at another. His last scheme had been one for overthrowing the Cortes, and rendering absolutism triumphant by means of the Royalist regency of Urgel, for which he proposed raising a large loan. Money, he said, would put any amount of armies on foot in Spain; and with these he undertook to dethrone the Cortes. The plenipotentiaries at Verona listened to him in mingled wonder and distrust. "It is not Ouvrard who is fabulous," exclaimed Prince Metternich, "but the times in which we live." The plan of Ouvrard suited neither Chateaubriand nor Alexander, who desired to employ foreign force to put down the Spaniards. It would have suited the policy of Villèle; but that efficient financier would not countenance the empirical politics or loan-mongering of Ouvrard. The sole condition made by the latter was the recognition by the French Government of the regency of Urgel. To this Villèle would not consent.

Divining the utter want of precaution and preparation of the French ministerial offices previous to the invasion of Spain, Ouvrard took care to have business which called him to Bayonne, where he soon saw that there was neither bread, nor flour, nor forage; and that horses for transport were

obliged to be seized from the farmers around Bayonne—a resource which would fail the army on the other side of the mountains. When notice was given to M. Sicard, the Intendant-General, that it was the wish and the intention of the Duc d'Angoulême to enter Spain at once, he was at his wit's end, considered the thing impossible, but ended by proposing Ouvrard to General Guilleminot as the only person capable of enabling the army to advance at once over the Pyrenees. Ouvrard was immediately summoned to the Duke. The contract for supplying the army with provisions was offered to him, and accepted on the condition that neither War nor Finance Minister was to be absolute judge in case of difference. Arbitrators were to decide when such occurred.

In the mean time the French divisions were advanced to the very frontiers. The stream of the Bidassoa alone separated them from the country they were about to invade. It was the moment for the band of exiles and Imperialist officers to risk a trial in order to induce their comrades, ere entering upon the ultra-Royalist and liberticide expedition, to fraternize with them. Colonel Fabvier had calculated upon mustering a band of from eight hundred to one thousand men, with whom it was his project to pass the Bidassoa, and penetrate into the cantonments of the French army. Instead of eight hundred, however, he could not collect more than one hundred and twenty French at Irun, with some thirty Piedmontese. The haste of the Duc d'Angoulême to pass the frontier, which it was expected he would do on the 7th of April, left Fabvier little time for preparation. He might have passed the Bidassoa, where both its banks were Spanish, and have marched with his band into the French cantonments. In

case troops were marshalled to oppose him, his men might have flung themselves amongst their old comrades, and obtained their sympathy and fraternization. Instead of this, Fabvier conceived the plan of hoisting the tricolor flag, and display his little band of Imperialists upon one end of the broken bridge of Behobia, with the deep stream of the Bidassoa between it and the other broken end of the bridge on the French side. Fraternization in such a case was almost impossible. Colonel Fabvier afterwards excused his unfurling the tricolor on the other side of the stream, by alleging that he intended to pass by the ferry-boat, which he could seize after it had landed the French mail. He arrived too late for this, and had no choice but to march further up the river, or make the experiment as he did. As Fabvier's band hoisted the tricolor in sight of their countrymen, under the white flag, they sung the Marseillaise in chorus. It was the 9th Light Infantry which occupied the other side of the Bidassoa, with a gun and some artillerymen at the head of the broken bridge. General Vallin, who commanded the brigade, no sooner saw the tricolor, and the attempt to entice by it the soldiers from their standard, than he ordered the artillerymen to fire the gun. They did so; but the shot had no effect, and the refugees shouted, *Long live the Artillery!* The General then saw the gun reloaded, and its second fire struck a lieutenant and two or three officers of the little insurgent band, one of whom held the flag. As it fell it was caught up by another of the refugees, and still kept floating. General Vallin then brought up a company of gendarmes, who directed a fire of musketry on the refugees, killed some twenty of them, again struck down the tricolor, and forced the band which hoisted it to retreat.

Thus evaporated on the Bidassoa the last efforts and the last hopes of the Carbonari. On the following day Oudinot's division entered Spain, and were followed by the others. Ouvrard accompanied them, and at Tolosa summoned the country people to bring in provisions, which he paid for at exorbitant prices, the fame of which spread, and had the effect of procuring abundance of food and forage which was poured at the feet of the French as they advanced. This was one of the great elements of success, which the French Commissariat itself could not have achieved. General Vallin and M. Ouvrard removed the two only obstructions to the Duc d'Angoulême's march.

It was on the 11th that Ouvrard spread out his gold before the eyes of the Spaniards at Tolosa, and paid it away liberally to all who brought in necessaries. On the 17th the Duke reached Vittoria, occupying the difficult country north of the Ebro without firing a shot. Ballasteros, the Spanish General, to whom was intrusted the task of resisting the French in these northern provinces, was only on his march, when he encountered the French as they emerged from the mountain passes into the plain. There was nothing left for him but to withdraw behind the Ebro; so utterly incapable did the Spanish Exaltados prove to make use of, direct, and inspirit an army, which counted no fewer soldiers than the French. It is said that the Spanish people and peasantry welcomed the latter. No doubt they did, when the Constitutionalists made no effort to defend themselves, and when armies and Generals vied in the rapidity of desertion. It is the universal fault of democratic parties when they attain power, to neglect, and not even to make themselves acquainted with, what to them must be the two elements and instruments of success, the

army and the peasant population. They universally take it for granted, that the army will continue to be to them what it has been previously, an obedient instrument and machine; the peasantry they take it for granted, must be charmed by the mere names of liberty and constitution, neither of which make themselves known by a single benefit. That the Spaniards should not have known how to interest either army or peasantry in their constitution is not surprising, when such advanced countries as Germany and France itself have made the same blunder and failed from the same cause.

Had the Spanish Cortes, or its leaders, shown the smallest capacity, or made even moderate use of the great resources which they possessed, they had a powerful ally in England, and in Mr. Canning, who would not have allowed the cause of Spanish independence and liberty to perish, had that cause showed any vitality or power of self-sustainment. But when the Constitutionalists added all the imbecility of Spanish absolutism itself, to the extravagance and vaunt, as well as violence of democracy, nothing was left but to allow such a worthless crop of liberty to be mowed down with the certainty of its springing up later. The fear of Mr. Canning was, that French absolutism itself would become too powerful, extending as it now must over Spain, and linked as it was with kindred despotism as far as Siberia. He might have consoled himself with the certitude, that the very success of a party so devoid of all moderation, justice, or good sense, and so opposed to the spirit and so blind to the world, would produce in France as well as in Spain a revulsion. And Chateaubriand's scheme of crowning the Bourbon column with a capital of military glory, whilst he made

the base repose on the extinction of every liberty—electoral, personal, political—upon intolerance in religion, and the stifling of education and of thought, was so preposterous, and so certain of final failure and ruin, that the worst enemy of France and of Royalism could not but have exulted in the mad course which the Government was compelled to pursue.

The Duc d'Angoulême halted at Vittoria until his remaining divisions came up, and until his agents, as well as those of the Spanish ultra-Royalist juntas, employed the usual means of seduction and persuasion upon the Constitutional generals. The reminiscence of Marmont and 1814 was not lost. O'Donnel, Count d'Abisbal, commanded the corps covering Madrid; the employment of such an officer, who had already been guilty of a double treason, betraying the conspirators of the Isle de Leon first to Ferdinand, and then betraying Ferdinand to them, is of itself a sufficient proof of the imbecility of the Exaltado government of Spain. Of course, the French offered him an ample bribe, and of course O'Donnel accepted it. The Count de Montijo, a name and family since illustrious, acted as intermediary between O'Donnel and the Duc d'Angoulême; and the General ventured to proclaim in a letter to Montijo his contempt for the Constitutional party, and the too manifest incapacity of their chief. However true the judgment or the opinion, its expression at the moment when it was requisite to cover treason excited general disgust. Abisbal sought to recall and disown, but his own officers cried shame upon him, and the General was obliged to resign. He asked a pass for Seville, but no sooner obtained it than he privately took the road to the French head-quarters. Before reaching

there, he fell into the hands of some Spanish Royalists, who were about to take summary vengeance upon him, when the arrival of a French detachment saved him. Madrid being now left to itself, with a little more than a thousand soldiers under Zayas, Bessières, the Royalist guerilla, attempted to surprise it, and penetrated through the gate of Alcala with that design. But Zayas was able to defeat an attempt made for the sake of robbery and plunder. He drove Bessières and his band out of the capital, and slew numbers of them. On the following day, the 23rd, the French arrived, and Zayas retreated in his turn.

It was fortunate that a certain portion of the rabble of Madrid, who loved the Inquisition and Ferdinand, had not had the courage to second Bessières, or a dreadful scene of anarchy might have ensued. They lay quiet, however, till the French troops entered, and then they arose in security to attack the Hall of the Cortes, to destroy it, as well as all the relics of the constitutional government, aptly crying *Long live Religion!* and *Perish the Nation!* A bust of Riego was carried in procession, and falling was broken in pieces in the Place Mayor; and the Duc d'Angoulême might boast with truth, that he made his entrance into the Spanish metropolis amidst the acclamations of no small portion of the population.

The Cortes in the meantime, with their minister, escorted by a division of the army, and by the more ardent militians of Madrid, had compelled the reluctant monarch to accompany them, at first to Seville. Here the Constitutionalists thought themselves secure of at least some weeks' repose. But two French columns had without loss of time marched in pursuit from Madrid, and they had already crossed the Sierra Morena before the members of the

Cortes at Seville were aware of it. Ferdinand made every possible resistance to further flight; but as the journey from Seville to Cadiz could be accomplished in a boat, dropping down the stream of the Guadalquivir, the transference of Ferdinand to Cadiz presented few difficulties. The Cortes, however, were obliged to decree that the King was in that state which the Constitution provided for in case of his being insane, that is, morally or physically incapable of reigning. A Regency for a few days was appointed. A conspiracy of the King to escape failed, and he was brought to Cadiz. The people of Seville, who had applauded the Constitution, strongly blamed this violent application of its provision. The populace of that town showed its sympathy for that of Madrid by rising as soon as the Constitutionalists left it, and by indulging in all the excesses of plunder and even murder. This was stopped by the arrival of a Spanish division under Lopez Banoz, which took possession of the city for a short time. It soon returned to Cadiz, leaving Seville to be occupied by the French general, Bourdouville, on the 21st, who pushed on his troops without loss of time to Puerta Santa Maria, a little town on the bay of Cadiz, and opposite to that city.

The Generalissimo remained at Madrid engaged in directing negociations rather than combats with the Spanish Generals, who thought more of higgling for the price of their defection, than either of the Constitution or the King. Morillo alone showed signs of a determination to take a middle line between the furious reaction of the Royalists, and the vain coercion which the Liberals at Cadiz were imposing on the King. But the French invasion had destroyed every possibility of a middle course, and of a

moderate party or policy for a long time. Where power had not been given to the ultra-Royalist Regency and their creatures, these assumed it; and they exercised their authority on all occasions by a general proscription and punishment of the Liberals. Their cruelties and excesses filled even the French with indignation. And when the Duc d'Angoulême, having nearly won over General Ballasteros and Morillo with their armies, was proceeding to Cadiz to terminate the war, he felt obliged to pause at Andujar, and issue a decree abrogating the power of the Spanish Regency, which he had created, forbidding them to make arrests, and ordering the French officers to liberate all those put into confinement for political crimes.

Fear, as well as forbearance, had its share in this moderation of the French commander. The position of the Spanish constitutionalists at Cadiz, especially if supported by England, was considered as inexpugnable. The remembrance of the length of time Cadiz, supported by the same ally, had withstood the French army under Marshal Soult, was still fresh at the Tuileries. The despatches of Chateaubriand showed how ready the French Government was at first to make peace upon fair terms, and even constitutional stipulations.* All that was required was,

* Chateaubriand proposed to re-establish the Council of Castile, and the Allies, on sending ambassadors to the Council, were to settle the terms of final accommodation.

"If we persist," says Chateaubriand, "in refusing to make peace till Ferdinand is free, and the army of the Cortes dissolved, we may prepare for a thirty years' war. The Cortes will never consent to be hanged, nor Quiroga and Riego stipulate to be shot. Master of the king, they will defend him and themselves in Cadiz, protected by England, and no one can touch them. If therefore it was proposed to us to make such changes in the constitution as to leave Ferdinand really king, it is clear that he might make peace, even in virtue of the constitution. The Allies cannot pretend that some 500,000 Frenchmen must be slain, and a *milliard* spent, in order that such and such a claim should disappear from the constitution." [It

that the Spanish Generals and armies should have displayed some constancy, some patriotism and honour, and the constitutional statesmen around Ferdinand some ability. But they flung away every chance. Their conduct disgusted even Mr. Canning with their pusillanimity and selfishness; and French absolutism gained a more complete victory than Chateaubriand himself could have desired.

The Royalist Regency, indeed, which the French installed, created more hostility by their cruelties, their decrees, and their pretensions than the constitutional armies. They issued ordonnances annulling every act of the Cortes, as well as the functions and appointments of the late year. At Saragossa and Burgos, all the respectable citizens, to the number of hundreds, were marched to prison, and their wives and relations could not without danger to their lives bring them food. The Royalists demanded as their right the liberty of pillaging the houses of the citizens. The French troops and commanders did their utmost to check such excesses and prevent such cruelty; upon which the Regency complained that they were obstructed by the French in their rightful measures of retaliation. Reparation, they alleged, was due to them for their having

It is evident, from this letter of Chateaubriand to M. De la Ferronays at St. Petersburgh, expostulating with the demands of Russia, that Alexander insisted on the unconditional subjugation of the Spaniards, and on no constitution or liberty being granted them.—So much to the other extreme had the spirit of Alexander turned. At the same time his own agents in Spain remonstrated with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the same sense with Alexander, that is, remonstrating on the absurdity of granting any constitution; or any liberty to the Spaniards. M. de Flavigny, writing from Burgos, the 14th of May, declares, that the Spaniards will have no constitution, that they only respect the power which descends from above, not that which rises from below. The enlightened classes may wish for institutions; but what of them? asks M. de Flavigny. Force is with the clergy and the people, &c. Such was French political reasoning with regard to Spain.

been deprived of power and ascendency so long. The Marquis of Talaru, French ambassador with the Regency, unable to calm their fury, forwarded their demands to the Duc d'Angoulême; and the Generalissimo, shocked by such proceedings, and aware how they might stand in the way of the surrender of Cadiz and the submission of the constitutional armies and officers, issued the ordonnance of Andujar, which has been noticed. The Regency replied by a protest. The Trappist, in the places where he commanded, absolutely refused to allow its execution. The Royalist Generals protested; and the Duc d'Angoulême found himself obliged to modify the tenor of his ordonnance, and thus confess that his arms had restored to supreme authority, in Spain, a party which even its liberators could not control.

As the Spanish peasantry welcomed the French, and could not comprehend the complaints of the middle and enlightened classes against Ferdinand; as the army showed no alacrity in fighting, and its Generals neither talent nor constancy, whilst the middle class and townspeople were too scattered and divided of themselves to do anything without the organization, the spirit, and the head, which the Revolution ought to have afforded; the retreat to Cadiz was a forlorn hope. The fact of the Constitutionalists being driven into a remote corner of the kingdom, left every soldier to choose another banner, and every partizan another cause. The mere defence of Cadiz against the Duc d'Angoulême, and keeping Ferdinand in a trap, could never render the cause triumphant. The Cadiz government accordingly launched Riego. He raised the banner of the constitution in the rear of the French, and thus raised obstacles to the prosecuting the siege.

Riego reached Malaga, took the command there of some two thousand men who had been under Zayas, and with them advanced towards the division of Ballasteros, which was at no great distance. To take them from Ballasteros, who was making terms with the enemy, was Riego's aim, but in this he was baffled by the cunning of that General. He then directed his course to Jaen; but numerous detachments of the French then pouring into Andalusia, instantly engaged in pursuit of Riego, aware of the importance of his discomfiture. Defeated by Colonel d'Argout, on the 14th of September, the little army of Riego melted away, and he himself wounded, with one or two officers, sought refuge in the mountains. Being obliged to visit a farm for provisions however, he was recognized; the peasant warned the French of the track of the fugitives; and Riego, made captive, was brought in triumph to Andujar. Being captured by French Generals they might have preserved the life of Riego, as their prisoner of war; but the Duc d'Angoulême had suffered so much both from the insolence of the Spanish Royalists, and the covert reproaches of the French Government, on account of his ordonnance of Andujar, that he declined interfering for the captive Riego, against the demands of the Spanish Royalists to have the originator of the revolution given up to them.

The French before Cadiz had, in the meantime, pressed the siege. The Trocadero and other advanced works had been carried by assault; and the minister of the Cortes felt compelled to come to terms with the besiegers. They despatched General Alava several times to the Duc d'Angoulême, from whom they received the invariable answer, that the French Generalissimo refused to treat except with

Ferdinand at liberty. He added, that his advice to the Spanish monarch would be to grant an amnesty, and at the same time a Constitution. In this answer the Duke implicitly followed the orders which he received from Paris, which were for him not to meddle with political arrangements, but to make peace solely on the condition of Ferdinand being free.

The French were, however, still afraid lest the chiefs of the revolution should, by a desperate resolve, succeed in carrying the King off with them in a vessel to America. This would not have served them much, for Ferdinand, upon the soil of America, would have been free. It was feared, nevertheless, and Ouvrard declares that a large sum of money had been employed as the purchase of the Constitutional Generals; the same means were employed, through Ouvrard himself, to overcome resistance and dissuade desperation in Cadiz. Certain it is that the Cortes were overcome, partly no doubt by the promises of an amnesty and a modified constitution, which the Duc d'Angoulême continued to hold out, though he would not stipulate. It was arranged that Ferdinand should be set free. Before this could be carried into execution, those of the militia of Madrid who were at the outposts and heard of the capitulation, flocked into the city, loudly expressed their disapprobation of unconditional surrender, and insisted upon some terms of security being given to them in Cadiz. This led to further delay, to a demand of conditions from the Duke, conditions which he refused The French made preparations for the assault, and the Madrid militia for resistance, when Ferdinand in alarm, caused a proclamation to be circulated through the city, promising, in his own name, amnesty, constitution, and the other

conditions which the Duc d'Angoulême was known to recommend. This appeased the suspicions and removed the objections of the militia-men, and it was finally agreed that Ferdinand should repair to the head-quarters of the French.

On the 1st of October, about six months after the entrance of the Duc d'Angoulême into Spain, that prince had the satisfaction of seeing the Royal barge advance from Cadiz to Puerta Santa Maria, bearing the Royal family, including the King's brother. Admiral Valdez and General Alava were charged, on the part of the Constitutionalists, with the duty of escorting the King; and seeing him safe on the opposite shore. Nothing could be more sincere, courteous, or encouraging, than the way in which Ferdinand addressed Valdez and Alava during the hour's run across the bay. The monarch professed himself, in the sense of the proclamation of the previous day, prepared to forgive and to forget, and to adopt of his free will the system of a Constitutional sovereign. The moment, however, that the barge touched the strand, and that the Duke d'Angoulême and his staff advanced to welcome the monarch to his freedom, the latter turned and cast such a look upon Valdez—a look so full of vengeance and significant of execution, that the Admiral, by an almost involuntary movement, pushed the barge back from the shore, thus rescuing himself and Alava from the impatient vindictiveness of the King.

There are few characters in history so vile as that of Ferdinand: the extremes of cowardice and servility, of tyranny and cruelty, have seldom been carried further than by him. Nevertheless, when the long period of coercion which Ferdinand, his brother, and family under-

went, are considered—the frequent menaces, the daily dictation they were obliged to suffer, the necessary dissimulation learned by a captive under such circumstances—it must be admitted that Ferdinand and his brother Carlos did undergo a period of suffering and of trial, which must have sown and nourished a deep feeling of vindictiveness in almost any breast. Nor is it to be wondered at that ferocious feelings ever after predominated over all others in the minds of the two brothers, making them irreconcileable enemies of that party, which had subjected them to so much durance, humiliation, and affright.

The consequence of restoring minds naturally so arbitrary and cruel, and necessarily so irritated, to supreme power, ought to have been taken into consideration by such a man as Chateaubriand. But that statesman confesses that he cared not the least for Spain, or for Ferdinand, whom he hated and despised, and to restore whom, he declares, with a recklessness of principle, which would befit Satan himself, if it were not more in the character of Pulicinello, that there was no great harm in restoring the throne, "for that he would in all probability fall back under the yoke of insurrections, and be quite unable to extinguish them."

When Chateaubriand first precipitated, and Villèle consented to, the invasion of Spain, they both contemplated the establishment of a Constitutional government, somewhat less free, perhaps, than that of France. In this design they were at first staggered by its being contrary to the principles on which they acted, that of the indefeasible right of kings, to do more than restore power and freedom to Ferdinand. The Duc d'Angoulême had left Paris, whose ideas of insisting upon Spanish liberty as well as

Spanish Royalism, prevailed. But he soon learned, especially after that his ordonnance of Andujar was disapproved of even by Chateaubriand, what a change had taken place in the views of Parisian statesmen with regard to Spain. At every mention of a constitution to be granted to the Spaniards, Metternich remonstrated, and Alexander showed himself offended. Neither would hear of aught, save the absolute Ferdinand. And the French Ministers, seeing that they had alienated England, durst do no other than obey the injunctions of Russia and of Austria. They saw, indeed, that one result of this invasion and this triumph would be, to widen the breach between Spain and her colonies, and render the separation permanent. For the colonies would never again submit to Ferdinand, however they had been willing to keep up the connexion with constitutional Spain. The success of the French Government in restoring the Spanish monarch thus dissolved the Spanish empire. Chateaubriand saw it, but hoped to obviate it by one of his wild and poetic schemes for establishing a Bourbon monarchy on the other side of the Atlantic. The hopes of effecting this, with the support of continental states against the great insular and maritime powers, was vain.

Nor could Chateaubriand, with all his boasted acuteness, discover why the Emperor Alexander and Prince Metternich were so averse to any idea of a constitution in Spain. He deemed it to be fanatical hatred of liberty on their part. It was, however, far more a dread of the league of constitutional and progressive countries in the west, against the absolutist and stationary Governments of the east. Into this league France might have entered, had Spain obtained a moderate constitution. To this Italy might have rallied;

upon this Poland might have awakened: and the necessity of keeping those two subject countries irrevocably fettered, acted then, as well as since, as the bond of alliance between Austria and Russia, on the principle of opposition to every kind of constitutional freedom.

The hope of establishing the Bourbon dynasty firmly in France, and procuring for it popularity, by such an alliance as these two powers could afford, was perfectly consistent with the creed of ultra-Royalism. But that Chateaubriand—who had been a thorough Constitutionalist in 1814 and 1815, and who proclaimed so ably and so generally by his pen, that the only prospect for either monarchy or the Bourbons was their adherence to the liberal spirit of the age—for him to turn round and seek to fortify the Bourbons by the adoption of contrary principles, and by contracting alliances in altogether an opposite sense, only shows the fatal nature and results of imaginative genius developed in either the priest or politician.

Although Ferdinand might retain rancour against Valdez and Alava, officers who had remained faithful to the Constitution, the Duc d'Angoulême thought that at least Ballasteros, who had foiled the last enterprise of Riego, secured his defeat and capture, and brought over to him an army to support the French in their efforts to liberate the monarch, might hope for a favourable reception. But Ferdinand turned from Ballasteros almost with as much ire as from Valdez. No sooner, indeed, did the once more absolute King of Spain find himself in his apartments, free to wield his pen and to issue ordonnances, than he sat down to prepare, and hastened to issue, a decree annulling every act sanctioned, every liberty granted,

every law, every appointment, which had, as it were, the stamp of the Constitution upon it.* At the same time that Ferdinand passed a sponge over the Constitution, its liberties, its laws, and its personages, he declared all the acts of the Royalist Regency valid, thus restoring the monks to their property, and to the Inquisition its power. Salz, the chief member of the Regency, was appointed to the double office of father-confessor to the King, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He at the same time delivered up Cadiz to the French, and General Beaumont took possession of it. One of the uses to be made of it was to threaten England that France would permanently keep possession of it, if she dared to acknowledge the independence of the Spanish-American colonies. Mr. Canning laughed at the empty threat: the surrender of Cadiz, however it completed for the time the subjugation of Spain, hastened instead of retarding the final separation of Spain from her American colonies.

The Generalissimo of the French army seeing his victory complete, and his influence smaller, hastened to leave Spain, refusing the solemn ovation that the Royalists of Madrid proposed to pay to him. A more congenial fête was preparing in Madrid to celebrate the King's return: this was the execution of Riego The Regency had deter-

* That by this conduct Ferdinand in nowise deceived his French liberators we have full proof. They each and all knew perfectly well the treacherous fiend to whom they were restoring absolute power. A month before the surrender the Duc d'Angoulême writes, "The king may make me a hundred promises, but he would break all of them the very same day, and the moment I turned my back. If I could not prevent the Regency doing any harm, what influence can I have over the King?"

Villèle at the same time writes of the cruelties and reaction of the Royalist Regency, "as an exaltation, more the result of fear and weakness than of anything else." This was very true. But what was Villèle's conclusion after making this remark?—"that it was necessary to pardon and tolerate this violence!"

mined that he should be tried, not as a soldier taken in arms, but as a deputy guilty of the crime of voting the King's suspension from absolute power. For this crime he was arraigned before a tribunal, composed of the alcaldes of the Court. He was of course condemned, and without delay, to be hanged upon a gibbet, which, of a monstrous height, was erected in one of the squares of Madrid.

The ceremony of Riego's execution, and of the King's solemn entrance into his capital, followed one another, and were evidently imagined by the same decorators. The gibbet of Riego was of such enormous height, that he was unable to mount the numerous rounds of the ladder which reached it. The triumphal car of the King was equally gigantesque. Riego was brought to execution in a filthy cart, dragged by a wretched ass, whilst the victim himself was attired in a fantastic garb and head-dress, intended to attract ridicule. The King's car was drawn by a band, apparently of opera dancers, in pink and green, intermingled with figurantes, and accompanied by the whole *corps de ballet*. Prone as was the rabble of Madrid to worship theatrical sovereignty, and to cover the martyrs of political or religious freedom with ordure, they found it impossible not to respect the majesty of Riego, reduced by starvation and severity almost to inanition, in order that he might not play the hero, but still maintaining the dignity of the soldier and the patriot. French bayonets hedged in that execution on one day, and escorted the theatrical car of Ferdinand on another—the two ceremonies forming the sum of their deeds, and characterizing the nature of their exploits in Spain. The French laureats call this glory; but history, for ever connecting these events with the name of Bourbon, cannot fail to qualify them by another name.

CHAPTER VII.

VIEWS OF CHATEAUBRIAND AND VILLÈLE—THE SEPTENNIAL ACT—OPPOSITION OF THE JUDGES—CONVERSION OF THE FIVE PER CENT. STOCK—ITS REJECTION BY THE PEERS—DISMISSAL OF CHATEAUBRIAND—NEW MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS—DECLINE OF LOUIS XVIII.—HIS HABITS, CHARACTER, AND DEATH.

In politics, as in morals, and indeed in everything human, it is vain to look and wait for those solid and imperishable foundations, which defy time and preclude change or decay. Great and even lasting edifices, with vast and magnificent cities, have been built on heaps of faggots and on piles of wood. So in politics and in morals: taking man, so imperfect, so ignorant, so brittle, empires and bodies politic and institutions may be built up and perfected of men, of man's faculties, and energies, and virtues, and vices, such as they are. But there are some who refuse to build on any foundation, but would build on nothing but granite; so there are some who in religion seek for demonstration of the unseen, who in philosophy insist on some irrefragable and primitive truth, and who do not consider politics as stable, unless they have established some principle or found some basis which they consider immutable. Unfortunately nothing is immutable in any part of the scene of life. All that such men can do therefore is, to pretend that the principle which they have

found is immutable and immortal, and that it is impiety to doubt and profanation to question it. Having thus raised a political dogma to the rank of a superstition, they think they have got a solid foundation for government. But all the tyranny they employ to establish their principle, or make men bow to it, fails and recoils upon itself. The greater the triumph of the principle, of course the more arrogant and insufferable the political priesthood who live and profit by it, and consequently the more terrible and more overwhelming the reaction. Such a principle was Legitimacy—such an effort to establish it, and force all to worship it, was made during the fifteen years of which we narrate the events. Those who prescribed and enforced it were all enthusiastic, eloquent men; many of them believed they were regenerating not only France, but the human race, by their policy and their acts. On the contrary, they had strained all the energies of their hopes and minds to that which was imaginary, to what was unreal and untrue, and what was worse, to what was inexpedient and impracticable. What they attempted counteracted the great motive powers of the time—the progress, and development, and freedom of the people. They undertook to swim against a great current, and thought that they mastered it, when they succeeded in floating upon it for a time, not perceiving that although their heads were above the wave, they were still borne rapidly and irresistibly down its current. The great task, effort, and problem of the Restoration, and of those who held power under it, was not to form a constitutional government. Had that been a first consideration with them, they would have succeeded. But whilst a constitution made no part of ultra-Royalist anxieties, it was a secondary consideration with even such men

as Chateaubriand and Villèle. The first object of the party which obtained power and kept it, was to establish legitimacy: the aim was never more open or more flagrant, and we may add never more successful, than in the Spanish war. It was so successful, that even its enemies admitted that legitimacy had triumphed. The French in general began to think, that it would never cease to reign, and they began to bow to it accordingly, not indeed in love, but in fear. If an abstract principle, utterly baseless as a moral truth or a maxim of justice, and only tenable on the ground of its being expedient to establish and even to observe, could have been founded in France, it would have been so by the explosions and decisions of all the French Liberal conspiracies of 1822, and by the discomfiture of the Spanish Constitutionalists in 1823. Ultra-royalism could not have been more triumphant. Its success was almost as great as that of Napoleon, without his glory however. Here was the mistake of Chateaubriand and of the Court. They fondly imagined, that the campaign of the Duke d'Angoulême had at least some of the prestige and influence of the great campaigns of the Empire, and that its results and its triumphs were such as to fascinate the people and command their admiration. Popular admiration is not so easily or lightly won. The educated and political classes were indeed struck by the successes of the Spanish campaign: they surprised and startled them, and made them believe in the stability and power of the Royal government. But the French people entered into no such calculations, and were touched by no such wonder. They merely saw the aping of Napoleon's exploits, in a campaign performed like a promenade, without risk, without genius, without calling forth one high military

quality. The successful invasion of Spain and reduction of the Cortes procured credit and respect for the Government of the Restoration with politicians, foreign statesmen, and domestic functionaries; but it made no progress in dethroning the popular idol, and the use which was made of it only rendered the contrast greater between it and the simplest exploit of the Revolution or of the Empire.

What has just been said of these ultra-Royalist zealots, and of their declining to found a government and institution upon men, habits, interest, and intelligence, such as they were, but determining to invent something more immutable, and still in the abstract, in order to force men to bow down to it; this is also true in another respect of the more practical of the Royalists—of such men, for example, as Villèle. His triumph was great, his party and principles triumphant. The opposition, both in the Chamber and the country, had been discredited by the futility of the attempts to overthrow the Government, and by the falsity of all their assertions and prophecies respecting Spain. But Villèle was not contented with a momentary triumph. He aimed at nothing less than to render it permanent. And he aimed at effecting this, first by passing a law for the septennial duration of parliaments, and then by a general election, in which, making use of all the influence acquired by success in Spain, by the direction of the prefects, and the ascendancy of the Royalists, he might succeed in excluding every Liberal from the Chambers, and thus silencing in the representative assembly of the nation, as well as in the press, the voice of Liberal opposition altogether. The fate of this silence to nullify constitutional government altogether will be seen in the ensuing chapters. That such men as Labourdonnaye

or Bonald should have imagined such a scheme would not excite surprise; but that it should have been concocted and acted upon by Chateaubriand and Villèle, both of whom attributed a certain value to constitutional government, only shows how much unexpected success had clouded their better faculties, and prompted them to acts fatal to themselves and to the Government they sought to serve. About this time, Chateaubriand recommended M. de Polignac as his successor to the embassy in London. The choice was objected to both by Louis XVIII. and Villèle, but Chateaubriand carried his point. "M. de Villèle told me," said Chateaubriand, "that I should repent of this. He was right. Fate was driving us at the time against our knowledge to the ruin of that old state of society, at the very moment we were making the most strenuous efforts to revive it."

One of the causes of the failure of Royalism and the Restoration was the jealousy between the Ministers of Finance and of Foreign Affairs. As soon as the telegraphic despatch, announcing the surrender of Cadiz, and the liberation of Ferdinand, reached the Ministry in Paris, the first impulse of Chateaubriand was to rush to the Tuileries, in order to congratulate its royal occupants, and of course receive that guerdon of praise to which, as the person who originated and decided the war, he was certainly entitled.

"In my ardour I ran to the chateau," says Chateaubriand, "and there received such a bucket of cold water on my head, as completely thrust me back into my habitual humility. The King and his brother were far too much delighted even to perceive my presence. The Duchess d'Angoulême was naturally overwhelmed with joy at her

husband's triumph. Even when I returned to pay my respects to her on the Sunday following, the Duchess had an obliging word for every one of the Ministers except me. She could not abide me, as she since confessed to M. de Montmorency."

The Bourbons, in fact, hated an independent man as they abhorred a liberal idea. Both were protests against that unlimited power in worldly matters which they had been taught to consider their birthright; and even the zealot Comte d'Artois loved infinitely more the supple Villèle, who had suffered himself to be dragged into the war, than he did the impetuous Chateaubriand who precipitated it. This is intelligible on the part of Louis XVIII., who really dreaded the war, and shared in Villèle's reluctance. Louis XVIII., moreover, was perspicacious enough to have perceived the insincerity of Chateaubriand, his never-failing desire and even unconscious efforts to supplant every rival or superior. Chateaubriand draws a picture of himself at the council-table, allowing Villèle and Corbière to do all the business, whilst he played the lazy courtier by lending an ear and a ready smile to the jokes and stories in which Louis XVIII. loved to indulge. Villèle considered that this interrupted business, and would not listen to them. Chateaubriand thought he paid court by doing so. He was mistaken. The rivalry between the colleagues nearly burst into an explosion when the Emperor Alexander sent Chateaubriand the cross of St. Andrew, and passed over Villèle, the Prime Minister. This aggravated in the eyes of Louis XVIII. what he principally reproached Chateaubriand for setting himself up and apart as the propounder and the representative of the successful policy of the time. No doubt the Viscount was this, and more

than this, for he was full of obsequiousness for Russia, in the hope that Alexander might deign to aid the Foreign Minister's project of taking the Rhenish provinces from Prussia, and previously terrifying England into abandoning the South American States. The Foreign Minister, after having conquered Spain and liberated Ferdinand, allowed Alexander to send Pozzo di Borgo to form a Cabinet of his choosing at Madrid. This kind of meddling and influence Alexander dearly loved. The more remote the country from him, the more he seemed flattered by wielding influence over it. Chateaubriand indulged in this the Czar's empty vanity, and the Czar repaid the Viscount in pretty much the same coin, the cross of St. Andrew; but Villèle and Louis XVIII. were both so jealous, that Chateaubriand was obliged to transmit a despatch to Alexander, begging him to restore peace and equilibrium in the French Cabinet by sending the same cross to Villèle.

Another quarrel which had disturbed the Cabinet, after the return of the Duc d'Angoulême from Spain, was the repugnance which that prince entertained to the War Minister. The Duc de Belluno had, from this time, been very wroth with Ouvrard for taking the supply of the army, during the expedition, out of the hands of the regular Commissariat. Although Ouvrard had been first called in by the advice of one of the chief officers of the Commissariat, who despaired of providing for the army, still the War Minister considered Ouvrard's appointment as a slur upon his administration; and so, no doubt, it was. Ouvrard, therefore, met every resistance and hostility from the War Office, and from Villèle himself, who took the Duc de Belluno's part. But the Duc d'Angoulême, who felt that he and his expedition had been indebted to

Ouvrard, and who had such ample proofs of the incapacity of the war administration, took Ouvrard's part, and insisted on the dismissal of the Duke. Ministers durst not oppose, and the Duc de Belluno was dismissed with the office of the embassy to Vienna. Even this consolation was snatched from Victor, by the Court of Vienna refusing to recognise any titles from Austrian territories, worn by French grandees. The Duc d'Angoulême desired that General Guilleminot should succeed to the War Ministry; this, however, both Chateaubriand and Villèle opposed, they preferring to give the office and the seat in the Cabinet to another follower of the Prince, a man apparently null. This was Monsieur de Damas. The choice proved the usual mistake of being jealous of capacity and talent; for Guilleminot, of all men, would have made not only an excellent War Minister, but would have been a future support for Villèle himself against the Ultras, whereas Damas proved in politics a twin brother in imbecility and obstinacy to Polignac.

For the moment, however, Villèle gave up his habit of resistance to the caprice of the Ultras. The present was their triumph; and his refusing to associate his policy with theirs would only have established the little part or merit he had in their success. The administration of justice, as it was called, in the hands of Peyronnet was pushed to an extreme of rigour unknown before. Writers in serious journals had been silenced and proscribed. Peyronnet now attacked the wits, obtaining their condemnation for the slightest allusion; and, in order to make an example, he caused Magalon, condemned for some political jocularity in the *Album*, to be handcuffed with malefactors, dragged through the streets and along the roads on foot,

and subjected to the severest and most degrading kinds of prison labour.*

It is astonishing how principles or prejudices, (whichever they may be considered,) or habits of judgment survive, and are handed down in class and profession. Never was caste or calling more completely broken up and severed from its traditions than the French bar or the French legists; and yet, at the present time, the spirit of the old *Parlemens* or legal bodies revived. The legislation of the ultra-Royalists had consisted in diminishing the power of the jury, and placing the liberty of the person or of the press at the mercy of the judges. These, at first, showed all the rigour expected of them against the press, and against the seditious and turbulent; but when the efforts and the prosecutions made and ordered by the Gove nment, turned manifestly towards the establishment of an intolerant religion, when the university was handed over to the Jesuits, when severe penalties for the desecration of

* When the press committed any act of indiscretion with regard to foreign affairs, it was dealt with in a different manner. Thus the *Tablettes Universelles*, remarkable as the first periodical in which the young intellects of the age, those which afterwards distinguished themselves in the *Globe*, commenced their essays, incurred the displeasure of M. Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador. That diplomatist, after his return from Spain, where he had appointed a Ministry, and strove to moderate the headlong zeal of Government, expressed himself freely in company, and observed, with great truth, "that although the French army had put down revolutionary anarchy in Spain, it had established in its place a Royalist anarchy, quite as deplorable." The *Tablettes*, contributed to by writers moving in the best circles of society, published the remark of M. Pozzo. He was indignant, and demanded of Chateaubriand its suppression. Instead of extinguishing the *Tablettes* by violence, which would have been inconsistent in such a stickler for the liberty of the press as Chateaubriand, a Government agent merely threatened the proprietors with its suppression, unless they consented to sell it. They of course did so, and were paid 180,000 francs. The rising opposition of the young men of talent of that day was merely suspended by M. Pozzo's susceptibility. They soon found another organ.

Sunday, not merely by sale and purchase, but even by village dancing, began to be referred to the tribunals, the judges soon displayed their old dislike of priestly ascendancy. The bishops, led by Clermont Tonnerre, Archbishop of Toulouse, made open demands for the old immunities and ascendancy of the Church. They demanded the restoration of the registers of births, marriages, and deaths to them; the re-establishment of synods, of the religious orders, of the old festivals, independence for the priesthood of common tribunals, and the suppression of the Concordat, which secured the liberties of the Gallican Church. This was an attempt not merely to bring back France, in ecclesiastical matters, to the previous century, but to the state of things anterior to the Reformation. Such pretensions on the part of the clergy, and the power of that clergy in politics, alarmed the whole legal body of France, and flung the judges at first into a Jansenist, and at last into a political opposition.

Another body of great and influential men was driven into the same attitude of resistance, in part by the same causes. This was the Chamber of Peers, which, consisting chiefly of notabilities and veterans of former governments and dynasties, did not form that kind of aristocracy which allies itself naturally with a high priesthood. The presence of a number of bishops on the benches of the Peers instead of reconciling that body to priestly domination, on the contrary, gave rise to greater repugnance. In the France of that day and even of the present, the Chamber of Peers is not an assembly which of itself claimed much respect, or exercised much influence. Representatives of times and things, of interests and dynasties passed away, the Peers were not much looked up to by the public, to which

they were rendered even more strangers by the law prohibiting the publicity of their debates. The Peers, therefore, gladly seized every opportunity of winning popular favour and respect. The Liberals amongst them, less advanced and less impetuous than the orators of the Chamber of Deputies, were thrown into the shade by their more lively opposition; but when the Liberal party withdrew in a body from the Chamber with Manuel on his expulsion, the part of opposition thus abdicated in the Lower House was taken up by more moderate, but not less able men in the Upper House, and for the remainder of the session, the Liberal opposition in the Peers took the place left vacant by the secession of the Liberal deputies.

To crush this rising opposition, Ministers, towards the close of 1823, made a large promotion to the House of Peers, and was obliged to take from the Chamber of Deputies for this purpose many of their adherents. It was necessary to supply their place by new elections. The Liberals had seceded from the Chamber, which was much more comfortable for Ministers since their absence. They excluded the Opposition permanently. The partial elections which had taken place showed the Royalist cause to be so much in the ascendant, that fewdistricts or departments could resist the influence of the prefects, or would perform the idle feat of returning Liberals. It was resolved, therefore, to dissolve the Chamber, have a general election, and then by introducing a law for the septennial duration of the Chamber, to make use of the present moment of time to secure a long lease of power. Whatever the Liberals might allege against this, as a breach of the Charter, Ministers were able to shield themselves under the example of constitutional England, which enjoyed

a full account of personal and parliamentary liberty under a Septennial Act.

On the eve of Christmas, 1823, appeared an ordonnance dissolving the Chambers, convoking the electoral colleges for the end of February, and summoning the new Chamber to meet, not till the end of March. The result of these elections aroused the feelings and expectations of the Royalists. Liberal writers of the time have furnished a long series of instances in which the prefects and the several Ministers spared no means, fair or foul, for the purpose of influencing the elections. No doubt, these were unscrupulously resorted to. But the depression of the Liberal party in the country, the disgust of some, the apathy of others, consequent upon the triumph of the Royalist policy, and the failure of all Liberal schemes and combinations, formed no doubt the principal cause of their electoral defeat. Out of 429 elections, the Royalists were able to count 410; the Liberals could contend for not more than 19. Several of the moderate Liberals thought to improve their position by separating their cause from their more extreme and Carbonari brethren; but this instead of operating in their favour, annihilated them. The Left Centre was excluded in a body from the Chamber; and, indeed, of both Centres, Royer Collard remained almost alone the representative of that intermediate party and opinion, on which, for years past, Louis XVIII. had fixed his predilections and founded his policy and his hopes. As statesmen of the Left, merely General Foy, Benjamin Constant, and Casimir Perrier remained, and these were returned by the capital, with five other members, who were Royalists. Laffitte lost his election by one vote. The ultra-Royalists, not contented with having reduced the Liberal Opposition to a dozen members,

raised a new objection to Benjamin Constant: he was a Swiss, they said; not a Frenchman. Constant could not deny his Swiss birth, but he pleaded a liberal and noble law of the Constitutional Assembly in 1790, which allowed every descendant of the French families exiled on account of their religion, to claim whenever they wished it the quality of French citizen. Constant, counting two of these Protestant exiles amongst his ancestors, was admitted by the sentence of a committee.

It was a great mistake, at least on the part of such ministers as Villèle and Chateaubriand, to attempt thus to exclude the Liberals from having voice or representatives in the Chamber. They represented undoubtedly a large portion of the sentiment of the country, and to exclude that was to falsify the system on which the Constitution was based. Nor had the ultra-Royalists or these Ministers any very objectionable scheme to carry. The political views of the Cabinet for the future were such as it would be far better to discuss than pass in silence. That the zealots amongst the Royalists could not tolerate the free-spoken sentiments of Liberals, and wished to crush and to erase them altogether, is conceivable; but, far from having an interest in this, Chateaubriand and Villèle stood in want of a Liberal opposition to support them in the maintenance of a policy which stopped short of extreme reaction. The fumes of gratified vanity rendered Chateaubriand blind, whilst the necessity on the part of Villèle of keeping at the head of the Royalist party compelled him to avoid all semblance of being moderate or lukewarm.

The session of 1824 was opened on the 23rd of March. The King, while announcing the success of his arms in Spain, also stated that his army had quitted, or was about

to quit, the Peninsula, with the exception of 40,000 men, which were still to remain for a short time to maintain tranquillity. In addition to this, the royal speech announced a law for declaring parliament septennial, and for the conversion of the five per cent. stock into three per cents.

"Repose and piety," said the speech, "are, after long convulsions, the first necessity for France. The present mode of renewing the Chamber does not attain these ends. A project of law will be presented, rendering the renewal septennial. The brief duration of the war, the prosperous state of the revenue, and the progress of credit, enable me to announce that no new tax or loan has been required to cover the expense of the year. Measures have been taken to insure the reimbursement of the capital of the perpetual annuities created by the State in less favourable times, and to obtain their conversion into funds of which the interest is in proportion to that obtained in other monied transactions. This operation, which must have such a happy influence upon agriculture and commerce, will permit, as soon as it is accomplished, the reduction of certain taxes, and the closing of the last wounds of the Revolution."

This last ambiguous announcement alluded, and was known to allude, to a project for indemnifying those noble emigrants whose property had been confiscated and sold. The saving to the State, and the diminution of the interest of the debt, were, according to Villèle's scheme, to allow the creation of an amount of new stock sufficient to satisfy the claims of the emigrants. The diminution of the burdens on land was also promised in the paragraph of the royal speech, as well as the general diminution in the rate of interest, so favourable to property already so much indebted as land must be.

There was nothing in either of these projects so very liberticidal and unfair. If the previous changes in the electoral law had concentrated legislative power in the hands of one class, and discontented all honourable men,—if the confiscation of the liberties of the press, of the right of association, of individual liberty, and the transference of education and patronage to the clergy, was the restoration of despotism, or of the arbitrary power of a privileged class,—the use to be made of this power in the present session was not so serious. Nevertheless, the project of septennality and of conversion raised a storm of opposition and a frenzy of denouncement quite as great as if the two measures had been acts such as Ferdinand of Spain indulged in.

With regard to the septennality of the Chamber, it was suggested and recommended to Villèle far more by Liberal than by reactionary views. What septennality does for a Minister, who has numerous powers of patronage and influence, is to render him more independent of the parliamentary majority for the time being, as it renders that majority independent of the electors. It was Villèle's object rather to be able to check the ultra-Royalist majority, than to indulge and be carried away by its zeal. Chateaubriand, indeed, had high and peculiar aims. He was for taking the barrier of the Rhine for France, giving Russia in return *carte blanche* in the East, under the pretext of reuniting the Greek and Latin Churches; he desired to establish Bourbons on thrones in the Spanish colonies of America, and, in imitation of Napoleon, to give France military and diplomatic glory in exchange for freedom. For these schemes Chateaubriand thought he required permanence in the Royalist majority.

Although, for the principal one, such a minister could hope for no doubtful support and success from a national and even liberal party.

It was on the septennial system that the English Tories had apparently founded their long term of power; and this alone was sufficient to decide Chateaubriand and Villèle. But the septennial period of renewing Parliament, which suited staid and sober England, was but ill adapted to impatient France. Whilst opinion in England resembles the water of a great inland lake, which does, indeed, at distant intervals overflow, but which in general retains a calm surface and an equal level, opinion in France ebbs and flows like the sea, is subject to constant agitation, and has its currents to and fro. Seven years form an age in France, to the end of which one set of opinions seldom lives; and the rising generation there is so eager to throw off their ideas and the law not merely of age but of maturity, that representative machinery requires more free play than in England. The system of the partial renewal of assemblies, in the proportion of one-fifth every year, was not ill imagined to deaden the vivacity and counteract the impatience of the French. Nothing could more strongly mark the current opinion, at least amongst those admitted to the electoral body, than this annual re-election of one-fifth. From the time that M. Decazes gave electoral rights until his fall, each year's renewal had gained in Liberalism, until even the moderate Royalists were threatened with being overwhelmed by the ultra-Liberals. From the time of the Royalist reaction, and consequent change in the electoral law, each successive election had been more and more Royalist, till the Liberals were totally excluded. Villèle sought to stereotype the

majority he had, rather than allow it to augment in zeal and ardour. Besides, he had discovered the great secret of working a representative system by corruption; and that becomes far too difficult and costly when electoral bodies are summoned every year. New deputies were not disciplined so immediately to the necessities and secret habits of government. To this a seven years' lease of power was necessary in order to render the operations of political corruption feasible and possible.

The law was first presented to the Chamber of Peers, and first discussed there. The objections to it were not confined to the Liberals; for whilst they objected to septennality as a formal breach of an article of the Charter, others represented the plan of substituting a general election for many partial and successive ones, as likely to produce in a time of popular effervescence the return of such an assembly as the Convention. M. Corbière defended the law, on the ground that hitherto parliamentary sessions had been employed in temporary legislation, in putting down sedition, or meeting difficulties as they arose, whereas it was necessary to give the country local institutions, and those required by material interests. Corbière no doubt alluded to what once had been a plan of Villèle, which was not only to restore a territorial aristocracy, but to give it power in its locality. Such a scheme Villèle was never able to proceed with, his dissolution and his septennality Bill giving him indeed a Royalist Chamber, but a Chamber which regarded Royalism in a different light from the Minister, and one of whose early convictions was that M. de Villèle himself had enjoyed far too many personal advantages, and far too long a tenure of power.

The debate in the Chamber of Deputies was continued during several days. The most remarkable speech which it called forth was, as usual, that of Royer Collard, who, however, spoke little on the question of septennality, and much on the utter perversion of representative government in France. The annual renewal of a certain portion of the national representatives, he declared, could alone suit the country; for in a time of general election the people not only were, but felt themselves sovereign, which was in flagrant contradiction with the principle and the policy on which, at least, present Ministers sought to found their power and the strength of the throne. Having said thus much against septennality, Royer Collard, in the rest of his speech, seemed to prove that it was very little consequence whether a Chamber was elected partially or integrally for seven years or for five. For the whole power of election and representation, he showed, had passed from the nation at large, and had centred altogether in the class of functionaries who nominated, who elected, who tried, and decided in doubtful cases, and who, masters in every way, rendered the Government in which they triumphed irresistible. These arguments, addressed to a Chamber of functionaries, were thrown away. A law declaring that their mandates or tenure of power should extend to seven years instead of two or three, could not but be acceptable to a newly-elected Chamber; and the Septennial Bill passed by 292 votes against 87.

One of the cherished objects of Villèle in rendering the Parliament septennial, and thus giving stability and permanence to the march and the policy of administration was, that he might be enabled thereby to turn his attention to what is after all the true end of politics and states-

manship, the development of domestic prosperity, the satisfaction of the material and moral wants of the age, and the many requirements of a great people. French governments, for a long series of years, Villèle had the sagacity to perceive, had been conducted with a view to extraneous and artificial ends. Years were spent in subjugating Europe, and bringing all the resources and strength of the country to war. Since the Restoration the entire efforts of Ministers and Chambers, with the struggle of parties and of intelligence, had been directed towards what was after all but a mere question of police, the keeping the country from anarchy, sedition, and revolution. All this time England, however weighed down by the burdens of the war, and distracted not a little by popular turbulence and what appeared to be the successional freedom of all classes, still devoted much time, intellect, discussion, and expenditure, to questions of pure industry, wealth, and commerce. It had established a Board of Trade for examining, sifting, and reporting upon those new principles of free trade, then germinating in the productions of the thinking class. Villèle instituted a similar Board or Council in France. A portion of these inquiries in England concerned the commercial relation of colonies with the mother-country, a subject which Villèle fully understood, and in which he was conversant. What more immediately struck Villèle was the financial prosperity of England, its increasing population, consumption, and wealth, which placed large surpluses at the disposal of its Chancellor of the Exchequer, and raised the vital question of how surpluses were to be disposed of. Should a portion of the debt be paid off, or was it not better to afford alleviation to the country by taking off the more onerous taxes? All these proceedings

of the English Parliament, and activity of the English mind, filled Villèle with as great a desire to emulate it, as the colonial power, naval ascendancy, and continental influence of England filled Chateaubriand with desires and schemes of diplomatic rivalry, and even war. Chateaubriand the genius was rummaging in the past, and seeking to resuscitate the Empire and the ascendancy of Napoleon; whilst Villèle, the more sober and prosaic statesman, was for trying that task which no French Minister had ever attempted, or we believe will ever attempt, that of providing in an intelligent spirit for the requirements and developments of the French people, without seeking to stilt them into heroes or depress them into slaves.

The first fact that struck Villèle as a financier was the great difference of interest paid by England and by France for their public debt. The insecurity of the French Government had rendered the loans of 1814 and 1815 most onerous, but ever since that epoch the French funds had been gradually rising. In 1823, Messrs. Rothschild had taken a loan of some 20 millions sterling, at little short of 90 francs for the 100, bearing five per cent. In the ensuing spring these funds sold for 103; and of course the Finance Minister thought it his duty to propose a reduction of interest, or a conversion of stock, in order that the State might profit by its own prosperity. The reduction of the rate of interest was too manifestly favourable to the landed interest to need explication; and Villèle rendered it still more acceptable to that now dominant class by tacitly promising that the amount saved on the operation should be devoted to the object of indemnifying the emigrants of the Revolution. This won

the approbation of the Count d'Artois, the most powerful supporter of the movement.

There were other parties, however, and those influential, who were hurt and dissatisfied by Villèle's measure. Those principally affected were the Parisians of all classes. The provincial French had no trust in State funds, and very little of the *œconomies* of the provinces ever found its way to Paris; but in the capital all who had property were *rentiers*, from the wealthy inhabitant of the Chaussée d'Antin to the humble room-holder of the Marais. Here functionaries deposited their savings, shopkeepers their gains,* and here, too, the clergy lodged the fruit of their œconomies. Such numerous classes and interests were not without their champions; and these put forward, some of them at least, most extravagant arguments. Thus, some pretended that because the French Government in granting these annuities made no mention of the capital, therefore these annuities were to be perpetual, as the State was bound to pay *in eternum* these annuities as they stood to the holders. No argument could be so detrimental as this to funded property of any kind. For, however a generation may burden posterity with a sum borrowed to

* There were 196 millions of *rentes*, five per cent., at this time, of which 56 millions could not be reimbursed. There were 32 millions in the Sinking Fund, and different public charities and institutions held the rest. The 140 millions were distributed as follows:—

	Francs.	Francs.			Francs.
From	10 to	50	10,000 holders	possessed	310,000
„	50 „	99	36,300 „	„	2,750,000
„	100 „	999	76,000 „	„	30,600,000
„	1,000 „	4,999	15,500 „	„	42,500,000
„	5,000 „	9,999	5,000 „	„	27,290,000
„	10,000 &c.		1,600 „	„	36,550,000
			145,000		140,000,000

meet necessities too great for annual effort to meet, or annual resources to bear, a perpetual mortgage of a country's revenues, without the possibility of its liberating itself from the debt, would prove a burden, which future generations would inevitably shake off. It was self-evident that the *rentes* were interest for a certain capital. The very name of Five per Cent. indicated this capital; and the Government which reimbursed this at par could not be considered fraudulent.

The practical objections to the plan of M. de Villèle were more forcible. Thus it was alleged, that the present rise of the securities above par was artificial, produced in a great measure by the capitalists, who were to conduct and profit by the operation, while the fundholders would have one per cent. stricken from their annuity, without any compensation. The law proposed was,—

The Finance Minister is empowered to substitute three per cent. stock for that existing at five per cent., either by an exchange of one for the other, taking the three per cent. at 75, or by the reimbursement of the 100 to those who refuse to accept the conversion.

To this it was objected, that if the State economized thirty millions of francs in its annual payment of interest, it added one-third to the capital of the debt, and thus threw away in the future more than it saved at present. The most formidable opponent of the measure in the Lower Chamber was Casimir Perrier (Laffitte, who had then no seat in the Legislature, supported the conversion), who renewed his old and very narrow objection to every financial measure not effected by French bankers and capital. "Money abounds, or it does not abound," said Casimir Perrier: "it is the highest temerity to

attempt such an operation as the present. If it is abundant, why have recourse to foreigners, and place the finance of the country under the Austrian eagle or the British leopard (Rothschild and Baring), in order to reimburse the French fundholders? But the truth is Government could not reimburse. The whole scheme is based on the belief that the *rentier* cannot demand reimbursement in a country where there are so few investments, and where, consequently, the fundholder is at the mercy of the Government."

The reply of Villèle was frank. He admitted his desire to indemnify the emigrants and to "heal the wounds of the Revolution." He denied that he had foreseen the possibility of conversion: had he foreseen it, he would not have concluded the loan of last year. A host of circumstances (amongst others that of England reducing a quantity of four per cents. to three and a-half) had caused capital to overflow into the French funds. Much of the rise was, in consequence, the result of the influx of foreign capital, and no doubt it was partly foreign capital that would enable Government to accomplish what it proposed. For capital was of no country; and M. Casimir Perrier, instead of narrowly grudging the profits which foreign capitalists might acquire, ought to congratulate the country on having its resources increased and its annual expenditure lessened, by means of the competition and the influx of capital other than French. The Minister admitted that the reducing of the four per cents. would be preferable to a reduction to three. But it was impossible.

The speech, however, which contains the most full information with respect to the motives which actuated the deputies and the proprietorial interest, is that of

M. Syries de Mayrinhac, who made himself the special champion of the landed interest, pleading against its monied rival. The taxes on landed property ranged from one-fifth to one-third of the annual produce, which, to a kind of property so easily and so generally indebted, was almost extinction. Yet contrasted with land so treated stood the public funds completely untaxed, producing regularly their five per cent. without reduction, and which had gradually grown during the last nine years to 133 millions of francs yearly interest. Of course this had swallowed up capital, and had left land no possibility of borrowing, except at enormous rates of interest. Every burden was thrown upon the land and on the provinces, whilst the Parisians, who were all *rentiers*, enjoyed certainty of revenue, and exemption from taxation. The rigour of indirect contribution was at the same time unknown to them. The town poor had, moreover, a hundred institutions of various kinds, whilst the country poor remained a charge upon the proprietors. The price of bread was kept down in Paris at the expense of the general taxpayer. The very house-tax was not one-half in town what it was in the provinces.

The discussion of the law for reducing the rate of interest, was, in fact, a field in which the interests of the metropolis and of the provinces came into collision. This invariably forms a very important feature of French politics. Unfortunately for the Bourbons they founded their party altogether on provincial interests and rustic traditions, forming their representative assemblies exclusively of squires, and rendering themselves and their government every year more and more the aversion and the laughing-stock of those classes and that intelligence con-

gregated in the metropolis. The general sentiment of Parisian society became so universal and so strong, that it infected even men of those classes and professions naturally attached to the Government of the time. Thus the very functionaries in Paris, the lawyers and judges, the Peers, and some even of the clergy, were carried away by the general sentiment, which had but to penetrate from the upper layer of society to the lower, in order to produce such an explosion as that of 1830. The contentment of the lower classes of towns was a care which had not yet attracted the attention of the French politician. Villèle then, and Guizot twenty years later, despised such considerations, however manifestly they had been found to actuate the policy of the English statesman.

The law for the conversion of the five per cent. stock was carried by a large majority, 238 against 145; but even these 145 showed that a representative assembly cannot be rendered permanently submissive or unanimous, and that if the benches of the Opposition are cleared of one party, they are pretty sure to be occupied by another. If Opposition had not as yet acquired sufficient weight in the Chamber of Deputies to oppose so successful a Minister, in that of the Peers it was far more formidable than he had at all calculated upon. He had imagined that the promotion of 1823 to the Upper House would suffice to render it amenable to his will; but although a Government, or a dynasty, may succeed in forming a representative chamber of one class of property and interest in the country, as had now been done in France, it was difficult to do this with regard to a House of Peers, already declared to be hereditary. The grandees of former dynasties, as well as the veterans of preceding administrations, had of course

gained admittance to the Chamber, and these subsisted far more by pensions and upon the interest of capital than on landed property. In fact, the Frenchman who has attained dignity in office, in politics, or in place, keeps his rank as long as he moves in the sphere of Parisian society, but loses it at once on retiring to a provincial residence. The landed interest in France, with the exception of a few names, was much more a squirearchy than an aristocracy. This, such as it existed, was too much disconnected with the land to favour its exclusive interests and pretensions. When Villèle's project, therefore, came triumphant with the votes of the landed interest in the Chamber of Deputies, it encountered in the Peers the hostility of that monied interest, which was stifled in the Lower House. Count Roy, so often Finance Minister, led the opposition in the Peers, in a speech pointing out all the objections to the measure, commingled with the political acrimony and general unfairness of Casimir Perrier. "The interest of money in France," said Count Roy, "far from having really fallen below five per cent., was at a much higher rate, considering the amount of capital in the country and the requirement for it." Behind Count Roy grouped the peers of Decazes' creation, and of the Duc de Richelieu's following. Whether, however, these would have had the courage or the influence to throw out a Ministerial Bill, voted by the Chamber of Deputies, and supported by the Court, was doubtful, had not aid been given to the Opposition from quarters where it was little expected.

One of those who most freely condemned the law of conversion, in society and in his crowded saloons, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. de Chateaubriand had,

indeed, no very strong objections to make, and no very strong grounds of difference; but jealousy had grown up between him and Villèle. A seat in a Cabinet, and ministerial or parliamentary duties, with merely domestic matters to discuss and to carry, filled him with weariness. The Prime Minister having extricated himself and the country from the Spanish wars, had no desire to launch into any of Chateaubriand's additional schemes. Villèle had no wish to carry further that rivalry to England and that alliance with Russia, with which the Foreign Secretary hoped to work such wonders. And it was soon apparent that two dissentient and rival parties frequented the Hôtel of the Finance Minister and that of the Foreign Secretary. Chateaubriand, indeed, supported the Septennality Bill, and was about to speak upon it; but as he at the same time desired to lower the age requisite for deputies from forty to thirty, Corbière, rudely preceding him at the tribunal, took from him his turn, and deprived Chateaubriand of the opportunity of making a speech. Corbière had a special aversion for Chateaubriand, and declared that if the Viscount re-entered the Cabinet by one door, he would disappear at the other. The coarse mediocrity of the man could not tolerate even the presence of such a colleague as Chateaubriand. He hated him as Robespierre hated Condorcet, and no doubt would have shown his hate in a similar manner had times permitted.

What Chateaubriand has written on the subject of conversion, merely shows that he never turned his mind to the subject. "Every reduction of interest upon a capital," says he, "is bankruptcy." With more reason he adds, "The price of five per cent. stock, at the commencement of 1824, was 93; its subsequent rise to 103

was not natural." Chateaubriand adds, that Villèle never communicated to him the terms of the treaty or understanding between the Government and Rothschild; he only told them to M. Corbière. It has been shown before that, even at the time of Guilleminot's dismissal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was left in ignorance of the chief political resolutions of the Cabinet. Yet he seems, not to have protested against this. He merely took his revenge by criticising in society, though not in the Chamber, the measures of the Finance Minister. The fall of the statesman, who meditated nothing less at the moment than the redistribution of Europe and the reorganization of America, cannot be better told than in his own words.

The last day of the debate on the great financial project had arrived in the Chamber of Peers. The Septennial Bill had already passed; Louis XVIII., on the morning of the debate, pronounced to M. de Chateaubriand, in a marked manner, an eulogium upon some speech delivered in favour of the conversion. His intention to remain silent on the subject still remained the same. Some dog had bit him. This appeared in a bad light to the King, who was led to consider M. de Villèle's hold of office dependent on the success of the Bill. M. de Chateaubriand did not believe in this, but he certainly had the appearance, in refusing to speak, of contributing to the fall of the Prime Minister. He went on the 3rd of June to the Luxembourg. M. Mollien moved as an amendment a different kind of reduction. Count Roy proposed a reduction to four and a half per cent, which was not worth while considering. The only amendment, or proposal, in opposition to this measure, that M. de Villèle thought

worthy of consideration, was the demand of the Archbishop of Paris, M. de Quelen, for some indulgence towards those small holders who possessed not more than a thousand francs annual interest. The declaration of so grave a personage against the Bill had given courage to those who hesitated in their opposition, and in fact the Archbishop headed the defection against the Prime Minister. M. de Villèle promised, at the last moment, to introduce measures which would secure the small holder from loss. But it was too late. When the first paragraph of the law was put to the vote in the Chamber of Peers, it was rejected by 120 votes against 105.

The vote occasioned much surprise and great jubilation. The Count d'Artois was disappointed, the King annoyed. The failure was universally attributed to Chateaubriand, whose friends in the Deputies had not spoken, and had most of them voted against Ministers. It was said that Chateaubriand had influenced the Archbishop, with whom he was intimate, and that the latter had been even promised a place in the new Cabinet. Yet, at the moment of the adverse vote, Chateaubriand approached Villèle, and said to him, "If you resign, I am ready to follow you." M. Villèle, for answer, cast upon Chateaubriand a look, which the latter declares he did not comprehend at the time, although he remembered it ever after. Three days afterwards the following ordinance was put into the hands of the Foreign Minister:—

Louis, by the Grace of God, &c., ordains,

The Count of Villèle, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Finance, is charged *par interim* with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in place of the Viscount de Chateaubriand.

'Thus was turned ignominiously out of office, by the approbation of the King and of his brother, the Minister who had decided upon the invasion of Spain, and the restoration of Ferdinand; who had rallied the army to the Bourbons; and who had sacrificed all his Liberal principles and constitutional tendencies to the party of the ultra-Royalists, as the only party that would maintain him in power, and allow him to pursue what he considered the resurrection of glory and of monarchy in France. Villèle triumphed. But in the present instance one cannot say that genius was altogether sacrificed to mediocrity, or high talent to base envy. For the man of genius certainly wanted honesty, and in the pursuit of his purpose and his ambition, was false to a degree that it required greater art, more assiduous care, and more constant dissimulation to cover, than a man far more accustomed to the paths of Liberalism and imagination than to the ways of the world could command.

But if Chateaubriand was deficient in the address of the courtier, M. de Villèle miscalculated the power of such a writer in opposition. The brothers Bertin, then possessors of the *Journal des Débats*, and skilled, from habit and the profession of journalists, to discern when a statesman had reached his zenith, and when he was upon the decline, did not hesitate to adopt the cause of Chateaubriand, and open to him their columns as a powerful battery against Villèle. The kind of insurrection in the Chamber of Peers against the Minister emboldened them, and several sentences passed by the Royal Courts, and that of Cassation, in favour of journals which had been prosecuted, showed that the judges had grown weary of Government ascendancy, and were disposed to check rather than promote it.

Few of the events of the year excited more interest or indignation, indeed, than the attempts of the Minister of Justice and of the royal household to court or silence the independent press and of the most ably-conducted journals of Opposition. The *Courrier Français* was prosecuted before the judges of the Royal Court, under the Press Law, for the crime of tending to trouble the public tranquillity and bringing contempt upon the Government of the King. Constitutional opposition of every shade, if carried on with spirit, must, it was evident, become obnoxious to such a law as this, if the tribunal was inclined to condemn. So great was the latitude of judgment, that on the political feelings of the bench of judges must depend their decision. This was the objection made to the law when it was discussed. All the severe or spirited articles which had appeared for some months in the *Courrier Français* were collected and read to the Court by the Procureur-General,—a denunciation of Ferdinand of Spain,—a reproach to the Justice Minister, for chaining M. Magalon, editor of the *Album*, to a galley-slave,—an article against the curate of a parish, who refused to christen a child, because it had Manuel for a godfather. The tendency of this was certainly to bring contempt upon a Government. But some of the judges of the Royal Court thought that it was Government which brought contempt upon itself; and, accordingly, the *Courrier Français* was not condemned.

A trial which made equal noise was that of the *Quotidienne*. This was the old Royalist organ, and as such was habitually read by the Minister's own party. But it was violent in opposition to Villèle. The attempt was, therefore, made to buy it, which succeeded with regard to a few

shares. These being made use of to crush the veteran editor, Michaud, there appeared two Quotidiennes, and finally the whole affair was made public by a trial in the Courts, which redounded little to the honour of the Government. In the case of another journal which had ceased to appear, through the manœuvres of ministerial agents, and which had been resuscitated, the crown lawyer pleaded that it had no right to be revived without the royal permission. Even that the judges overruled, and gave their decision in favour of the journal.

Perceiving thus that the very foundations of the law for silencing the press were swept away, by the judges becoming the protectors instead of being the persecutors of the journals, and, unable to withstand the galling pen of Chateaubriand in the *Journal des Débats*, of the zealous ultra-Royalists and bishops in the *Quotidienne*, Ministers made use of the powers left them by the clause in the law to re-establish the censorship during the intervals of the sittings of the Chamber. In the ensuing month the journals of almost all colours appeared each morning with blank columns, each article being erased by the censors. These very blanks had the effect of poignant writing, for they rendered the Ministry unpopular with the Parisians almost as much as the diatribes which were suppressed. Nor did the closing of the columns of the press silence the inveteracy of Opposition. Chateaubriand and others recurred to pamphlets and to books, and overwhelmed the retrograde Ministry, who could not bear publicity or face the light, with opprobrium and ridicule. But whilst the great mass of the Parisians joined in this war upon the Minister, that personage felt strong in the support of the squirearchy of the Chamber of Deputies, of the Court, and the heir

presumptive, as well as of the more astute and influential of the priestly party.

One of the crimes of Chateaubriand was his alienation from the bigoted and retrograde Church party. He was not a member of the *Congregation*. He had written a powerful book in favour of religion, and even of Catholicism; but it was as piety and faith that he recommended it, not as a code of politics and morals. In the eyes of the Duchess d'Angoulême and the Count d'Artois, he wanted true piety, and his attachment to the ecclesiastical power and its restoration was not sufficiently ardent. If Villèle was enabled to triumph over Chateaubriand by being considered a more zealous friend of the Church, it became incumbent on the Prime Minister to show this by filling up the places in the administration and the Cabinet. But another event, more imminent every day, influenced Villèle in his selection of colleagues. This was the declining health, and not distant demise, of the King, and the probable succession of the future Charles X. To succeed Chateaubriand in the post of Foreign Affairs, Villèle chose M. de Damas, War Minister, and friend of the Duc d'Angoulême. Clermont Tonnerre was removed from the Marine to the War Office; and was replaced by M. de Chabrol. The Duc de Doudeauville was made Minister of the Household; and his son, Sosthene de la Rochefoucauld, the introducer of Madame du Cayla to the royal apartments, was created Minister or Director of the Fine Arts. Villèle then made Bishop Frayssinous exchange his post, or rather his title, of Head of the University for that of Minister of Public Worship as well as of Ecclesiastical affairs. Though much blamed for the appointment, and even for the creation of the Ministry, the

aim of Villèle was rather to check the ultramontane party of the Ministry than to give full reins to it. Frayssinous himself was far from contenting the zealots, by whom, especially by Lamennais, he was fiercely and continually assailed.* At the same time, Villèle showed his sagacity by appointing to office, though not in the Cabinet, M. Martignac, to whom he looked as the most promising disciple of that school of adroit and temporizing policy which was his own.

What gives life to age is activity, especially activity of mind. The body even in decay seems to resume and retain vigour as long as the mind has a purpose and a will; these ceasing, the renovating power of the body seems not called into action, and torpor ensues. As long as Louis XVIII. retained Decazes, or even the Duc de Richelieu, Ministers who required the King's support, and craved his counsels and his intervention, the King retained his vivacity. No sooner, however, had the Duke thrown away his own power, and given the Monarch up to the domination of the party of the ultra-Royalists and the Count d'Artois, through the instrumentality of the new electoral law, than Louis sunk into hebetude, both as a man and a monarch. He was somewhat reconciled to the change, by perceiving that M. de Villèle had none of the extravagance of his party, and would act as a check upon it, as far as prudence and the preservation of his leadership would allow. Madame du Cayla filled the place which intimacy requires. She was the confidante of the monarch's thoughts, and at the same time, the intervening medium between him and

* Lamennais was at this time so furious against any innovation upon the teaching, the faith, or the despotism of ancient times, that Paul Louis Courrier said of him, "What a noise Lamennais would have made on the day of the creation, could he have witnessed it! His first cry to the Divinity would have been, to pray him to respect that *ancient chaos*."

the religious party, or between him and the Minister; for Villèle was too illiterate to command, and too coarse to hold, much personal communication with the King. Reconciled with the sacerdotal party and with his brother, through Madame du Cayla, and at the same time, reposing on Villèle, Louis XVIII. abandoned anxious thought and personal interference in politics; contenting himself with enacting the king in all matters of etiquette, and in sustaining the dignity of his house. Monarchy to him was the monarchy of Louis XIV., in form at least. Thus he re-established all those great offices of the court, for which no duties remained corresponding to the titles. The King did not merely require their presence, like modern sovereigns, on days of ceremony and parade, but he held a real levée,—that is, he expected that those honoured with the privilege should take advantage of it, and be ready when his bed-room door was thrown open of a morning to enter and pay their respects, and be witness of the tedious toilette of a gouty invalid. He also presided at the Council of Ministers, where he more often indulged in telling stories than in discussing matters of state. The subjects of his stories were drawn from the reports of the secret police, with which he was always entertained. These reports were made up of scandal, and of individual failing, rather than of treason, or of aught which seemingly regarded politics. But Louis XVIII. loved to skim the scandal of the Parisian world, through his police, when he could no longer do so by conversation. He received few visits, latterly none except those of the royal family and Madame du Cayla.

Lamartine, one of his court, has depicted the nature of the old King's life, even to its smallest peculiarities, with

the minuteness of the memoir writer. He has described those rapid drives around the capital, and from palace to palace, in which he used to kill his own horses, and those of his *gardes du corps*, who were far from worshipping the royalty of which they were supposed to be the ornament and the support. On one occasion his police brought the monarch an intercepted letter of one of his own *gardes du corps* who accompanied him in his rapid rides. The writer concluded with,—"When shall we escort the old —— to St. Denis?" Lamartine mentions one of his fancies, which was to be transported to Versailles, in the old palace of which he caused his former apartment to be furnished just as it had been. There he would shut himself up, and evoke the reminiscences of his early life,—of the court of his brother,—of the misfortunes of his family,—and of all that past which he had done so much, and yet so vainly, to restore. In reminiscence of his exile, he caused to be laid out, in the grounds of the park, a little retired garden, in the English fashion, in which he also liked to be wheeled, and to be left alone to his contemplation. The garden is a copy of that Louis XVIII. possessed at Hartwell; it still exists in the *jardin Anglais*. On his return from these excursions the Parisian public generally saw in the royal carriage, as it galloped past, the figure of the King, asleep, his white head uncovered, and hanging down, insensible to the silence, indifference, or disrespect of the crowd.

The King set apart the Wednesday as sacred to Madame du Cayla. She spent that day with him at the Tuileries, and carried away fifty thousand francs every such evening, destined to be the purchase-money of the chateau which the King caused to be built for her at St. Ouen.

In this most unpicturesque village, near the gates of Paris, stood the most unpicturesque mansion, which remains as the monument of the royal attachment. Louis recollected that from St. Ouen he had dated and issued the Charter. St. Ouen, he said, would form the monument of his wisdom, the palladium of his race. Its name and memory would endear him to the French; and Madame du Cayla's chateau was to be the monument. Little thought Louis XVIII., as he spoke these words during the fête which inaugurated the chateau, that his brother would destroy the palladium; and that St. Ouen, its monarch, its goddess, its charter, and its chateau, would all alike be forgotten.*

The day before that which Madame du Cayla spent with the King, M. de la Rochefoucault spent with her to impress on her mind the desires and injunctions of the Congregation, or religious party. He at the same time insinuated the wishes of the Count d'Artois. On the morning after her interview with the King, M. de Villèle paid his respects to the mistress, receiving and communicating information and counsel; on the intermediate day, Louis kept up a constant correspondence and exchanged letters, morning and evening, with Madame du Cayla. It should be here remarked, in order to complete the truth of history, that whilst Lamartine, a great respecter of the Bourbons, represents this connection as one of pure and platonic friendship, Capefigue, who had equally good access to the opinion and information of the highest personages and classes, supposes it to have been of a character quite the reverse.

* Madame du Cayla's chateau of St. Ouen has been long offered for sale, and unable to find a purchaser.

The two parties most concerned passed their own judgment on the connection, when the last fatal malady gaining ground upon the King, it seemed decorous to Madame du Cayla and to him that they should separate, and see each other no more. It was so arranged; and yet Madame du Cayla was compelled once more to repair to the Tuileries. Louis, indifferent through life to the duties of religion, was contented to die without going through those almost public forms of penitence which the Roman Catholic Church requires. The sacerdotal or religious party, which had introduced Madame du Cayla to the palace, did so in order to gain political influence over the monarch, but of course not with the view of inspiring him with really religious sentiments. Even now, when every desire existed that the King should set a good example, and should go through the forms of that religion which was the political creed of the dominant party, Madame du Cayla alone had influence to persuade the moribund prince of the necessity of submitting to such a ceremony: the last task she performed for the sacerdotal party, who had made use of her. And here let us record their gratitude.

The King frequently pressed Madame du Cayla to receive more ample marks of favour than the chateau and domain of St. Ouen. She refused; the King observing, that it was little matter, for she would find that the testament he left behind him would secure her honourable independence. The breath, however, had no sooner left the King, than the first care of the pious Count d'Artois, his brother, was to take possession of his private cabinet, shut himself up there, and burn every record that Louis XVIII. had left, either in the shape of testament or correspondence. A moderate pension was granted to

Madame du Cayla for the remainder of her days, and then Louis the XVIII.'s brother took no further notice of the lady whom he had made the instrument of his own domination, and that of the ecclesiastical party, over his brother's mind.

The death of the King was tedious: it was a slow decay of the extremities, which, long torpid, at last were detached from the body, and mortification ensued. The words of Louis XVIII. to his brother were,—

"I have tacked between parties, like Henry IV. Unlike him, I die in my bed, and in the Tuileries. Do as I have done, and you will reach the same end of peace. I pardon whatever annoyance you may have caused me, for the hopes I entertain of your conduct as King. But," added the dying monarch, pointing to the Duc de Bordeaux, who was brought in, "let Charles the Tenth take care of the crown for that boy." The prescience of the King did not fail him. He all along, and to the last, foresaw, as Charles II. of England did, that his brother and successor would disinherit the dynasty and prostrate the throne. On the 16th of September, 1824, Louis XVIII. ceased at once to live and to reign.

As he observed in his last words to his brother, Louis had achieved no small thing for a king and a Bourbon when he died in his bed, and in the palace of his ancestors. How far this was due to his talents or his foresight may be questioned. He was certainly far from being either by his intelligence or his character equal to the requirements of a monarch ascending the throne at such a critical period, in the face of circumstances and parties so inimical. His conduct in 1814 was of deplorable weakness, and his government was marked by a fatal imbecility; for it was

by the utter want of skill, courage, and even common sense shown at that epoch, that the new dynasty sunk so deeply in popular respect that no series of years and success could restore it. Even in 1815 Louis XVIII. was not awakened, and he fell into the same error of continuing the old Chamber, and distrusting and misusing the principle of representative government. The fact was, that Louis XVIII. had no principle, or, at least, no other principle than that which his brother professed, of a nation being the property of the eldest of a reigning dynasty, and that it could have no rights and no liberties whatever except what is derived from his behest. He was willing, indeed, to modify this, and depart from it in practice, so far as he deemed necessary to satisfy the exigencies of moderate men; but he had no faith either in the justice of the representative principle, considered in the abstract, nor in the wisdom and good results of its being fairly applied, at least in France. From the ultra-Royalists of that day he differed, however, in many respects. He did not believe that the country could be brought back to what it had been in times past. He was no believer in the efficacy of religion for political purposes, and was too well versed in the literature of the last century not to have a tinge of its material philosophy. He was fond of a court, its pretensions, and its splendour, but was no worshipper of the old aristocracy. The sentiment which principally inspired him, and influenced his acts in the five more important years of his reign, that is, from 1816 to 1821, was dislike of those who sought to put an intellectual yoke upon him. He first rebelled against Prince Talleyrand, who pretended to direct the foreign affairs of the country according to his humour, without consulting Parliament

or King. He then looked about for, and at last found in M. Decazes, a proper instrument to do his personal will, or at least to allow Royalty its fair share of influence. Through him Louis certainly made the boldest and wisest effort of the fifteen years of Bourbon reign to establish the government upon a middle and a constitutional party. In this effort, indeed, consists his chief claim to be honoured as a constitutional king. We have explained and developed elsewhere the cause of his failure, which was certainly a want of confidence and belief in the true representative principle, and in the capacity of the middle class to carry it out. The fatal mistake of relying on a body of functionaries, instead of upon a class of independent citizens, proved the ruin of Decazes. But it was an error almost inseparable from a country with an administration so centralized and so universal, and whose surface was so thickly strewn with functionaries, that they outnumber the class of independent citizens altogether. If, however, in these attempts Louis XVIII. and Decazes committed many errors and imprudences, the liberal and civic party in the country were quite as imprudent, and far more unjust. Instead of tolerating Decazes, appreciating his efforts and those of the King, they, in a great measure, made use of the great liberties both of Parliament and of the press to depreciate the dynasty altogether, and to raise upon its fall that of the Bonapartes, which certainly was far less friendly to constitutional liberty. Public opinion seconded the Liberals in their career of ingratitude and folly, and the result was the failure of the plan of Decazes and of the King to found a middle party, and to maintain a government upon its basis. We have seen the result. The ultra-Royalists took advantage of the mistake, drew a weak

Minister into a second change of the electoral law, and into the establishment of their own ascendancy from it. In all this Louis XVIII. was a passive actor. He did not approve of the reaction, and took little part in it; but when he found it successful, when he saw a vigorous and Tory policy put down sedition and turbulence with far more success than his own moderate and constitutional attempts at rule, Louis had misgivings whether his brother and the Ultras might not be right after all, and whether the French, intolerant of moderate and liberal rulers, might not be better fitted for a government of coercion. Whatever doubts he might have had of the expediency of ruling the country with a strong hand, and continuing a policy of coercion, the success of the Spanish expedition convinced him; and the old monarch, who had tried in vain to be a Louis XVI., making concessions to his people, resigned himself to enact the part of Louis XIV., of whom he affected the state, the dignity, and the pretensions.

The King, therefore, experienced in a fulness of glory and success, the results of a system not his own. He could not, indeed, have been displeased by a triumph over the most noisy, the most destructive, the most vulgar of his foes. By good fortune and the natural strength of an established government, he had passed through a year of military conspiracies; and, seizing the opportunity, his Minister had launched the army upon an enterprise, which, little glorious as a martial exploit, was triumphant as a political manœuvre. But after all this was the ascendancy of force. The system which had such success was not the constitutional one. It was achieved by the government of a party, and no very large party, of priests and monks, and rustic squires, of crown lawyers and political zealots, who

monopolized power to the exclusion of the majesty of the nation, and in defiance of its sentiments; who gagged the press, packed the Parliament, trod down the civic and intelligent classes, being in their turn abhorred and despised by them. And in this kind of policy they were hardened and encouraged to persevere by full success, since the conclusion to be drawn from successive experiments, was that, where moderate and constitutional attempts had failed, coercion and rigour, and the strong hand, had insured tranquillity, prosperity, and submission.

It would thus be most unfair to consider that Louis XVIII. had established the dynasty, and that Charles X. overthrew it; that the yielding and circumspect character of the one saved, the rash and precipitate passion of the other destroyed, it. The reigns of Louis and of his brother are one, or, if they are to be separated, the line of division must be taken at the moment when the Duc de Richelieu's electoral change flung Parliament and Government into the hands of the Count d'Artois and the ultra-Royalists. From that time was inaugurated the policy, which in fact prevailed and was persevered in, with a very slight and brief interruption, until 1830. That reign of force and of an unconstitutional party happened to be crowned with triumph during the last years of Louis XVIII. But the seeds of that crop of discontent and disaffection, which swelled like a tide, nevertheless were sowed largely, during these years, until it reached the height, and produced the catastrophe of 1830.

CHAPTER VIII.

ACCESSION OF CHARLES, HIS GRACIOUSNESS AND WOULD-BE LIBERALISM—THIS SOON BELIED BY MINISTERIAL MEASURES—LAW OF MORTMAIN, OF SACRILEGE—INDEMNITY TO THE EMIGRANTS—THE CORONATION—DEATH OF GENERAL FOY.

CHARLES X., who now succeeded to his brother, and assumed the title, whilst he continued to wield the authority, of King, had no change to make in either his policy or in the personal composition of the Ministry. M. de Villèle possessed his entire confidence, as he had long been the instrument of his will. The acts of his administration had been attended with such signal success, that the monarch feared to change any, even the smallest of Villèle's arrangements. It was expected that the private friends of the new monarch would now, at least, be advanced to power; that Jules de Polignac would be promoted to the Cabinet, and M. de Vitrolles take a leading place in its councils. But Villèle objected to the incapacity of the one—that was the term he applied to M. de Polignac, and to the restlessness of Vitrolles. Absolute himself, as King, Charles X. seemed to respect equal absolutism in his Ministers.

Charles X. had, however, no idea of delegating his own

sovereign power. Though no longer young, he showed no symptoms of the decadence, the laziness, or the weakness of age. He walked as erect, and was as graceful in his demeanour as in the days of his youth. "It is the labour of thought," says Lamartine, "which makes a man old, and Charles X. had never thought." The judgment may be too harsh, but it certainly was borne out by the monarch's aspect, which was as null and unintellectual as his stature was majestic. His physical advantages and courtly air inspired the King with the desire to be gracious. There was nothing he studied more, than to make a good and favourable impression by his reception. Supposing himself the source of all power, all honour, all favour, opportunities were seized of conferring them upon those he loved. Moreover, he had no idea but that he was the most benign and liberal of monarchs. He felt confident that in keeping all power to himself, and imparting none to the nation, he was doing no wrong, and that he was guilty of neither arrogance nor imprudence. The experiment of constitutional government, such as had been made during the last three years, pleased him vastly. Instead of diminishing his kingly power and revenues, it marvellously facilitated and augmented both. The Chamber of Deputies, packed as it was of squires and functionaries, was ready to propose and sanction all unpopular acts. The King might be a despot and a prodigal,—the supposed national representation was there to take away the odium. Economy, leniency, and generosity, seemed to flow from the King, and the King alone. His virtues were thrown into relief; the odium of his vices were borne by others.

According to the received etiquette, Charles X. had withdrawn to the Palace at St. Cloud, from that of the

Tuileries, occupied by the remains of the late King. There he received his family, to the members of which it was his first care to restore the ancient ranks and titles devolving on their new position. He addressed his son, the Duc d'Angoulême, as Dauphin, and the Duchess as Dauphine. These titles imply youth, and as the Dauphin was turned fifty, his new rank created a smile. The companions of the young dauphin used to be styled *Menins*, whipped boys, who were to bear castigation for young royalty. Even this absurdity was revived. Thus, even whilst the new King was conforming the appointments and acts of his government according to the supposed desires of his people, Court arrangements betrayed that his tastes and tendencies were still more in the spirit of four centuries back than of the present. The monarch's want of good taste was, however, redeemed by good-nature. The late King had always looked with distrust upon the Duke of Orleans, who had been compelled to remain in England for some time after the Restoration. Louis would not allow him the title of Royal Highness. Charles X. conferred this at once, and accompanied it by the more solid gift of the ancient appanage of the House of Orleans, consisting chiefly of the large Crown forests, which had not been sold at the Revolution, and which now rendered the Duke of Orleans one of the wealthiest proprietors in France. The eldest son of the Duke of Orleans was promoted to the command of a regiment. The Imperial generals, even those who had given most trouble by their opposition in the preceding reign, were welcomed with generous forgiveness by Charles X. Grouchy was of this number, as was also Excelmans.

To the peers and deputies who came to pay their respects

to him at St. Cloud, Charles X. said explicitly, "I promised, as a subject, to maintain the Chamber and the constitution, which we owe to the late King. Now that the right of my birth has given me power, I will employ all of it to consolidate, for the happiness of my people, the great act I have sworn to maintain."

The King was complimented on his accession and entrance into Paris by the Archbishop de Quelen, and by the chief pastor of the Reformed Church. The former having had the arrogance to hint at what was expected by the Church from so pious a prince, did not receive the answer of assent he expected; whilst to the Protestant pastor Charles declared, that all Frenchmen were equal in his eyes, whatever was their religion. Although the great act of amnesty was reserved for the coronation, still it was anticipated by numerous pardons. So that all those exiled in consequence of the conspiracies of 1822 were enabled to return to France. The act which most redounded to the honour of the King, was the abrogation of the decree establishing the censorship. This was not so wonderful a boon; for Government had the right of enforcing such an order only during the interval of the session, and the opening of the new session was necessarily at hand. Still the taking off the censorship by the new king implied that he would not again have recourse to it or re-enact it; and no act of his was more popular, or gave better hopes of the new reign. In consequence of these acts, the review of the National Guard, passed by the new King, became a popular fête, by the acclamations with which the citizens greeted a monarch, who commenced his reign with such fine promises and liberal leanings. It was at this review, when the royal cortège was pressed by the crowd, and the

Guards came forward to drive off the people, Charles exclaimed "Point de hallebardes"—no halberts! It would seem, as if a liberal and constitutional prince was succeeding to a reactionary, a bigoted, and a tyrannical king. The truth was the very reverse of the seeming. And yet people, so distrustful and awake as the citizens of Paris, were misled by the delusion for a moment; and not only the citizens, but the monarch himself believed that he was merely inaugurating a popular reign, that he really possessed the sentiments and intentions which he professed, and that misunderstanding between him and his people was henceforth impossible—so little did monarch and people know each other.

The parliamentary session of 1825 was opened a few days before Christmas of the previous year. Charles X. then first addressed the Chambers as King.

"The glory of the reign just closed," he declared, "could never be effaced. Louis XVIII. not only raised up once more the throne of his ancestors, but consolidated it by institutions, which, connecting the past with the present, restored peace and happiness to France." The monarch then spoke of the confidence which had greeted his accession, of the friendly and conciliatory sentiments of foreign courts, and of the necessity of still leaving a portion of the French army in Spain. He spoke of the amelioration that the sacred interests of religion demanded, and then came to what was to be the principal measure of the session.

"The King, my brother, found a great consolation in preparing the measure for healing the last wounds of the Revolution." These words were known to mean the repairing the losses of the emigrants. "The moment has arrived for accomplishing the wise design which he con-

templated. The situation of our finances will permit the accomplishment of this great act of justice and of policy, without augmenting the taxes, or impairing credit, or curtailing the funds destined for the public service.

"The ceremony of my coronation will terminate the first session of my reign. You will assist, *Messieurs*, at the ceremony. There, prostrate at the foot of the same altar at which Clovis received the sacred unction, and in presence of Him who judges people and kings, I will renew the oath to maintain, and cause to be observed, the state-laws and institutions granted by my brother."

As long as the King, his presence, his promises, and his graciousness were before the country, all was sunshine; but when the Minister came forward with the series of laws destined, as usual in a constitutional country, to satisfy and complete the wishes of the parties and the interests that are dominant, the political heaven became at once clouded, and men had reason to doubt, whether they were after all delivered from the empire of the squires, the Crown lawyers, and the priesthood. The Prime Minister presented three projects of law to the Chamber, one regulating the civil list, another according a *milliard* of indemnity to the emigrants, a third reproducing the scheme of conversion or reduction of the Five per Cents. M. de Peyronnet, the Minister of Justice, at the same time came to startle parliament and the public by a new law of terrible penalties against sacrilege, and another sanctioning the re-establishment of nunneries in France. At the same time the War Office, which was supposed to have passed under the direct control of the Dauphin, inaugurated his Royal Highness's rule by a decree placing one hundred and sixty-seven generals on half-pay, all those in fact who had

not been employed since 1815. It was a general dismissal in fact of the veteran general officers of the empire. However necessary it might be to arrive at such a conclusion, the idea of applying this to the mass, and at the epoch of a new reign, showed the indecorous and impolitic spirit which dictated them.

The first subject of debate in the Chamber was that portion of the law regulating the civil list which insured to the Duke of Orleans and his family the landed property already made over to them, as the ancient appanage of the family. All appanages had been abolished by the National Assembly. Louis XVIII. had restored the property, however, as appanage, and its receipts or revenues were duly paid to the Duke of Orleans. But that careful prince feared the insecurity attached to the title of such a property, and he had begged of the new monarch not only to sanction the grant anew, but to obtain the vote of the Chamber also for that sanction. To gratify his relation, the King ordered the re-grant and regulation of the appanage to be included in the vote of the civil list. It was instantly met by the objection of the ultra-Royalists, who could never pardon the Duke for his father's and even his own participation in the acts of the Revolution; and even his equivocal position as a prince of the blood, looked to by the parties who conspired against the State, as capable of filling whatever vacancy, accident or revolution might cause in the succession to the throne. "Ministers," said M. de Berthier, "no doubt desire to force the passing of the Orleans' appanage through the Chambers, by introducing it in good company." Whilst the ultra-Royalists thus opposed a mere matter of justice to the Duke, or rather a rectification of injustice committed by the revolutionary

assemblies, General Foy, and the leaders of the Opposition, supported the Duke's claim, and the Minister's sanction of it, showing how strong personal considerations were on both sides of the Assembly.

This, however, was but the discussion of a day. The projects of law, which Ministers brought forward either for the restoration of their property to the old noblesse, or for the reconstruction of ecclesiastical property and privileges, were those which caught the attention of the public. The first step towards the restoration, or rather the re-constitution of church property in land, was to declare monastic establishments legal, they being still prohibited, and to allow them to receive gifts and bequests of real property. The general prejudice against monastic institutions and mortmain was still strong, especially amongst the educated and middle classes; and Ministers proceeded to fulfil the wishes of the religious party with great caution. A law had been brought in during the previous session to allow nunneries or communities of religious women. The excellence of some of those institutions for women, who tended the sick and the poor, and did duty in the hospitals, was well established. Napoleon himself had sanctioned many of them. Accordingly it was proposed to give a legal right of existence to all communities of women which the Government should sanction, and to give them the right of accepting heritages. Even this met with very serious opposition in the Chamber of Peers. Messrs. Porsalis, Lally-Tollendal, Pasquier, Lainé, spoke against it, insisting that the Legislature should reserve to itself the power of sanctioning religious houses; that women, when they took the vows in some countries, were considered civilly dead, and could not hold or bequeath property after they became nuns. To give

the right to nunneries of accepting and inheriting property would lead to all the old abuses. In vain did Villèle rise to pronounce that the law was merely one to legalize the existence of religious houses, and that to regulate them should be the subject of future legislation. The Chamber of Peers rejected the law.

It was, therefore, now reintroduced, in a more modified form. No gift or bequest to a nunnery of more than one-fourth of the property of any one was to be considered valid. The article of the Civil Code respecting individuals, annulling all legacies or testaments in favour of clergymen or physicians, who may have attended the dying, was kept in force. Moreover, the Minister of Public Worship gave proof that of eighteen hundred religious communities of women only fifty were devoted to contemplation, the rest being busied in teaching the poor and tending the sick; whilst the property acquired by all was of very trifling amount. In this state, and upon these representations, the law, in which, moreover, it was provided how such establishments were to be suppressed if necessary, passed both Chambers.

When this first debate of the session had called the attention of the public to the manifest exigencies of the ecclesiastical party, its interest and indignation were roused by that which next became the order of the day, and which outraged general opinion in that to which it is most sensible, decorum and humanity. This was the famous law of Sacrilege. Some rare instances had occurred of persons who were criminal and absurd enough to show their disrespect of the religious reaction that was in progress, not merely by interrupting public worship, but by entering churches at night, and stealing or profaning the

vessels and the wafers used for the Holy Sacrament. When certain rare and extreme cases of unaccountable crimes, unforeseen in his Code, came before Napoleon, he ordered the guilty to be shut up in a madhouse—a severe punishment for the sane. Nothing, however, would satisfy ultra-Royalist legislation, but the system of penalty, as well as of government, which prevailed in centuries past. Those who profaned the sacred wafers were condemned by the new law to the penalty of parricide.

In undergoing this, the condemned was obliged to walk barefooted to the place of execution, have his hand cut off before his head, and so on. It resembled the demand of the Spanish fiscal to have Riego disembowelled and quartered.

A powerful speech of Count Molé recalled the Upper Chamber from the absurd anomaly of discussing an impossible crime, called *Deicide*, to the true duties of senatorial legislation. Crimes were committed against society, sins against Heaven. Criminal jurisprudence must lapse once more into barbarism, if the great Councils of a nation like France were to become a place for bishops to discuss how fire and sword were to be employed to punish dissent from dogmas, and disrespect for the objects of religious reverence. "Pagans," said Count Molé, "might avenge offences offered to their gods, whom they believed to be actuated by human passions and human weakness; but the Gospel expressly forbade Christians to attempt to avenge the Divinity." The Duc de Broglie followed Molé, and denounced the covert way of proclaiming a dominant religion. Chateaubriand was vehement against the project. But certainly no orator of Opposition uttered anything which told so powerfully against the law as the arguments which

M. de Bonald thought fit to employ in its behalf. "The good," he said, "owed their life to society as a service; the bad owed theirs as an example. How was it possible to distinguish crime from sin? Was there not the Decalogue still taught to all Christians as a rule of life? Religion in the Gospel was armed with a sword, and enjoined to use it. If the Saviour prayed for the lives of his executioners, his Father was not softened by that, but on the contrary persecuted and chastised the people that had committed it, leaving them without home or altar, an example of Divine wrath and vengeance to the world. As to awarding death for sacrilege, what is it," concluded the Christian legislator, "but to send the criminal before his natural judge!" M. de Bonald was indeed sufficiently ashamed of so monstrous a doctrine as to erase the sentence from the report in the *Moniteur;* but it was heard by all, and remains a remarkable instance of what extremes fanaticism may reach in the field of religion and politics.

After the law of Sacrilege came that for raising money to indemnify the emigrants, which, however just in itself, was argued by the Royalists as an expiation due to the crime of revolution, and denounced by the Liberals as raising once more the altar of aristocracy, and inaugurating it by the sacrifice of millions, to be raised from the tax-payer. Thus the public mind had no repose. Every motion, every debate, the entire business of the session displayed the priesthood and the aristocracy, those classes vanquished in the Revolution, as eager to grasp the power of vengeance and the restoration of property. Villèle was a statesman certainly fitted to turn his own mind and the attention of the Legislature to those great questions of tolerance and material improvement with which England

and its Parliament were every day more occupied. But France was driven in quite an opposite direction; and Villèle, to keep his position as Minister of the ultra-Royalists, was obliged to devote his whole time, and that of the Cabinet and Chambers, to the reactionary laws, some of them, like that of Sacrilege, destined never to be used, and merely passed in order to insult and to intimidate.

The chief business of the session was the indemnity to the emigrants—a measure sufficiently unpopular in itself; but as if to render it more so, Villèle coupled it, as he had from the first intended, with a reduction of the Five to Three per Cents. In his former scheme the reduction was to economize or produce the sum which was to be voted as an indemnity. There was no prospect of a conversion so profitable now; but the Minister persisted in his plan, as if he connected the restoration of the emigrants' property with a proportionate reduction in the revenue of the Parisians, so disaffected to the Ministry at least, if not to the King. M. Martignac stated the case for the emigrants with his wonted lucidity, as well as the mode of estimating the loss which it was proposed to make good. The valuation was easy with respect to all property sold subsequent to 1795, since an account of the rental of each property in 1790 was always given at the sale, and formed the basis of its set-up price. There had been 452,072 sales of the landed property of emigrants, of which 81,455 were made subsequent to 1795. The annual revenue of them amounted to 35,000,000 of francs, and the price, at twenty years' purchase, was calculated at 692,400,000. The remainder, previously sold, bought at low prices, and paid in assignats, was calculated at 605,000,000 francs of capital. Upwards of 300,000,000 of debt and charges had

been paid, leaving the indemnity due, or to be paid, something less than a *milliard*, or a thousand millions. The Minister proposed to satisfy this claim by delivery to claimants stock bearing three per cent. interest; that is, thirty millions of *rentes*, six millions of which were to be issued each year for five years.

Had such a measure of reparation been presented to a truly national representation some years earlier, before the ultra-Royalist band of gentlemen, whose fathers or who themselves had emigrated, had succeeded in establishing political ascendancy and tyranny, as masters of the Church, of the Government, and of the Court, the indemnity might have been voted as a measure of policy and generosity as well as of justice. The landed property, marked as having been that of emigrants, did not fetch the same price, and was not sold at the same value, as other lands. It was of great importance to give all lands an equal and a sure title, and some millions spent in this manner would not be thrown away. There were other arguments, still more forcible, appealing to the generosity of the country. But neither the public nor the Liberals could listen to any plea put forward by men who had usurped the mastery of the State, and who made a mere show of asking the nation to give them what they had the power and the determination to take. At the very opening of the debate M. de Girardin stated the objection that the Chamber was about to act the part of judge in its own cause, for three-fourths of its Members were of that privileged class which would be benefited by the present law. To this it was merely replied, that the legislators of a country could not be strangers either to the political or pecuniary interests discussed by them. The line of argument taken by the

first orators of the Left was, that confiscation had been the law and practice of the monarchy, as well as proscription. The rule was, that whoever committed treason, or entertained political ideas adverse to the existing order of things, and which could not maintain themselves by force, were punished by death, exile, and loss of property. What became of the properties of the Coligny, the Concini, the De Thou, the Marcillac? They were confiscated, and given to some great lord of the Court. The revolutionary government, in confiscating the property of the emigrants, and condemning them to death, did no doubt what was ruthless, but what had always been the law and the habit of the country, and of the monarchy itself. To this it was rejoined, that the emigrant had committed no treason, and had done no wrong; a great many had run away merely from the guillotine—from the guillotine, which was to strike off their heads for no other crime than that of having been born gentlemen. Military men had emigrated to escape being massacred by their officers. Lafayette had emigrated to escape the Convention. Where was the crime? But the party of the emigration, rejoined the Liberals, continued to make war upon the Revolution, abetted the conquest of the country by foreign armies, and spent all their energies to bring back tyranny by means of the sword. The most endless and most hopeless task, said one, was for any generation to hope to redress the wrongs of the last. Every class in France had suffered, had been mulcted. The public debt had been cancelled to the amount of two-thirds. Was the creditor of that time to be indemnified in this? Violence and wrong had everywhere prevailed. "As to reparation," exclaimed the Count de Thiars, himself an emigrant,

though now an ardent Liberal, "have not the ultra-Royalists reparation in their hands? and do they not take it with full hands? Are they not masters of the Government, its places, and its patronage? Who command regiments, who fill all the offices of the State, who command ships, and fleets, and colonies? What more indemnity can the party fairly demand?"

A diversion was made to these attacks by Labourdonnaye and the more frantic Royalists, who maintained that the King had no right to declare the tenure of emigrants' property secure in the hands of those who had taken it. The indemnity, if there was such a thing, should be levied on them, instead of burdening the nation with a milliard.

Such an audacious and extravagant proposal merely served to give a terrible theme to General Foy, who depicted the emigrants, after having usurped political power, now about to use it to deprive the peasant proprietor of his property, and to inflict a chastisement upon a nation which offended and repudiated them. "Is it as a right they claim this?" asked Foy; "but right respects the laws and habits of society. It is only force that sets such laws at nought. But force—is it on the side of the aristocratic and emigrant party? Have they vanquished us? Are they most numerous? More numerous, indeed, they are in this Chamber, where, in proportion to the rest of the nation, they are certainly as two to one; but in the country they are not more than one in a thousand." After the murmurs which this apostrophe had excited, Foy represented that such an act of reparation ought at least to have been asked of the nation, not voted by a Chamber of those immediately interested; and instead of a mass of

money, placed in the hands of Ministers to distribute at their caprice, the indemnity ought to have been limited to the descendants of those who had been despoiled. Giving it to collaterals was no reparation; it would merely be distributing the wealth of the country, in many instances, to foreigners—to persons wearing Austrian uniforms, or commanding Russian armies.

The effect of General Foy's speech was so overwhelming, that Villèle ascended the tribune immediately after to expose its exaggerations, and place before the Chamber and the public a more calm exposition of the truth. "The indemnity," he said, "was neither a punishment to one class of Frenchmen, nor a recompense to another. It was a measure indispensable to complete the Restoration, to give unity, security, and peace to the country. It was a guarantee against the return of confiscation and civil discord. The spoliation of the emigrants had been defended on the plea, that it was the habit of the old monarchy. But the State in centuries past merely struck at one or two grandees, it did not punish a class, or confiscate in the mass. The confiscation decreed by the Revolution was done for a political purpose. It was with the intention of preventing the emigrant and Royalty itself from ever returning. But they have returned, and it is fortunate that they survived to return. The last orator depicted emigration as a crime. 'They were wrong,' argued he, 'to escape from the burning soil of their country.' If, however, the Bourbons, and those of the families who escaped had remained behind, as they are now reproached with not having done, what would have befallen them? What would have become of his present Majesty? And what would have become of us? It is considered a great crime to

have called foreigners to tread the soil of France? What necessitated them coming in 1814, but the immoderate ambition of one man? And what would have been the consequence, had not the princes of the Royal family emigrated and survived? What had we to oppose to the armies of the sovereigns of Europe? France is not a country to be annihilated or divided; I know this, and I think it. A resistance, if so treated, would have at last shaken off the yoke of the foreign soldier. But at what cost, what loss, what sufferings, and what sacrifice! What humiliations would it not have been necessary to endure, until every heart was penetrated with the necessity of a great effort for national deliverance! Our liberation from the foreigner without convulsion or shame, the recovery of the public liberties and the return of peace, all the prosperity and happiness that France enjoys, it owes to the emigration." This simple e pression of truth, which could not be denied, restored that equality in the debate, which the violence and extravagance of too many arguments on both sides had destroyed.

The masses of the town population, however, which proved the chief readers of newspapers throughout the country, were far more influenced by the attacks of Opposition than by the answers of Government. Nothing more contributed to render M. de Villèle and his Ministry unpopular, than what was in itself an act of fairness and justice; because the press, which profited by it, did not cease to make it the reward of reaction rather than reparation. Thus the use made of the sums to be received as indemnity was considered as likely to be employed in purchasing back the confiscated property, which, even after the indemnity, was thus thought to give a

better title to the former proprietor than to the present one. To favour the transfer an amendment was introduced, diminishing, in favour of the old proprietor who should repurchase, those onerous duties of registry and stamps, so severe in France. This amendment, betokening the restoration of emigrants to their landed property and privileges, called forth all the ire and eloquence of Foy.

"This law," exclaimed he, "proposed and discussed in another spirit, might have been, as his Majesty intended it, a pledge of union and peace. Instead of this it is made a declaration of war, an instrument of vengeance and of hatred. The emigrants, it seems, do not only want the indemnity, but their lands too. They will have them back by influence or force. Power is in their hands; and if clandestine means do not suffice for the purpose, violence will no doubt be employed. The proprietors of national domains are, in general, the sons of those who bought them. Let them recollect, that in these debates, their fathers were stigmatized as robbers and ruffians. For these to part with their property to the old proprietors will thus be to commit outrage on the memory of their fathers, and to be guilty of an act of cowardice themselves." Here the murmurs and at last the shouts of the Chamber interrupted the General, who concluded by saying, "Should the emigrants proceed to employ violence to tear the land from those who possess it legally, let them remember, that they have the King and the Charter for them, and that they are in the proportion of twenty to one." The division was startling to the Minister. Of 383 voters, there were but 259 in the affirmative, the opponents of the law amounted to 125,

the largest minority which had appeared in a Chamber so devoted that the Opposition had been reduced to nineteen members. It was indeed calculated that the minority comprised the vote of every member not interested in receiving a share of the indemnity; so much had the bonds of party been relaxed by triumph. M. de Villèle saw in the large minority, which showed itself under cover of the ballot, the proof that the party which followed M. de Chateaubriand, however they spoke for the law, voted against it; and as the same opposition showed itself in the Peers, it suggested to the Minister the idea of dissolving the Chamber, and of expelling even those who showed a semi-tint of Liberalism, as the members of the extreme Left had previously been got rid of. This inability to tolerate constitutional opposition, and the defections which were incidental to it, and which compel over-large majorities to separate and split, even by their own weight, was the great mistake and ruin of Villèle. The indemnity passed through the Chamber of Peers; an amendment substituting Five per Cent. Stock for Three was negatived. Nothing remained but the distribution, which the Minister accomplished by means of Commissioners chosen in both Chambers, and well paid for their duties. Many members of the Liberal opposition received large sums for property confiscated during their emigration. The Marquis de Lafayette received £18,000, Rochefoucault and Liancourt, £60,000, Gaetan de le Rochefoucault £17,000., the Duc de Choiseul, £44,000, Count de Thiars, £15,000 The bulk of the indemnity went, however, to the dominant party, many of whom purchased back their lands, or reinvested a similar property. And had such a measure been followed up by establishing the influence of men of wealth and property in the provinces

upon a legal and constitutional basis, the Restoration might have created a class capable of holding permanent influence over the electors and in the representative Assembly, even when elections were made free, and that Assembly thrown open. But the Royalist government was driven to satisfy the priesthood in their tastes, their caprices, or their love of domination and of vengeance, and not allowed the time or the opportunity to erect any real bulwarks of the aristocracy or the throne. Voices were not wanting, such as those of M. de Noailles and M. de Romans, to demand those provincial institutions of which M. de Villèle once acknowledged the necessity. But that statesman was not merely absorbed by the exigencies of the ecclesiastical and ultra-religious party, he was also influenced by the necessity of maintaining his own ministerial power, for which centralization, with its myriad offices to bestow and ubiquitous influence to wield, offered so many facilities.

The ministerial plan for the reduction of the Five per Cent. Stock was no longer this year so imperative, or so immediately disastrous to the small holders. It merely gave the option to the holders of the Five per Cents. to exchange those for Three per Cent. at 75, or for Four and a Half at par, with the guarantee, that the latter should not be reduced for ten years to come. By another clause of the project, the Sinking Fund was no longer to operate upon the Five per Cents., which were above par. It was to be employed in purchasing the new Three per Cents. Of the six millions of *rentes*, to be issued in the year as indemnity to the emigrants, the Sinking Fund would be able to purchase three millions; the other three millions the Finance Minister hoped to cover by the increase of the produce of the taxes. Thus, by

ever circuitous a manner, M. de Villèle hoped to have accomplished his aim of the preceding year, that of paying a milliard of indemnity to the emigrants, without adding to the permanent burdens of the country. There are, however, no provisions so generally overthrown by events as those of a Minister of Finance. When Villèle first conceived his double plan of indemnity and of conversion, the commercial and moneyed world were in the heyday of prosperity, and capitalists flinging money out of the windows in every kind of speculation. But very soon after the Minister had been able to get his project voted, that is, in 1825, came the great panic of the English and continental money markets, which drove all capitalists to sell and secure themselves. In France Five per Cents. soon fell under par. Even the Three per Cents. with the promise of half of them to be bought up, were also at a discount. The unfortunate holders of Five per Cents. who accepted M. de Villèle's conversion not only lost one-fifth of the annual interest, but saw the value of the capital diminished, whilst the economy to the State in the reduction of interest was insignificant. The result had a great effect in injuring the reputation of the Minister for financial ability, which was one of the chief supports of his power. Graver charges than that of incapacity were made against him. Bertin de Veaux, the friend of Chateaubriand, and Casimir Perrier, the financial authority of the Left, accused the Minister of bringing forward the entire scheme merely for the sake of allowing the Rothschilds and others, who had purchased some twenty millions of Five per Cent. *rentes* in anticipation of the final reduction of the previous year, to get rid of this large amount of stock without loss. "Reject the law," said M. Bertin to his brother deputies, "and there will be mourn-

ing in Jerusalem." The project of law, however, passed both Chambers.

Another portion of the Minister's budget gave rise to contested debates, and led to a celebrated trial. The subject was that part of the War budget, which went to pay Ouvrard for supplying the French army during their Spanish expedition. Ouvrard had received upwards of two millions sterling. His claim amounted to more, and was contested by the War Office as well as by the reporters of the budget. The enemies of the ministry all fastened upon the enormous sums which the Government had been obliged to pay to Ouvrard from the inefficiency of its own Commissariat; and sought to deduce from the facts, that the contractor had bribed every one in office, or in command, to procure the facility of carrying off his supposed enormity of gain. Whilst Foy and Perrier thundered from the Liberal side against the Spanish war, its corruption and its cost, Labourdonnaye and the discontented Royalists on the other were no less vehement. The Minister, to save himself, very readily sacrificed Ouvrard, whom he did not like; and that celebrated capitalist found himself the victim, sacrificed by friends and devoured by foes. Without all the tact of his countryman, Beaumarchais, in such a position, Ouvrard had still much of the readiness, the courage, the obstinacy, and the ingenuity of that celebrated character. And he, too, contrived to extricate himself from the troubles into which he was thrown, confinement in a prison making part of them, with the courage and address which his own pen has ably shown.

The ceremony of the coronation was announced to take place at the close of the legislative session. It would have

been wiser to have made it precede the discussion of the series of laws for the re-establishment of the clergy and the aristocracy. The public would have applauded the pomp in the month of January, especially as the King, in lieu of the old coronation oath to destroy heretics and wield absolute power, now took an oath to maintain the Constitution and the Charter. Along with this solemn oath he took others for maintaining certain orders, such as that of the *Saint Esprit*, which at most concerned a few knights, but which was here put upon a par with the Royal duties towards the nation. The coronation, however, would have been popular except for the session which preceded it, which more than undid all the advances of the new monarch to the middle classes. All that money, and tradition, and pomp could lend of magnificence to the ceremony was employed. Chateaubriand came forward to act the laureat to it, in one of his grandiloquent pamphlets. Victor Hugo tasked his young muse to celebrate it; and Lamartine naturally greeted the solemn re-espousal of royalty and religion. But a simple song of Beranger, turning the whole ceremony into ridicule, had far more vigour, and made far more impressions than the solemn strophes of Hugo and Lamartine, or than the imaginative prose of Chateaubriand. Although the politicians who had the regulation of the coronation did all that lay in their power to modernize and make it harmonize with a constitutional system, the clergy did not abate an iota of their antiquated rites. Thus the *saint ampoule*, or phial of oil, which, according to monkish chronicles, had been brought down from heaven to St. Remy to anoint and chris n Clovis, had been publicly broken and cast out by the Commissioners of the Convention. This phial and its

contents were now again discovered, reproduced, and declared to be the genuine phial, and it was employed to anoint the body of the King in seven different spots, which were bared by seven apertures in his coronation garment. The arming, the anointing, the prayers, the changes of position and of costume, the monarch bearing the sword and the crown of Charlemagne at one time, at another the sceptre and the more modern paraphernalia of royalty, lasted six hours, and exhausted the patience and strength of the monarch, however well endowed with both qualities. There was a liberal admixture of the old historic names of the French noblesse, with the new illustrations of the Empire; the veteran Prince de Talleyrand, as grand chamberlain, acting as the link between them. It was his duty to put on the velvet boots of the King. Marshal Moncey acted the part of constable. Soult, Jourdan, and Mortier, were amongst the new knights of the order of the Saint Esprit.

Amongst the knights who knelt down for investiture were M. de Villèle and M. de Chateaubriand. The latter had come to Rheims after the publication of what he had written in favour of the coronation. His friend and fellow Breton, as well as his accomplice in opposing Villèle's first law of Conversion, Mons. de Quelen, archbishop of Paris, had mentioned to the King some names of personages in disgrace, whom at such a moment it would be desirous to receive again into favour, when even traitors were indulged with an amnesty. At the name of Chateaubriand, Charles X. observed, "Him I regret." "Shall I tell him so?" asked De Quelen. After some hesitation, the King said he might. But the hesitation was such, that De Quelen, afraid also of again exciting the jealousy of Villèle, made no mention of the circumstance to Chateaubriand. On his

reception of the latter, the King had to take off his gloves, in order to clasp the hands of the new knight in his. Charles took the opportunity jocularly to repeat the old French proverb, *Chat ganté ne prend pas de souris.*—A cat in gloves cannot catch mice. Chateaubriand did not understand the wit, or the condescension of the remark, and remained, as usual, silent and discontented. The monarch said no more, but resented the silence. And Chateaubriand was yet more mortified at leaving Rheims still in disgrace. The amnesty published on the occasion was large, and betokened the King's, and even Villèle's, desire to bury even the remembrance of treason and disaffection.

Could the King and his Minister have inspired the clergy and the Crown lawyers with their own moderation, hopes and opportunity still existed for a reconciliation between the monarch and the middle classes. But immediately after the coronation, and whilst the recess of the Chambers might have left an interval for repose, the active Attorney-general instituted a prosecution against the leading Liberal journals, no longer for disaffection, or for bringing the Government into disrespect, but for attacking the Jesuits, and accusing the Court and the high authorities of the realm with a conspiracy to introduce ultra-montanism, and to deliver up the liberties of Church and State to political monkery. M. de Montlosier, an ardent Royalist, at the same time published, in the *Drapeau Blanc*, his fierce and never-ceasing denunciations of the Jesuits. The name of these became general in every mouth, as a bugbear, a menace, and a curse. The judges of the Royal Courts, sympathizing with the public rather than with the Crown lawyers, acquitted the journals and the writers

brought before them; and Government reaped a large harvest of odium, without succeeding in any one attempt at repression or vengeance.

The year closed with an event and a sad ceremony, which for the Parisians, the middle classes, and the liberal party throughout the kingdom, threw into the shade even the solemnities of the coronation. This was the death and solemn funeral of General Foy. He died of the orator's malady, a disease of the heart, and was accompanied to the grave by, one might say, all Paris in mourning; a manifestation which alarmed Villèle, and startled the police and the Royalists, to behold what an army of foes they had in the Parisian population; and even astonished Charles X. with the revelation that his own popularity was more evanescent and less universal than that of an orator of Opposition.

No Frenchman united so fully and completely as Foy, the qualities which commanded the respect and admiration of his countrymen. As a soldier and a General, he had borne his part in all the glories and reverses of the great military period, without having been stained by any of the baseness which tainted too many in the trying years of 1814 and 1815. A very few years' parliamentary experience had communicated to the soldier the experience of the politician and the accomplishments of the orator. His language was vehement, concise, and felicitous; his gesture graceful; his general view of politics and treatment of his adversaries moderate and sensible, although on rare and critical moments he was carried away by his own eloquence, or by the passions of a party, of which he felt himself to be the most powerful organ. No man would it have been of greater importance for the

Bourbons to have gained. While a young subaltern, he had incurred risks by manifesting disgust at the cruelties of the Convention. After 1815, he was one of those who united respect for the military greatness of Napoleon with a full sense of the incompatibility of the existence of the Emperor and constitutional liberty. He respected the Bourbons, and always attacked the monarchy, not the dynasty. He was no conspirator; and he was ready to allow, even to the ultra-Royalists, that consideration and respect which the men of his party could not comprehend. General Foy was a Mirabeau—if one could suppose Mirabeau with honesty of purpose and simplicity of life. The impression which his death left upon the capital can only be conceived by those who witnessed it. For a full month scarcely any other thought occupied the public mind, no other name was in men's mouths. He died poor. A subscription being announced for his widow and children, a few days produced a million. Laffitte subscribed 2000 pounds sterling, the Duke of Orleans and Casimir Perrier each £400. The latter, who succeeded Foy as the most powerful orator of Opposition, pronounced the funeral oration over his grave.

CHAPTER IX.

VILLÈLE'S NEGLECT OF FOREIGN POLITICS—DEATH OF THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER—RECOGNITION OF HAYTIAN INDEPENDENCE—LAW TO FAVOUR HERITAGE OF ELDEST SONS, REJECTED BY THE PEERS—THE JUBILEE—MONTLOSIER'S DENUNCIATION OF THE JESUITS—MR. CANNING IN PARIS; HIS POLICY AND LANGUAGE.

NEVER was a more profound political calm than that which prevailed when Charles X. ascended the throne. The disaffected and rebellious parties, which had distracted not merely France but Spain and Italy, were crushed or quieted. Even the monarch's councillors saw no inconvenience in his granting an amnesty. Although the Royalist party had during the last years so narrowed the electoral franchise, and so employed the government influence as to render power a monopoly in their hands,—although the press was either silenced or persecuted—still there was a weariness of ineffectual endeavours after full and fair constitutional liberty; and as there was a great deal of prosperity, free openings for industry, and facilities for turning and augmenting wealth, the nation would have been contented, as England had been in the previous century, with the little freedom of representative government left it, had the dominant power ceased to provoke it on those points upon which it was most sensitive,—equality of rank, with

the freedom and tolerance of conviction and opinion respecting religion.

Foreign politics were dormant, if not dead. The presence of Chateaubriand in the Cabinet had caused them to eclipse domestic policy. Now M. de Noailles complained, that whilst foreign politics formerly predominated over all others, they came in merely at the tail of the home or the financial administration. This, however, was the very purpose and intention of Villèle. That statesman, far from admiring the heroic policy of Chateaubriand in office, or from tolerating for a moment the mad schemes with which he proposed to follow it up, was sorely embarrassed with the results of his facile triumph over the Spanish Liberals. The expedition had deranged his plan of domestic economy. Spain, far from being able to pay even a portion of these expenses, was more bankrupt and more penniless than ever. Ferdinand and his Minister would listen to no advice, scouted all suggestions of a moderate policy, and to Villèle's recommendation of a constitution replied by the taunt that the Spanish king could depend on Russian and Austrian support without such exigencies. It had been long a sore annoyance to Villèle to see England augmenting each year its foreign trade, whilst the exports and imports of France remained stationary. The recognition of the Spanish colonies by England, which the Royalist party and the Chateaubriand policy would not allow Villèle to imitate unless Ferdinand entered into terms himself with the colonies, distressed the French Minister. He saw England shooting ahead in influence and trade, and he exerted himself to the utmost to induce Spain to adopt those moderate and constitutional forms which could alone restore her finances, enable her to obtain money, and, at

the same time, to enter into terms with the South American colonies, thus procuring for indemnity, as well as a renewal of connection, privileges, and trade, instead of abandoning all to England. Ferdinand, however, would listen to no counsel. Instead of setting his own house in order, he and his Ministers were only anxious to interfere in the affairs of Portugal, and, indeed, not unnaturally proposed to treat it as France had treated Spain,—march an army to Lisbon. Here, however, Mr. Canning interfered, and seized the opportunity of enacting the counterpart to the Duc d'Angoulême's invasion by the despatch of British troops to Portugal. In all this Villèle showed himself no antagonist to Canning. He never desired a crusade in favour of despotism; and if he could not check or resist ultra-Royalist demands at home, he at least neutralised them in foreign policy.

This course was facilitated to him by the removal of those who would have been powerful opponents. Chateaubriand was in disgrace; M. de Montmorency, appointed governor of the Duc de Bordeaux, died about this time; whilst he whose effort to drag France into active schemes of selfish ambition, as well as encroachment upon its neighbours,—Alexander, expired at Taganrog. His death left Charles X. and his Ministers free from Russian counsels and Russian intrigue. A great link was broken by this event between France and St. Petersburgh. It was personally to Alexander that the Bourbons were bound to be grateful; and his capricious ideas necessarily had weight with them. These had at first impelled Louis XVIII. to Liberalism; and they at last drove him to stifle the liberties of the Peninsula as well as of France itself. Alexander, indeed, had spent the latter years of his reign in undoing the work

of preceding portions of it. No wonder that he should exclaim against the vanity of all human and all kingly purposes, and that he should have felt his reign, like his life, to have been a failure. He had promised himself to be a great benefactor and a great regenerator of humanity; yet, because the few steps that he made towards giving liberties and institutions to some of his subjects, led to unavoidable inconvenience, he turned not only upon them but upon himself, and after having lived a Liberal from sentiment, he spent his latter years as a tyrant and a propagator of tyranny, from no more profound motive than personal fear and wounded self-love.

The first act of Villèle's in the new session of the Chamber was intended to set an example to Spain. It was a recognition by France of the independence of what was once its colony,—St. Domingo. The principal motive was, no doubt, to open trade. England had thriven by the recognition of its colonies, and was repaid for its empty sovereignty by a prosperous trade. Villèle sought to follow the same example. He demanded six millions sterling of the government of Hayti, as an indemnity to the French proprietors expelled from it, and as the price of its recognition. Boyer accepted these conditions; and the ultra-Royalist Chamber of Deputies consented to acknowledge a revolutionary government in the great colony of France, at certainly no exorbitant price.

It were well if Villèle could have conceived and accomplished, with regard to domestic matters, measures of such good sense; but his colleague, Peyronnet, was a man who would have rendered unpopular and destroyed a score of empires. His delight, indeed, was to brave unpopularity,—to struggle against the stream of popular opinion,—to defy and

overcome it. If he had really succeeded in overthrowing and annihilating, or even weakening the democratic freedom which he abhorred, that would have been as intelligible even as his reactionary laws; but his latter measures went to irritate rather than crush, to provoke, not kill. Of what use were the penalties of sacrilege to the predominance of the Church? Why renew and keep up the outcry which the indemnity had caused against Government for seeking to restore the old aristocracy, by introducing in the following year a law to procure for the eldest son a larger share of the paternal property? This was a long-cherished project with the Court party. M. de Polignac had strongly recommended it from London in 1821, and Villèle had then replied to him that success in such a project would be impossible; that the habits, prejudices, and tendencies of the people were against it; and that it would never obtain a majority in the Chamber. Notwithstanding so just an appreciation, the Prime Minister was overruled.

There never was a country or a state of society in which the principle of attaching exclusive rights and privileges to birth had been so much abused as France. A certain number of families had monopolised the greater part of the lands in France not in possession of the clergy. The remaining lands, leased or held by any other families, were burdened with all the taxes. In addition to this, the privileged class of families considered itself exclusively entitled to fill every office in the State, even to the post of a subaltern officer. This monstrous wrong inflicted upon others did not render the French gentry more apt or more skilled to fulfil their duties. The independence and liberty of which they robbed the ignoble they would not have for themselves, for they sunk into mere slaves of the Crown;

so that the whole country became a large, living, moral sore, which nothing but the searing-iron of the Revolution could remove and heal. The fearful remedy of the Revolution and its crimes left a deep impression of disgust, no doubt, but it did not obliterate the traditional horror of the state of things which preceded and produced them.

An attempt, therefore, to restore the old landed aristocracy, with its exclusive privileges, was more outrageous to the feelings of the French than even handing them over to the Jesuits. The proposal to establish a new right in favour of the eldest son was a project which would awaken discussion in every family throughout the kingdom. All the families with sons and daughters of mature age, had grown up in certain expectations and ideas of right. To sunder this was to commit greater violence than to destroy any liberty.

Yet the law introduced by Peyronnet had nothing in it either very violent or unjust. By the existing law the father of a family had not the full right of disposing of his own property; he must leave it equally amongst his children, and to them he must leave it. There was but one-fourth which he was allowed to dispose of and bequeath according to his pleasure. The proposed law went merely to ordain, that when the father had not made a will, the one-fourth which he might have dealt with as he liked should be added to the portion of the eldest son. By making a will, any one could withdraw his property from the action of the law. Certainly, the tyranny already exercised upon every owner of property by the Code, in rendering his children independent of him, was far greater than any supposed tyranny introduced by the law. Still, it was the commencement of a new system; it was running

counter to the habits and the rules of families, of the French mind, and of the liberal party. The tumult which it raised is beyond description.

The grave mistake of the ultra-Royalists was their ardour to change the very foundations of society, and replace those which existed by what had existed a century previous. Although to the completion of such a task they had merely given some blows of the trowel and the hammer, nevertheless the mere noise of their being at work alarmed the population, and filled them with the idea that everything was about to be subverted. The orators in opposition (not merely those of the extreme Left, but such men as Pasquier and Molé) represented with great truth that aristocracy, or the influence of wealthy classes, possessed of greater learning, higher views, and superior education, could not fail to spring up in a prosperous country. The tendency of the Revolution might hitherto have been to create peasant proprietors, but with the growth of capital would arise, nevertheless, the existence of larger fortunes. This, whether in land or not, would naturally be hoarded in the same families, or, at least, in the same classes; and quite sufficient permanence of interests and ideas for any monarchy would be found without attempting to fix the land in the possession of certain families. The separation of the land and the families free from the current and action of the age, would merely cause both to deteriorate; and instead of framing an aristocracy to lead, to govern, and be respected by the people, a caste would merely be formed less capable and less respected, and even less wealthy, than the rest of the community.

But Peyronnet had not so much the formation of an

aristocracy for his object, as of a class of small landed proprietors, who were to form the great majority of the electoral body, and who, transmitting from father to son their little property and their narrow ideas, were always to elect Chambers like the present, and ever keep the Corbières and the Peyronnets in power. To stereotype a form of apparently constitutional government, and to fix what was moveable and progressive in its very nature, shows the absurd hopes and fatuous ideas with which the Royalists were possessed. The law assigning the additional fourth of the property to the eldest son was applicable to all who paid 300 francs of direct taxes. As these amounted to one-fifth of a rural proprietor's income, they applied to men of from £60 to £80 a-year. Had the class been far more rich, were they at all greater friends of order and monarchy than the citizen who had saved and invested his money in a farm? Were they not, moreover, by their fortune, and necessarily by their connection, a middle class? And of whatever class they were, how could the addition of one-fourth to the property of the eldest son, when the father died intestate, make any sensible difference in the distribution of rural property and in the political feelings of the electoral body? Equality and democracy covered the whole country, and M. de Peyronnet was to deal it a few pricks of a pin, which enraged the powerful mass for the moment, but which offered no chance of seriously affecting or modifying its nature, fate, or opinions for the future. Nothing short of idiotcy could have inspired such futile and self-destructive attempts at legislation.

The best defence of the law was made by M. de Montalembert. He declared that the division of property had

brought the condition of French families and property to the condition of a rabbit-warren. The existing law established equality, no doubt, but it was the equality of immense misery and destitution. The present state of society in France, with the laws which ruled it, create a twofold tendency,—that of the poor to a democracy, by the hopeless poverty which it entailed upon them, and that of the upper class to a despotism, because it makes functionaries of them all. The consequence would be that France would continue to fluctuate from one to the other, unless an intermediate class between a functionary aristocracy and a popular democracy could be created. Nothing could be more just or more true than these arguments and predictions of Montalembert; nothing more sound than the recommendation to establish a middle class, on which constitutional government could be based. But it was not by confining electoral rights to rural proprietors, and meddling with the laws of succession affecting them, that a middle class could be formed. On the contrary, it was by allowing towns and townspeople, and the commercial classes, their just influence as well as their just development; it was by trusting them, giving them a fair share of liberty, instead of shutting them out of the path of the constitution, that the middle class which existed was to be brought to constitutional monarchy, and the Minister and legislator of a constitutional monarchy made to respect its prejudices and consult its interests.

The hopelessness of a Minister being able to carry such a law when every able speaker and politician in the Chamber of Peers was hostile to it, was but too apparent. If an attempt to bolster up aristocracy was opposed by every one eminent in the aristocratical Chamber, where could

Government hope for support? As the debate advanced, indeed, the ministerial project was so convicted of inefficacy, as well as unpopularity, that Villèle despaired of it. His own defence of it was far from being confident or spirited. He even promised that the operation of it should be limited to those families paying 1000 francs direct taxes; and it was admitted that this would affect but eight thousand families throughout the kingdom. This, put in the shape of an amendment, was negatived; and when the first article, and principal one of the law, was put to the vote, it was rejected by 120 votes against 94. Nothing but an article permitting entails for one generation passed. Thus was the great effort of the ultra-Royalists, to lay the first stone of the foundation of an aristocracy defeated by the Chamber of Peers, which was, in fact, more a senate of notables and government men than a feudal aristocracy, however nominally endowed with hereditary rights. The exultation through the country was immense; the capital was illuminated. It was as if the Revolution and its ideas had once more gained a victory.

The proposal to establish by law inequalities between classes and between brothers, revolting as it was to the peculiar sentiments which animate the French, did not create so much irritation and alarm as the pretension of the ultra-religious party and the encroachments of the Jesuits. The freedom restored to the press at the accession of Charles X. by the abrogation of the censorship, and by the refusal of the Royal Courts to condemn writers for even virulent attacks upon the clergy and the Jesuits, left the Church, and the Government itself in its ecclesiastical tendency, exposed to a battery which every morning

opened upon them from the press. The deputies who were of the religious party, or Congregation, as it was called, urged Villèle to bring forward at once a law against the press. But he replied, that one unpopular measure was sufficient in a session, and to establish the privilege of eldest sons was all that he would attempt for the present. Moreover, Villèle saw that this religious question had already divided the Royalist majority. The 125 votes of minority on the Indemnity Bill were increasing, and a great number of Royalists, like Chateaubriand, began to think that the Liberal party had been too much crushed, Liberal ideas too much expunged, at least from the Chamber, and that the religious reaction was going too far. The Clergy and the Court, although they could not induce the Minister to put down the press in this session (1826), proceeded to brave public obloquy by causing to be performed in Paris a series of processions and religious ceremonies, which savoured of the forms and observances of centuries previous. The occasion was the *jubilee*, a religious *revival*, celebrated formerly every hundred years, but now every quarter of a century. It commenced, in fact, a holy year, during which all were expected to make their peace with the clergy, receive the sacrament, and thus qualify for power, for patronage, or even for justice, in the many walks of life over which Government or its influence presides. The jubilee was opened with the greatest solemnity, its ceremonies and processions were attended by all the royal family, *minus* the Duke of Orleans, who ventured now and then to absent himself. Dukes and Marshals, Peers and Deputies, were all expected to attend; and such men as Talleyrand and Soult were seen clothed as penitents, with lighted torches in their hands, walking through the streets of

Paris in the midst of a devout procession. The kind of compulsion which made every good courtier conform to ceremonies so little in accordance with the age, was exercised not merely towards civilians but military men. Whole regiments and military divisions were ordered to perform their jubilee; and those who failed or showed reluctance were marked, got into the black book of the almoner, and were sure to be passed over whenever there was advancement. The consequence was that a great many officers and non-commissioned officers, who were young enough to take another profession, quitted the ranks of the army; those who remained from inability to find another profession, experienced the same disgust and fell into more dangerous disaffection. The most efficient way of undermining the throne of the Bourbons, and rendering the army indifferent to them, was sedulously pursued by the War Minister, M. de Damas, the friend of the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, and member of the Congregation.

In the midst of this a sturdy old Royalist from Auvergne, indignant at the ascendancy of that priestly party, which monopolised the patronage and the influence of the State, and which intercepted the graciousness and favour of the King from his old servants and officers, undertook to collect from the personages of his own party, as well as from common fame, all the facts and secrets relating to the Congregation, the Jesuits, the organization, the influence, the acts and aims of the religious party. M. de Montlosier having collected these facts, arranged them in what he called a *Mémoire à Consulter*,—in other words a brief,—and published it for the edification of the Parisians. The book had a most rapid and universal sale; it was greedily read and purchased throughout France,

supplying fresh matter for the journals to expatiate upon, for the public to ponder, for the members of the two Chambers, and even for the judges of the Royal Courts, to take up.

"It is not sufficient for the *Congregation*," writes Montlosier, "to occupy every post in the administration and the police. Throughout every part of the country it has created a police of its own. The spy system was formerly a thing, which merely employed baseness to execute; but this is now ordained as a duty by men who inculcate religion. To give secret information to the Government, as far as our relations in society afford the facilities, has become a virtue and an act of conscience. Letters of noblesse are conferred in return for it. The lower classes are taught the same lesson as their superiors. An association exists, entitled that of Saint Joseph, in which workmen are enlisted and disciplined. Shops are appointed to sell them wines cheap. I have seen lacqueys and chambermaids in Paris, who are recommended by the Congregation. The most remote villages, the highest dignitaries of the Court, the officers of the Royal Guard, none have escaped the Congregation. I can say nothing positive of the Chamber of Peers; but in the Chamber of Deputies there are from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty members of the Congregation. This body fills the capital, and overrules the provinces. There under the lead of bishops and vicars-general it forms a triumphant coterie, before the influence of which prefects and sub-prefects, commandants and magistrates stand in awe, the Government and the Ministry itself being unable to resist them."

Montlosier, who had edited a French newspaper in London for the Bourbons, and who enjoyed a pension in

consequence, was deprived of it for his book. This of course added to his popularity, and his denunciations at length became the subject of debate in the Legislature.

It was during the consideration of the Budget, that M. Agier, the chief of what was called the Royalist defection amongst the deputies, introduced the subject of the Congregation. Villèle had laboured hard to make up by economical administration in his own department for the unpopular tendencies and character of his brother Ministers. His budget showed the diminution of a million sterling in the expenditure. Far, however, from obtaining applause for this, M. Agier, who spoke the opinions of Chateaubriand, taxed the Prime Minister with beggarly economy, at the expense of the army and of the navy. The army, according to Agier, was in a state of dissolution and discontent. More than nine hundred officers had sent in their resignation during the last two or three years, the duties of the soldier having become attendance on the confessional and in processions, rather than in military pursuits or exercises. M. Agier launched into a repetition of Montlosier's denunciations, and declared, that he had no objection to the priesthood, or to their wealth; even the Jesuits, in their places, he had no abhorrence of. What he dreaded were the Jesuits in Court dresses, and in office, and in the world, whose retrograde policy and influence alienated every heart both from religion and from the King, who established an inquisition, and who discredited every virtue and every devotion, except that of fidelity to the Congregation and its supposed interests. M. Villèle said little in reply to these attacks upon a society and an influence which he himself would have been glad to shake off. But he refuted the complaints of the Chateaubriand

press, that France had abdicated its influence abroad, because the Government was neither engaged in war nor intrigue.

Then, for the first time, a proposal was made in the Chamber to interfere in behalf of struggling Greece, the monarchy of which seemed threatened with extinction by the fall of Missolonghi. On this occasion several orators expatiated with great ability on the necessity of raising up between the Euphrates and the Danube some power or nation more capable than the Turks to resist Russia, and preserve the independence of a territory, which if it fell to any European power, would destroy the general balance. But Villèle could never raise his mind out of domestic difficulties to show even that solicitude for foreign struggles and events which the French people required. Opinion accused Villèle of not only having delivered himself up to the Jesuits, but of being incapable of elevating his mind to considerations of foreign policy, and consequently to the interest and dignity of France abroad. For this he was reproached not merely by Sebastiani and Perrier, the orators of the Left, but by several Royalists, such as Hyde de Neuville and Chateaubriand. Such attacks discredited the Minister not only with the public, but amongst the members of his own majority.

To the rebuke of others, that Government exercised a tyranny in the provinces, Villèle replied, that he regretted more than any one the vice of centralization. But how was is possible to remedy this? By erecting local bodies. And here no doubt occurred to the Minister what was one of the misfortunes of the epoch. Government had instituted provincial or departmental councils, but with the same timid and distrustful spirit with which they had instituted the Chamber itself. The members of their provincial

councils, being nominated by the Government or the Crown, and consisting of functionaries, or of provincials attached to the Government, afforded neither support nor council. The French proverb is well known, "That one can only lean upon that which resists;" but the system followed since ultra-Royalism became predominant would have nothing that resisted. In several cases Government had consulted the provincial councils, especially on the question of the right of the eldest son. In all cases these assemblies returned the kind of answer they thought most agreeable to the Minister who asked the question, never dreaming that truth could be welcome or useful. The Minister thus deceived by reports and by provincial bodies ran blindly into the most unpopular measures.

Villèle now declared, that he was most anxious for departmental councils and municipal bodies. But of the Royalists, who recommended them, he asked, how are they to be elected? In other words he asked, are they to be counterparts of the close electoral system? If so, of what use are they? "Of old," said the Minister, "corporations and provincial bodies had funds and annual property of their own. Now they have none. We cannot give them the general revenue to collect; and if they have no funds to expend or to collect, where are their functions, their importance, their use?"

All other attacks and accusations against the Government were of little importance compared with those directed against its obsequiousness to the priesthood. These were renewed with such violence, that M. Frayssinous, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, thought it best to come forward and avow the existence of the *Congregation*, which, however, he depicted as what it had really been at first, an

humble association of pious persons, anxious to propagate their sentiments, but not seeking to do so by violent and political means. The pains the Minister took to assert that he neither belonged to the Congregation itself, nor even felt its influence, excited only the smile and incredulity of the Chamber. After having devoted one day to a defence of the Congregation, M. Frayssinous made another declaration in favour of the liberties of the Gallican Church. Stung by taunts respecting the Jesuits, the Minister at length entered upon that delicate question also. He said, that four Jesuit establishments in France had birth under Napoleon, since which time they had increased indeed, but not in the formidable manner represented, since they were at the head of only seven ecclesiastical seminaries of the one hundred which the country contained.

M. Lainé, in the Chamber of Peers, made a formidable answer to the Minister's excuses. He showed, that the Jesuit schools contained more scholars than the thirty-eight Royal colleges taken together, and that one of these schools was no other than a normal college for rearing all the professors of the future university, and this was done by a society absolutely illegal, formally prohibited by the law, a society which every sovereign in Europe had been compelled in the interests of their own independence to banish. These fierce denunciations and this timid defence were continued after the close of the session. There were even symptoms, that the aggravated discontent of the educated classes with the efforts to force religious observances and influence upon them, had gained the lower ranks, which for some years, even in popular times, had been comparatively quiet. In 1826 when the

Missions endeavoured to enforce the penitence and observance of the Jubilee in the great manufacturing towns, the citizens rose and there were serious tumults. At Rouen the mob broke into the cathedral and disturbed the service. In Lyons and other towns they were contented with counter demonstrations in the streets, and the police found much difficulty in protecting the missionaries; they were obliged to confine their processions and ceremonies to the churches. The anti-sacerdotal cry everywhere was the demand to have Molière's Tartuffe represented—a wish which no theatrical management durst indulge.

Meantime the pen of M. de Montlosier did not rest. In addition to the *Mémoire à Consulter*, he published the *Dénunciation aux Cours Royales*, a denunciation of the Jesuits and their establishments to the Courts of Justice. It was the wish and recommendation of M. de Peyronnet that the Royal Court should take no notice of the denunciation. The Procureur-general proposed a judgment to the effect that there was nothing to deliberate upon. But the Court thought otherwise. It did deliberate, there being only two out of fifty-five judges, who were for their passing over the accusations. At length, the Court passed judgment, to the effect, that seven or eight express laws, which were enumerated, all prohibited the re-establishment of the company of Jesus, a prohibition which the Court approved, the principle professed by the Jesuits being destructive of the independence of any government, incompatible with the constitutional Chamber and the public law of the country. There was no doubt of the illegality of what M. de Montlosier denounced; but it belonged to the high police, and not the Royal Court, to see such infraction of the law prevented and punished. The crime or

misdemeanor was not such as the Royal Court could of itself ordain a prosecution for.

The condemnation was as strong as the judges of the Royal Court could make it, without stepping forward to prosecute. Whilst the first body of legists in the kingdom thus openly espoused the popular and anti-sacerdotal side, the bishops filled the columns of their journals, and the towns of their dioceses with pastoral letters, thundering against the Liberal opposition and the impious press, and descending almost personally into the arena with the most extravagant language, the most intolerant and exultant expressions. Of these none made use of words so fierce and intolerant, as the Abbé Tharin, Bishop of Strasburg. At this very period, it was considered necessary to appoint a preceptor as well as a governor to the Duke of Bordeaux. The Duke of Montmorency had first filled this office, and had been succeeded by another personal friend of the King, the Duc de Rivière, as deep in the ideas of priestly reaction as M. de Montmorency, but far more mild in character. Had public opinion been consulted, every voice would have pointed to Viscount de Chateaubriand as the fit governor for the prince, but Chateaubriand was in opposition.* To the astonishment of every one, the preceptor fixed upon was no other than the most bigoted and most extravagant ecclesiastic in France, Tharin, Bishop of Strasburg. The idea which first sug-

* Chateaubriand writes as follows to Montlosier:—"I am for religion as much as you. I hate the Congregation, and those associations of hypocrites which transform my domestics into spies, and whose only altar is power. But I think that the clergy, these parasitic plants removed from it, might very well enter into our constitutional régime, and become the support of our new institutions. You wish to separate the clergy too much from politic. The clergy owes me much, but does not like me; but we must be just, and do what is right for religion and for monarchy."

gested itself was that the appointment was as a challenge, a kind of defiance to public opinion. But this was not the case. Charles X. made the appointment from the recommendation of his intimate circle—of his almoner, his confessor, and of the Duchess d'Angoulême; and far from discerning how much he outraged public opinion, he flattered himself that he was still keeping up the character of a popular King, and that his people could not dislike or misinterpret his feelings.

Mr. Canning spent the autumn in Paris, and was exceedingly well received by Charles X., who did him the unusual honour of having him to dinner at the Royal table. The King admired much of Mr. Canning's previous political career, and he cordially supported the idea, then first broached by his brother statesman, of the necessity of raising a Christian power and banner in the Levant, other than Russia and independent of St. Petersburgh. Mr. Canning found the King in a state of political confidence and beatitude, and conceiving that he was taking no dangerous political step, when he solemnly handed over at St. Cloud the heir to the Throne to the preceptorship of Bishop Tharin. Every one, except the King, felt the imprudence of this choice; and the *Journal des Débats* dared to put itself forward as the indicator of the general opinion, when it said that the monarch was impelled blindly to destruction by a fatality which every one saw, yet which no one could resist or prevent.

No doubt it was what Mr. Canning witnessed of the complete separation and antagonism between the French Court and the French people, which led him so soon after to declare in full Parliament, that he should shrink from declaring war, for in such event the entire people of the Con-

tinent would join England or any power, which upheld a Liberal policy, against their own sovereigns. Yet Canning had every reason to be contented with Villèle, as far as a passive policy suited the interests of England. Thus in discussing the affairs of the Peninsula, Villèle admitted that French influence in Spain was but nominal, that it had been dearly purchased, and that the Minister would gladly shake it off being far more embarrassed and weakened, than either pleased or strengthened by it.

The affairs of Spain became at this time mingled with those of Portugal. The sovereign of this country dying, left as his heir Don Pedro, then in the Brazils; and he, fully aware how impossible it had become for one sovereign to reign on both sides of the Atlantic, therefore chose to make Brazil his own empire, and to transfer Portugal to his daughter Donna Maria. The transfer he could render welcome to the Portuguese by accompanying it with a Liberal charter, and he hoped at the same time to conciliate his brother Don Miguel, by offering to him the young princess for his queen, on the condition of his accepting the charter or constitution. An English ambassador brought over this charter from Rio to Lisbon. Its proclamation led to troubles, the absolutists and partizans of the old system of government flying to Spain. Here, of course, they found favour and support from Ferdinand and his Minister, who proposed to act towards Portugal as France had acted towards them. England naturally opposed any such intervention, and Mr. Canning plainly menaced, what he afterwards performed, to despatch English troops to Lisbon. Villèle did all that Canning could have desired. He menaced Spain with abandoning it, if it interfered, and on his advice being slighted he with-

drew his ambassador. Villèle did thus, moreover, whilst the more zealous ultra-Royalists who supported him, as well as the Royalist deserters under Chateaubriand, pressed for a war with England, rather than allow a constitution to be proclaimed in Portugal.*

Both Ministers met their Parliaments in December: Canning to announce the despatch of troops to Portugal; Villèle to say that he had recalled his ambassador from Spain. The language and the policy of the French Minister was timid and humble; that of the British Minister arrogant and boasting. This was but just revenge for the aggression of 1823, and was deserved, if addressed to Chateaubriand; but it was ungenerous in the English Minister towards Villèle, over whom though he humbled himself, Canning triumphed nevertheless; thus rendering his position in the face of his own petulant opposition doubly difficult. But the fact was, that Canning considered Villèle's ministerial career as near its close. He was scouted by popular feeling, and attacked even by the Royalists in the Chambers. When Canning spoke to Villèle of Greece, the latter shook his head, and owned himself too much broken in spirit and embarrassed with domestic difficulties to entertain any new scheme. Canning considered such a Minister as dead, and he saw the great probability of his being succeeded in power by his rival Chateaubriand, who was also the political rival of Canning himself, and the antagonist of England. The English statesman, therefore, did not moderate his words. He not only expressed his determination to defend Portugal by arms, and to avoid the alternative of war with France itself solely because he could count upon the aid of the

* Lafayette's Correspondence, t. vi., p. 237.

Liberals of that country and of Europe; but he made use of Villelè's own language to declare, that the occupation of Spain was a burden and an injury to France, not a profit: whilst on the contrary, England, by the policy it had pursued, had counteracted the wrong by separating definitively the Spanish colonies from the mother-country, and calling "the new world into existence to restore the balance of the old." The defence of Canning sounded then, and sounds still, extremely well. But such words not only greatly aggravated the weakness of Villèle, and precipitated his fall, but they were influential in causing the subsequent appointment of French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who felt indignant with England, and leant back for a counterpoise upon that old alliance of France with Russia, which had constituted the Duc de Richelieu's policy, which had inspired Chateaubriand's intrigues, and which, turned by the new Czar Nicholas to his profit and to the furtherance of his designs, might, had Charles X. succeeded in mastering his people and continuing his reign, have turned to the serious detriment of Great Britain.

CHAPTER X.

UNPOPULARITY OF MINISTERS—PEYRONNET'S NEW PRESS LAWS—ROYER COLLARD'S DENUNCIATION OF IT—PROTEST OF THE ACADEMY—VILLÈLE'S DEFENCE—RIOT AT THE FUNERAL OF THE DUC DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT—PRESS LAW WITHDRAWN—REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL GUARD—THEY CRY "DOWN WITH THE MINISTERS!" AND ARE DISSOLVED—INTERVENTION FOR GREECE—NEW ELECTIONS—FIRST BARRICADE—FALL OF VILLÈLE.

It was difficult for a Minister to amass a greater degree of unpopularity than Villèle had now done. In domestic matters he had made himself the mere instrument of the least intelligent of the priesthood, and the least capable, as well as least wealthy, of the aristocracy. Forced years back into a foreign policy not his own, it had triumphed in his despite, and he sacrificed the colleague who had wrought that triumph, to sink back certainly into a more liberal policy abroad, at least as far as regarded the peninsula; but it was inglorious, ineffective, and, moreover, unsatisfactory to the Royalist party. His colonial policy, exemplified in the final abandonment of San Domingo, might be equally wise, but it was also inglorious and lowering to Royalist pride. Ample as was his majority, and great as had been his efforts to gratify the religious party, he had not rendered it triumphant. Both aristocracy and clergy felt themselves resisted by a popular force, which

had grown up and displayed itself, apparently owing to neglect and want of skill on the part of the government. If the Liberals were furious at the confiscation of the public liberties and of electoral rights, the Royalists were no less discontented that so little profit or stability had been drawn from so much power. The moderate Royalists thought they would do better by trying their way back to Constitutionalism; but the Court, the King, and the Clergy would never permit this, and they already craved a minister after their own heart, and a statesman for the country, analogous to the preceptor they had given to the royal heir.

Villèle, however, declared himself ready to satisfy ultra-Royalist exigencies. Their chief complaint was against the press. The Prime Minister had given his colleague, De Peyronnet, full powers to prepare during the recess a law, which would satisfy the Royalists and the clergy, and protect them, as well as the Government, from that daily shower of sarcasm and exposure poured upon them by the press. Villèle needed this for himself. The pen of Chateaubriand had torn his political reputation to tatters; whilst the Jesuits and the Congregation in lieu of converting or intimidating the people had been exposed, since they were unmasked in the commencement of 1826, to such an explosion of mingled hatred and ridicule, that the population of towns rose to hoot and pelt them when they appeared. Peyronnet undertook to remedy this by a law, not only restricting the press, but modifying the juries. The session opened for its presentation in December, in order that it might be referred to a committee, and be ready for discussion and for being voted in January. The King's speech, which scarcely touched upon foreign politics, and merely spoke of the good understanding with foreign

powers, presented the new press law as the important business of the session.

Immediately after Christmas, the Minister of Justice stated the series of measures which he proposed, and which embracing every kind and mode of publication, threatened not merely the journals with suppression and their writers with prohibition, but made printers and booksellers fear that their calling was altogether at an end. The Minister first described the precautions to be taken against the publication of books. None were to be published for five or for ten days after a copy had been left at the offices of the Government. The speeches of members of the Chamber, memoirs of literary societies, pastoral letters of bishops, were excepted. The Commission of the Chamber extended the number of exceptions, one of which was to acted dramas of the day. The printer was bound to declare beforehand to how many sheets a work should extend, and this limit he was not to exceed under penalty of having the work seized and confiscated. Neither was he to allow a single sheet to be removed from the printing-office till the number of days had elapsed for the examination of the work. Every book under five sheets was bound to pay a stamp duty of a franc for the first sheet, and a penny for every other.

No journal could be published without the name of its proprietor printed on it. Falsehood in such a declaration incurred the suppression of the print. There were to be no more than three proprietor-editors of a journal, and these should possess at least one-third of the property in it. A penny stamp was to be necessary for each number of a journal. Then followed a long list of heavy fines for provoking to a crime, or provoking to a misdemeanor, followed

or not followed with results. An allusion to the private life of any one was punished by a fine of 20*l.*, besides the damage and fines due for libel, should it amount to one. Any article outraging the royal dignity, the order of the succession to the throne, the religion of the State or its Ministers, was liable to a fine of thirty thousand francs.

The simple censorship of books and journals was mercy and mildness compared to such a captious and severe law. But the censorship brought with it such a mass of odium, and gave the Government such a power over those Royalists who went beyond it, as well as over the Liberals themselves, that it was difficult to carry. The King had commenced his reign with abrogating it, and instead of recurring to it, the present ministerial law of repression was imagined. Yet oppressive and tyrannical as it was, it cannot be admitted to be any very monstrous aggravation of the press laws, which previous Ministers had introduced. It was the growing liberality of the tribunals, and the opposition of the judges to the Government, which had rendered these old laws ineffective; and the same cause would have neutralized the present law, unless the Government could appoint new judges, and find other tribunals. The general conviction was, that Government was every day growing more tyrannical and more severe. This was no doubt true. But a greater change had been wrought in the public opinion of the country, which, weak, unheard, unfelt, and disunited in 1820, had no power or means of resistance, whereas, in 1827, every mind and every class had been so goaded by a series of unpopular acts, not confined to Paris, or to the Chamber, or to the political world, but brought home to every hearth by the imprudent efforts of the clergy, that every grade and class of society, high and low, and every

hamlet as well as every town, was excited to resist a tyranny, which wounded the pride, thwarted the habits, and outraged the convictions of the people. The struggle of opinion against its oppressors was carried on most ably and powerfully by the press; and the people were satisfied with the manifest victory which these opinions were gaining by means of the press. The journals of 1827 were no longer those of 1820, which had in vain tried to interest and rouse a dormant and weary public. A new generation had come to mingle its young feelings and passions with those which had flagged; and the press, which was crushed without difficulty or menace in 1821, required a revolution to extinguish it now, or at least provoked it by the successful attempt to do so.

The storm of resentment and passion which was excited in the nation at large by Peyronnet's law, found on the benches of Opposition orators whom it inspired with the general enthusiasm; and although some of the greatest political and oratorical genius were no more, still the superior excitement of the times gave greater energy and eloquence to those who remained; and never certainly were men assailed with such overwhelming vehemence of denunciation, as the unfortunate Ministers who sat on the same bench with Peyronnet, and supported the obnoxious law.

It was customary for members who wished to speak on a question, to inscribe their names some days before upon a list which was prepared. The first on this list was the first to speak. M. Royer Collard, anxious to open the debate, came at six o'clock in the morning to write down his name. There were already three members before him. After a speech from Agier, who in the name of the Royalist defection repudiated the law, its insidious and tyrannical regula-

tions were exposed by Benjamin Constant. This orator began by showing that, under the reign of the censorship, the country, unable to vent its feelings or complaints, was convulsed by perpetual conspiracies: now the object was to restore the censorship without the name. This it did by means of the previous deposit of all books enabling the police to seize and suppress them first, as well as punish them after even for unpublished writings. With the censorship came the tax which compelled the payment of a thousand francs for a pamphlet to the treasury. The refutation of a calumny, the complaints of a subordinate oppressed, the statement or protest of any one robbed or ill-treated, the few pages requisite for those necessitated a thousand francs previous outlay. The printer by this law was made responsible for all he published: 500,000 volumes had issued from the press of one existing printer. Could he have read them? All these objections to the law, so numerous, that they filled a pamphlet of themselves, had indeed been stated in a joint petition by upwards of two hundred and fifty booksellers and printers, many of whom were staunch Royalists. All of these petitioners declared that they must close their printing-offices, and throw out of work the numerous trades and artizans employed in connection with books and journals in consequence of it. These were estimated at 40,000 in Paris alone; and this body of men, threatened now with a loss of livelihood, and ever after regarding the Government and the Bourbons as their mortal foes, became not uninfluential actors in the popular drama that was opening.

An incident arising out of this threatened cessation of the trade of printing and publishing, was the body of Academicians being moved from their usual neutrality and

quietude to lift up a voice against the law. The French Academy, that great association of letters, had by no means shown itself disaffected even to the ultra-Royalist government. It had elected Frayssinous and De Quelen, and it contained several placemen. Lacretelle the younger, as he was called, had been a very zealous Royalist writer. He had written a History of the Revolution in a Royalist spirit, and was a constant lecturer at the *Société des Bonnes Lettres.* More timid men than Lacretelle and Villemain could not be found; yet it was they who raised their voices in the Academy, proposing that the body should address a deprecatory petition on the subject to the King. The Archbishop of Paris begged them to do no such thing, as it might cause the suppression of the Academy. This provoked the Academicians; and the two members who had proposed the petition, were empowered, along with Chateaubriand, to draw it up. The King refused to receive it. Lacretelle and Villemain were deprived of their places: one was Dramatic Censor, the other Master of Requests. Michaud, one of the Royal readers, a most ardent Royalist, was disgraced for the same reason. Decorum or moderation were unknown to Corbière, and Villèle could not interfere with these petty but prejudicial acts of vengeance.

When Benjamin Constant had recapitulated in the Chamber all the minute and tyrannical provisions which menaced the existence of all connected with printing, and which the Academicians had come forward to deprecate, M. De Salaberry, as ministerial champion, sought to demonstrate the justice of this law against the press, because it was consonant to the Jewish and to ancient legislation. The Greeks put to death those who corrupted youth, and the Hebrews forbade people to read till they were thirty.

The modern world had allowed full liberty of writing and printing, and from this liberty had sprung Revolutionists and Protestants, and anti-Legitimists. It is an engine that launches fire and sword. It is the only plague which Moses forgot to inflict upon the East.

Such defenders as Salaberry merely covered tyranny with ridicule. The great speech of the debate was that of Royer Collard, who on this occasion indeed surpassed himself.

"No former law," he began by observing, "had ever aimed at more than destroying the licentiousness of the press; the present law was remarkable as aiming at the destruction of the liberty of the press and printing itself. The idea of the proposers of the law was, that it had been a great imprudence on the day of the creation, to allow man to come forth intelligent and free in the midst of the universe. The wisdom of Ministers was employed in correcting this error of Providence, in restricting His imprudent liberality, and in bringing back humanity, sagely mutilated, to the happy innocence and ignorance of brutes. In defending a measure conceived on such principles as these, Ministers are obliged to admit that they extinguish the good with the bad. As the press, they say, produces more bad than good, let us destroy it altogether. Apply the same principle to government, to jurisprudence, and you must put the whole country into prison, regard the population as so many suspected persons, and in fact renew that régime which existed under the Terror. There would be a confiscation of all motion and all liberty. It would proclaim as a great moral truth, that evil produces far more evil, than good can produce good. The Creator of all things thought the contrary. Ministers tell you that *He*

was mistaken. Liberty being stifled, of course intelligence must die. Truth may be a good, but error is an evil. In extirpating evil, take no care of the good. Let truth and error perish together. As a prison is the only remedy for the ills of liberty, so ignorance is the only desirable grave for intelligence. Ignorance is the true science of man, and the true law of society. This was the good old rule of the destroyer of the Albigenses, who flung Catholics and Protestants alike into the flames, and sacrificed the innocent lest one of the guilty should by any chance escape."

"In order to destroy the press," continued M. Royer Collard, "the law does not shrink from setting at nought every law of morality, every right of property. It is one of those laws which prompt people to disobey it. We have before now traversed epochs, when the authority of law was usurped by tyranny, when evil was declared good, and virtue considered a crime. At such a moment we sought our rule of action in our consciences; and we obeyed God rather than man. How is it that under a legitimate monarch we are brought back to those fearful reminiscences? The worst of this attempt at tyranny is, that it cannot be executed. It is with tyranny as with liberty, it does not suffice to write down or decree one or the other. Both have their precedents and their conditions. Twice in twenty years did tyranny lay its heavy hand upon us, at one time armed with the revolutionary axe, at another with a front radiant in the splendour of fifty victories. The revolutionary axe has been long blunted, nor is there any party which dares think of wielding it again. It is by glory alone, military and political renown, that tyranny at present could acquire strength. Without glory it would

be merely ridiculous. Ministers of the Crown, proposers of this law, known or unknown, may it be permitted to ask, what have you achieved of greatness which raises you so high above your fellow-citizens, as to give you the right of imposing tyranny upon them? Where has your glory been acquired? Where are the victories you have gained, or the immortal services you have rendered to your country? Obscure and mediocre as ourselves, it does not appear that you surpass us in aught but temerity. Tyranny could never subsist in such feeble hands. Yet a faction with so little intrinsic power or right proposes to you the destruction of the press. Last year it demanded the exclusive privilege of eldest sons to inherit property. The year before, it came with the law of Sacrilege in its hand. Thus in religious, in social, in political respects, its tendency is backwards. It would make us recoil into ignorance, fanaticism, and barbarism. Fortunately the enterprise is difficult. They may succeed in preventing a single line from being printed in France; and a wall of brass may be erected to prohibit us from the importation of the foreign press. But discussion has been for a long time active between good and evil, between the true and the false. That struggle has filled innumerable volumes, read day and night by an inquisitive generation. The ideas of these books are not merely in libraries, they have passed into the heads and into the familiar discourse of men. Can you expel them from their minds? Have you got a law for that? Until we have forgotten what we know, we shall be very unfitted for becoming servile and brutal. The onward movement of the national mind does not depend merely on the press: it is born of liberty, such as has been enjoyed, of free labour, and of leisure. The social life of towns, the inter-

communication of a civilized country keep it alive. In order to enslave Frenchmen, you must disperse and impoverish them. Misery alone can be the safeguard of ignorance. Trust me, that what you had best do for your purposes, is to reduce the population, to send them back from the pursuits of mechanical industry to the labours of the field, burn the factories, fill up the canals, and plough up the high roads. Until you have done that, you have done nothing. Until the plough has passed over the whole of civilization, what remains would be enough to undo all that you have done. I shall propose no amendments. The law is not worthy of them. Compromise there can be none with the spirit of tyranny which dictated it. I reject it altogether, from respect to humanity which it degrades, and to justice which it outrages. I reject it from fidelity to the cause of legitimate monarchy, which it shakes, or at least endangers, lowering it in public opinion as faithless to its promises. It is the only act of devotion which I can perform towards the cause to which my attachment was proved in its days of exile and misfortune."

In vain did Villèle seek on the ensuing day to extricate the Ministry from that culprit position, in which the terrible speech of Royer Collard seemed to fling them. He ridiculed the idea of a tyranny, to which any one could address such language. There was but one tyrant in the country, he said, and that was the press.

No part of the debate made a worse impression upon the public than that in which Casimir Perrier pressed Ministers to declare how far they intended to apply the law to the general literature of the country, and to works long printed and known. "Were Voltaire, Rousseau, and the writers of the eighteenth century to be permitted? Were

Pascal's Provincial Letters, and the Tartuffe of Molière to be proscribed?" "If some works of French literature are to be proscribed, and others not," exclaimed Constant, "Government must publish a list of proscribed works, and put them in the Index, as is done in Rome." No satisfactory reply was given by Ministers even to these taunts. They were sure of their majority in the Chamber of Deputies, where the law passed by 233 votes against 134.

The true constitutional opposition was, however, to be found in the Chamber of Peers. Ministers, aware of this, had hoped, by a large nomination of Peers, at the accession of Charles X., to overcome the frowardness of the Upper Chamber. But both the King and the Duc d'Angoulême objected to swamp the Peerage, at least to commence a reign by such an act of violence: the promotions to the Peerage on the accession of Charles X. were, therefore, few and insufficient. Indeed, by giving up the censorship, and exposing the Government to the attacks of the press, and at the same time refusing to protect them from the hostility of the Peers, Charles X. irredeemably weakened that very cabinet of Villèle, to sustain which he afterwards showed such obstinacy, and was prepared to go such lengths. Whilst De Peyronnet's Press Law, a *law of love*, as one of the Minister of Justice's articles in the "Moniteur" styled it, a title too amusing not to be caught up by the public (which nailed and affixed it to the law), was under the examination of the committee in the Deputies, the Peers occupied themselves with a petition from the indefatigable Montlosier on the subject of the Jesuits. They did all they could for the petition and for its subject; they gave serious attention to both, appointed a committee to examine it, and the celebrated Portalis was

its reporter. Such a report, with a debate upon the Jesuits in the Chamber of Peers was sufficient to keep opinion alive upon a subject so calculated to render the Minister and the Crown unpopular. Thus the debate was closed by passing to the order of the day. The reprobation felt by the Chamber of Peers for the society of the Jesuits was as evident as the opinion of the Royal Court of Paris. It was during this debate, that the Duke of Fitzjames took the opportunity of representing M. de Montlosier as a half-crazed old gentleman, running after notoriety, and who, when an exile in England, had been noted for the wildness of his projects. M. d'Ambray took up the defence of Montlosier, who, being a member of the Constituent Assembly, whilst the clergy were despoiled of their wealth, was heard to exclaim, "You are taking away the riches of the clergy and despoiling them of their gilded crucifixes. It matters little. They will carry before them crucifixes of wood; and after all it was a wooden crucifix by which the world was saved!" "The man was no fool," observed M. d'Ambray, "who spoke these well-known words."

When De Peyronnet brought the Press Law before the Peers, they proceeded to treat it in much the same spirit which they displayed with regard to Montlosier. They appointed a committee of members by no means ministerial. Count Portalis, Portal, and Bastard, as well as the Duc de Broglie, were of the number. These before drawing up a report proceeded to examine as witnesses several persons connected with the printing and publishing trade. This boded obstruction not acquiescence; when an incident occurred, which caused considerable irritation and disgust, and very much aggravated the hostile feelings of the Chamber of Peers towards the Government.

The venerable Duke de la Rochefoucault-Liancourt died towards the end of March, at the age of eighty, after a life spent in philanthropic enterprises. M. Corbière, it will be remembered, had deprived him of a score of gratuitous places, because he had disapproved of the centralization of the authority to visit and control prisons. The enmity of Corbière rendered the Duke's name more dear to the Liberals and the Home Minister feared lest the funeral might afford an opportunity for a liberal effervescence or manifestation. The Duke had founded a college of engineers and mechanics at Chalons. Those who had been bred up in it, and were in Paris, asked to be allowed to carry the body of their benefactor to the grave. The family felt the request an honour, and the body was so carried to the church of the Assumption. But on proceeding from the church to the cemetery, the funeral was stopped by an agent of police, who summoned those who bore the body to give it up, and allow it to be carried in the usual conveyance of the hearse, which followed. Those who had borne the body appealed to the sons of the late Duke, who were present. They declared it to be their wish that the funeral should continue as it commenced. The police agent immediately communicated an order to the officer of a company of troops, which attended as a guard of honour to the Duke's remains. As there was some hesitation to obey the police agent, the soldiers were ordered to support the latter, and a quarrel ensued, in the midst of which the coffin was thrown violently on the paving-stones of the street, and shattered. The Chamber of Peers, on learning the indignity, ordered its Grand Referendary to make inquiry into the facts. This functionary blamed the severity of the order which led to

the disgraceful circumstance, an order the more unwarrantable, since the Abbé Emery's remains had been carried to the cemetery by his scholars. A debate ensued, in which the Home Minister, Corbière, being roughly treated, very insolently defended the police; upon which the Grand Referendary, M. de Semonville, felt himself obliged to reassure the Peers present against the brutality of the Home Minister and his myrmidons of the *Pompes Funebres*, by declaring that "such a thing should never happen again, as he would himself conduct their lordships to their last resting-place."

Whilst the Chamber of Peers was in this temper, its Commission had, it was known, prepared a report not by any means favourable to the Press Law, to which they proposed a number of amendments, suppressing its most severe provisions, and mitigating it in every respect. The amendment had met with no opposition from even the ultra-Royalists in the Commission. Ministers immediately had a presentiment of defeat, and in order to avoid it, M. de Peyronnet withdrew his law before it could be debated, or even the report read in the Chamber of Peers. The national joy at such a triumph was even greater than on the occasion of the rejection of the *droit d'aînesse*. Paris, Lyons, and the other great towns illuminated on the occasion. There was a general festivity and rejoicing throughout the country.

Nothing is more remarkable, and indeed more unaccountable, than the great good humour which prevailed generally amidst so many causes of serious hatred and provocation. In former years, when the government of the Bourbons, far from embarking in any such course of reaction and persecution as at present, was carried on

with constitutional aims under a monarch possessed of sense and moderation, the sentiment towards the Bourbons and the throne was such as is but too fully indicated by the crime of Louvel. After that, the discontent of the middle classes was increased day after day, and year after year, by fresh reactions. The Count d'Artois was personally the chief of that reaction, the head and front of the great persecution against the liberties and constitution of the kingdom; and yet, reaching the throne as Charles X., and indulging in a few popular acts, he was greeted with a welcome and a respect which his brother had never commanded. The whole country, even to the very rabble, seemed to have learned the constitutional doctrine of considering Ministers apart from the Crown, of throwing all odium upon them, and maintaining their loyalty intact. The Parisian public of 1827 came to resemble their English brethren more than themselves. No doubt this was, in a great measure, owing to the circumstance that men of moderate opinions, and even of Royalist connection took the lead. It was no longer the men of the Empire who harangued, or the writers of the Revolution who thundered in the press; it was such men as Chateaubriand who took the lead in opposition, who poured forth one day an ode on the coronation, or an invocation of St. Charles on the King's birthday, and the next dragged Villèle and Corbière through the dirt, and laid all the crimes and follies of the Government of the day upon those devoted persons. That Chateaubriand's opposition provoked a resistance and awoke an opposition very dissimilar from those which stop at constitutional results may be judged from what he says himself. "In many industrial classes the workmen were at my orders. I could not take a step

in the streets without being surrounded by them." So completely was it a Royalist opposition which sowed the first seeds of 1830.

Nothing can be more salutary, or more decorous, than those constitutional forms of respect for royalty, provided that no one is the dupe of them. This was, unfortunately, the case with Charles X. Circumstances led him to mistake for strength what in reality was weakness, and for adhesion what in truth was defection and mutiny. All different kinds and grades of opposition had tacitly agreed to range themselves behind the lead of the constitutional Royalists. Royer Collard and Chateaubriand were the leaders of the masses, which on all sides were rising against the throne. But these leaders, even in arms, approached the object of their hostility with such respect, that Charles thought he was approached by worshippers, and that, as King, he was a demigod; when it was no other than foes who were closing round his bulwark of divine right, and preparing to storm it, if it refused to surrender.

The 12th of April was the anniversary of the day on which the King had entered Paris. On that day it was customary for the National Guard alone to do duty at the Tuileries. The observance was put off till the 16th, the 12th being Thursday in Passion-week. On the 16th, accordingly, the King received the felicitations of the officers of the National Guard who came to the chateau. The citizen soldiers of the Guard even cried *Vive le Roi!* as if to declare that they did not hold the King responsible for the unpopular Press Law which had just been voted in the Chamber of Deputies. Charles X., gratified by the cries, and mistaking their import, expressed his satisfaction to the officers. These asserted the loyalty

of the National Guard in general, and begged the King to put it to the proof by holding a review. Marshal Oudinot, who commanded the National Guard, was the first to obtain a promise to this effect from the King. Charles thoughtlessly gave it, and the review, reluctantly consented to by Ministers, was ordered for the 29th. On the 17th the obnoxious law was withdrawn. It was, however, not withdrawn by Ministers as a concession to public opinion. They reserved the resolution to crush the resistance of the Upper Chamber, and force their law through the Legislature at a future time.

On the appointed day, the National Guard, amounting to from 20,000 to 30,000 armed citizens, were drawn up in the Champ de Mars. The leader of the anti-ministerial Opposition had strongly recommended that the cry of *Vive la Roi* should be general, mingled with cries of *Vive la Charte*, but with no other allusion or reprobation. The monarch arrived on horseback. The princesses followed in carriages. Passing along the front of the first legion, satisfactory cries of *Vive le Roi!* saluted the royal cortège. But the citizens of the seventh legion, from a remote and uncourtly quarter of the capital, cried *Vive la Charte!* to the exclusion of *Vive le Roi* altogether. The King's countenance instantly expressed his annoyance. An officer of the regiment near him ventured to ask his Majesty if the cry of *Vive la Charte!* was displeasing to him. "I came to receive homage, and not a lesson," observed the King. The reproof was taken with humility, and was attended with full success; for the whole legion instantly shouted *Vive le Roi!* So respectful and attached had the citizen class become, even under the most harsh treatment, to a constitutional Monarch. The rest

of the review passed, for the King, in a manner quite satisfactory; but the feelings of discontent, repressed in the presence of the monarch, burst forth at sight of the carriages containing the Princesses. The Duchess d'Angoulême was unpopular; her harshness was proverbial. Small respect was shown to her and the Duchess of Berri, and the cry of "Down with the Jesuits!" was vociferated around them. Popular acclamations, even more than popular sentiments, gather intensity from being indulged. The National Guard, as they returned to their habitations, forgot all the recommendations to be prudent and moderate. They stopped in crowds before the hotels of Villèle and Peyronnet, and cried, "Down with the Ministers! Away with Peyronnet!" Unaccustomed to such rude manifestations, the functionary class feared that a revolution was at hand.

The King himself returned to the Tuileries, satisfied altogether with the review,—so much so, that he gave Marshal Oudinot permission to draw up his thanks, in order to address them officially to the National Guard. But the Princesses arrived with other impressions. They had been outraged, they declared, and insulted. The mob and its cries were recommencing 1790. If not put down, the throne was sure to be overturned. It was natural enough that the daughter of Louis XVI. should view even the commonest events of a constitutional government by the light of those of lurid flame which had seared her youth. Ministers ought to have been endowed with more sagacity and coolness.

"But the insult and castigation which he received, had," said Chateaubriand, "communicated irascibility to the cold temperament of Villèle, and rendered desperate the

maleficent spirit of Corbière. The Ministers had the want of tact and the misfortune to demand of the King an act punishing the National Guard. The Princesses were clamorous, and abetted the demand. The whole Court assumed the same tone. So that on the following day the King recalled and destroyed the order of the day which Oudinot had prepared for returning thanks to the legion for their loyal conduct. Cabinet councils were held, at which the monarch presided, as to the best course to be pursued. Villèle, Corbière, and Peyronnet, personally cried down by the National Guard, felt that it or they must be put down. They did not hesitate. Damas and Clermont Tonnerre supported these views. MM. de Chabrol and Frayssinous preferred dissolving merely that legion which had uttered the obnoxious cries. But it was impossible to tell which legion had caused the turmoil before the ministerial residences. The Duc de Doudeauville opposed the measure altogether; so that, in fact, the religious or most obnoxious party in the Government shrunk from breaking with the citizens, whilst the mere politicians were for violence. Charles X. hesitated. He was for moderation in the afternoon, but came round to violent measures in the evening. Villèle threatened to resign. The decree dissolving the National Guard was drawn up and signed. After having crushed the Carbonari conspiracies in 1822, and triumphed over Spanish liberalism, Villèle despised popular insurrection. Other councillors saw the danger of a complete and formal repudiation of the citizen class from around the throne. The Duc de Doudeauville said so in sending in his resignation.

The King feared for a moment that his Ministers had been too bold. But as the event passed without disturb-

ance, and the uniform of the National Guard merely disappeared, the Court congratulated itself on its energy. "The King can do everything," said the Duc de Rivière. The Court party, indeed, began to declare against the unpopularity and unskilfulness of Villèle, who remained at the head of the Government, whilst there was no force in him, but in the King and his name. Such being manifestly the case, the Court party aimed at forming a Ministry of its own, and undermining Villèle. They proposed bringing Jules de Polignac from London, and at first installing him in the place of the Duc de Doudeauville. Villèle, who saw through these schemes, opposed them; and the consequence was, that no Minister was appointed to the Royal Household in lieu of the Duke, who had resigned.

It was then that Villèle took counsel with himself alone how he could best restore and consolidate his power. The great fault, indeed, in these his latter days of statesmanship, was that he had no other idea. He thought neither of King nor Constitution, but of himself. What most shook him was the alienation of the Court party and Congregation, and their evident readiness to sacrifice him. He therefore proposed to himself, not so much the setting aside of his unpopular comrades, as the advancing of them to posts of dignity, out of the sphere of politics. Corbière, his friend, he thought of making Grand Referendary of the Chamber of Peers. Semonville, who filled that office, heard of the Prime Minister's intentions, and represented that a screeching cat, dropped from the ceiling of the Chamber amongst the seated Peers, would not have a much more disagreeable and ludicrous effect than the appointment of Corbière. What Villèle craved was impossible.

His political fate was irrevocably linked with that of Peyronnet and Corbière.

A large promotion of Peers was indispensable; and as a great number of these must be taken, not only from the Chamber of Deputies, but from the most ministerial fraction of it, a dissolution was its necessary accompaniment. Both measures were resolved by Villèle, and both consented to by the King. The secret was strictly kept. But these measures were so likely to be resorted to, and were so necessitated by the position of Villèle, that they were foreseen and not unprovided for. The Chamber of Peers, comprising all the experienced men of past Governments, took an opportunity of tying to some extent the hands of the Government and of its prefects. The Chamber had before it a jury law presented by M. de Corbière. It was conceived for the purpose of composing juries of the wealthy class, which exclusively enjoyed the electoral franchise, and of functionaries. The basis of the law was to make jurors and electors the same. The Upper Chamber took advantage of this to fix or modify many of the rules which influenced elections. It ordained, first, the preparation of both electoral and jury lists by a certain day. They made it impossible for the prefects to erase names from these lists, without a trial and solemn judgment. They settled how supplementary electors were to be added. In short, they very much contracted that arbitrary power which the prefects had exercised in the management of the elections of 1824. Some coolness at the time having sprung up between Corbière and Villèle, they neither of them perceived the tendency of several of these amendments, or did not communicate with each other, so as to take steps to defeat them. Perhaps, too, they shrunk

from disclosing, by unsuccessful opposition to these amendments, their determination speedily to dissolve the Chamber.

Amidst the many defects which rendered Villèle's rule as distasteful to the French politician as to the French people was his want, not merely of knowledge and of sympathy for foreign affairs, but his utter neglect and suppression of them. No doubt his rival, Chateaubriand, had gone to the other extreme, and exerted himself to absorb the entire resources as well as attention of Government in conquests or influence abroad. He did this avowedly, in order that glory and success in foreign enterprises might reflect splendour upon the throne, and give strength to the dynasty. Villèle would not admit the heroic into his policy: afraid of associating with him a talented and active foreign minister, and unable and unfit to attend to such questions himself, he allowed great events to pass in Europe without taking part in them, leaving to other powers the influence and the glory which thus might have been acquired, and lowering France to a passive and secondary part, derogatory to its character, its interests, and pride.

The first efforts of the Greeks to shake off the domination of the Mussulmans may be said to have commenced with Villèle's rise to power. Their efforts had interested all European nations and governments. There was no country in which the public was more excited, or more alive to the Greek cause, than in France. But Villèle remained cold. The Spaniards had impressed him with a disgust for intervention and its consequences; and Villèle gladly crept under the examples of the Russian and Austrian Emperors, who regarded the Greeks as

revolutionists, highly culpable in resisting the tyrants whom Providence had set over them.

The death of Alexander, however, restored the Russian Government to its natural impulses. That empire now came to press with its whole weight on the Mahomedan powers south of it. A campaign against Persia inaugurated the reign of Nicholas, who was equally prepared to insist on the Christians of Wallachia and Moldavia being freed from the pressure of Turkish armies. Canning, who dreaded Russia, had in vain urged the French Minister to come forward, in concert with England, and extend that protection to the Hellenes of Athens and the Morea which Russia gave to the population on the Danube. Villèle could not have elevated his mind to such considerations, even had he been more free from embarrassments in domestic administration. The English Cabinet, therefore, turned at once to Russia, and sent the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburgh, to mollify the new Emperor's warlike resentment against Turkey, and at the same time to offer co-operation in the emancipation of Greece. Russia had proposed originally to split Greece into three principalities or hospodarates, at which the Greeks were indignant.* Disgusted with the severity of Russia and the indifference of the French Government, they had appealed to England, and invoked its mediation. Russia could not propose to do less for Greece than England, and an agreement with the view to the liberation of Greece was signed between England and the Emperor Nicholas, in April of 1826. It was stipulated that the other powers of Europe should be invited to accede to it. It was dangerous and disgraceful

* See the Portfolio, and Russian State Papers in the *Annuaire* and Annual Register.

for France to be left out of such arrangements; and Villèle reluctantly and carelessly joined in these diplomatic resolutions. The wishes of the three Courts being signified to the Turkish Government, met with a peremptory refusal; and France, England, and Russia, were compelled to follow up their original resolve by a solemn treaty, signed at London on the 6th of July of the same year.

By this treaty, the Powers agreed to offer their mediation, and to press upon the Porte the necessity of allowing the Greeks to govern themselves, acknowledging the Sultan as their suzerain, and paying him an annual tribute. If Turks or Greeks refused to negotiate upon these terms, and persisted in hostilities, the Powers agreed to take the measures considered necessary to put a stop to the war and enforce the armistice they proposed. The treaty of the previous year produced a result very unexpected by the French Minister, and one for which he accordingly obtained little credit. This was the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino, which, had it proceeded from the express orders and resolute policy of Villèle, would certainly have strengthened the ministerial power at home as well as the influence of the country abroad. Three French men-of-war and two frigates, under the Admiral de Rigny, took part in the engagement off Navarino.

Meantime, Ministers were subjected to a host of mortifications as the session drew to a close. The withdrawal of the Press Law discovered their weakness, and every one sought to strike a blow at them. The produce of the taxes had greatly diminished; and Villèle, who had framed his estimates on a large scale of expenditure, allowing to each department of the Government the maximum it demanded, was surprised and taunted by a staring deficit

as the year advanced. Whilst Laffitte and Sebastiani attacked him on this score in the Lower House, and, in addition to his other failures, depreciated the Minister as a financier, Chateaubriand, in the Upper Chamber, pointed out the only system by which the Government could hope to prolong its existence: these were by swamping the Peerage and re-establishing the censorship. The censorship, he declared, would be of little avail for Ministers; for, by the failure of the late Press Law, the country might be inundated with pamphlets, however the press was gagged; and as to the Chamber itself, sixty new Peers, promoted for the sake of obtaining a ministerial majority, would half of them be compelled to go into opposition to save their character and respectability. Ministers, he said, could not avert their own fall; the only doubt was how far they would be allowed to drag down the monarchy with them. The King, who heard not only these prognostications, but the distrust and coldness which the courtiers began to entertain of Villèle, was somewhat reluctant to accede to what the Minister demanded; but to refuse was to necessitate his resignation, and then power must fall, apparently, to Chateaubriand, allied with the Liberals of the Left. To avoid this the King therefore listened to the proposals of dissolution which the Minister made. The prefects were consulted. Each of these answered for his department, and the monarch consented to allow the Minister to pursue his scheme. Of upwards of one hundred and twenty promotions to the Peerage laid before him for approval, Charles would, however, sanction but one half. The monarch, to try the spirit of his people and of the soldiers, repaired to the camp of St. Omer. In his progress thither, and on his review of the army, nothing passed which

did not lead Charles X. to suppose that he was beloved by the population and revered by the army: so often does popular respect dissimulate even disaffection, and so reluctant were the French of that day to enter upon that internecine war which the dynasty was forcing upon it.

On the King's return, the dissolution and promotion to the Peerage were resolved on, opposed, however, vehemently by Chabrol and Frayssinous. They appealed to the King, who inclined to Villèle, and observed, "that the revolution having made its way into the Chamber of Peers, it was absolutely necessary to drive it out."

The three measures were accordingly ordained. A censorship was established over the journals; seventy-six new peers were thrown into the Upper Chamber; and the Chamber of Deputies being dissolved on November the 5th, the new elections were ordered to take place on the 15th. There was no more than the time for post or telegraph to carry the order to the remote parts of the kingdom. Even in Paris, what with the short interval and the censors disallowing even the recommendation of Opposition candidates, Government, it was thought, must carry the elections by surprise. But mere lists sufficed to indicate to the electors what the country expected of them. Old Royalist journals, such as the *Débats* and *Quotidienne*, made known the names of Liberals whom they preferred to Ministerialists. The Liberal journals published the names of the Royalist deserters who followed Chateaubriand; but the unpopularity of Villèle and his colleagues, even amidst the members of the chosen electoral body, was sufficient to insure their defeat.

As usual, Paris took the lead in what had become a national and universal movement. Of 8,000 electors,

7,000 voted for Opposition candidates; it was the same whether the district were peopled by the rich or the poor. Dupont de l'Eure, Laffitte, Perrier, Constant, Schonen, Ternaux, Royer Collard, and Baron Louis, were returned. The Parisians instantly proceeded to celebrate the victory they had obtained, and in doing so the people tried beforehand those modes by which a mob can resist even an armed force, as if they already foresaw the extremities to which they should be obliged to have recourse against the throne. No class was more opposed to Villèle than the small shopkeepers, who had been in general holders of small portions of the Three per Cent. Stock, and who had lost in consequence. The streets of St. Denis and St. Martin were illuminated in honour of his defeat. The mob, delighted, did not think that the illuminations lasted long enough. Some threw stones at the windows where lights had not appeared, or where they had been extinguished; others flung squibs and petards; the police every now and then rushing in amongst them and clearing the streets. By-and-by it was discovered, that where there was an obstruction of carts and carriages the police were embarrassed to act. This natural obstruction suggested the idea of an artificial one. There are generally in every street of Paris houses in progress of demolition and reconstruction. The people made use of the materials to protect themselves against the sudden incursions of the police, and two or three barricades thus sprung up. The police destroyed them; but those who piled up the obstructions and those who witnessed the act were so amused and delighted, that the work always recommenced. A large barricade of planks and paving-stones was erected near the church of St. Laurent and

the Passage du Grand Cerf; another near the church of St. Leu. To the surprise of both parties, the police were repulsed from these popular bulwarks. They returned with loaded arms, and a volley soon set the defenders flying; but even their escape by the neighbouring streets was easy, and thus the idle youth of those quarters of Paris became acquainted with the exciting pastime of raising barricades. The *instruction judiciaire** entered into on this occasion has left a circumstantial history of this embryo *émeute*—the birth of the modern barricade. These scenes were renewed on the following evening. The same barricades were raised; and they were again obliged to be attacked by a fire of musketry, and carried by assault, which could not be done without making several partial victims, without increasing exasperation, and affording themes of denunciation against Ministers.

There was no need of barricades as yet. The elections were sufficient to render Villèle's continuance in power impossible. Of 282 ministerial candidates, who were presidens of colleges, and whose re-election the prefect had promised, not more than 119 were elected. Villèle threw the blame on the tyrannical and retrograde tendencies of his two colleagues, Peyronnet and Corbière, and he was quite prepared to sacrifice them. Corbière, resigned to his fate, was anxious to withdraw. Peyronnet, not re-elected by one department, although he had been candidate in two, demanded the peerage. Even this was refused him by Villèle, who, hoping to form a Ministry without him, did not desire to have Peyronnet as an opponent in the Upper Chamber. The interval between the election and the close of the year, which inevitably brought the meeting

* Published some time afterwards in the *Moniteur*.

of the new Chamber, was employed by Villèle in negotiation, and attempts at a junction with some party. None, however, would listen to him. Even Martignac, whom he had raised up, replied, "that feeling political life in him, he could not consent to be tied to the dead." The King, indeed, gave M. de Villèle liberty to form a Ministry, but expected that the arrangement should be concluded by the new year.

The refusal which M. de Villèle encountered from all sides, his inability to secure the adhesion of any one political personage of weight, became known to the King long before the epoch he had assigned to Villèle for the formation of his Ministry. Other parties seized the King's ear, and proposed to him different combinations. Charles communicated all to Villèle, even after he despaired of his Minister being able to survive. Those who pressed nearest to Charles X. were the companions of his exile and his affection, if not of his confidence. The Duc de Rivière, and all the members of emigration and the old noblesse, derided Villèle, and recommended Polignac as the statesman who would save the monarchy. Charles X. was by no means so irritated and infatuated as to recur to such counsellors as these; and although at this time a writer published a spirited pamphlet, which greatly aroused attention, calling upon the Duke d'Orleans to come forward and seize the crown, which was falling from the weak and inexperienced hands of the present monarch, neither the nation nor the Duke of Orleans were prepared for such an extremity. The Duke protested more loudly than any one, and the writer, Cauchois Lemaire, was condemned to fifteen months' imprisonment and a heavy fine.* M. de

* Lafayette wrote on this subject, regretting "that Cauchois Lemaire should have indulged in such a *plaisanterie*. We are too different from

Villèle was able to represent how far less in accord with the two Chambers M. de Polignac would be than he was himself. To preserve a majority it was requisite to unite the two fractions of the Royalists, and this could not be done if the most Ultra parties took the lead.

Of the members of the existing Cabinet, MM. Chabrol and Frayssinous had of late been moderate, and had deprecated all the extremes of Peyronnet and Corbière. But Frayssinous was obnoxious, as the advocate of the Jesuits. Chabrol was therefore consulted by the King towards the close of the year, and besought to procure a list of new Ministers. That Minister was for comprehension; the list he presented contained the names of Chateaubriand, De la Ferronays, Fitzjames, and Labourdonnaye. Charles X. was startled at all these names. Chateaubriand had fed the popular clamour by his pen, and Labourdonnaye was no less violent. Both were champions of the press, carried to the point which the King deemed licentiousness. M. de la Ferronays had a quarrel with the late Duke of Berri, who forgot himself so far as to treat him with disrespect. De la Ferronays had replied, as he might have done to any other gentleman, with indignation and defiance. The Duke of Berri was generous enough to pardon the insult he had provoked, but the King and the Duc d'Angoulême preserved the recollection of it. The latter, however, waived his objection to La Ferronays, whose appointment would appease Chateaubriand, and introduce that statesman's ideas and weight into the council without his person.

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the English aristocracy to have even a Duke of Sussex in opposition, or to have any weight. But the prosecution and the sentence are greater faults than the letter. One would be inclined to prosecute the Government for having put into every head the idea, that the Duc d'Orleans might, by any possibility, make himself king of France."

Lainé was offered the seals, but refused. His place was well supplied by Portalis. Villèle himself had offered place to Casimir Perrier and Laffitte; both had refused. Chateaubriand now recommended Ministers to take Casimir Perrier and Sebastiani for colleagues, but there was no room for a thorough Liberal; it was the two sections of the Royalists which disputed power, and the Ultra party had so far succeeded that they had secured the adhesion of Portalis, Martignac, and Roy. Villèle, however, defeated their schemes, and these three politicians accepted office with Chabrol. Roy assumed his old post at the Finance, and Martignac became Minister of the Interior.*

The Cabinet was wellnigh arranged, when Martignac and Portalis declared it to be a *sine quâ non* of their acceptance, that Villèle, Corbière, and Peyronnet should go to the Chamber of Peers. This did not enter into the calculation of Villèle, who hoped to remain chief of a party in the Deputies, and thus reconquer Ministerial power. But as M. de Richelieu would not accept office unless Decazes was exiled, so Martignac refused to be minister unless his former friend and patron, Villèle, was removed to another sphere than the Lower Chamber. This was at least progress in constitutional humanity, if not generosity or civilization. Villèle could not resist the wishes of the King, and on accepting the peerage he bade adieu at least to political importance.

The number of years during which De Villèle held power without transcendant oratorical talents, without being the chief of a great party, for Royalists both of the consti-

* "The King," says Chateaubriand, "soon conceived a hatred for Martignac. Charles X. obeyed his tastes rather than his principles. He disliked Martignac because that Minister loved pleasure. Yet the King favoured Villèle and Corbière, though neither of them went to mass."

tutional and of the absolutist school distrusted him, without being an accomplished courtier, and without higher or larger political views than his contemporaries, has filled some with admiration and many with surprise. He attained eminence at first, and came to fill the chief offices of the State, by great parliamentary assiduity, flexibility, and knowledge of business. To this was joined a high character for probity—(he left office with the same very moderate fortune with which he assumed it),—for good sense and for moderation, as far as his line of politics would admit. Louis XVIII. found in him the Minister whom he had thought to create in Decazes. Charles X. prized him for what was his great defect—his having no high or ulterior aim, but leaving that to others, especially to the monarch, whilst the Minister confined himself to the business of the present, and to the every-day necessities of Government. The electoral law, which placed the car of the monarchy in a certain track, was passed under his direction, and it fulfilled the purpose for which it was intended, throwing the whole power of the State into the hands of that party which M. de Villèle represented. From this time it was the illusions and exigencies of the party which led the Minister, and not the Minister his party. He merely checked its extravagance, set aside its zealots, and would allow or yield to only one or two of its follies each year. He thus enabled the Royalist party to live longer, long enough for them to have learned experience, had they been capable of it.

They still, however, reproach his memory and his reputation by alleging, that he entered upon the Ministry with the Royal power at its height, and that he left it in a condition that was past recovery. This reproach is unjust. When Villèle took power, the Bourbons were execrated by the

public; the entire surface of society was undermined with secret associations, and filled with combustibles which exploded from month to month. His long, successful, regular, and vigorous administration put down and outlived this dangerous state of things. Narrowed as liberty was, and defective as was the constitution, people became accustomed and attached to it and to the monarchy, so that all energies were turned towards correcting it by legal means. Imperialism concealed itself, Republicanism was extinct. In the press and in Parliament the language of Opposition was as exemplary as it could be even in England. The opposition was certainly more formidable than that which assailed the Duc de Richelieu, for instead of being confined to politicians it counted all classes and grades of the public, which during that time had been instructed in politics, and took an interest in its progress; but all this was improvement. This opposition and even indignation, although far more formidable to a Minister, was not so to the Crown; and if Charles X. had had the good sense or the good fortune to understand and play the part of a constitutional King, wielding the very great powers that a constitution always must leave to a King, he had a people fashioned and reconciled, and attached to that form of Government, and fully prepared to respect the dynasty, if the dynasty remained true to its oaths. Indeed, so thoroughly constitutional had the French become, to the utter oblivion of either empire or republic, that when the dynasty did disappear, constitutional monarchy survived, and even a Bourbon prince succeeded without personal competition or even the form of any other Government being mentioned.

CHAPTER XI.

THE MARTIGNAC MINISTRY.

THE 1st of January 1828 announced a new Ministry to France. It was at first doubtful by what name it should be known, as M. de Villèle had succeeded in persuading the King that the appointment of any President of the Council or Prime Minister was needless and pernicious. M. de Chabrol, who formed the Ministry, was not allowed to remain in place long enough to attach his name to it; but M. de Martignac was soon acknowledged to be its leading spirit. This statesman was of the Gironde, gifted with the warmth and eloquence of that region. Young, open, imaginative, sanguine, he was the contrary of Villèle in everything except moderation. He had the polished education and cultivated intellect which Villèle had not. He loved letters and men of letters, pleasure, and society, but independent of this had passed through his apprenticeship, and risen through the several grades of administration. M. Lainé, the great constitutional Royalist of Bordeaux, had first distinguished Martignac, and introduced him to the

Duc de Richelieu. Villèle soon perceived his merit, and appointed him to be his agent to accompany the French army into Spain as Civil Commissioner. He held the pen for the Duke d'Angoulême; and was the source of many of those liberal acts and proclamations with which the Duke endeavoured to counteract the mad absolutism and vengeance of the Spanish Regency first, and the Camarilla afterwards. He has left a volume of contemporary history upon these events, which remains a monument of his taste, sagacity, and moderation.

The Cabinet was formed, but could not be said to be complete, when Charles X. first summoned it to meet, and presided at its councils. He began by stating to them his position and his views, which, after entering into some details, he summed up at last by saying, "I tell you frankly, gentlemen, that it is with reluctance I have parted with M. de Villèle. Opinion has been quite mistaken about him: his system was mine." This mode of inaugurating a constitutional Ministry was neither satisfactory nor safe. Martignac is said to have rejoined, that a change of men must inevitably be in some respects a change of things; and he showed how widely he thought the future Cabinet ought to differ from Villèle. He proposed that Chateaubriand should be called to it as Minister of Public Instruction. Frayssinous, who was to remain Minister of Public Worship, had made the proposal to Chateaubriand, who had accepted it. The King at first declared that Ministers did not know Chateaubriand, who would render the Government impossible; and added, that he would prefer Casimir Perrier. Perceiving however, that Martignac insisted, and not objecting, perhaps, to Chateaubriand as a dissolvent, the King waived his opposition, and showed

that however rigid his expression had been, he was by no means obstinate, as he was considered, in his prejudices or opinions. With the King's consent, Chateaubriand was therefore formally offered the Ministry of Public Instruction. He had been consulting his friends of the *Journal des Débats*, and they cried *Fi* upon his accepting any office except that of Foreign Affairs. He therefore refused, and in refusing recommended Royer Collard. But M. Vatismenil was preferred; a young lawyer of reputation, who had pleaded for the Jesuits, and who promised to be to Peyronnet what Martignac was to Villèle. The direction of the Fine Arts was offered to Villemain, but he refused; the Doctrinaires, or the party of liberal and philosophic intelligence, having been passed over in an invidious manner.

It was difficult indeed to compose a definitive or permanent Ministry, it being as yet but conjecture what character the new Chamber of Deputies would assume. One thing was certain, that it had been elected in antagonism to Villèle, and in repugnance to all that he had advanced and favoured. Such a Chamber must leave the press free, and could not allow the Jesuits to remain in possession of public instruction or of political influence. The most striking fact of the elections was that, however restricted the franchise, the popular choice had restored the Liberals to almost their old numerical importance in the Chamber. They mustered nearly eighty votes, instead of being represented merely by a general officer and two bankers. The lawyers, who had been completely excluded from the late Royalist Chamber, now came back in force; Dupin the elder and Mauguin foremost. The spirit of the Chamber, even comprising the liberal Left, was

Royalist, at least professedly so. But Royalism was no longer a distinguishing epithet or a distinction of party. Royalism had conquered at least a political life. It stood unopposed and unquestioned, and would have remained so, even in Villèle's hands, had neither he nor those behind him insisted that no one should be considered sufficiently Royalist who could not utter the Jesuit shibboleth. But the Royalist party, triumphant, had as usual split into a half-score of fractions. There were the priestly Royalists, the Labourdonnaye Ultras, who did not wish to burden themselves with the Church; there were the friends of Villèle, the followers of Chateaubriand, the remnant of the old ministerial fraction of Richelieu and of Decazes; there were the Doctrinaires of the Right Centre, and the moderate Liberals in the Left Centre; a multitude of small fractions scattered around and lying upon the surface like so many Cyclades, difficult to steer amongst, and tedious to characterize or even to enumerate.

The first act of the Cabinet was to give a great satisfaction to that mass of parties and of opinions which protested against the Jesuits. It named a commission to examine into the circumstances of their influence and their existence in the kingdom. The members were De Quelen and Feutrier, bishops; Seguier and Dupin, lawyers; Lainé and Mounier, ex-ministers; De Noailles and De Labourdonnaye, peers; Courville, counsellor of the University. In this way alone could the Cabinet make known the satisfaction it contemplated giving to popular opinion, for the King would not consent to utter a speech from the throne which either reflected on the late Ministry, or announced any marked contradiction of its policy. The election for the chair of President was looked to with

anxiety, as an indication of the strength of parties and tendency of the Chamber. Yet it was difficult to form a conclusion from the result. * Labourdonnaye, Royer Collard, and Casimir Perrier, had no very great disparity of votes. The extreme Right and the extreme Left seemed to balance each other; and that Central part of the Chamber, which had been effaced in former elections, now returned to resume the mastery and to hold the place of arbiters. The policy of the Martignac Ministry was thus marked out to be that of leaning on the Centre, as Decazes and Richelieu had once done, and to avoid either offering a triumph to either extreme, or so offending and offering a weak side to both, that they might unite for the parliamentary discomfiture of the Ministry. This, however difficult for Martignac, would not have been impossible, if the Cabinet either had the full confidence of the King, or if the monarch would keep his influence and activity within constitutional limits. Unfortunately, neither of these was the case with M. Martignac and Charles X.

When a monarch is unfaithful and insincere to his Ministers, he must expect from them a corresponding conduct. If the nullity of the Royal speech surprised and hurt the majority, Ministers excused themselves in private by acknowledging that the King would not admit of any paragraph or word which seemed to reflect on Villèle. This, accordingly, the majority were determined to supply in the Address. It would have been wise to have respected the monarch's personal feelings towards Villèle. The King was willing to concede in acts, though not in words, as was evident from the appointment of the Commission to examine into the existence of the Jesuits. But the misfortune of party struggles throughout all the period of the Restoration

was the importance attached to personal hatreds. At the present moment the inveteracy of Chateaubriand was added to general resistance; and the Address drawn up by the Commission and voted by the Chamber characterized the elections as the "country repelling the deplorable system which rendered the Royal promise illusory." On a former occasion the Chamber of Deputies had, under the influence of Charles, when Count d'Artois, inflicted a similar insult on Louis XVIII., who replied with dignity and resentment. Charles X. was still more wroth. Summoning the principal Ministers, he said to them,—"Well, gentlemen, you see to what I am subjected. But I will not suffer my crown to be thrown into the dirt. Convoke the Chamber here in my Cabinet. I will tell the Deputies who have insulted the majesty of the throne, that I dismiss and dissolve the Chamber."

Martignac appeased the resentment of the King, in a great measure, by assuring him that the ill-humour of the Chamber if allowed to expend itself in words, would be less likely to direct any formal accusation against Villèle. Charles, therefore, not only endured the hard paragraph of the Address, and answered it with ambiguous politeness, but he underwent the constitutional necessity, imposed by the censure in the Address, of dismissing Chabrol and Frayssinous, the only two Ministers of the existing Cabinet who had sat in that of Villèle. Frayssinous was succeeded in the Ministry of Public Worship by Feutrier, Bishop of Beauvais, who showed himself hostile to the Jesuits; whilst Chabrol's place was given to Hyde de Neuville, the friend of Chateaubriand. The influence of this personage had made itself felt in the vote for the Presidency, and in drawing up the Address. It became absolutely neces-

sary to mollify him, and with him the *Journal des Débats*, whose hostility or support was as important as that of the fraction of the Chamber itself. Chateaubriand was purchased by the appointment to the Roman Embassy, and by an accompanying sum for the payment of his debts. The stoppage of his pension as ex-minister and ex-ambassador by Villèle, gave him some claim to their succour. How the *Journal des Débats* was at the same time induced to support Martignac, M. de Lamartine has recounted.*

It was not those in the front rank of politics whom it was most difficult to satisfy. The Administration in France is an immense web, on the due arrangement and management of which depends electoral influence in the provinces, with the content or discontent, adhesion or treachery, of the whole functionary class. Martignac was

* The *Journal des Débats* had at this time the importance of a political institution. No price was too great for it. The journal did not sell its opinion, it merely took subsidies, which, without corrupting it, remunerated its services. At the beginning of the Villèle Ministry, the *Journal des Débats* received 12,000 francs a month. When M. de Chateaubriand, whom the Bertins did not hesitate to follow in his disgrace, was dismissed by Villèle, the *Journal des Débats* gave up its *subvention*. Interest was sacrificed to friendship. At the fall of Villèle, the King and Martignac felt the necessity of winning so powerful a friend, and so dangerous an enemy. The King himself saw M. Bertin, and asked him to become reconciled to his Minister. "This Ministry?" replied M. Bertin to the King, with an audacity which deeply displeased Charles X. "I have made it; and it had better treat me well, or the hand that made can unmake." The King dissembled his disgust, and told the story some months afterwards to one of his Ministers, adding, "After all, what is one to expect from political organs which are to be had for a price!" The Richelieu Government gave 144,000 francs a year to the *Débats*, Villèle and Corbière would give nothing. When Martignac succeeded, he restored the *subvention*, but the proprietors of the paper demanded the arrears, or, in other words, to be paid for the war they had waged against the previous Ministry. They then received 500,000 francs, of which 300,000 francs went to the younger Bertin, and 200,000 francs to Chateaubriand.—*Lamartine, Histoire de la Restoration*, tome viii. p. 131.

obliged to insist on the nomination of men whom he trusted, and who would not make use of their power to undermine him. But the King held pertinaciously to all the old officials who had served under Villèle, and who, indeed, under that Minister's reign, had been appointed by himself when Count d'Artois. Charles would not allow a single dismissal, or the substitution of one functionary for another, without his intervention. So that, in short, Martignac was unable to secure his hold of power, as it could alone be secured in a centralizing system, by showing himself complete master of his subordinates.

Martignac, instead of resigning on account of these obstructions to his ministerial authority, went on the principle of not laying very great stress on the influence of names or the exercise of patronage. He looked to the truer principle of appealing to popular opinion, and leaning upon it. But in adopting so noble a principle of government, Martignac made the same mistake as Decazes had done in hoping or in imagining that it could be acted upon in presence of a Chamber elected by a narrow body of electors, which, as well as the Chamber it returned, however influenced for a brief space with patriotic views and national enthusiasm, was still liable to be influenced on important occasions by mere selfish interests and party spirit. In fact, the Chamber, with the present electoral law, and, moreover, with that septennial existence wanting to the Assemblies of 1820 and 1821, was not sufficiently open to allow a Minister to rely on popular opinion against manœuvre and intrigue. When the Minister played the popular card against the Court, he forgot the numerical power of the Court and the Congregation in the Chamber, and how easy it was for a combination of interested par-

ties to triumph over the purest patriotism and the most noble purposes.

It was by the obnoxious laws which Villèle brought forward each year that he sunk in the esteem even of the more sensible and moderate men of his own party, and became an object of popular execration. By a contrary conduct, that is, by bringing forward each year a number of truly popular, enlightened, and progressive laws, Martignac thought to rise in public esteem and influence, as Villèle had declined. The measure which he first proposed was to establish purity of election. The frauds and manœuvres employed vainly by the late Ministry to force a majority, had raised a storm when the Assembly met. Martignac, though seeking as far as possible to cover Villèle, declared, that for himself he would abandon all influence over elections, and would remain as neutral and impartial, as if they neither affected nor concerned him. He brought in a law for securing this.

To purity of election he joined liberty of the press, with every facility accorded for multiplying the organs of public opinion. He proposed demanding and expending some three or four millions sterling in order to send an expedition to liberate Greece; and, lastly, he determined to expel the Jesuits.

The difficulty of accomplishing such political acts were no longer in the Upper or Lower Chamber, but in the King's Cabinet. The history of the struggles of the session should be told by some servitor of the King, some courtier who had access to his privacy, and might have witnessed the combats between the ideas of the religionist and the monarchist, and the necessities of a constitutional government. The year 1828 must, indeed, have been a

sore trial to Charles X., whose every principle and hope, and even whose views of prudence, were thwarted and set aside by his Ministers. The knot of every difficulty being then in the palace, the debates of the Chamber and the manœuvres of party thus lost much of their interest and importance. The great object of popular odium having fallen,—the Jesuits being on their trial,—there was no room for diatribe, for bursts of eloquence or passion. The opposition of the Villèlists wanted life; whilst the intrigues of Court and Congregation to undermine the semi-Libéral members were carried on underground, and naturally escaped the publicity they abhorred.

The first acts of the Ministry won the full adherence of the Left. The verification of powers, as the examination into the validity of elections was called, took up the first ten weeks of the session. The Chamber rung with the frauds and violence habitually practised by the party in power. No sooner was this over than Ministers proposed a law for regulating elections. The mayor of each commune was to propose the electoral lists, which were to be permanent, after being examined by the Prefect in the Council of Prefecture, where no erasure or addition of a name could be made without the reason being stated in writing. Ample means were afforded for either enforcing a right to the franchise or disproving it. There was a dispute as to the Court of Appeal. The Ministry proposed it to be the Council of State in some cases, the regular Courts of Justice in others. The Opposition objected to the Council of State, and Ministers no longer insisted on it. The differences on this subject, it may be here remarked, led soon after to an express motion by Dupin—for one of the liberties allowed or introduced by the Martignac Ministry

was that of deputies making motions, which except in very few cases was impossible under former governments. Dupin uttered a powerful attack on the Council of State, which he declared to be incompatible with constitutional government. He called it an Imperial Divan, the very knot in which were tied the worst bonds of centralization. Vatismenil was the champion of the Council of State, which with some justice he observed, could not be done away with, unless the whole administrative system was changed. There must be an appeal from the Court of Prefecture, which, without a Council of State, would be supreme. As the existence of this Council in a constitutional country is a much-disputed point, the attack, in which Dupin of course collected all the objections to it, must attract the attention of those who study the mechanism of different governments.

The question was too advanced for the Chamber or its parties to take interest in. It was looked on as an effect of the rivalry which the independent lawyer always entertains for the administrative legist. Vatismenil too, the opponent of Dupin in this debate, began to give satisfaction to the Chamber and to its Liberal side by his acts as Minister of Public Instruction—acts by which he incurred at the same time the dislike of the Court and the religious party. Vatismenil published an ordonnance regulating primary instruction. The education of the poor, it need scarcely be observed, was in Villèle's administration, when public instruction was intrusted to an ecclesiastic, handed over altogether to the clergy. Vatismenil now ordained, that there should be a school committee in every commune or parish, consisting of nine members—the curate, the mayor, and the *juge de paix* forming three, and each

of them appointing two others out of the lay notables of the commune. This gave the clergy but one-third of the influence, and laid the foundation of popular education in France.

An innovation, or a reform, which gave equal satisfaction, one which was not announced, but which transpired, was the abolition of the *Cabinet Noir*, a committee of twenty charged with the secret examination of letters at the Post Office. One of the first acts of Martignac was to order the discontinuance of this office and its duties, the circumstances connected with which were revealed by M. Petou.

The law regulating the electoral lists, however simple, gave rise to prolonged debates in both Chambers. The Royalists, who saw the result of the last elections in the rise of the Liberal party to almost its former importance, considered the State as lost, if elections completely free from functionary influence took place. That Martignac or any Ministry pursuing such a course, must not only render the machinery of elections pure and free, but must render the franchise equally so, and then abolish the law of electoral monopoly, was equally evident. They therefore pointed out all the dangers to Royalty; and certainly there was great danger to Royalty, such as they understood it. It was supported by Agier and the Royalist defection. The minority numbered 105 votes, against 257.

The new law for regulating the press next occupied the attention of the Legislature. The press and the elections indeed formed the ever-recurring subject of motion, of change, and of debate, throughout the Restoration. The censorship had become impossible. The Chamber and the political world were so broken into parties, that none would allow a Minister, who could represent no more than one of

them, to shut the mouths of all the rest. Martignac's policy with regard to the press was, first to break up the monopoly of the two or three journals, which had grown so powerful under a system of monopoly, that, as we have seen in the case of the *Débats*, it both bullied and robbed the Government, and even insulted the King. Instead of a Royal authorization being necessary, Martignac proposed to allow any one to set up a journal. But in order to confine the possession of such an instrument of power to one possessed of wealth, he insisted on capital being deposited as caution-money to the amount of producing 400*l.* a-year interest. To the offences of the press, the new law affixed very heavy fines, fines which might amount to the whole of the caution-money; and the trial and judgment upon these offences he gave to the Royal Court, without a jury. Prosecutions for *tendency* were done away with. The system of fictitious editors was rendered impossible. There was some of the severity of Peyronnet's law of love in this. Benjamin Constant, who had at first approved of the law with indiscreet precipitation, in a little time not only withdrew his praise, but denounced every single article of it, as "not indeed striking the brains out of the press with a club," as Peyronnet proposed, but as politely inviting it to commit suicide. The speech of Martignac, in reply to Constant, was one of the happiest efforts of the Minister's eloquence throughout the session. Portalis also made an able defence of the law against the objections of Constant, and replying to a personal allusion, declared, "that he should, like his father, continue to defend the public liberty against the exaggeration of those who set up for its exclusive defenders, but who, at many epochs, had shipwrecked the State, and compelled the

country to seek for peace and reform under the shelter of arbitrary power."

It is impossible not to be struck in the perusal of these debates, and of those of the session generally, by the prophetic tone which so frequently pervades them. Not one, but many orators, seemed fully aware, that by the very existence, and of course by the acts of the present Ministry, Royalty, as understood by its partizans, was driven gradually into a corner, from which there was no escape but by a *coup d'état* or breach of the Constitution. Not only was this thought and said, but the precise nature of the future *coup d'état* was pointed out, being the use to be made by the Crown of the 14th Article of the Charter. Constant alluded to it. Count Simeon, in the Peers, composed a kind of homily on the subject. And all looked forward to the time, when Royalty in the person of Charles X. must surrender his sword, or use it in his defence. Such public allusion to an anti-constitutional stroke of policy must have habituated the unfortunate King to the idea, and helped to precipitate him into the folly of having recourse to the extreme.

It was during the session of 1828 that parties in the French Chamber were first brought to the consideration and discussion of that great question, which, at this moment (1854), has come to absorb all other interests. This was the great question of the independence of Turkey, and the balance of European power in the Levant. The Russian declaration of war and accompanying manifesto were issued on the 14th of April. The design of Russia was evident. It was to take advantage of the weakness of the Porte, consequent upon the defection of Greece, the alienation of the other European powers, and upon its own

military reforms, and push Russian conquest to, if not beyond, the Danube. The Duke of Wellington, then at the head of the British Cabinet, had laboured with a view to inspire Russia with moderation. The Sultan, who saw that the more he yielded the greater became the demands of Christian powers, had defied war—an extremity for which he was little prepared. Had France been to be depended on, England and Austria would have at once held a firm and defiant language to Russia. But parties in France were not prepared to join in so bold a policy.

The Martignac Ministry, or M. de Martignac himself, with the Left Centre of the Chamber, on which he principally leaned, entertained just and liberal views; but the Villèlists were averse to any active foreign policy. The Royalist defection, inspired by Chateaubriand, was for an alliance with Russia; whilst the Liberals of the Left were so far in agreement with Chateaubriand, as to be more influenced by a stupid spite towards England, than by a wish to preserve the Ottoman empire from the grasp of Russia.

The aim of the Chateaubriand faction was to allow Russia *carte blanche* in the East, provided Russia in return would enable or permit France to recover its old barrier of the Rhine. But as such selfish conduct would arouse the enmity of England, Austria, and Prussia, it behoved France to be well assured of Russia's support, ere they ventured upon such policy, or such a war. It was evident, indeed, that Charles X. had no such command of his people, and sat upon a throne too ill-secured to engage in any such a scheme. But it was the opinion of Chateaubriand and his friends; and the Ministry had need of the friendship and support of all parties. The Government flattered this

idea by coming forward to demand an additional credit of eighty millions of francs for the purpose of increasing the army. It was requisite to assume this attitude, for Russia might push forward to Constantinople and achieve the conquest of Turkey without compensating, or even consulting France.

The question of the credit was referred to a Committee, before which Ministers in confidence stated its reasons and its grounds of action. The members of that Committee were of the Left Centre, and chose for their reporter General Sebastiani, who drew up a statement of what the Committee considered to be the interest of France in the affairs of the Levant. It was a document which might have been written by any statesman of the present day. It breathed no selfish wish, recommended no sinister intrigue. "Justice and moderation," it declared, "should be the rule of Europe. Aggrandizement of every kind was a danger. Ancient nations should not be allowed to become the prey of their greedy neighbours, or to disappear, the victims of treaties and wars of partition provoked by iniquitous and brutal violence."

The report was an energetic denunciation of Russia, and proposed the vote of the funds for the purpose of resisting its ambition. The Liberal Opposition had, however, a great many reasons for not approving of the grant. The policy of the Cabinet was considered good, as far as it aimed at the liberation of Greece, but as it also proposed the employment of troops in a great military expedition, and the raising of ample funds to support it, the Opposition feared lest these might be used as the elements and means of ministerial power, rather than of advancing either liberal institutions or French influence

abroad. The war in Spain had been conceived and executed solely with the view to give strength to the Royalist Government which planned it; and in that case it had been eminently successful, whatever it had proved to Spain and to the constitutional cause. It had not only formed a kind of alliance between the Bourbons, the Royalists, and the army, but the enormous sums spent had proved a source of corruption, and were supposed to have procured many valuable adherents to Villèle and his Cabinet. Had the Martignac Cabinet a firm hold of power, and were it likely to continue to wield such means of influence, as a successful army and a lavish expenditure gave, the Liberals might not have objected to its embarking in the wars of the East. But with the King's known tendencies and discontent with his Ministry, power might at any moment be transferred to a party far more Royalist and absolutist than Villèle. So that every addition of strength to the Government might be turned to crush that constitutional liberty, of which there again appeared to be some hopes.

These were not the reasons put forward by M. Bignon, the great foreign politician of the Left. He developed a line of policy completely contrary to Sebastiani. He leaned to a Russian alliance, not merely for what Russia might give, but for itself, and out of superannuated aversion which the disappointed politician of 1815 entertained for Austria and for England. "This movement of Russia towards Asia," argued Bignon, "is it not after all an advantage, as it inclines the Colossus to lean from Europe, instead of leaning towards it to crush us with its weight?" To this pusillanimous and anile consideration, Bignon added others of the same kind. He said, "that Russia, in

extending her empire would inevitably cause it to split into fractions, and that Russian possession of the Bosphorus might hurt English trade, but in nowise interfere with France."

Sebastiani fully and eloquently refuted all these arguments. "A power," said he, "half Asiatic, half European, would weigh upon Europe with all its Asiatic strength and barbarism. States had never split into fractions whilst they were in the ascendant and in course of conquest. This took place during their decline: and Russia marching on Constantinople showed no such symptoms. Russia, master of Turkey, would have the German Powers for vassals; Prussia would become its servant; Austria its subordinate; and the isolated constitutional powers of the West would be swallowed up, as Athens was by Macedon, because they did not direct their forces against Philip in time." Another portion of Sebastiani's reply is not to be forgotten: "As to the objection," said he, "of voting funds for a Ministry so infirm as the present, one which may be replaced by an ultra-Royalist and retrograde administration at any time, he could not entertain that distrust, for any such attempts to restore the ancient system of Government, must, it was evident to all, endanger the monarchy."

The Ministry obtained their vote of credit, and made use of it to fit out a military expedition to the Morea. When it was first proposed to occupy Greece by the soldiers of one of the protecting Powers, Russia objected to an English force occupying a part of the continent of Greece, but it made no objection to the French sending its legions to the Piræus. It was accordingly agreed that a French army of 14,000 men should be despatched to Greece, a resolution and a measure highly pleasing

to the King. Far from presenting any obstacle to them, as was supposed, the English Cabinet, then presided over by the Duke of Wellington, gave its full assent to the French expedition to the Morea, in a treaty concluded with Prince Polignac in London. The friends of Chateaubriand in the French Cabinet, especially the Minister of Marine, Hyde de Neuville, persisted, nevertheless, in the idea that England was jealous of seeing French armies in Greece, and was labouring to prevent them; and the preparations of the expedition was hurried, as that of Spain had been, in the distrust that perfidious Albion would bar the way. The Duke of Wellington was at that time, however, far more anxious to stop Russian progress and ambition, than to conceive or act upon small jealousy of France: and could any Minister have been supposed to possess solidity in France, or could the King and Government of that country have been to be relied on, no doubt a strenuous effort would have been made to erect the natural barrier against Russian ambition of a triple alliance between England, Austria, and France, which, however impossible under the feeble Bourbons, has been since brought to completion under a Bonaparte prince.

The choice of a General to command the expedition to Greece was, like all personal questions, a difficult one to arrange with the King. Charles had an instinctive dislike to the officer whom his Minister proposed. Maison, who won his baton of Marshal in Greece, had received Louis XVIII. on his landing at Calais, and was destined to reconduct Charles X. afterwards to Cherbourg. In 1820 he had adopted the policy of Decazes, had aided to expose the pseudo-plots of General Donnadieu, and being

promoted to the Peers, had always voted against the administration of Villèle. This, which was his recommendation to Martignac, was the cause of the King's repugnance. Charles wanted a General to reap laurels, and acquire power with the army, on whose arm he might at a critical moment depend; and he therefore recommended Bourmont to the command. Martignac was firm, however, and General Maison was appointed. The expedition sailed about the middle of August, and landed in Greece before the 1st of September. The British authorities in the Mediterranean had hoped to induce the Pasha of Egypt to withdraw his troops from the Morea, so as to render the French expedition useless. But Hyde de Neuville, like Chateaubriand, and even General Maison, burned to send the expedition for the expedition's sake, the one to make political capital, the other military reputation from it. When the French army landed, there was fraternization, not hostilities, between it and the Egyptians. Ibrahim, instead of attacking the French general, repaired to his camp, and displayed an adroit admiration for a power, which his sagacity already discerned as a useful support against English jealousy or dictation. Ibraham Pasha showed, in this instance, all the pride and address of his father. He could not, however, refrain from asking the French General, how his countrymen, who marched so enthusiastically to enslave the Spaniards, should show equal zeal in rendering the Greeks freemen. Marshal Maison met with no resistance in the Morea, except from the garrison of one of the castles which closes in the Gulf of Corinth, near Patras. As the Trocadero was the solitary feat of the Spanish war of 1823, the cannonading the castle of the Morea was the

only exploit of that of Greece in 1828. Such an easy conquest was a disappointment to the Court, nevertheless it rewarded General Maison no less with the baton of Maréchal.

The most difficult subject for Ministers was the ecclesiastical question, for upon this they were at variance with something deeper than the King's political tendencies or ideas. In order to give satisfaction to public opinion, it was necessary to wound the Royal feelings and convictions. Vatismenil had taken an important step in setting primary education free from the dictation of the clergy. The separation of the portfolio of Public Instruction from that of Ecclesiastical Affairs, the appointment of a lawyer in the person of Vatismenil to the former, and of a liberal clergyman, Bishop Feutrier, to the latter, were important concessions to the anti-sacerdotal feeling. A Commission had been appointed to examine how far religious communities, prohibited by law, existed in the kingdom, and what influence or development they had obtained. The Commission did not give in its report until the end of June, when it frankly declared, that the Jesuits, or an order following the rule of Saint Ignatius, had possession of six seminaries for the education of youth destined for the world, as well as for the priesthood. These were at St. Acheul, Dôle, Bordeaux, St. Anne d'Auray, Aix, Forcalquier, Montmorillon, and Billon. Montrouge, the chief establishment of the Jesuits at the gates of Paris, was not alluded to. The majority of the Commission did not see how these ecclesiastics, after having obtained the permission of the Bishop of the diocese to preach and teach, could be interfered with, or how they could be questioned for habits or for views kept secret in their own

bosoms. The Archbishop of Paris, who sat in the Commission, had no doubt exercised his authority, and the result was this braving of popular opinion in the report, to such a degree, that a feeling of indignation took possession of the public mind, and swelled to a perfect storm in the Chamber of Deputies. Instead of saving the Jesuits, by their declaring that they could not be interfered with, when the existing law, the Royal Court, the Chamber of Peers, and that of Deputies, all proclaimed their presence in the kingdom to be contrary to the law and dangerous to the Constitution, it became imperative upon the Ministry to pronounce against the decision of the majority of the Commission.

Ministers did not hesitate to prepare an ordonnance immediately, which subjected the schools enumerated to the control of the University. This amounted to an expulsion of the Jesuits, as the University admitted no professor who had not graduated in its bosom and submitted to its laws. The ordonnance expressly forbade any to be admitted as teachers, who had not affirmed in writing that they belonged to no religious congregation prohibited in France. Ecclesiastical schools were limited to the reception of not more than 20,000 students, and were forbidden to receive scholars destined for lay professions. Charles showed the greatest repugnance to sign this ordonnance, which dismissed from the Court, and from all influence in it, those in whom he had placed hopes for converting the rising generation to Royalism and piety. Ministers were obliged to represent that they must resign if they were not empowered to issue this ordonnance. The King consulted Frayssinous, who replied that, although he might not have recommended such a measure,

yet he deemed the ordonnance preferable to a resignation of the Ministry. The majority of the Chamber were so unanimous in favour of Martignac, above all in connection with the expulsion of the Jesuits, that the King had no resource but to submit. He therefore at length consented to sign it. He declared, however, to the Bishop of Beauvais, Feutrier, that to put his name to this ordonnance was one of the most disagreeable acts of his life, placing the Crown in opposition to faithful servants, whom he esteemed. "You think, Bishop," said Charles, as he signed it, "that we are not doing a dangerous thing?" "Sire," replied Feutrier, "you are saving religion in this country from ruin." Furious was the outburst of indignation from the ecclesiastical party. The *Quotidienne* cried profanation, and almost denounced the Bourbon reign as more impious than the Bonapartist. Bishop Feutrier was compared to Judas, and had betrayed the sanctuary. The Bishops declared that they could not obey the ordonnances of an impious administration. Clermont Tonnerre, Archbishop of Toulouse, conveyed his denial by a letter, announcing that the motto of his family was "*Etiam si omnes, ego non*," and he meant to adhere to it. Martignac and Portalis, alarmed by such a storm, sent off an embassy to Rome, not trusting the ambassador Chateaubriand, to obtain the consent of the Pope to the ordonnance. This his Holiness granted without difficulty, which being communicated to Latel, the King's confessor, had some effect in soothing the impatience and soreness of the monarch.

Thus did Martignac get through the first session as Minister, overcoming the scruples of the King, the enmity of the ultra-Royalists, and the extravagance of the extreme Liberals. Making the Left Centre of the Chamber his

support, as Decazes had done, but flinging himself upon public opinion, as Decazes could not, Martignac succeeded in at least one year of office repairing many of the fatal errors of Villèle. He emancipated the Government from the priestly party, defied them in Parliament, and made use of his majority there to triumph over the scruples and prejudices of the King. Unfortunately, however, Martignac exhausted in his first session all those boons to liberty and liberalism which he was ever likely to wring from the monarch; and as he could not again come to Parliament with such a number of popular measures as the emancipation of the press, the purity of elections, and the expulsion of the Jesuits, measures which silenced the party cavils and selfish demands of party, he was obliged to stoop to keep his majority together, by concessions of interests, and by favour and places to persons. At this game Martignac wanted the patience and the skill, as well as the resources, of Villèle. It was this question of persons, this replacing of the dependents of Villèle and of the priestly party, by the more liberal followers of a constitutional system, which occupied Martignac during the recess. In this, however, he found more obstructions in the King's attachment to those whom he had helped to place, than in obtaining the power to propose liberal measures. For the latter he could plead the necessity of conciliating the Parliamentary majority. The same necessity existed, indeed, in a greater degree, for the gratification of the majority by places as well as policy; but the Chamber not sitting, Charles could always parry his Minister's solicitations by the excuse that there was ample time before the next session for the consideration of such things. Martignac wished to change some thirty prefects, and he could scarcely be said to be Home

Minister, if he had not this power; but the King opposed every change, and disputed every new nomination. The admission of Chateaubriand's friends and of the Doctrinaires once more to the Council of State was another source of quarrel and complaint. The King expected Martignac to carry on the Ministry in presence of a Liberal Chamber, whilst preserving and employing all the friends and instruments of the administration which he had replaced.

The wonder, indeed, is, that Martignac at all undertook the ungrateful and impracticable task of keeping the King within the bounds of constitutional government, and the Chamber within that of loyal acquiescence. Had he possessed a free command over one or the other, he might have had better hopes of success. But his hold over the King was not even so firm as he flattered himself. In his public capacity, as Sovereign, Charles might yield to the constitutional will and policy of his Minister, but in the habits and connection of his more private and domestic life, the King remained unchanged. The post of governor of the Duke of Bordeaux having again become vacant, the King bestowed it upon the Baron de Damas, who had been Minister with Villèle, had previously been an emigrant, and who was a worshipper of all that was antiquated and anti-constitutional. By such appointments as this Charles demonstrated how little real influence his Minister had, and how completely unchanged and unmoved he remained. Not only had the King rendered himself unpopular by this, but he injured irrevocably the prospects of the young Duke of Bordeaux, who appeared to the public as the heir of the legitimate throne, no doubt, but also as the disciple of the Jesuits and the emigrants, in fact, of all that were anti-national and anti-patriotic.

Even the journal which the King habitually read was Villèle's. Martignac had founded the *Messager* to be his own organ. The inconvenience of such an instrument is, that the zeal of its writers always steps beyond the prudence of the statesman. The *Messager* pointed to reforms in prospect, which were no doubt meditated by Martignac, but which alarmed Charles X. The latter sought for the reflection and encouragement of his own ideas in the *Gazette de France*, ably edited by M. de Genoude, and daily casting contumely and suspicion upon every act of the Minister. When Martignac, on seeing the *Gazette* in the King's hands, used to expostulate with good humour, the King excused himself by saying, "The perusal of the *Gazette* was an old habit." The ultra-royalist *Quotidienne* already heralded Polignac, and was the journal of the Court and Congregation. It was always to be found on the work-table, or by the *prie-dieu*, of the Duchess d'Angoulême.



CHAPTER XII.

MARTIGNAC'S HOPE OF CONTENTING THE LIBERALS AND SATISFYING THE KING—HIS MUNICIPAL LAW—THE KING'S JOURNEY TO ALSACE—POLIGNAC'S ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE CABINET—THE LEFT OPPOSE MARTIGNAC'S MUNICIPAL LAW, WHO, IN ANGER, WITHDRAWS IT—FALL OF MARTIGNAC, AND APPOINTMENT OF THE POLIGNAC MINISTRY—THE KING OPENS THE SESSION, IS MET BY THE CELEBRATED ADDRESS OF THE 221—THE CHAMBER PROROGUED.

WHETHER a rational hope existed, even in 1828, of preserving and continuing constitutional government under the sovereignty of Charles X. may be much doubted. That hope, however entertained, must have been founded exclusively on Martignac,—a man peculiarly formed, endowed, and placed to reconcile and bring together, still for a time, the diverging impulses of monarch and of people. But the law of popular freedom and influence is motion. It has been often compared to the ocean, which must ebb and flow: it cannot remain stationary. The constitutional secret is, that of placing upon it a power which can rise and fall with the tide. Charles X.'s. idea and convictions were not made to acquiesce in this. He was for building his throne on a rock,—that of legitimacy,—a part of the political terra-firma which had been washed away, and no longer existed in France. Popular progress and royal concession led, according to Charles's experience and views, to the dictatorship of a Robespierre, and a scaffold for the monarch. That was, in fact, the great

conclusion which the Bourbons drew from the Revolution, and which was not merely that of Charles X., but of Louis Philippe. Resistance with them was prudence and duty! But neither Martignac nor Guizot could have lived but by concession. Martignac's tenure of power, and prolongation of office, depended altogether upon the fresh concessions which he would make.

The concessions were of two kinds,—of liberal measures, and that of adopting liberal men. The latter is often the cheapest concession for a sovereign to make. But men were, in truth, more repugnant to Charles than even measures. Martignac was, of course, in communication with the members of the Left, through his friends of the Left Centre. They began to discuss with him early the laws which he could introduce in the next session, or the colleagues he might take. With respect to measures, the grand one was to alter the electoral law. It was useless to broach this to the King, for perhaps even the Chamber was not ripe for it. It implied a dissolution immediately after, and would be unpalatable to more than the Royalist members.

Martignac offered, in lieu of any change in the franchise, to propose a good municipal law, endowing towns with self-government, and at the same time establishing assemblies of departments for the application and the voting of local funds and improvements.* If the municipal law was important to the Liberals and the citizen class, the other had been loudly demanded by the Royalist Chamber, who, in the provinces, were weary of the prevailing influence of the prefects. Moreover, the changes proposed were not, it was thought,

* See Lafayette's Correspondence.—He speaks of negotiation with the Minister on the subject as far back as August, 1828.

of that vital and important nature which were calculated to arouse the opposition or awaken the distrust of the King. Lafayette and others would have coupled with the law a demand for the restoration of the National Guard. Martignac avoided that question. He rather hinted, that if the country were first endowed with municipal and departmental assemblies, formed upon principles not too democratic, but of the notables of towns and departments, the wishes of such influential classes and bodies, expressed in the form of petitions, would have very great effect in influencing the Chamber, and in guiding as well as in supporting Ministers. Formerly, when the Cabinet meditated a change, or proposed a law, they consulted the prefects, but these had on several important occasions deceived, rather than enlightened, the Minister as to what were the public exigencies, and as to what was popular opinion. This had been a great cause of the mistakes and ill success of Villèle and Peyronnet. By means of a good municipal and departmental organization a better electoral system might be attained.

The King, however, was sagacious enough to perceive, and not at all wrong in concluding, that his Minister was much more liberal than either his acts or his words bespoke. He felt that if Martignac continued Minister, he should be obliged to purchase each year of office by concession. Charles, anxious to escape them, could only do so by finding a less liberal Minister, who could nevertheless secure a majority. A politician who would promise this, might no doubt be found. But could a permanent majority, more conservative than Martignac, be put together? Corbière assured him that it could. The *Gazette* published article upon article to show, that the friends of Villèle

and Labourdonnaye, Royalist and ultra-Royalist and Religionists united, could form a majority independent of Martignac. Could this be formed or proved, Charles thought he had a Minister who could lead such a combination in his friend Prince Polignac.

It would have been difficult to find a man, who had so little knowledge of France, of its prevalent ideas, and of its rising or risen generation, as Prince Polignac. Exiled while young at the commencement of the Revolution, attached to the Court and the Count d'Artois, he had shown his devotion by mingling in those plots of desperadoes who aimed at the life of Napoleon—enterprises for which M. de Polignac was every way unfitted. Indeed, it was Polignac's fate always to thrust himself into tasks which he ought to have been the last man to undertake. His complicity in these plots had led to ten years' imprisonment, from which he was only liberated in 1814. This had overwhelmed his weak nature with empty melancholy and pious resignation. No man was better prepared for a cloister; for even at the time that he was aiming at the high post of Prime Minister, he made no acquaintance, and had no intercourse with the leading men of his time, but lived apart in a dreamy empyreum, as remote from statesmanship as from life. One anecdote, recorded by Lamartine, depicts him to the life. After he had quarrelled with the Chamber, and when he was obliged to prorogue it, his feeling was not that of regret, but delight. Some one sought to encourage and console him by pointing out how the Chamber might be conciliated, and brought to give once more a majority to the King. "A majority," exclaimed Prince Polignac, in a fright: "I should be very sorry indeed to have one. I shouldn't know what to do

with it." Such was the simple and true expression of the feelings, as well as the measure of the capacity of him, whom Charles X. selected to be the Constitutional Minister.

Villèle had always kept Polignac at a distance. The sinking health of M. de la Ferronays rendered it more than probable that his place as Foreign Minister must be filled up. M. de la Ferronays himself, from friendship to Polignac, was lavish of eulogium on his conduct as ambassador; and the King, who had at one time a poor idea of his friend's abilities, came at last to be of opinion that his talent was equal to his zeal. In conversation respecting the probable successor to M. de la Ferronays, Charles X. put forward Polignac. M. de Martignac had not only the natural personal and political objection to such a choice, but he succeeded in representing that the effect of such an appointment would be an outrage upon those who supported the Cabinet. M. de la Ferronays was a friend of Chateaubriand; the very Left respected him.* If a place in the Ministry could not be given to Sebastiani, and were now given to Polignac, how could the Chamber be managed, and a majority kept together?

In the autumn the King undertook a journey to the provinces of the east: Martignac accompanied him. On such occasion the King shook off the influence of the Royal family, of the Court, and of his confessor, and showed himself far more frank and liberal than at the Tuileries. Yet even this affability turned to the disadvantage of Martignac. There is no aristocracy in Alsace. The beautiful old castles on the declivity of the Vosges are universally in ruins.

* "I am sorry for the accident," writes Lafayette, "which has happened to La Ferronays, whose character I like, and who inspires me with much confidence."

Manufacturing towns have risen in the plain, and the tall chimneys of their factories have replaced the turreted battlements of the feudal lord. Charles X. was received by the great manufacturers of Mulhausen—by the Kœchlins and the D'Argensons, who had conspired against the Bourbons in 1822. Casimir Perrier and Benjamin Constant chose the moment to visit their friends in Alsace, and were received by the monarch, no longer with distrust, but with open arms. He conferred the Legion of Honour upon Casimir Perrier, who was flattered and pleased. From such conduct the Members of the Left and Left Centre drew inferences highly favourable to the King, and unfavourable to his Ministers. M. Martignac pretends, they said or thought, to be unable to overcome the prejudices of the King, so far as to obtain important places for us within the Cabinet, or without. This cannot proceed from the King's repugnance; never was monarch more affable, or apparently more reconciled to political antagonists. This animated such men as Sebastiani, and rendered them more intractable to Martignac. But the King in truth meant little beyond courtesy, and wished to make a good impression for the moment; his repugnance to admit any of even the semi-Liberals to office was as great as ever. Ministers tried their utmost on the King's return, and with difficulty obtained the admission of some of Chateaubriand's friends to the Council of State.

M. de la Ferronays returned with the new year to his post, his presence being necessary previous to the opening of the Chamber. The war between Russia and Turkey not being concluded, Government had made no use of the funds it had procured in assuming a martial attitude. They had contented themselves with driving the Egyptians from

Greece, M. de la Ferronays insisted indeed upon the integrity of the Ottoman empire, but as he trusted the preservation of that integrity to the known respect of the Emperor Nicholas for treaties and declarations, it was evident that Charles X. had given *carte blanche* to Russia, and left to England and Austria the care of defending Turkey.* In an interview which M. de la Ferronays had with the King, the Minister was taken ill, and fainted. The physician ordered him to withdraw from public duties. It became imperative to find a successor. The King had repudiated every personage proposed as fit to replace M. de la Ferronays. He would not hear of Pasquier, because he had offended the ultra-Royalists; nor of Chateaubriand, who had wielded the pen as an Opposition writer; nor of the Duc de Mortemart, to whom he could not find an objection. He insisted on leaving Portalis Minister of Foreign Affairs *ad interim*, whilst he wrote for Polignac. He bade Portalis, or the interim Foreign Minister, to request Polignac's attendance in Paris. Portalis protested against the evident design, when the King observed there was a necessity for Prince Polignac, ambassador in London, conferring with the Duc de Mortemart, who was going ambassador to St. Petersburgh. Portalis conveyed the message. But it is probable that Polignac received another communication direct from the King, for the Prince announced in London, that he was going to Paris to enter the Cabinet. On his arrival in Paris, the Prince in his first visit to Portalis mentioned that he was about to take the Foreign Office, and that it had been arranged by the King. But

* Prince Metternich having proposed a joint remonstrance of Four Powers to Russia against its encroachments, the same, in fact, which was made a quarter of a century later, De la Ferronays positively refused to join in any such step.—See *Portfolio*.

his presence becoming known, he was denounced by the press with all the virulence that may be supposed. The journals spoke but the feelings of political men. However some of the Ministers might have felt inclined to bow to the King's positive demand, and receive Polignac as a colleague, they saw it was impossible; and all declared to Charles X., that they must resign rather than admit his appointment. Polignac urged, that he had announced in London his nomination, and that he could not return thither; he would be contented with the Ministry of the Royal Household. Even this demand was rejected, and Polignac, piqued, made offers to several of the politicians of the day, out of office, to form a Cabinet with him. He was already assured of the King's assent. None however would embark with him, and the vacancy in the Cabinet was filled up, not indeed very permanently, by M. Portalis taking the seals of the Foreign Office, and ceding the Department of Justice to M. Bourdeau. M. Portalis had perceived, that a Ministry, wanting the King's confidence, and leaning upon separate and uncertain fractions of the Chamber, could not long endure; he therefore asked for the reversion of the post of President of the Court of Cassation, which the King promised him in return for his pliancy.

The session, which was to decide the fall of the Monarchy and of Constitutional Government in France, was opened towards the end of January by a Royal speech of great length. It was sufficiently null on the subject of foreign policy; it was even mean in its allusion to the war between Russia and Turkey, merely observing that peace would not be disturbed in the rest of Europe. This meant, that France, not choosing to interfere, Turkey was abandoned to its fate. There was no political capital to be made out

of an interference to save the independence of Constantinople, and therefore a French Ministry was far more alive to a squabble which it had with the Dey of Algiers, than to a war which threatened to give the Bosphorus to Russia. Never were governments so useless to any great European cause as those of the elder Bourbons. The treaty for the rescue of Greece was signed without France, and that for the subjugation of the Ottoman empire by Russia might also have been signed for all that France did to prevent it. To crush for a moment the liberties of Spain, and thereby ruin Ferdinand and Royalty, was the sole foreign achievement of the restored Monarchy almost to the very eve of its fall.

The Speech announced the presentation of a law of municipal and provincial organization, which should give communes and departments a just share in regard to the question of their interest, whilst preserving its protecting and moderating power to the Crown. "The emancipated press," said his Majesty, "enjoys entire liberty. If its pernicious foe, licentiousness, still shows itself under shelter of a generous and confiding law, the public reason will justly appreciate its extravagance; and the judges, faithful to noble tradition, know and will perform their duty."

When the paragraph of the Address of the Upper Chamber in answer to this was read, Prince Polignac rose to declare how fully he approved of the sentiment, and of the law which gave liberty to the press. "The press," said he, "was a sentinel set to observe the enemy, whose every movement it should watch and give warning of without exciting needless alarm, or firing a useless shot." After this simile, the Prince declared, that he saw with alarm excess of zeal seek to disfigure and misrepresent the institutions of

his country, founding upon some abuses in these institutions doctrines which could only scatter the brands of discord throughout the country." By this ambiguous phrase the Prince thought to denounce the ultra-Royalists as well as to profess his own attachment to the Charter and the Constitutional Government. After so palpable a bid for office, such an announcement that he was prepared to take office as a friend to representative government, Prince Polignac returned to London to await that more favourable opportunity which events could not fail to bring, and which the King was prepared to turn to his friend's advantage and elevation.

When the Address was put to the vote in the Chamber of Deputies, the members of the Right rose and left the Assembly; the friends of Villèle, those of Labourdonnaye, and also the priestly party, joined in this manœuvre, which was at once a protest against the policy of the Government, and a display of their own strength. Whilst the different fractions of the Right thus united their forces, those of the Left and of the Centre agreed in their vote for the Presidency, Royer Collard, Périer, and Sebastiani being the candidates. Royer Collard was again selected by the King. The same accord reigned during the discussion of the Address, and upon its continuance manifestly depended the success of the plan to force the King into greater concessions, until the country should recover the reality of constitutional government. In relating the event which immediately followed, it will be very difficult to apportion to each side and person their share of blame for not sedulously cherishing and preserving this accord. A disagreement and a mutual want of confidence sprung up between Martignac and these coalesced parties, which

ended in their common ruin. Portalis, it has been seen, had secretly sold himself to the King for the promise of a permanent place. Martignac was inclined also to obsequiousness far more than certain of his colleagues.* The King or his agents, it is to be feared, flattered and deceived some of the Opposition with hopes, for the mere purpose of detaching them from the Government. And a belief came to prevail, that Martignac, instead of finding resistance in the King to liberal men and liberal measures, was wont to exaggerate them for the sake of maintaining his own authority and influence.

These unjust and fatal suspicions were augmented by the nature of the municipal law, as soon as its presentation took place. The question was unfortunate for Martignac. There were others, such as the press, the Jesuits, the electoral frauds, and no doubt the electoral franchise itself, on which the Minister was of the same opinion as the Liberals; but with regard to the organization of municipalities, Martignac was conscientiously conservative. He had been political agent in Spain, and had seen to what anarchy municipal liberties without other freedom lead; and he dreaded the consequences of introducing the American system of municipal assemblies and self-government by the side of the agents of a centralized administration. He sought, therefore, to counteract the democratic tendencies of municipal institutions by narrowing the body of the electors, as well as the body eligible to the council, so as to

* Lafayette writes from Lagrange, on December 6, 1828:—"The democratic section of the Cabinet, MM. Molé, Hyde de Neuville, Beugnot, and Vatismenil, have triumphed over the objection to bringing forward the municipal law immediately. The King is reduced to be as democratic as the four Republicans whose resistance has prevailed in the Council."

confine both exclusively to the wealthy oligarchy of the provinces.

Under the Imperial and the existing system what were called municipal and provincial councils existed, all nominated by the Crown or the prefect. By Martignac's law, there were to be councils of the *Communes*, councils of district, councils of department. The highest tax-payers were to be the electors, to the number of thirty in a commune of five hundred population. Councillors of districts were to be elected by the highest tax-payers of the canton in the proportion of one for every hundred. Councillors of departments to be elected by the assemblies of districts. Functionaries, graduates, and professional notables were to be superadded to these electors. So that whilst there were in the kingdom eighty thousand persons considered fit to elect deputies to the legislature, not more than thirty thousand were considered capable of choosing councillors of departments.

The Commission appointed by the Chamber to examine the project, chose M. Dupin for their reporter, and the document which he drew up was, in many points, a severe satire upon the timidity of the Minister. Moreover, it proposed a host of amendments, very much altering the nature of the law. It first erased the word *notable*, as establishing inequality. It extended the right of voting for both municipal and departmental councillors to all entitled to vote for deputies, and excluded the clergy and other functionaries from the vote. It blotted the district councils altogether from the system.

Martignac was prepared to have his scheme amended, its franchise widened, and its spirit liberalized; but that his allies of the Left Centre should thus turn it inside out,

run the pen across what was the chief principle of the measure, by rendering the most wealthy the most predominant in their locality—to have this denounced as an absurd attempt at establishing an oligarchy, was what Martignac was not prepared for. It was with difficulty that he withstood in the Palace and in the Chamber the reproaches of the Right, who accused him of betraying the monarchy, of establishing revolutionary assemblies in every province, and committing the anomaly of making administration depend upon election. The reporter, M. Dupin, displayed much force of argument in favour of the amendments; and M. Etienne during the ensuing debate made a powerful speech, in which he exposed the absurdity of attempting to form an aristocracy in a country where it did not exist, or to endow with aristocratic privileges a class of men, who differed in no respect from their brethren. In England there were proprietors and tenants, employing and employed; but in France the great mass of the population were proprietors, whilst employers and employed were both insignificant in numbers. In fact, the country was socially and physically democratized, and any other than democratic institutions were impossible. All this was very true, but it was not calculated to encourage the King, Court, or Royalists in making concessions. If such was the language of the Left Centre, what was that of the Left? Jacqueminot declared, that he would accept the law as amended by the Commission, although he considered it but a small instalment of what the people desired, and which they would have. Ministers must grant these and more, must go further, if not, they should be punished for their tardiness by a rejection of the budget.

It was an unfortunate thing that some better understanding had not been come to between Martignac and the

chiefs of the Liberal and semi-Liberal majority which supported him, as to the main features of the law which the Government was about to introduce. Whatever importance might be attributed to the law itself, it was certainly not so pressing or vital as the maintenance of the administration. But neither Left nor Left Centre cared to make much sacrifice or effort to support Martignac. There were some exceptions. Casimir Perrier, for example, altogether moderated his opposition, and incurred reproaches on that account; but his example was little followed. There were some who knew the King so little as to suppose, that after turning out Martignac, he might indeed appoint a reactionary Ministry for a moment; but that this would fall in its turn, and be succeeded by a Ministry of thorough Liberals, far preferable to that of the cautious Martignac.* Such illusions as these led away the men of the Left Centre into a violence of opposition to Martignac's municipal law, which was tantamount to the overthrow of the Minister; whilst Martignac, seeing the ingratitude and imprudence of the Liberals, gave way to an illusion equally baseless and void. This was, that by resisting the exigencies of the Liberals, he would win the confidence and support of the King, and be enabled by a constitutional use of the royal prerogative to resist the efforts made both by the Right and by the Left to invade and seize upon the Government and the influence of the Crown.

The discussion of the law in general came to a close on the 1st of April. A division on a matter of no great

* "There is a Ministry, called a coalition," writes Lafayette, "ready to succeed either the present men, or a ministry of the Right, which the Crown may have the imprudence to appoint. It is thus that you will see Casimir Perrier arrive at power with Chateaubriand, Pasquier, Molé, Royer Collard, Sebastiani, and Roy."

importance was decided in favour of Ministers. This inspired hopes. On the following day the first article of the ministerial project came on for consideration. It ordained, that the councils-general of departments should be chosen by the district councils, which themselves had been chosen by cantonal councils. For this system of double election, the Commission proposed to substitute the simple and direct election by all who paid three hundred francs impost. Ministers refused to yield. Martignac even denied to the Chamber the right of destroying a law presented by a Ministry, and substituting for it another upon a different principle. It was superseding the functions of Ministers by the authority of a Commission of the Chamber. Ministers being thus at variance with their own majority, the article was put to the vote. That vote was given by rising and sitting. The Left and Left Centre rose to affirm the amendment of the Commission. In rising to reject it, Ministers were left alone; the Right would not support them, and accordingly the amendment of the Commission was carried against the Government. The Left Centre was triumphant. Such men as Dupin and Sebastiani considered they had gained a triumph; when the Chamber was suspended by the circumstance of Martignac and Portalis quitting their seats together. Several deputies came to ask the Ministers who remained, what was the meaning of their colleagues withdrawing. The reply was, that they had gone to consult the King, and to receive his orders.

The sitting was suspended, whilst Martignac and his colleague hastened to announce to Charles X. their defeat. "I told you how it would be, Messieurs," said the King. "You cannot deal with these people. It was time to stop. I thank you for your resolution." The mission to the

palace was soon performed, the Ministers returned to the Chamber, and its sitting being reopened, M. de Martignac ascended the tribune with a paper in his hand, of which his countenance, pale with emotion, too clearly told the import. The paper which he read was an ordonnance withdrawing the two laws which were announced as the great object of the session. The Minister immediately withdrew. The work of legislation was over, that of revolution commenced.

The dismissal of Martignac, and the appointment of Prince Polignac as his successor, was a determination taken by Charles X. from the moment that the Minister had broken with the Liberal majority in the Chamber. The very opposition to Martignac on the part of the Left Centre, or moderate Liberals, having betrayed so much personal ambition, crafty and experienced men assured Charles X. that a Royalist Ministry, uniting the friends of Villèle and Labourdonnaye without the personal unpopularity of the ex-minister, could not fail to rally to it many of the semi-Liberals who had intrigued with Martignac, had been dissatisfied with him, and had in fact overthrown him. Whether this was possible or not with a Villèle ministry reconstituted, it certainly was not possible under a Polignac. The King, however, was led to believe, that his friend would make as good a Prime Minister as any other man; and he by no means contemplated, when appointing him, that he would be driven to an open rupture with the Chamber. It was necessary, however, to get the budget voted, and for this purpose the Chamber sat still two or three months, during which the monarch continued to show courtesy to Martignac, although he at times indulged in by no means good-natured remarks upon his Minister. M. de Martignac

had an exceedingly soft and pleasing voice, "the voice of a man," says Chateaubriand, "to which the female sex had given somewhat of their weakness and their seduction." Charles X. used to compare him to Madame Pasta, and after his efforts of eloquence used to ask his visitors, alluding to Martignac, if they had heard La Pasta. Every one, save the Ministers themselves, foresaw their fall. What might be the future policy of the King was the subject of every conversation. Even in the Chamber doubts and suspicions would break forth; and upon one occasion General Lamarque, alluding to the prognostication that the Court meditated a *coup d'état*, begged to observe that the people also had their *coup d'état*.

The parliamentary session closed at the end of July. The King had not altogether waited for it to sound influential persons. During the discussion of the war budget, the opposition in the Chambers had driven the Minist r, M. de Caux, to despair by their objections and reductions. He came to the palace to request the King to do without so many aide-de-camps, and in other respects to meet the wishes and the economy of the deputies. In speaking of the Chamber, M. de Caux happening to say that its conduct was "abominable," the King immediately caught at the word, and drawing M. de Caux aside observed, "You will admit that this cannot last. Am I sure of the army?" "Sire," rejoined the Minister, "you must tell me for what purpose." "Without conditions," said the King. "If your Majesty asks aught of the army in the name and scope of the Charter, you may count upon its absolute obedience; but beyond that—without speaking of soldiers and non-commissioned officers—of the officers themselves, out of twenty thousand, there are not five hundred who are well-

born, and not a thousand who have six hundred francs a-year. Re-establish the old *régime* with such an army as that!" "Oh," said Charles, "who wants to violate the Charter, or what has the army to do with the Charter? I will respect it."

The King consulted secretly with Villèle's friend, Montbel, keeping at a distance Villèle himself, with Labourdonnaye, with the ex-President Ravez, and with Chantelauze, a lawyer of Grenoble, whom the Duc d'Angoulême had picked up, and in whom his Royal Highness found as much political genius as the King believed in Polignac. The moment the day was fixed for the closing of the session, this personage returned to Paris. He visited none of the Ministers, except Portalis, at whose residence, by the King's desire, Polignac left a card. The Prefect of Police, at a dinner which he gave to the Ministers, informed them first of the presence of the Prince in Paris. More certain indications of his arrival and of the cause were given by the Prince calling upon M. Roy, and asking him to keep the Finance Department under a new Government. M. Roy refused, as he afterwards did to the King's solicitations, unless M. Martignac retained office. It is said that Polignac then proceeded to offer the government to M. Decazes, who was to admit the principal members of the Left; and that in forming such a Cabinet, of which Polignac was to be Minister of the Royal Household, the King was ready to make all concessions of persons, but none of things. The proposal, therefore, could not have been serious.

On the 6th of August, M. Portalis was summoned to St. Cloud, and was there informed by the King of his intention to dismiss his Ministry, "which had made

concessions without satisfying the enemies of the Crown." All that Portalis said in reply was, to ask for the permanent place which the King had promised him in writing, that of President of the Court of Cassation. The King evaded his promise by observing that he was not sufficiently satisfied with the conduct of Portalis, and that the nomination must rest with the future Cabinet. The other Ministers named by Portalis hastened to resign their portfolios into the King's hands. Charles X. had then no need of dissimulation, and he treated them all with more or less rudeness. Vatismenil and Feutrier, who had sacrificed the Jesuits, were dismissed with anger.

The same evening the composition of the new Ministry became known in the capital. It was as follows :—

The Prince de Polignac, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. de Labourdonnaye, Home Minister.
M. de Bourmont, War Minister.
M. de Montbel, Public Instruction.
M. de Courvoisier, Minister of Justice.
M. de Chabrol, Finance Minister.
M. d'Haussez, Minister of Marine.

"I never could have believed," said Chateaubriand, "that I should see M. de Polignac invested with supreme power; his limited intellect, fixed yet ardent, his fatal and unpopular name, his religious opinions, strained to enthusiasm—were sufficient causes for his eternal exclusion."

If Polignac was contemned and abhorred as the very type of all that was obnoxious, he being a courtier of the *ancien régime*, an *émigré*, and an ascetic, Labourdonnaye represented the vindictiveness, the executions, the reaction of 1815. Constant had denounced him as the Marat of

Royalism; he who tried toe stablish a Terror under the Royalist flag with a convention of squires. The two names, Polignac and Labourdonnaye, were not only odious to the nation at large, but repugnant to politicians. Polignac was dreamy, exclusive, wrapped up in fanaticism and reverie; Labourdonnaye, quarrelsome, impossible to live or to agree with.* Bourmont was no less odious to the Royalists as one who had won his epaulettes under Napoleon; to the Imperialists and the army, as one who had deserted and betrayed both.

Never was moment or circumstances worse chosen in which to affront a nation. Years of discussion, of greater or less freedom, of increased facilities of communication and information, had rendered the whole country alive, as one family, to the wrong offered to its rights, and to the offence put upon its prejudices. A new generation had risen which knew the last century only in books, and which in these had learned to despise what the new Ministry represented and the King desired. The professions, almost empty in 1814, had become filled up in the lapse of fourteen years. Even the generation of Royalist squires, many of whom were surviving at the epoch of the Restoration, had given way to their sons. The youth, which the university had reared and turned forth, were no longer indeed materialists, and were followers far more of

* The following character of him by Chateaubriand must be given in the original, as untranslatable :—

"Le Comte de Labourdonnaie, jadis mon ami, est bien le plus mauvais coucheur qui fut oncques: il vous lâche des ruades sitôt que vous approchez de lui: il attaque les orateurs à la Chambre comme ses voisins à la campagne; il chicane sur une parole, comme il fait un procès pour un fossé. Le matin même du jour où je fus nommé ministre des affaires étrangères, il vint me declarer qu'il rompait avec moi: j'etais ministre. Je ris et je laissai aller ma mégère masculine, qui, riant elle-même, avait l'air d'une chauve-souris contrariée."

Kant than of Rousseau; but they were no worshippers of political religion; they had far outgrown the philosophy of De Maistre and Bonald, which the new Keeper of the Seals, Courvoisier, boasted to profess. Never was the French press so rich in powerful writers and in journals of all kinds. In addition to the old organs, the *National*, founded by Thiers, Mignet, and Carrel, rivalled the *Journal des Débats* in terseness, powerful writing, and high views. The *Temps* commanded even a greater variety of contributors—Guizot and Dupin, and the leading men of the Left Centre, taking it for their organ. The Doctrinaires had extended the *Globe* from philosophy and criticism into a political instrument, foreseeing the great struggle of principles and parties. All these were let loose upon the King and his fatuous Government, who were gibbeted all and each of them every morning for the amusement, the malice, and the excitement of a million of readers. The provinces seemed more excited than the capital; the contrary of what seemed to be the rule in times of disaffection. The middle class of Brittany formed an association for the avowed purpose of refusing to pay taxes, whenever they should be demanded illegally and without the sanction of the Charter. Prosecutions of such attempts, or of the press, were useless, for the last law had put repression in the power of the judges, and these were hostile to Polignac and to any absolutist or sacerdotal reaction. What M. de Caux said of the army might be repeated of every class from the peer to the peasant. That Ministers might not be ignorant of public opinion, Lafayette and other Liberal chiefs made progresses through the country, attended banquets, and made speeches. The reception of Lafayette at Lyons was

a complete manifestation of that wealthy city against Polignac, and in favour of almost republican resistance.

Some of the new Ministers had acceded to the first requests of Polignac, but became alarmed at these growing symptoms of popular resistance, and chose different pretexts to resign and escape the dangerous responsibility. "At the time of the formation of the Ministry of the 8th of August," writes M. de Polignac, in his *Etudes*, "I represented to Count de Labourdonnaye the necessity of re-establishing the Presidency of the Council, suppressed by the last Ministry, which obstructed the march and the unity of Government. I tried to prove to him the advantage of having, not a chief, but a central point, from whom a homogeneous impulse might be given to all parts of the Administration. I pressed him to fill this post. He refused, and declared that he would quit the Ministry if a President was appointed. Things remained in this state, till the incompatibility of humour and character between M. de Labourdonnaye and M. Courvoisier hastened a solution. The other Ministers took up the idea of a Presidency. The rude manner of Labourdonnaye annoyed his colleagues; nor did we find in him that energy which circumstances required. He floated in continual irresolution between excessive reserve and abundant confidence; and we found that a bold leader of a vanguard was not the fittest person for the defence of a besieged town. M. Courvoisier, in my absence, proposed the re-establishing of the Presidency of the Council. His proposal meeting with supporters, M. de Labourdonnaye rose, and would listen to no observations, but carried his resignation to the King. He accepted the peerage. The King named me President of the Council;

M. Montbel, Home Minister; and Count Guernon de Ranville, Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction."

Notwithstanding that the Cabinet, like a company of soldiers in presence of the enemy, thus closed and filled up its ranks as front men were stricken down, several of them stood in the ministerial ranks with hesitation and reluctance. "Four of the Ministers," writes Lafayette, "have determined to resign, or keep office merely till after the opening of the session." Those who hesitated were Courvoisier, the new Minister, Guernon de Ranville, Chabrol, and Montbel.*

As if to keep up the public excitement till the meeting of the Chambers, the Cabinet resolved on a prosecution of M. Bertin, for an article in the *Journal des Débats*, satirizing the advent of the new Ministry.

"Behold," said the journal, "once more broken, the bond of confidence which united the people and the monarch. Behold, again, the Court with its old rancours, the emigration with its prejudices, the priesthood with its hatred of liberty, which come to throw themselves between France and its King. All that the country has conquered by forty years' labour and misfortune is to be

* It would have been impossible for any one to take a more just view of the policy which M. Polignac proposed, and of its consequences, than Guernon de Ranville. He showed these in a report which he addressed to the Prime Minister, in which he represented the inutility and danger of a *coup d'état*, even if it succeeded. "But succeed," said M. Guernon, "it would not. I admit that the masses are tranquil, and take no part in political quarrels, but how little would suffice to rouse them? Does not the middle class touch and communicate with the lower on a thousand points, so as to be able at need to raise up a tempest of which the boldest could not foresee the issue." No statesman could have more clearly seen into futurity. And yet Guernon de Ranville, after saying in this very document that the Charter should be the ark of the covenant, signed the ordonnances.

taken from it. The attempt is made to force upon it what it rejects with all the energy of its will. The glory of the present reign was its moderation. But that is no longer possible. The new Ministers could not be moderate, if they ever so much strove to be so. Their very names excite a hatred which, of course, becomes reciprocal. Being dreaded, they must dread; and although they may begin by muttering the words liberty and the Charter, their imperfect utterance of such words must betray them. Their language will be taken for that of hypocrisy and fear. What can they do? Seek support in the force of bayonets? But bayonets in these days are intelligent; they know and respect the law. Will they tear the Charter of Louis XVIII.? Let them take care. The Charter has a solid foundation, upon which despotism itself would go to pieces. The people, who pay ten hundred millions to the law, would not pay two to the ordonnance of a Minister. Illegal taxes would raise up a Hampden to break them. Why are we compelled to evoke such a reminiscence of civil war? Unhappy France! Unfortunate King!"

On being arraigned before the Royal Court for this article, M. Bertin, who defended himself, was acquitted by the judges. When, a short time afterwards, these dignitaries went to pay their respects at the palace, as was customary on New Year's day, the King warned them rudely not to forget their duties; whilst the Duchess d'Angoulême, when they approached her, told the judges, harshly, to "move on." They went straight to the Palais Royal, paid their respects to the Duke of Orleans, and were graciously received.

The Chambers were convoked for the 2nd of March.

The King opened the session in the Louvre on that day. The conclusion of the war between Russia and the Porte, by the treaty of Adrianople, and the determination of the Government to take striking vengeance upon the Dey of Algiers, comprised the first paragraph of the speech. After a few words of adherence to the Charter, the King continued:—

"Peers and Deputies,—I do not entertain a doubt of your support in accomplishing the good that I purpose. You will reject with contempt, then, the perfidious insinuations propagated by malevolence. If culpable manœuvres should raise in the way of my Government obstacles which I cannot, or, rather, which I will not anticipate, I shall find the means of overcoming them in my resolution to maintain the public peace, in the just confidence of the French, and in the attachment which they have ever shown to their King."

The ambiguous menace was received in silence. He who uttered it was more agitated than those to whom it was addressed. The press was loud and significant in its indignation. The votes for the choice of President showed Ministers to be in a complete minority. The Commission of the address, composed of the Left and Left Centre, chose Etienne to draw it up. The Peers took a shorter time to prepare and present theirs: they declared the rights of the Crown inseparable from the national liberties. Chateaubriand, who had resigned his embassy, was the chief speaker in opposition. His speech foreboded a revolution, which, he said, a pen like his own was sufficient to accomplish.

The answer which Etienne wrote, and which the

Commission agreed to, in answer to the menacing paragraph of the Royal speech, was as follows:—

"Sire,—In the midst of the unanimous sentiments of respect and affection with which your people surround you, there has arisen in many minds a lively disquietude, disturbing the security which France had begun to enjoy, drying up the sources of its prosperity, and capable, if prolonged, of deeply troubling its repose. Our conscience and honour, with the fidelity which we have sworn and will always observe to you, impose upon us the duty of declaring what is the cause of this evil. The Charter, which we owe to the wisdom of your august predecessor, and the benefits of which your Majesty has expressed the wish to consolidate, consecrates, as a right, the intervention of the country in the discussion of its public interests. This intervention, besides being indirect, ought to be wisely tempered, and circumscribed within the exactly-traced limits, which we will not suffer to be passed. But it is positive in its result, for it renders the permanent accord between the political views of the Government and the wishes of your people the indispensable condition of the regular march of public affairs. Sire, our loyalty, our devotion, condemn us to tell you that this accord does not exist. An unjust distrust of the sentiments and the reason of France forms the fundamental idea of the present Administration. Your people is troubled at this, for it is injurious, and is rendered the more anxious, as it is menacing to the public liberties. Sire, distrust can find no place in your noble heart. No, Sire, France no more desires anarchy than you meditate despotism. You can put faith in its loyalty as it has faith in your promises. Let your Majesty pronounce between those who mis

represent so calm and faithful a nation and malign us, when we come with profound conviction, to lay in your bosom the complaints of a people jealous of the esteem and confidence of their King. The royal prerogative affords the means of restoring between the powers of the State that constitutional harmony which is a first and necessary condition to the strength of the throne and the grandeur of France."

The calculation of Ministers previous to the meeting of the Chambers was, that having committed no act of any importance, it was impossible for the Opposition to accuse them. The King had an undoubted right to appoint his Ministers, and until they committed some overt or imprudent act, the Chambers could not condemn them or proscribe them without attacking the prerogative of the King; even to this the Royalist Opposition replied by the *Journal des Débats*,—"The ministry is in error. Its inaction is as bad as its violence. If since the 10th of August it has made nothing more than a few ridiculous movements, uttered nothing more than a few falsehoods, and restricted itself to a few prosecutions in detail, if, in fact, it has not done all that was expected of it, its past sufficiently announces its future life. Its name alone is an act of accusation sufficiently authoritative. A ministry like this, hostile for the present, and dreaded for the future, is already condemned. Nothing has been wanting but actual judges. The Chamber of Deputies will enact their part, and pass their sentence."

Both sides, however, were too impatient. If Ministers desired to throw upon Opposition the odium of making an unprovoked attack, they ought to have refrained from putting taunts and threats in the royal speech; for on

these taunts and threats the Chamber found sufficient reason for returning a mistrustful and warning address. The difference between Crown and Chamber was at the moment more one of men than of things; and Charles X. was more obstinate in his attachment and aversion to certain persons than even in his political principles. We have seen that upon these he could be induced to yield; but to have the Minister of his choice condemned without being heard, and rejected merely because he was the King's choice, seemed to the monarch a flagrant breach of his prerogative. The line of argument taken in the Chambers by the Ministers and their adherents was precisely this, the address was an attack upon the prerogative of the Crown. Guernon de Ranville especially developed the idea, and pointed out the danger. Benjamin Constant, as well as Dupin, replied that the Chamber did not seek to force the King's will, because it was in the King's power to appeal from the Chamber to the country by a dissolution. This was, after all, but an adjournment of the compulsion put upon the monarch's will in the nomination of his Ministers.

Amongst the very few acts of the Ministry was the dismissal of a colonel of the guard for having voted for the Opposition candidate in his department. This became the object of animadversion and debate, and was chiefly remarkable from the circumstance of Prince Polignac thinking fit to rise to reply. The few words that he said were so *mal-apropos*, and his whole demeanour so hesitating, that the enemies of the Minister indulged in loud acclamations at this proof of the parliamentary incapacity of the Prime Minister. The debate on the famous address was not, indeed, marked by eloquence. Guernon de Ran-

ville showed most ability on the ministerial side. Guizot and Berryer both addressed the Chamber for the first time on this occasion. M. Guizot exposed the presumption of a Ministry, which takes the conduct of public affairs in a great crisis with the avowed aim of extricating the country from it, and yet which does nothing, exercises no authority, gathers no strength, and brings more discredit on the name of Government than all the assaults of Opposition could bring. People distrust its intention, whilst they mark its weakness. M. Guizot pointed out the existence of a moral discontent and mutiny, which was far worse than material disorder. This was the more dangerous, because whilst the surface of society remained tranquil revolution was brewing in its depths. "Hence," concluded M. Guizot, "the necessity of our warning the Government by the frankness of our words. Ours is the sole voice that can reach the highest authority in the State, and dissipate his illusions. Let us take care not to weaken the force of our words by such an amendment" (that of M. Lorgeril substituting a much milder paragraph). "Let us not enervate our expressions; let us be respectful and tender, but neither hesitating nor timid. Truth has difficulty enough in penetrating to the cabinet of Kings. Let us not send it there so pale and weak as to admit of its being mistaken." The amendment was rejected; and the original address was voted by 221 members, there being 181 for modifying or rejecting it.

This address, which the *Quotidienne* called the next morning the first manifesto of the Revolution of 1830, was voted on the evening of the 16th of March. The following was the usual day of the week for holding the Council under the presidency of the King. Ministers opened it

by declaring their readiness to resign; but Charles would not listen to this. It would be an abdication, he said. Besides, what Ministry could be found to agree with such a Chamber? The King added, that he had consulted M. Royer Collard, the President, as to what men or party would be likely to command a majority, and Royer Collard had replied, no one. Nevertheless, M. de Polignac says that Chabrol and Courvoisier were for a modification, and for offering seats in the Cabinet to two members of the Left Centre.

The King, however, after having dismissed M. de Martignac, could not return to him, nor yet take a man less conservative and less talented. The ministers almost all recommended the dissolution. Guernon de Ranville took the view of Chabrol and Courvoisier, and urged the expediency of not breaking at once with the Chamber. This was overruled. The King received the deputies on the 19th, and in answer to the address said:—

"I had a right to reckon on the support of the two Chambers to accomplish the good I meditated. My heart is afflicted to hear the deputations of the departments declare that the accord between them and my Ministers does not exist. I have announced my purposes on opening the session. These resolutions are unchangeable. The interest of my people prohibits me from changing. My Ministers will make known to you my intentions."

On the following day the Chambers were prorogued till the 3rd of September.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EXPEDITION TO ALGIERS UNDER BOURMONT—ITS SUCCESS—MINISTERS MEDITATE A COUP D'ÉTAT—MODIFICATION OF THE MINISTRY — PREPARATION OF THE ORDONNANCES — THEY ARE ISSUED.

THE vote of the address of 221 upon one side, the total interruption of one year's parliamentary session on the other, formed a mutual declaration of war. It was for both to consider and apply ingenuity and resources to carry on the struggle. The Liberals were much more determined, much better organized. Although the old societies for promoting insurrection and conspiracies did not exist, there were associations far more in the spirit of the time; associations not having absolute treason for their object, nor deterring moderate men. The society, *Aide toi, le ciel t'aidera*, had been formed for influencing the elections. Guizot and the Duc de Broglie were members of it, which answers for its constitutionalism, and as the writings and pamphlets which it distributed were addressed to the class paying three hundred francs imposts, they could not hold a very revolutionary language. The society now got up patriotic banquets, taking example from those which had been offered to Lafayette at Lyons and elsewhere.

One took place in the garden of a Parisian house of entertainment. That M. Guizot should have been of the society which organized such a banquet, and that M. Odillon Barrot, then appearing for the first time, should have been one of its presidents, proves how every shade of political feeling was in antagonism to the throne.* At the same time the Royal Court, condemning some journals for publishing the resolution of the *Association Bretonne*, added motives to the sentence, which were a more pointed attack upon Ministers than upon the libel they condemned.

On their side Ministers could do little, save deprive their enemies of any places still retained by them. They were utterly unsupported by any fraction of opinion or of the press. Villèle came to Paris. Although the Duke of Wellington had been very glad to see Prince Polignac take the portfolio of Foreign Affairs from the Russian hands of M. de la Ferronays, he dreaded the consequences of the Prince undertaking to be the Prime Minister. Blaming any rash attacks against the constitution, the English ambassador saw no hope for Charles X. except in Villèle. But the King's passions were excited. He would not submit to manœuvring or conciliation, and turned his back upon Villèle. Peyronnet still retained his old grudge against his former colleague, and contributed to his rejection. The *Gazette de France* made known to the public the progress of these negotiations with Villèle, and on the first rupture M. de Genoude broke with Polignac, and denounced his incapacity and folly.

In the middle of April, M. de Bourmont left Paris and

* It may be remarked that Casimir Perrier was not at this banquet, and that Dupin, accused of flying to the country to avoid it, was obliged to excuse himself in a letter published in the journals.

the distracted Cabinet to place himself at the head of the expedition against Algiers. His last words to his colleagues and to the King were, to entreat them to await his return before they ventured upon any act which might provoke open collision with the people. He advised, above all things, that in such a case the command should not be given to Marmont, who, though a brave soldier, was an unlucky General.

The differences between the Dey of Algiers and France had been of many years' standing. The French had occupied since the fifteenth century a portion of the coast, a station and a fort at La Calle, in the province of Bona, which facilitated their fishery for coral. France had, of course, lost these possessions during the war which drove their vessels from the sea; but in 1817 the French Government recovered them by the payment of large sums, which, however, did not satisfy the Dey. To this standing cause of difference was added that of the flag. The French Government not only demanded that its own vessels should be free from the Algerine corsairs, but that papal vessels should enjoy the same protection. This the Dey would not understand. Moreover, certain Algerines who had furnished provisions to the French under the Consulate and the Empire, which had been only partially paid. The difference on all these subjects of quarrels reached their height in 1827. The Dey had written directly to the King of France, stating his griefs. That monarch did not think it worth while to reply; and the Dey avenged what he considered the insult on the French consul, telling him he would not allow a French cannon on the coast of Algiers. The French consul replying no doubt with warmth, the Dey Hussein struck him with the

large fan used in the East for keeping off flies. This insult France punished by a blockade, which proved very ineffectual. Another attempt at obtaining reparation in 1829 led to the French vessel, bearing a flag of truce, being fired upon by the batteries of Algiers. To M. de Polignac, just installed, fell the task of taking efficient vengeance on the Barbaresques.

The Prime Minister has left in his "Etudes" a circumstantial account of his motives for undertaking the subjugation of Algiers. Turkey he considered to be in a state of dissolution: in other words, Russia had determined to swallow up Constantinople at the first opportunity, which Charles X. and Le Ferronays had determined to lend their moral support to accomplish. France was to consent to this great aggrandizement of the empire of the Czar not for anything that the Czar held out in return. He never proffered the frontier of the Rhine, or indeed promised anything, except the alliance of Russia against the liberalism of England and the jealousies of Austria. The alliance of Russia thus promising so little to France in either east or west, Prince Polignac conceived the original idea of enlisting Mehemet Ali in the service of France. The Viceroy was to consent to assume the title of Lieutenant of the French King, and in this capacity he was to march an army along the coast to Algiers, to dispossess the Dey. Mehemet Ali was to have ten millions of francs and four ships of the line from France. How Mehemet was to be rendered more obsequious to France than the Dey Hussein, after he became master of almost the whole African coast, does not appear. This first essay of the new Prime Minister's politics excited antagonists and dissentients everywhere. The rest of the Cabinet protested. England stirred

up the Sultan; and even Pozzo, the Russian ambassador, was hostile.

The project was therefore abandoned, and no way remained of bringing the Dey to reason than an expedition. The Admirals were all averse to it; they shrunk from every undertaking of the present Government's conception. But Bourmont was determined to proceed with it, and hoped that his success as commander would not only wipe away whatever tarnish might rest on his military reputation, but that it would greatly come in aid to the King in his struggle with the Constitutionalists and the country. An army of nearly 40,000 men was prepared at Toulon; eleven ships of the line, and twice as many frigates, were to bear them. The English Ministers showed much jealousy, and protested. Prince Polignac returned the very fair answer, that the French flag had been insulted, and must be avenged, but that Algiers once conquered, the French Government would willingly come to an understanding with its allies as to what rule should be substituted for the piratical regency. The English Government ought to have been contented with this, unless it thought the circumstance grave enough to warrant forcible resistance. The remonstrances of Lord Stuart de Rothsay were answered by Prince Polignac with becoming pride, and by M. de Haussez, the Marine Minister, with vulgar insolence.

The expedition, sailing from Toulon on the 25th of May, no sooner reached the coast of Africa than it was dispersed and driven back by a tempest. But rallying his ships, Admiral Duperré once more drew near to Algiers, and cast anchor in the bay of Sidi Ferruc, about four leagues to the west of the town. There the French landed

without opposition, but were attacked in a short time by an Algerine army equal in force and much stronger in cavalry. The Arabs mingled in close conflict with the foremost of the French, but when the columns of these, preserving their order, issued from the rear, driving the disorderly mass before them, the Algerines were obliged to retreat, and even abandoned their camp. In a day or two the French General advanced to the attack of the fortresses which crowned the heights behind Algiers. They invested the fort of the Emperor on the 30th, and in four days they so knocked it to pieces that an assault was practicable. But whilst marching to it, the Algerines blew up the fortress with a tremendous explosion, which left the French nothing except ruins to take possession of. The Dey, however, was obliged to surrender on the condition that life and property should be respected, and he himself be allowed to retire with his family and harem whither he would. On the 5th of July, the French entered Algiers, and found in the public treasury sufficient to defray the expenses of the expedition.

On the 11th, I saw Charles X. and the royal family proceed in their gilded and transparent coach of state to join in the Te Deum at Nôtre Dame for the conquest of Algiers. It was impossible to behold more joyously exultant countenances than theirs. But these sentiments were confined to the inside of the royal coach. Not a cry of exultation or of welcome arose from the crowd around, which looked on with disapprobation so marked and frowns so universal, that if any power remained to popular sentiment or in popular masses, it was evident that the house of Bourbon, though on the morrow of a victory, was at the same time on the eve of a catastrophe.

Throughout the month of April, M. de Polignac was still hoping and seeking to acquire colleagues, at least amongst the Royalists, who would secure the support of that party in the elections. He had interviews with M. Delalot, but the latter would not listen to any terms. The Royalists were as much opposed to M. de Polignac as the Liberals; the *Quotidienne* as hostile as the *Constitutionel* and *Courrier*. How the King and the Prince could have conceived the plan of carrying on the Government against the wishes of both Liberals and Royalists seems inconceivable. On the 29th of April the ministerial journal published the following remarks:—

"The King is the instrument of that eternal severeignty which is in God. The King is *His* minister for the conservation of society. In virtue of this right, anterior to all law, the King makes war and peace, and in virtue of this also he makes ordonnances for the safety of the State (Art. 14 of the Charter). What people call *coups d'état* are something both usual and regular, when the King orders them in the general interest of his people, even though he go in appearance against the laws."

Such was the first public menace or announcement of Ministers to have recourse to a *coup d'état*. To this the journal of the Left Centre replied, that any *coup d'état* of the kind would be met, not by insurrection, but by passive resistance,—a general refusal to pay taxes, a struggle between the people and the fiscal officer. No doubt the first menace of the *coup d'état* was made in the ministerial press, in order to allow the Government to discover what was the mode of resistance contemplated. Having satisfactorily found out, as he thought, that this resistance was to be confined to the refusal of taxes, M. de Polignac

proposed to meet this by flinging himself upon the Chamber of Peers, and getting it to vote the budget without the Deputies, in order to save the monarchy from revolution. The personage to whom M. de Polignac opened his mind on the subject of this notable scheme was M. de Semonville, Grand Referendary of the Chamber of Peers. To him M. de Polignac insinuated that the Peers and their Chamber were far too little in the body politic,—that greater rights and prerogatives ought to be given to them,—that he was ready to do anything for the Upper Chamber, and he prayed M. de Semonville to inquire and inform him what might be considered a boon by the Peers. M. de Semonville, a sly and cunning personage, affected not to perceive the political drift of the Prime Minister's offer. With apparent alacrity he undertook the task; and when questioned by M. de Polignac, replied that the favour most grateful to the Peers would be the privilege accorded to the eldest sons to go to Court in a green (*vert pomme*) uniform. M. de Semonville meant to imply that M. de Polignac could confer upon the Chamber of Peers nothing of greater political importance. "He was turning me into ridicule," observed Polignac; and so the attempt ended.

On the 16th of May was issued the ordonnance dissolving the Chamber, and ordering the assembling of the electoral colleges for the 23rd of June and the 3rd of July. Three of the Ministers,—Chabrol, Courvoisier, and Guernon de Ranville,—insisted on its being brought before the consideration of the Council what measures were eventually to be taken in case of the elections proving unfavourable. M. de Polignac, prepared for their resignation, admitted that the 14th Article of the Charter, giving the Crown the right to issue ordonnances, would then be

recurred to. On this, MM. de Chabrol and Courvoisier resigned. When they went for this purpose to the King, Charles corroborated their fears. "The electors would have cause to regret if they made bad choices," he said; and added, "I am determined to mount on horseback, and not upon a scaffold, like my brother." The Ministers who withdrew were replaced by Peyronnet and Chantelauze. The latter was chief judge of the Court of Grenoble, and showed the greatest reluctance to be promoted to the post, so perilous at such a time, of Keeper of the Seals. The Duc d'Angoulême, who had great faith in Chantelauze as an orator and a political philosopher, returned by Grenoble from Toulon, in order to press the acceptation of Chantelauze. Chantelauze was the philosopher of the future *coup d'état.** He was for absolutism, what Royer Collard was for constitutional monarchy,—its most eloquent champion. Montbel was desirous of resigning, but the personal entreaties of the King, who embraced him, and besought this act of devotion on his part, induced him to remain. Guernon de Ranville, at the same time, yielded to the entreaties of Polignac. Montbel took the Finance, in lieu of Chabrol; and Peyronnet assumed the Ministry of the Interior. The Baron Cappelle, considered a skilful hand at the management of the elections, was also admitted to the Cabinet with an inferior office.

* The following letter, written by M. Chantelauze to his brother at the time of the appointment, was read, no doubt as telling in his favour, during the subsequent trial of the Minister before the Court of Peers.

"I do not want you to learn through the *Moniteur* my nomination to be Keeper of the Seals, the most important and most unfortunate event of my life. For two months I have opposed a resolute resistance, but I have no other choice, the order given me permitting no disobedience. I resign myself therefore to the part of victim. Watch over the elections, to fail in them would be now far more disgraceful."

The presence of Peyronnet soon made itself felt in the audacious language of the *Moniteur*. That generally circumspect and efficient journal was made to announce to the electors in the first days of June, that "the King would never yield, and that if a hostile majority was returned, strong measures would be employed, which would no doubt produce a struggle and popular turbulence." Peyronnet knew therefore fully what he meditated provoking. Capitalists had the same feeling, and the funds went down rapidly, especially after the menacing article in the *Moniteur*. The monarch spoke a language less menacing to the electors, but still pointing in the same direction with Peyronnet's coarseness.* The elections

* The following is the proclamation immediately before the election:—

FRENCHMEN,

THE last Chamber of Deputies mistook my intentions. I had a right to reckon upon its support for the good that I meditated. It refused me that support. As father of my people, my heart was afflicted. As King, I was offended, and I pronounced its dissolution. Your prosperity, Frenchmen, constitutes my glory: your happiness is mine. As the electoral colleges open, you will listen to the voice of your King. It shall ever be the aim of my efforts to maintain the constitutional Charter and the institutions founded upon it; but to accomplish this, I must freely exercise, and cause to be respected, the sacred rights which are the appanage of my Crown. In this consist the guarantees of your liberties and of the public tranquillity. The nature of the Government would be changed, if culpable efforts should weaken my prerogatives, and I should betray my oaths were I to suffer it. Under the protection of this Government, France has become flourishing and free. She owes it to her franchises, her credit, and her industry. France has no reason to envy other countries, and need aspire solely to retain the advantages she has. Be assured of your rights. I connect them with mine, and will protect them with equal solicitude. Don't be led away by the insidious language of the enemies of your repose. Repel unworthy suspicions and false fears, which shake the public confidence, and may occasion serious disorders. The aim of those who propagate such fears will be baffled by my unchangeable resolution. Your security and your interest will not be more compromised than your liberties. I watch over the one as over the other. Electors, hasten to your colleges, and do not absent yourselves. Let the same sentiments animate you, the same flag direct: your King demands it. I will fulfil my duties: do you accomplish yours.—CHARLES.

which took place throughout the country, not only of the district but the departmental colleges, were such as to destroy every hope of carrying on the Government except by the King dismissing his Ministers and retracing his steps, or else having recourse to extra-legal measures. Two hundred and seventy Opposition members were elected, 145 ministerial, with 15 who had voted the amendment of Lorgerie for conciliation. Even of the elections of the great colleges, supposed to represent the aristocracy of France, there were 76 members of Opposition, and 84 attached to Ministers. So completely had Charles X. nullified the undoubtedly Royalist power given him, had he known how wisely to use it, by the existing electoral law.

At this critical moment, one may observe how unfortunate it was, that a prince, so pious and so conscientious as Charles, should have supposed it possible that he could overturn the electoral law and ordain another, without violating the Charter, and by the power intrusted to him in Article 14. The electoral law had been changed on the 5th of September by Decazes, in favour of liberal men and liberal principles, by ordonnance; and the rights reserved to the Crown by Article 14 had been affirmed by the Chamber of Peers,* and admitted on more than one solemn occasion. It showed the necessity of precision in law, and rigidity in principle; for both Charles X. and Polignac, weak and fickle as they were, were men of all others likely to be bound by the strict words and manifest meaning of an oath.

The necessity of recurring to the use of the Article 14 seems to have been agreed on between the King and Po-

* In their report on the Press Law of 1822.

lignac early in July. They employed Chantelauze to draw up their opinions and state them to the Council. This he did, concluding for the necessity of either silently giving power to Goverment without the Chamber, or declaring the late elections null, and ordaining others according to a new law. None of the other Ministers, not even M. de Peyronnet, gave immediate adherence to this proposal. In a later meeting of the Council, M. de Peyronnet adopted Polignac's original idea of calling an Assembly of Notables; chiefly Peers. At Court the most feasible plan was agreed to be, that of changing the law of election by ordonnance, suspending the liberty of the press, and dissolving the Chamber. Guernon de Ranville alone opposed this strenuously. But introduced as he had been into the Ministry, his word was of little weight; so that when the Duc d'Angoulême told him he had better bow to the decision of the majority, he did so; and the determination was made known to the King. He appeared highly pleased, declared that experience had ever shown him, that to yield was the ruin of a prince. "They require me to change my Ministers; but I will not, not only because I have confidence in them, but because the Liberals would go on from step to step till they sent us to the scaffold."

The three ordonnances, one dissolving the Chamber, another suspending the freedom of the press, a third remodifying the electoral law, were prepared, the first by Peyronnet, the last by Chantelauze. Chantelauze too undertook to draw up the report, which was to be the preamble and defence of these important acts. In this report M. de Chantelauze depicted the growing anarchy and disorganization of the country. The very springs of monarchic Government were broken. Authority was lost

in the capital and in the provinces. The most subversive doctrines were propagated, and general anxiety reigned. Active, ardent, and indefatigable malevolence was sapping the foundations of order; distrust and hostility to authority were fomented in the people, and the germs sown of civil war. Having thus attributed all the weakness and anxiety, which the mere appointment of a Ministry possessed of no confidence except that of the King had produced, to some new cause, the reporter pointed out that cause in the press. If there had never been a stable Government, it was all owing to the press. The press had disordered even the most upright intellects, and shaken the firmest convictions. "The journals of Opposition," said the report, "have not feared to erect into a principle the resolution of the 221 voters of that address, which your Majesty had considered offensive. And although the King declared his resolutions unchangeable, the journals took no account of them whatever."

It is impossible to imagine that even M. Chantelauze should have put forward arguments so miserable, so ridiculous as these. They could have fallen from no other pens than those of the unfortunate princes themselves, Charles X. or his son. The report continues: "We are no longer in the ordinary condition of representative government. The principle, on which it is based, could not have remained unshaken in the midst of political vicissitudes. A turbulent democracy, which has penetrated into our laws, seeks to substitute itself for legitimate authority. It disposed of the majority of elections by means of its journals and the help of its numerous affiliations. It has paralysed, as far as it could, the regular exercise of the most essential prerogative of the Crown, that of dissolving the elective Chamber.

By this alone, the constitution of the State is shaken. Your Majesty alone has the power to replace and strengthen it upon its true basis."

The report, as well as the ordonnance which followed it, were read in a Council on the 24th of July. They were to be definitively discussed in another to be held on the following day in the King's presence at St. Cloud. Closely as ministerial anxiety kept the secret, it transpired from their very countenances, from their journals, their position. M. de Mortemart had returned from St. Petersburgh almost expressly to warn Charles X., on the part of the Emperor Nicholas, not to step beyond the limits of the Charter. The Austrian Court sent similar warnings. Many old friends of royalty besought the King not to exceed the Charter. Even the emigrants dissuaded him from it. M. de Vitrolles went to St. Cloud, on the 25th, to warn Ministers, that the aspect of Paris was dangerous, that what might have been attempted seven or eight months ago could not be tried now. Ministers, however, relied on their colleague of the Home Department, Peyronnet, and upon Mangin, the Prefect of Police, who was ready to answer upon his life, that whatever measure was promulgated, Paris would not stir. All that the police magistrate could perceive, was, that there was no appearance of premeditated revolt, whilst Prince Polignac, filling the War Office *ad interim*, declared, that there was abundance of troops, 17,000 men, to put down any attempt at disturbance.

But notwithstanding such reasons for security, anxiety and misgiving haunted the breasts of both the monarch and his councillors. The preamble and the ordonnances being first read, the adhesion of all around the council-table was asked and given. It was then for the King to sign, but

he paused a moment, stooped his head upon his hands, and remained for a time in reflection, still holding the pen. At last he raised himself up and ejaculated, "The more I reflect upon it, the more I am convinced of the impossibility of doing otherwise." He then signed, and each Minister afterwards affixed his signature. They accompanied this by each bowing to the King, as if to mark, that they did so in devotion to his person and his authority. It was agreed, that the ordonnances should appear on the morrow; and, to be prepared for all events, it was also determined to give Marmont the command of the troops in and around Paris.

The first person to whom necessarily the ordonnances were communicated, was M. Sauvo, director of the *Moniteur*. He received them from Messieurs Chantelauze and Montbel, but could not believe them, as he gathered their import. "God save France and the King!" was his ejaculation. "We hope so," said the Ministers. "I have seen all the days of the different Revolutions," rejoined the veteran of the press, "and I am filled this moment with the deepest terror."

The ordonnances were—

First: The liberty of the press is suspended. No print or journal can appear without authorization. No book of less than twenty sheets can appear without permission first obtained.

Second: The Chamber of Deputies is dissolved.

Third: The Chamber of Deputies shall consist of merely deputies of departments. The taxes, which constitute the right of election or eligibility, must be those of proprietor or life-holder. (The commercial class paying patents was by this excluded.) The old

number of deputies is revived, that of 258, with renewal of one-fifth each year. Each district college will elect a number of candidates equal to the number of deputies, and will be divided into as many sections as there are candidates. The sections are to meet in different places, and separately elect their candidates. The departmental colleges will elect the deputies, the half of their deputies to be taken from the list of candidates chosen by the district colleges. No amendment to a law shall be permitted.

A fourth ordonnance convoked the electoral colleges on the 6th of September.

CHAPTER XIV.

RESISTANCE OF THE JOURNALS, AND OF THE PRINTERS—COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSURRECTION—MARMONT'S FIRST MEASURE, WITHDRAWS HIS TROOPS, AND THEN ORDERS HIS COLUMN TO RECAPTURE THE CITY—SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE OF THE POPULACE—MEETING OF THE DEPUTIES—SOME OF THEM PROCEED TO MARMONT, WHO IS INCLINED TO TREAT, BUT POLIGNAC REMAINS OBSTINATE.

THE author of this history was a resident in Paris for a long time previous to the Revolution of July, of which he was able to observe the gradual but sure approach. Nothing was more remarkable than the complete absence of bluster, of violence, or of conspiracy. Political extravagance of any kind was scouted with ridicule. The vauntings of the Bonapartists (Chauvinism, as it was called), the pretensions of the ultra-Royalists, Republicanism even in the mouth of Lafayette, were none of them tolerated, and all so completely condemned by the good sense of the nation, that it would be impossible to imagine a population so broken to constitutional monarchy as the French of that time. It has been seen how greedily and kindly the French people hailed every expression and every symptom of the readiness of Charles X. to play the part of constitutional King. Never was a people prepared to overlook more faults, or be contented with less boons, than

the French of 1829 and 1830. But a fatality drew their unfortunate King to place his attachment and confidence in the only half-dozen individuals, perhaps, who were the objects of national contempt and aversion. It had been long foreseen that the obstinacy of the Crown to maintain such Ministers would lead to a breach between it and the Chamber. But as Guernon de Ranville admitted, the masses appeared tranquil, and the struggle of wealthy citizens and deputies with those possessed of government authority, could only be carried on by some kind of legal and constitutional resistance. In such a struggle the public had the courts of justice and judges on their side. And though any bold man who stood out might not have a jury to appeal to, like a Hampden, he was sure of judges equally favourable. Whilst the thoughts of all Liberals were turned to resistance of this kind, they deprecated *émeute*, or popular insurrection, as the worst thing which could befall. Every one seemed certain that any attempt of the kind must be put down, and the result would be to give tyranny an excuse for treading down the last vestiges of constitutional rights.

The scene which took place at St. Cloud of the solemn and anxious council, in which the ordonnances were signed, was on a Sunday. On the same day chance enabled me to observe that the great ecclesiastical seminary of St. Sulpice had been evacuated by its hundreds of scholars. "What can they have to fear? Are we about to have a popular rising against the priesthood?" was asked in the quarter. The next morning, Monday, the 26th, appeared the ordonnances in the *Moniteur*. Few readers in the capital were in the habit of looking at the official journal; the great event was little known till the afternoon. It was in the offices

of the several journals that the announcement first caused sensation. To them it was a death-blow. It infringed not merely liberty, but it deprived some forty or fifty thousand persons of livelihood, as had been calculated during the discussion of Peyronnet's law of love. Whilst editors and writers met, chiefly in the office of the *National*, then close to the Boulevard, to devise what means they should adopt for their common defence, the printers of the same establishments went, in their aprons, with copies of the ordonnances, to read them to groups in the Palais Royal. I mingled in some of these; and it was evident that whilst the penmen were drawing up protests, these compositors were meditating measures more energetic. The weather was the finest that a Parisian summer sends; but the Palais Royal showed no longer its usual crowd of women and children. These had given way to angry and severer groups; whilst the polished statue of Apollo, under which the Parisians had lit up the chairs of the gardens, by way of bonfire, to scare Charles X. and his Court at the great ball given a few days before to the King of Naples, showed that, contrary to Government opinion, either the masses were alive to passing events, or that the middle classes were ready to take the lead in tumult.

One of the first steps of the chief journalists was to hasten to the lawyer who had so often defended them, M. Dupin; but he observed that, although his legal advice was at their service, he could not join in a political consultation. They came to him, it was urged, not as jurisconsult but as deputy. "I am no longer a deputy," exclaimed Dupin. Half a dozen deputies met about the same time at Casimir Perrier's, Bertin de Veaux,

Sebastiani, Berard being of the number. All were more anxious to escape the difficulty than to meet it. Alexander de la Borde was the most valiant of them; and he, discontented with the rest, repaired to the office of the *National*, certain that he would find in the members of the press that spirit which parliamentary politicians wanted. M. de la Borde was not mistaken. He found the chief journalists of Paris in the act of drawing up an address, or a declaration of defiance and resistance to the illegal decrees of the Government, quite sufficent to have sent all of them to the scaffold, if Peyronnet and his ordonnances triumphed. M. Thiers' was the hand which drew up the protest. Signed by forty-five journalists, the initiative of resistance taken by the press, not only led to the conflict between the police and the journals at their offices, but it tended to shame the deputies into the adoption of some resolutions not less courageous.

The council of the journalists had no sooner terminated in the office of the *National*, than a crowd of liberal citizens who were electors met there also, and discussed divers plans,—one for the reassembling of the National Guard, another for refusing taxes. M. de Schonen, a lawyer, declared that the time was passed for discussion, and had come for acting. Violence could only be repelled by force. To this M. Thiers is said to have observed, that the people showed no signs of rising, and that against troops and cannons the physical efforts of unarmed citizens would prove unavailing. The deputies who met again, to the number of fourteen, in the evening, came to no decision, and saw no means of acting. The Palais Royal had been shut, and its group dispersed. Polignac's carriage had been pelted, and his windows broken. The funds had fallen five francs.

But neither Ministers nor Deputies as yet foresaw a revolution. All, however, who employed workmen, or came in contact with them, were surprised to perceive the ardour with which they took up the Liberal cause. All with one accord, therefore, whilst promising their daily pay, for the present, to those whom they employed, allowed them to take a holiday for this memorable week. Thus was the Parisian population turned into the forum.

Neither the King nor Polignac had, strange to say, yet spoken to Marmont. He was Major-General on service at St. Cloud when he heard of the ordonnances of Monday, but could not get the *Moniteur* to learn their exact nature. He repaired to a sitting of the Institute, probably for that purpose, and complained to his friend Arago of the madness of the Court. "It may grieve you as a citizen and a Frenchman; but I, as a General, may be called upon to act for a policy that I abhor, and for men from whom I have received nothing but insult." The King spent Monday hunting in the forest of Rambouillet. On Tuesday morning he spoke to Marmont, gave him the command, and the Marshal was installed at the head-quarters of the Carrousel on the afternoon of Tuesday.

The streets of the capital had, during the morning of that day been paraded by crowds of workmen, and especially printers, out of employ. The presses of the journals had published flying sheets, and these were either stuck up, or distributed gratis, read publicly, and passed from hand to hand. Peyronnet gave orders for the arrest of the forty-five journalists who had signed the protest of the previous day. As the journals had disobeyed the ordonnance in publishing, commissaries of police were sent to seize their presses. Even the police were not

zealous in their duty. Those sent to stop the presses of the *National* merely took out a screw, and went away. The screw was easily replaced, and the work of printing went on. Another commissary of police went to the *Temps*, where he was encountered by M. Baude, attached to the journal. He summoned the commissary to desist, declaring that he was committing an illegal act; that the laws protected the journals and their presses, and that no ordonnance could avail in contradiction to them. The commissary of police, however staggered by the obstinacy of Baude, sent for a locksmith to break open the door of the printing-office, and then break the press. Apostrophized by Baude, and warned that they were committing an illegal act, the smith refused to obey, till the special smith of the police and the gaols arrived. Seven hours were spent in altercation before the order of the commissary could be accomplished by a forcible entrance, and rendering the presses incapable of being worked any more. The attention of crowds was drawn during the progress of this struggle, which was noised all over the quarter, and greatly added to the excitement of the groups of workmen, who began to station themselves permanently in the Rue Richelieu and round the Palais Royal.

Eager to watch the rising of the popular tide, I went forth in the afternoon, and penetrated to the room of a well-known journal, of which the editor was in prison. There were seated around several of the signers of the protest of the day before, expecting every moment to be arrested, and certainly entertaining no hopes of being liberated from peril by popular insurrection. M. Berard has left a description of the meeting held by about thirty deputies at the house of Casimir Perrier on this same

afternoon of Tuesday. They would no more hear of protests on that than upon the previous day. The journalists who had taken that bold step had some of them fled, others had their presses broken. The example was not encouraging; and Casimir Perrier himself showed as little courage as any one. Villemain coming to this meeting, declared he had just seen a mounted gendarme killed by a pistol-shot, as he was menacing the crowd with his sabre.

During the early part of the afternoon of Tuesday, the police, mounted and on foot, were dispersed through Paris for the sake of maintaining order. They were, as yet, unsupported by troops. Marmont, in fact, only took the command in the afternoon, and his first care was to collect troops, and call them to Paris, having few or none under his hand. The gendarmerie, therefore, bore the first brunt of the popular ill-humour. Those drawn up in the Place before the Palais Royal were so hustled and pelted, that they at last fired; and amongst others a woman was killed. This was the signal for a general attack upon the police, who were compelled to retreat from the Palais Royal and from the Hotel de Ville. This success emboldened the crowd, which immediately fell upon the gunsmiths' shops, and succeeded in pillaging some of them, and procuring arms.

A great many causes combined to render the number of troops which the Government could dispose of less than perhaps at any other period. The French army did not amount to much more than 200,000 men; 50,000 were either in Algiers, or in reserve at Toulon to be sent thither. Each of the great cities and fortresses required garrisons. Two regiments of the Royal Guard had been sent from the

capital to Normandy to protect farmers and proprietors against the numerous fires which then so unaccountably ravaged that province. The troops of the north were chiefly concentrated for the summer,—the infantry at St. Omer, the cavalry and artillery at Luneville. A project which the King of Holland entertained, of calling Prussian soldiers into Belgium to allay the effervescence already rising there, produced a threat from M. de Polignac, that the soldiers of the two northern camps should be ordered to march upon Belgium, if the Prussians passed their frontiers. There were, therefore, few troops in Paris, and few within call. M. de Polignac, in his *Etudes*, estimates the force at Marmont's disposal to be 19,000. But they were soon found as deficient in zeal as in numbers.

I went down the Rue Richelieu about five o'clock on Tuesday evening. Marmont had just begun to employ the regular troops to seize the position which the police had quitted. The infantry of the Royal Guard marched into the Palais Royal, and drove the mob from the wooden galleries. They had pillaged a gunsmith's shop within a few yards of Marmont's quarters, and when troops came to compel them to desist, the people gathered an immense heap of rubbish which lay close to the theatre, the ruins of some houses which had lately been taken down; and behind this, as from behind a barricade, they pelted the soldiers with stones, and may have fired a shot or two. The lancers then charged up to the Rue Richelieu, and cleared it, whilst the infantry took possession of the heap of rubbish. At the same time, a discharge of musketry took place at the end of the Rue Traversière, by which four men were said to have fallen. With others of the crowd escaping from the soldiers, I found my way to the other

side of the Palais Royal, where the troops were also advancing. Here the people had stretched upon portable biers those who had been slain, and were proceeding to carry them as excitements to rage and revolution through the populous quarters of the centre and east of Paris. They were accompanied by small scraps of popular oratory, such as,—"Here are our brethren whom they have killed! To arms!" One powerful man had taken up the body of the woman who had been shot, and flung it before the military post, near the Bank, with imprecations on the soldiers. Returning to the Rue Richelieu, the scene of the late encounter, all was quiet. The Carrousel and the Rue Rivoli were as if no collision had taken place. Further on in the Place de la Concorde, a regiment of the Swiss Guards had just arrived; and soldiers were evidently crowding to the west of Paris, whilst distant murmurs told that the people were mustering in the opposite quarter. Although towards midnight all appeared quiet in Paris, still the symptoms were not such as to lead to hopes that the struggle had passed off. Several attempts at barricades had been made even in the Rue St. Honoré. The people seemed determined to overturn diligences and carriages for this purpose, so that they ceased to run. The lamps were broken in every direction, and the capital was left in a state of complete darkness. Moreover, several parties and bodies of troops of the line had plainly manifested a dislike for the service in which they were employed; and some said to the people,—"Come with arms, and you will not find us enemies." These symptoms encouraged the esolution of Liberal citizens to form committees in each district of Paris, for the sake of aiding or carrying on resistance as far as it was prudent or possible. National

Guards were besought to resume their uniform and their arms, whilst more active and decided men, connected chiefly with the press, joined the elder students of military and medical schools in preparing ammunition, and organising the means of meeting the military in the streets. During the night of Tuesday, several measures were silently taken, and nothing disturbed the tranquillity of Paris, except the burning of the guard-house near the Louvre which the people had broken into.

At day-break on the morning of Wednesday the 28th, and for two hours after, it would have been impossible to suppose while perambulating Paris, that a conflict had taken place, or was likely to be renewed. The streets were strewn with vestiges of an apparent riot. There were neither insurgents, nor troops, nor police in the popular quarters. Marmont had withdrawn the soldiers with the intention of acting on the defensive. The people awoke, as it were, to a fête, which a very brilliant sun illumined, and as many from pastime, as from fierce determination, began to stir the paving stones, and lay the foundations of the barricade. Arms seemed to come forth in abundance, for the National Guards had kept them. One of the powder magazines of the capital was attacked and plundered, so that cartouches became more plentiful than muskets. The populace, the citizens, the self-constituted chiefs of the insurrection, had thus a whole morning to combine and direct their plans, to erect barricades for defence, as well as to form columns for attack of the posts, within which Marmont had withdrawn; these were the Louvre, the Palais Royal, and the Tuileries. The Faubourgs St. Antoine and St. Marceau proceeded to pour down their coarse artizans, whose figure and gait and entire bearing recalled the days of the first

Revolution. The resemblance, however, was not perfect, for the men of the Faubourgs had been soldiers, had known discipline, abhorred blood except on the field of battle, and had been as much civilized by the Revolution as the middle class above them.

The use which these insurgents made of two posts, which seemed to Marmont of little importance, had great effect both in provoking him, and precipitating the Revolution. These posts were the Hôtel de Ville and the Cathedral of Nôtre Dame. The first, of such vital importance in revolutions as the spot where an insurgent municipality might be installed, was abandoned to the guard of a dozen men. The insurgents broke into it on the Wednesday morning, pulled down the white flag from its tower, and hoisted a tricolor. The encouragement afforded by this was obvious. The Place of the Hôtel de Ville became immediately the centre, from whence the efforts of insurrection were directed. But the towers of Nôtre Dame were higher still than that of the Hôtel de Ville, and could be seen all over Paris. So could its enormous bell, the *bourdon*, or the tocsin, be heard far beyond even the walls of the capital. The tricolor flag soon floated on the tower of Nôtre Dame also, and the *bourdon* set in motion, seemed to summon as in old times the whole population to the revolutionary conflict. Marmont soon found himself pressed even within the circle, where he had confined his troops. Barricades were erected in the streets adjoining the Louvre. A post not a few steps from the Palais Royal, that of the Petits Pères, was carried by the people, and the guard disarmed. This gave the insurgents possession of the Bank, as well as the Hôtel de Ville.

The circumstance of Marmont's giving full swing to the

insurrection during all the morning of the 27th, and at mid-day marching to put it down athwart all the barricades, and the obstacles erected during that morning, has not yet been sufficiently explained. It was during that morning that the barricades were thrown up, the people mustered, supplied with arms and ammunition, officered from the military schools, and no doubt supplied with money and provisions by the Liberal committee of each quarter. Some explain Marmont's conduct by supposing, that, on the morning of the 27th, he believed in an accommodation, and was reluctant to employ cannon or outrageous military means, until the Ministers, who met at St. Cloud, had sent him an order proclaiming Paris in a state of siege, and making it his duty to reduce it by force. The truth appears to be, that Marmont, in the night of the 26th to the 27th, did not think the insurrection likely to be serious, and imagined that the silence of that night was a return to order. He thought that withdrawing the troops would avoid irritation, and afford the people no object to attack. His letter to St. Cloud, on the night of the 26th, breathed confidence. Nor was it till nine o'clock on the morning of the 27th, that his communication to the Court began to breathe anxiety and portend disaster.* He had not yet employed cannon nor rigour, and the opinion of the Court was, that these extreme means, if resorted to, would infallibly get the better of any insurrection. Orders from St. Cloud, there-

* "I have already had the honour of giving an account to your Majesty of the groups which troubled the tranquillity of Paris. This morning they are becoming more numerous and more threatening. It is no longer an *émeute, it is a revolution.* It is urgent upon your Majesty to take measures of pacification. The honour of the Crown may still be saved; to-morrow it will be too late. I am taking the same measures to-day which I did yesterday; the troops will be ready at twelve o'clock, but I await with impatience your Majesty's orders."

fore, gave Marmont full power, and urged him to make a vigorous effort.

The Commander-in-chief accordingly resolved, about midday, to sweep before his guns and his battalions the resistance of the Parisians. He ordered two columns to march, the one along the Boulevards, the other along the quays, whilst a third was to occupy the great central market, called *Des Innocens*, from which the Rue St. Dénis emerges on one side to the Boulevards, and leads on the other to the Hôtel de Ville. These columns were each of them far too weak for the service demanded of them. That which advanced along the quays consisted of but one battalion of the Guard, the others had each two battalions of the Guard. Each brought with it two guns. It is remarkable that Marmont employed no troops but the regiments of the Guard on that service. He already doubted, and would not put to trial, the fidelity of the line.

The column which was to proceed along the quays to the Hôtel de Ville was to be supported by the 15th Light Infantry, which held the Palais de Justice and the Pont Neuf. It advanced without difficulty to the Pont Neuf. Then the Commander, General Talon, instead of taking the 15th Light Infantry with him, ordered them to line the opposite quays, and to fire on the crowd, which barred the approaches to the Hôtel de Ville. The 15th took up the position ordered, but refused to fire upon the people, unless they were fired at. Talon with the Guards advanced with one division along the quay of the cité, the other on the opposite side of the river. Both met determined resistance. Every window of the Hôtel de Ville, and of the houses opposite, was filled with marksmen, and a body of students did not fear to stand before the military. But

the two guns, with their discharges of grape, swept away popular resistance wherever encountered, and the battalion took possession of the Hôtel de Ville, and pulled down the tricolor. General Talon found it still difficult to maintain possession of the square, and to keep the insurgents at bay on the other side of the bridge, as well as up the narrow streets all around. Hearing probably of the conduct of the 15th regiment, the Commander-in-Chief sent a Swiss battalion to reinforce them. The column, which followed the Boulevards, met with no obstacle along their broad road, except a barricade attempted near the Porte St. Martin, which was entirely destroyed; there was an exchange of fire between the column and the insurgents in the side streets, but no permanent obstacle presented itself, till the Place de la Bastille was reached. The soldiers could not make their way from hence to join their comrades at the Hôtel de Ville, so strong were the barricades, so formidable the fire and discharge of missiles from the windows of the Rue St. Antoine.

The most painful and dangerous service was that intrusted to the remaining column to clear the Marché des Innocens and the Rue St. Denis. That portion of it which attempted the street was crushed for the most part with paving-stones, thrown upon them from the tops of the upper windows. The narrowness of the street and its windings left no play to cannon, and the chief enemies were above. The attack of a street, of which the barriers are all occupied by insurgents, requires a large force, prepared for destruction. The Royal Guards were neither in numbers nor in preparation fit for such a struggle. They were even without provisions, and no precautions for the supply of such an assemblage of troops had been made. The folly

of intrusting the *interim* of the War department to M. de Polignac was even greater than the intrusting to him the political administration of the country. Colonel Pleinselves, who commanded the Guards in the passage of the Rue St. Denis, received there a mortal wound, and was obliged to be borne along, supported on the muskets of his soldiers.

Whilst the people of Paris were thus defeating and massacring the Royal Guards, which were the only troops the King or Marmont could really depend upon, the deputies, increased to upwards of thirty by the arrival of Laffitte, Lafayette, and others from the country, met at the house of Audry de Puyraveau. New men are the boldest of speech and counsel. Mauguin was the first declaimer in the assemblage, and said that it was no longer an insurrection, but a revolution which had taken place. "To lead such a movement, men must comprehend it. It will find other chiefs, if the deputies shrink from acting as such. You have to choose between the party of the people and that of the Royal Guards. Do so at once, and name a Provisional Government." Casimir Perrier, General Sebastiani, and the Constitutionalists of the Left Centre, were horrified at so much audacity. Perrier adroitly succeeded in getting rid of even the consideration of the proposal, by saying that a deputation to Marmont to stop the effusion of blood would be the most practical step. Casimir Perrier, Laffitte, Gerard, Lobau, and Mauguin were appointed to form this deputation. Whilst they repaired to the Tuileries, M. Guizot read to the remaining deputies a protest, which he had drawn up.* Berard

* The undersigned, duly elected by different departments, and at present in Paris, feel themselves obliged by their duty to the King of France to protest against the measures which the advisers of the Crown, deceiving the Monarch's intentions, have caused to prevail for the overthrow of the legal system of election and the ruin of the freedom of the press. These

says, that although he found it very pale, he still seconded its immediate adoption, lest the result of discussion should be to render it still paler. Lafayette protested against the supposition, that the King was utterly blameless in all that had been done. Many exclaimed, that the term of parliamentary fictions were past, and that the use of them ought to be left to England; but that the French ought to state and establish in plain sensible terms the relations between people and sovereign in a constitutional monarchy. "As soon as the protest was agreed to," writes Berard, "I asked that we should put our names to it, but there was a general outcry that this was useless, it being sufficient to print, *the signatures follow.* I insisted, and reminded my colleagues that the thousand anonymous placards which covered the walls of Paris, had just been stigmatized by them as contemptible, and that their protest would be considered in the same light. But it was in vain; no one would sign. The protest was sent to the office of the *Temps* for publication. Coste, the editor, sent it back, saying 'he would print nothing that was not signed.' The deputies were then compelled to permit at least a list of those present to be drawn up and added to the document. M. Coste had,

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measures are directly opposed to the Constitutional Charter, to the rights of the Chamber of Peers, to the public law of 11th June, to the decision of the tribunal, and are calculated to compromise present peace and future security. The undersigned protest against these measures, and against all their consequences. The Chamber of Deputies, not having been constituted, could not be legally dissolved. Moreover, the attempt to form another Chamber of Deputies, after a new and arbitrary manner, is in formal contradiction of the Charter and of electoral rights. In consequence the undersigned declare that they always consider themselves as those legally elected Deputies, and as not capable of being replaced by virtue of any other illegal election. If the undersigned do not exercise the rights and acquit themselves of the duties they have acquired from their election, it is material violence which prevents them; and against this they will not cease to protest.

moreover, taken some of the paleness out of the document, blotted out the mention of the King, and rendered the declaration more spirited. So that if the famous protest of the French deputies against the tyranny of Charles X. has a personal and historic title to glory, it was more owing to Jaques Coste, than to the united wisdom and courage of Parliament."

Whilst the columns of the Guard were in motion to clear the way through the obstructed streets of the capital, and the few deputies in Paris pothering about what should be done, Arago, presuming on his friendship for Marmont, penetrated to the presence of the Marshal. Arago had heard of Paris being proclaimed in a state of siege. He saw the march of the troops proceeding to act upon it, and firing on the populace with grape, and he saw at the same time the fruitless efforts of so small a number of soldiers, as those of the Guard, to overcome the swarm of Parisian insurgents, who seemed to know no fear. Arago hastened to Marmont to expostulate with him: he has left an account of it in his testimony at the trial. Arago insisted that the people had right on their side as well as force, and that it was as unworthy as imprudent of Marmont to support the King, unless he would at once recall his illegal ordonnances. The Marshal admitted that all Arago said was right, but that he was bound by honour as a soldier not to abandon a cause at the very moment of its greatest peril. Moreover at the very time, M. de Polignac and his brother Ministers were in another apartment of the Tuileries, representing the Royal power; and Marmont knew the inutility of either appealing to them, or appealing to the King independently of them.

The Marshal then began to receive reports from the

commanders of his several columns, who, having in part accomplished the task of reaching their respective destinations, were blocked up there. All of them demanded reinforcements, to which Marmont had no answer, except that of his having no more to give. He instantly dictated to his aide-de-camp, M. de Guise, a letter, intended to inform the King fully of the state of affairs. The Marshal began by describing the state of his four columns, one at the Bastille, another at the Hôtel de Ville, a third divided between the Place Vendôme and the Place des Victoires.

"General Quinsonas," continued the letter, "reached the Marché des Innocens, turned and destroyed several barricades, and drove the insurgents before him in the Rue St. Denis; nevertheless, the groups were immediately formed behind him as he advanced, and I can only obtain intelligence from him by means of officers in disguise. Wherever the troops advanced, the people dispersed at their approach; but in every street a fire was kept up from the windows of every house, and every moment of advance was a combat. The troops are, perhaps, not threatened with seeing their position forced, but I cannot conceal that the situation becomes more and more serious."

Marmont was here interrupted in the dictation of his letter by the introduction of the deputies. What first struck him on beholding them was the recollection that it was not long since he had seen handed an order to the Commandant of Police, Foucault, for the arrest of Laffitte, Gerard, Mauguin, Lafayette, Audry de Puyraveau, Eusebe de Salverte, and Marchais. The city being in a state of siege, the police authorities were superseded and rendered subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. The Ministers

had handed this list to Marmont, who, without consideration, gave it to the Police Commandant. The moment that the Marshal perceived several of these deputies for whom warrants of arrest were preparing, he sent an aide-de-camp to get back the order of arrest, which he instantly tore. He then received the deputies with courtesy, and listened and replied to their arguments as he had done to those of Arago. Laffitte demanded the cessation of the fire. Marmont was not indisposed to an armistice, or an arrangement for the fire ceasing on either side. But this the deputies could not promise. The Marshal offered to appeal to the King, and represent to him the offers of the deputies, but he could give few hopes of his representations having the least effect. "In that case," exclaimed Laffitte, "I, for one, will join the cause of the people." The deputies were withdrawing, when the Marshal asked, as if from sudden thought, if they had any objection to see M. de Polignac. They replied, "No." The Marshal went to the Prince, and after some time returned, saying that an interview could lead to no good result. The Marshal then finished the dictation of his letter to the King, as follows:—

"When about to close my letter, Messieurs Laffitte, Casimir Perrier, Mauguin, Generals Gerard and Lobau, presented themselves, begging me to order the cessation of firing. I said, I could make the same request of them. They would not attempt it unless assured that the ordonnances were revoked. I replied that I had no political power to make any engagement of the kind. They then limited their wishes to my making known to your Majesty the steps they had taken. I think it urgent that these overtures should be profited by."

In a little time after, the Marshal received positive intelligence not only of the refusal of the regiments of the line to fire, but of the fraternization of many of the soldiers with the people. He hastened to communicate this to M. de Polignac, and received for answer, "Fire, then, on the soldiers who pass over to the insurrection." Marmont, in fact, was so impressionable, so pliable, so full of fears and scruples, that even when he gave the Ministers and the King warning of the perilous state of things, they merely took this for one of the Marshal's usual misgivings. Had they employed a blunt soldier, with a clear conscience and a frank character, they could have at least depended on his words and gathered truth and certainty from his communications; but Marmont's life, his defection, the payment of his debts by the Bourbons, left him a mere reed in the hands of the Government, incapable of being an instrument of power, or even a trustworthy channel of communication. The letter written by Marmont was brought to St. Cloud by his aide-de-camp, and made no impression on the King. And, to confess the truth, it was not calculated to make any impression; the expressions of it were neither of that fulness, frankness, or force, that circumstances required.

Had Charles X., obstinate as he was, been at the Tuileries on the afternoon of the 28th, he would have learned the relative force and prospects of his troops and of the insurgents, and might have taken measures for the safety of his Crown, or at least of his house. He had some idea of this when he asked M. de Vitrolles whether he thought the King's place at such a moment was not at the Tuileries. Vitrolles said that he should have thought so, but having learned that orders had been given to

arrest certain Liberal deputies, and also to form a tribunal at the Chateau to dispose of these and other prisoners according to military law, he no longer counselled the King to proceed thither. Had he done so the memory of Charles X. might be made to resemble that of Charles IX.

The afternoon of the 28th was one continued triumph for the insurgents, who had so multiplied and strengthened their barricades, that there were forty of them in a street, causing heavy losses to the soldiers who surrounded them; the artillery not being in that abundance requisite to clear even the streets. The Generals were disheartened with their losses. The Swiss battalion, which had suffered so much in passing through the Rue St. Denis to the Boulevards, hopeless of making its way either back by that street or by the Boulevards, athwart which every tree had been flung, marched out of town and returned outside the circuit of the walls to the Champs Elysées and the Tuileries. The column which occupied the Bastille was compelled to make a similar circuit, crossing the river and coming round by the Invalides. There were no such means of escape for the troops at the Hôtel de Ville and at the Marché des Innocens. Marmont was obliged to reinforce them. He gave orders to the colonel of the 15th light infantry to send one battalion to the aid of General Quinsonas in the Marché des Innocens. The battalion had several streets and barricades to pass, through the most dense and intricate part of the city. The officers sought to execute Marmont's order, whilst still observing the neutrality which they had kept up all day. They asked to be allowed to pass the barricades. The insurgents refused, and the battalion carried one or two after sharp struggles. The two superior

officers were wounded, and the battalion, having no cannon, came to the resolution that the task imposed upon them was too severe. They accordingly abandoned it, and withdrew to their old position, cheered, and not molested by the people.

A battalion of Swiss was immediately ordered by Marmont to execute what the 15th had abandoned. They advanced with far more determination, and soon cleared all the barricades between the Quai and the church of St. Eustache; there they missed their way, got embarrassed in narrow streets, and lost an immense number of men in the Rue Mandar, which they had entered to retrace their way to the market. The Swiss lost one half of their force, but brought Quinsonas the reinforcement of the rest, with ammunition. The use made of both by the General was to beat an immediate retreat from his position. Although cannon were useful in advancing, the troops would have gladly dispensed with them in retreat; as, in order to let them pass, the barricades had not only to be surmounted, but removed. It cost, therefore, great labour and loss to extricate the two guns in passing down the Rue St. Denis from the Market to the Quais. Many of the wounded were necessarily left behind, and it is to the credit of the populace that the soldiers of the Royal Guard were as well treated as the wounded insurgents themselves. So it was even with the Swiss, if they escaped the rabble and the *gamins de Paris*, and obtained refuge in any house. But the mob itself had no quarter and no mercy for the Swiss, tearing the red uniforms and cutting the moustaches off the dead for trophies. The order was given to General Talon to evacuate the Hôtel de Ville at the same time that all the

other regiments were bidden to fall back and concentrate within the Louvre and the Carrousel. The General did not think it prudent to execute this retreat till midnight had brought comparative quiet, and allayed the vigilance, if it had not diminished the number, of his adversaries.

No personage had gone to St. Cloud in the evening of Wednesday of sufficient weight to persuade the King that his Crown was in danger. M. de Vitrolles returned thither, but his restless and discontented spirit deprived him of credit. Alexandre de Girardin, one of the high officers of the Court, ventured on the same errand, but he merely met with reproaches from the Duchesse de Berri. But Ministers, as soon as they heard and saw that the columns of the Marshal, which went forth to put down the insurrection, came back decimated and discouraged, had the conviction forced upon them that the people had the advantage of the military, and that nothing was left but to yield. This conviction, however, was not forced upon them until so late on the night of Wednesday, or, rather, so early on the morning of Thursday, that it was necessary to wait the opening of the day in order to act upon it. Thus did this memorable night close for all parties, except for the victorious people themselves, in a state of painful incertitude. The Court was not aware of the gravity of its defeat. The Marshal, who knew it, had no power to act upon it. Ministers could not see the King till his time of rising on Thursday; etiquette forbade. The deputies, with the exception perhaps of Laffitte, did not see their way, or entertain an idea of how the crisis was to be terminated. The people alone, contented with victory, could not look so far forward as to be anxious what use was to be made of it. They had broken

all the ensigns of Bourbon Royalty and hoisted the tricolor. Had a Bonaparte Prince existed or shown himself, he would certainly have had great chance of commanding popular adherence. But the name of the Empire or of Napoleon was not mentioned. Even Austria, accused of intriguing for that dynasty, never made an effort. M. d'Appony, her ambassador, had gone to the baths of Dieppe. M. Polignac complained of the foreign ambassadors having turned their backs upon sinking Royalty, and never ventured near St. Cloud; but Lord Stuart had been but recently insulted by the King's Minister, and Pozzo di Borgo loudly deplored Polignac's incapacity and madness. Charles, therefore, was left to whist and slumber at St. Cloud, whilst the monarchy was foundering beneath him.

CHAPTER XV.

LAST DAY OF THE REVOLUTION—MINISTERS AT THE TUILERIES—DE SEMONVILLE'S INTERFERENCE—MINISTERS AT ST. CLOUD—CAPTURE OF THE LOUVRE—DUC DE MORTEMART APPOINTED MINISTER—REFUSAL OF AUTHORITIES IN PARIS TO TREAT WITH THE KING.

THE people of Paris in July had discovered a new element of power, a yet untried mode of defence against troops, and even against artillery. Their doing so was chance. The barricades were first raised for pastime as much as for serious bulwarks. As a new and unexpected force for the people, their invention at the time was amongst the many fatalities which beset Charles and Polignac. To provoke a whole people, and every class of it, is certainly a powerful mode of calling their inventive faculties into play against a tyranny that was hated and despised. But the monarch and the War Minister of 1830 had no reason to calculate upon popular attacks and resistance of another kind from those usually adopted, and, one would have thought, exhausted in the great revolution. Twenty thousand soldiers were ample to clear away a mob, had that mob not shown itself endowed with the military genius, and communicated to the

population of towns a new force, gallantly, and nobly, and wisely used in the first instance, but rendering all Government difficult, if not impossible, until the great verdict of July was revoked, and the opinion reversed, that townsmen were indomitable, standing in the defence in their houses, the streets, and the thoroughfares. The first experiment of that kind of defence at once baffled all the efforts of the military, and of the commander. It was this evidently hopeless nature of the conflict, rather than disaffection, which caused the regiments of the line to shrink from their duty. Had Charles and Polignac been a Prince and a Minister of great ability, and had Marmont far more of military genius than he possessed, the result would have been the same.

The new and successful mode of defence adopted by 100,000 of the population of Paris against a small and unprepared army of soldiers must have had its result. It is idle to criticise Marmont for concentrating or not concentrating. He would have been beaten in all and in every case. Never was a more gallant struggle. The soldiers of the Guard fought like heroes, and with the greatest heroism, showing indomitable constancy for a cause disliked from the first and ever hopeless. As to the Parisians fear was unknown; men, women, children, whole families rushed to the conflict as to a festivity, lending hand and energy to every work and every act; and the more delighted evidently the more it drew them into the vortex of destruction. The general excitement was a perfect moral inebriety. The difficulty was to find or to persuade any one of the least thought of prudence or self-preservation. Much as I was struck at the time with admiration for such universal heroism, the effect was

certainly to diminish respect for a quality so common, and so plainly epidemic, as courage in a combat.

Whilst the people of Paris were preparing in the night of Wednesday a certain triumph on the morrow, the depositaries of the Royal power were merely acting as checks upon each other. Marmont, as soon as he despaired of recovering Paris, might have taken steps of conciliation, might have taken advantage of the hours of darkness to communicate with the deputies, and to have established an armistice. To have ordered out the old National Guard, and intrusted to each legion its own district, would have been raising an army of citizens for the defence of order, property, and the throne. But the Minister was behind him. Polignac, as a War Minister, summoning the troops from St. Omer and Luneville to St. Cloud. Chantelauze ordered the judges to transfer their Courts to the Tuileries; Guernon de Ranville alone spoke the language of moderation, and advised the Marshal to summon to him the mayors of each district of Paris. The Marshal did so, and told them to come in their uniforms, in the hopes that they might be more respected, and achieve for him what he then desired, a suspension of hostilities. But there appeared no possibility of even addressing an insurrection without a head. The deputies, who had often threatened and demanded moderate conditions, had been repulsed, and remained unanswered.

At seven o'clock in the evening of Thursday, an aged peer, M. de Semonville, Grand Referendary of the Upper Chamber, feeling that his order was foundering with the monarchy, resolved to undertake the courageous mission of bearding both Minister and King, and telling them the truth with that rudeness and energy, which might be

pardoned to his rank and age. Getting the assistance of a young and courageous friend, M. d'Argout, to support his steps, M. de Semonville made his way through fire and over barricades to the Tuileries, broke upon Marmont, and demanded to see M. de Polignac. That personage no sooner appeared, than M. de Semonville apostrophized him with vehemence, and charged him with being the cause of the ruin which was befalling the country, the Crown, the public, with every institution, and every class. The aged peer demanded of the Minister the only reparation that he now could make, which was first the revocation of the ordonnances, and then the resignation of Ministers. Polignac defending himself with warmth, the Generals and officers entered at the sound of angry voices, and could not all be got to withdraw. M. de Semonville seeing his demands and apostrophes vain, summoned the Governor of the Tuileries to furnish him and M. d'Argout with the means of transport to St. Cloud. Seeing that officer as well as the Marshal evidently indignant at the obstinacy of M. de Polignac, who refused every means of putting a stop to the effusion of blood and the progress of popular triumphs, M. de Semonville proposed to them both to arrest the Minister, and then go forth to pacify the people and procure at least a suspension of hostilities. Marmont refused. The precedents of his life forbade his ever again committing what might be thought an act of treachery. The friends of Polignac, M. de Lamartine amongst others, vilify De Semonville for his conduct, and attribute it to the meanest of motives. This is the more hard and unjust, from the generosity and good feeling which pervade most of the judgments of the great and brilliant historian.

According to M. de Semonville, who recounted all the circumstances in his future depositions, M. de Polignac was the only decided opponent of his demands. Marmont was moved, even to convulsion. The insurgents were beginning to push even up the Carrousel; officers sent for permission to fire cannon with grape from the Rue St. Nicaise. Marmont refused, anxious for the means of suspending not continuing hostilities. Peyronnet, at the same time, evidently disapproved of the rigid refusal of Polignac. Whilst the latter first deprecated the missions of Semonville and D'Argout to St. Cloud, Peyronnet urged it, and upon its being determined on, Polignac resolved to precede or accompany them; Peyronnet advised them to hasten. The result was, that Ministers and Peers reached St. Cloud together, whilst Marmont drew up the following proclamation, and made great, though not very effectual efforts to distribute it:—

"PARISIANS,

"YESTERDAY'S events have caused many tears to flow. Too much blood has been spilled. From humanity I consent to suspend hostilities, in the hope that good citizens may withdraw to their homes, and resume their occupation. I entreat them to do so.

"DUC DE RAGUSE."

Little success attended this; and Marmont could not but hope that the apostrophes of Semonville, and the advice of several of the Ministers themselves, would induce the King to recall the ordonnances and take measures to enable him to come to an accommodation with his people. He therefore ordered his troops to maintain their positions, but, at the same time, enjoined them not

to carry on hostilities beyond the necessities of defence; to avoid firing grape, until it was imperatively necessary; and, in short, to conciliate rather than to repel or to provoke. Such orders inevitably damped the ardour of both officers and soldiers, and suggested to some an example, which Marmont himself had unfortunately set in 1814, that of treating for themselves. Marmont had garrisoned the Louvre by two battalions of Swiss, the firmest troops to resist the mob. The Louvre was menaced chiefly from the streets on each side of the church of St. Germain l'Auxerrois. At the head of each were barricades, from whence a continual fire was kept against the Swiss, who, from behind the double columns, returned it. The Swiss cannon swept the Pont des Arts, to keep in check a crowd of armed students, who awaited an opportunity to pass it to the attack. The grape-shot of their guns told on the venerable front of the Institute: from the quays and the Pont Neuf, thronged with insurgents, would every now and then advance a column, led by a youth of the Polytechnic School, on horseback or on foot, with the vain idea of carrying the Louvre by assault. The foremost of such attack always bit the dust, and the column retreated from the vain effort to escalade or even approach such a position as the Louvre.

The Carrousel, the Place de la Concorde, the Champs Elysées, were held by different battalions of the Guard, many of them decimated in the encounters of the preceding day. The Place Vendôme was occupied by two regiments of the line, the 5th and 53rd. The populace were supposed to come little in contact with them; and, in truth, the greater number of the insurgents to be found in this part of the city and amongst the prostrate

trees of the Boulevards, were of the better or middle classes, armed with fowling-pieces, and habited, many of them, in the uniform of the National Guard. Amongst the many efforts made to bring about a suspension of hostilities, one was made in this quarter. An aide-de-camp of the Marshal appeared on the Boulevard with a flag of truce. He was obliged to dismount in order to advance. What he had to say was difficult to hear amidst the frequent discharge of musketry and cannon; for it should be noted, that the insurgents had by this time got possession of several pieces of artillery, and plied them on several points with terrible effect. In order to save the aide-de-camp from violence, and at the same time to allow him to deliver his message to the people, he was made to ascend to the balcony of a café on the Boulevard Italiens. Although I stood under it I could scarcely catch his words, but he demanded a suspension of firing, and said that the King would give up Ministers and ordonnances. The portion of the public, which crowded around who heard these proposals, were certainly, nine out of ten, of the educated and even gentle class. The universal acclamation was, "Down with Charles X! No armistice!" and many added, "Down with the Bourbons!"

The effect of such offers being made, and such negotiations going on, almost in presence of the regiment which occupied the Place Vendôme, naturally led to conversation and negotiation between the military stationed there and the citizens who crowded round them, but who did not assail them. At length, some of the inferior officers and non-commissioned officers announced that they were determined no longer to combat for M. de Polignac; and they, at the same time, despatched one of their number

to M. Laffitte's. It was known throughout the quarter, that the deputies had assembled there. From Laffitte's the reply came, that General Gerard would take the command of these regiments. But as the General had no uniform, a brother of Laffitte's undertook to conduct the regiments to his abode. They stipulated that they were not to serve against their comrades, nor be deprived of their arms.

Thus did two regiments pass over to the insurrection, leaving the wide and important passage from the Boulevards to the Tuileries undefended and open. This was one of those events for which Marmont was not prepared, when he told M. de Polignac, on his setting out to St. Cloud, that he could maintain his present position for three weeks. His first care, therefore, was to send word of this defection to the King, and to demand his orders, which must now necessarily be a retreat upon St. Cloud. The 15th and 50th regiments, still with him, he ordered to the Champs Elysées, the furthest from the insurrection, whilst he called one of the Swiss battalions, which guarded the Louvre, to defend the entrance to the Rue Rivoli from the Rue de la Paix, abandoned by the two regiments which had deserted. This order of the Marshal, communicated to the Swiss officer in command at the Louvre, led to the most important military event of the Three Days. But there is some doubt as to what minor circumstances intervened. The two Swiss battalions had been in the habit throughout the morning of relieving each other in the difficult and murderous task of defending the Colonnade. The order to remove a battalion left to the other the permanent duty of the defence. The Colonel in command, De Salis, expostulated with Marmont on having his soldiers thus exposed

to permanent assault. He asked for another battalion. Marmont gave him excuses instead,—excuses, which hinted at an accommodation as likely to take place, and a withdrawal of the troops to St. Cloud as probable in no lengthened time. It is inconceivable, that such an intimation should have led the Colonel to withdraw his men from the Colonnade altogether. For the insurgents had shown audacity enough for escalade, and at the very moment the means existed in the shape of a wooden conduit, which lay like a ladder with one extremity on the ground and the other on the Colonnade, and had been used by workmen for shooting down rubbish. No sooner had the fire from the Colonnade ceased, and betrayed the withdrawal of the Swiss, than some *gamins*, shoeless combatants, crept along the bottom of the walls, and ran up the wooden conduit. This feat was seen by thousands to have been performed with impunity and success, and of course hundreds resolved to imitate it. The Swiss with every vigilance and courage could scarcely have repaired their neglect. But the sight of the shaggy head and powder-blackened visage of a genuine insurgent of the streets treading the halls of the Louvre, created instantly such a panic, that the Swiss who had fought so gallantly all day flung themselves down stairs and out of window into the court, crying, the insurgents were in the Louvre; and into the Louvre no doubt the insurgents flocked. Their numbers were sufficient to bring in a whole flight of them, who rushed from the barricade opposite, and were so soon and so completely masters of the Louvre, that they flung open the folding doors.

The Swiss fled in a panic, the greater part of the battalion into the Carrousel. Some leaped out of the window upon the quay, and by so doing warned the insur-

gents, on the opposite side of the river, that the Louvre was taken. Numbers of Swiss, however, were unable to escape from the court, or extricate themselves from the ground-floor of the Louvre. All were mercilessly massacred, and bits of the poor soldiers' red coats fastened to every button-hole or blouse of the victors bespoke a bloody trophy. Acts of generosity and mercy were numerous on that day; but the Swiss, who had kept the crowd of barricaders at bay for twenty-four hours, and had seen Parisian after Parisian fall beneath their balls, met from the exasperated men, who had also fought during that long interval, neither generosity nor compassion. The court of the Louvre, viewed a short time after the tide of war had passed through it, was one of those scenes which make a man shrink from deifying glory, or from acting the laureate to military exploits. The clearing of the dead, or rather the collecting them into heaps, in which the human form was scarcely recognized amidst dust, and rags, and gore, began even before the laurels of the field were won, so quick is the impulse to hide and to cover over the dark side of the picture of human deeds.

The Louvre communicates with the Tuileries by a long gallery,—that devoted to the masterpieces of art. The insurgents rushed along the gallery looking for apertures, and finding them, whence to fire on the retreating and panic-stricken troops in the Carrousel below. Marmont was engaged in giving directions towards the end of the Rue Richelieu when the disaster of the Louvre occurred. He of course was obliged to join the flight, and endeavour to infuse some order into it. But the Marshal had scarcely passed under the central entrance of the Tuileries, than the tricoloured flag was hoisted above him. Some of the

old military conspirators had watched their opportunity, and seeing the Louvre taken, rushed to the Tuileries, hastened to its *Mansardes*, and had the satisfaction of hauling down the white flag, and substituting for it that of the Revolution and the Empire.

The conquest of the Louvre and the Tuileries satisfied the great mass of the insurgents, to whom it implied the downfall of Charles X. At the moment few looked beyond; although every emblem of royalty was vindictively effaced and destroyed. The idea of the combatants could not be better expressed, than by their taking with them a student of the Polytechnic school, who had been mortally wounded while advancing at their head. This youth they bore in their arms up the great staircase of the palace, and through its gorgeous saloons, till they reached the throne-room; and there they laid him on the seat of royalty, where he expired. The capture and plunder of a palace was, however, too tempting not to attract some who thought more of rapine than of heroism. As the thieves detained at the Conciergerie had escaped, it soon became manifest that the sons of larceny were staining the cause of July. Its true heroes soon applied a remedy in the shape of their own ragged police, who seized some of the guilty in the very act, and shot them forthwith, subjecting all as they left the palace to search. The wealthiest establishment and deposits of Paris, fell that day into the hands of the most destitute and ragged of this population, victorious and in arms. There was scarcely an instance of dishonesty, or of the most destitute of these men derogating from his high character of heroism, even to minister to his immediate wants.

Whilst events thus rendered the popular cause triumph-

ant beyond all calculation in Paris, what were the councils, the measures, the attitude of royalty at St. Cloud? It being universally admitted that the cause of the overthrow of the dynasty lay not only in the acts which produced the insurrection, but in the delay to make timely concessions, there remained the doubt whether the blame of this should attach to M. de Polignac or to the King. M. de Polignac was paramount in the Cabinet. The King had ear solely for him. M. de Polignac was in the Tuileries during the whole of Wednesday. He refused to see the deputies. He replied to Marmont's tidings that the troops had gone over to the people, by saying, "Fire on the troops." He, who had alone the power of rendering the King fully aware of the critical state of his affairs, failed to do so. An impartial witness must throw the greater part of the blame on M. de Polignac. During his trial, however, that personage, very naturally, took the tone of defence which threw all blame on the King's obstinacy, and he represented himself as quite prepared on Thursday morning, if not before, to acquaint the King that all was lost, and that the ordonnances must be withdrawn. To this view of the matter, excusing M. de Polignac's conduct and influence, M. de Semonville's evidence is quite opposed. It represents the Prime Minister as the man who kept the King in the dark, who nullified the other Ministers, who deprived Marmont of power and of credit with the King, and who went to St Cloud to counteract the efforts of those who insisted on immediate concession. The most brilliant historian of the epoch, M. de Lamartine, takes the side of M. de Polignac, whilst he drags the character of Semonville in the dirt. After an attentive perusal of the depositions on the trial and the narratives published, we must

repeat the conviction that De Semonville did not mask or distort the truth, and that Prince Polignac was blind and obstinate up to the last moment.

Charles X. refusing to receive M. d'Argout, allowed Semonville to be introduced, but even then, at ten o'clock on the Thursday, after he had evidently had some conversation with Polignac, the King was not aware that he was vanquished. Nor would he entertain the proposal of the revoking the ordonnances. Semonville says, that he adjured Charles X., by the misfortunes he was bringing on the Dauphiness, and on the young children of the Duc de Berri, to make concessions in time. "If you do not," added the Grand Referendary, "there will be, by twelve o'clock tomorrow, neither King, nor Dauphiness, nor Duke of Bordeaux." The King smiled at this apparent exaggeration, after Marmont's message that he could hold out for three weeks, but said that he would assemble the Council.

The Council was assembled, and the King sat with his Ministers in deliberation the chief part of that eventful day. The first question, that of revoking the ordonnances, dismissing the Ministers, or accepting their resignation, and allowing MM. de Semonville and d'Argout to return with such assurances, was not mooted for more than a moment. Marmont was still supposed to hold firm. The regiments at Luneville and St. Omer were on their march upon St. Cloud. Two regiments of the Guards from Normandy were expected. The only resolution taken was to deprive Marmont of the command, ordering him to retreat upon St. Cloud, and give over the army to the Duke d'Angoulême. Somewhat later M. de Vitrolles made his appearance at St. Cloud, and asked to speak with the Prince de Polignac. M. de Vitrolles had relations with

Casimir Perrier and General Gerard, and came in their names, however indirectly commissioned by them, to recommend the revocation of the ordonnances, and the appointment of the Duc de Mortemart as Prime Minister. He also recommended the appointment of Casimir Perrier and Gerard. Had the offer been accepted at the moment, and announced forthwith to the deputies, it might have saved the throne to the Duke of Bordeaux; for although so many thought of the Duke of Orleans on the 30th, no one looked to him on the 29th. The Council at St. Cloud could, however, come to no decision. The Dauphin was averse to concession, and proposed to wait. Such was the excuse of Polignac to Vitrolles.

At length Marmont himself and his officers made their appearance, wearing the very aspect of defeat, covered with dust, and worn out with fatigue. Marmont was admitted to the King's closet, who left the Council to receive him.

"Sire," exclaimed the Marshal, "I have the grief to announce, that I have not been able to maintain your Majesty's authority in Paris. The Swiss, charged with the defence of the Louvre, stricken with panic, abandoned that important post. Hurried along after that in the general rout, I could rally my battalion only at the Arc de l'Etoile; and I have ordered the retreat upon St. Cloud. A ball killed the horse of my aide-de-camp by my side. I regret it did not traverse my head. Death would be less fearful than the spectacle I behold." The monarch heard and received Marmont with kindness, told him that the Duc d'Angoulême was appointed to the command, dismissed the Marshal, and returned to the Council.

The novelty and gravity of events caused those pro-

posals, which had been previously slighted, to be brought again upon the tapis. The King now showed himself at length inclined to accept the proposals of M. Vitrolles, to revoke the ordonnances, and appoint a Ministry, of which the Duc de Montemart should be the chief, Gerard and Casimir Perrier the Ministers of War and of Finance. The Ministers present at the Council of course could offer no opinion as to their own retention of office. But some of them, Guernon de Ranville especially, deprecated the revocation of the ordonnances, and the unconditional surrender of royalty. The Duc d'Angoulême was of this opinion. He felt himself at the head of the remnant of the army, and imagined he could employ it better than Marmont. Polignac seemed not to have been apprised of the King's resolution; but all bowed before it, and Charles X. summoning M. de Semonville, d'Argout, and Vitrolles, informed them, that the Duc de Mortemart was Minister, with Perrier and Gerard, and begged them to set out for Paris, and inform those, who had assumed authority there, of the royal concessions.

Although the Liberal deputies had promised to meet at Laffitte's early on the morning of Thursday, it was not till midday that about thirty had assembled. General Lafayette first addressed his colleagues, by acquainting them, that he was pressed by the people to assume the command of the National Guard. They gave assent to the proposal, which was seconded by Guizot. The latter added, that it was equally urgent to appoint, not a provisional Government, but a public authority, under a municipal form, to undertake the re-establishment and maintenance of order. M. Mauguin observed, that all were ready to perform their task without any title.

Bertin seconded the demand of Guizot. Laffitte put the proposition to the vote as to the formation of a municipal body for the defence, provision, and security of the capital. The mode of nominating this body then became a subject of discussion, when the clamours of the people without interrupted it, and Lafayette was obliged to go forth to appease them. The offer of the new regiments to put themselves under the orders of the meeting at Laffitte's suggested the necessity of appointing a commander of the troops, as well as one of the National Guard. General Gerard was instantly designated, and it was hoped by some, that he would act, as a counterpoise to General Lafayette. Gerard replied, that he should be happy to serve under the orders of his venerable friend, Lafayette. The affair of the regiments having for some time occupied the attention of the assembly, it returned to the question of the municipal body. It was agreed that five should be appointed, with the power of adding others.

In the midst of their debates a general discharge of fire-arms took place in the court of the hotel. Its effect was to produce such a panic amongst the deputies, that they dispersed in a few minutes, some leaping out of the window, others escaping by different staircases, till Laffitte, confined to his chair by a sprain, was left alone. The alarm was caused merely by the soldiers of the 53rd discharging their arms. Soon after came the news of the popular triumph, the capture of the Louvre and Tuileries, and the evacuation of Paris by the troops. The deputies proceeded to elect the municipal body. The names which had most votes were those of Laffitte, Perrier, Gerard, Lobau, and Odier. Gerard and Odier at once declined, the former on the ground that his military duties would

absorb his time. De Sochonen and Audry de Puyraveau were substituted for them. And the four newly elected, Laffitte being unable to stir, proceeded with Lafayette to the Hôtel de Ville, when they superseded an adventurer in a cocked hat, and borrowed uniform, calling himself General Dubourg, as well as M. Baude, one of the editors of the *Temps*, who had momentarily seized the direction of municipal affairs, and who now was appointed secretary to the Municipal Commission.

Evening was already advancing, when de Semonville, d'Argout, and Vitrolles reached Paris. Stopped by the first party of the people, they demanded where they would find General Gerard. They were told, that the Provisional Government was sitting at the Hôtel de Ville. "Already!" was their ejaculation. It was eight o'clock, ere they could arrive over barricades and obstacles at the Hôtel de Ville. They were brought immediately into the presence of the new authorities. Semonville stated the concessions which he brought. They were listened to in silence, by those who were against reconciliation with the King. Casimir Perrier, decidedly for it, confessed frankly, that the municipal body had little power, and could not take upon it to accept or refuse; but that, at all events, M. de Semonville and his companions had no authority to show, no signature, no document. They were accordingly referred to the meeting of deputies at Laffitte's. Thither d'Argout proceeded. Semonville could go no further from fatigue, and Vitrolles found his name an objection.

The discussions which ensued amongst the deputies at Laffitte's were more serious, and more favourable to Charles X. Berard, an influential man, told d'Argout

that of the three alternatives, the Republic, the Duke of Orleans, or Charles X. he preferred the latter. There were none but some young people who raved of the Republic. The Duke of Orleans had made no sign, and would be for making, not receiving conditions. Such was the prevalent feeling amongst the deputies on the night of Thursday; and had the Duc de Mortemart himself arrived with full powers, he might have surmounted all opposition. But the Duke was detained at St. Cloud.

It seems, that whilst the three negotiators had set off in search of the authorities installed in Paris, the Count Alexander de Girardin had gone to learn the state of parties, to keep alive the feelings and hopes of the Royalist cause. The King, who had seen the Duc de Mortemart, and compelled him to accept the office of Minister, detained him until M. de Girardin, the other negotiator, should return from Paris. Thus whilst the deputies, friends to the Bourbons, were awaiting M. de Mortemart at Laffitte's, M. de Mortemart was waiting on the King and the Dauphin at St. Cloud. It was two o'clock on the morning of the 30th, ere Vitrolles and d'Argout returned thither. They hastened with M. de Mortemart to the King. Having felt the want of regular documents, he set to work at day-break, with M. Mazas* for secretary, and drew up the different ordonnances, revoking those of the 26th, summoning the National Guard, appointing Marshal Maison to command it, and convoking the Chamber. To get these signed by Charles X. was the work of still more time. It was seven o'clock on the

* Mémoire, &c., par M. Alex. Mazas.

morrow of the 30th, ere M. de Mortemart could quit St. Cloud, in company with d'Argout and Mazas. When they reached the gate which gives egress to the Bois de Boulogne, and which is the direct road to Paris, they found their passage obstructed by the Royal Guard. In vain M. de Mortemart declared his person and his mission. He could not pass. The Dauphin, no doubt, with a view to thwart the negotiations and prevent the concessions, which he disapproved of, from being accomplished, had given these orders. M. de Mortemart and his companions proceeded, nevertheless, round the walls of the Bois de Boulogne on foot, traversed the Seine for greater security, and lost two more hours in this circuit and these delays. Whilst on the way to Laffitte's, they encountered the deputy Berard, who had spoken so favourably the previous night. His brother-in-law, General Dumas, was with him. M. de Mortemart learnt that the morning meeting of the deputies at Laffitte's had taken place, and had adjourned to meet after midday at the Palace of the Chamber. He stated the concessions with which he came provided. The opinion of those with whom he spoke was, that such concessions were now too late. The Council or municipal body at the Hôtel de Ville, in contact with the people, had been driven in a republican direction; but Perrier, and a great number of deputies, were for an accommodation with Charles X. A certain number, in order to make a compromise between the two extremes and preserve monarchy, if not the monarch, had put forward the Duke of Orleans. All the chances which on Thursday lay between Charles X. and anarchy, floated on Friday between the Duke of Orleans and a republic. In fact,

"Vive la Republique!" became the dominant cry of the insurgents, who were marching from all directions upon St. Cloud.

The friends of the Duke of Orleans and those who wished to push that Prince to the throne, less from personal attachment or private concert with him than from conviction that it was the only mode of escaping the republic, were active on that night. The following placard was prepared and distributed by the writers of the *National*:—

"Charles X. can never again re-enter Paris: he has spilled the blood of the people. The republic would be exposed to fearful quarrels, and would produce a breach with Europe. The Duke of Orleans is a Prince devoted to the cause of the Revolution. The Duke of Orleans never bore arms against us. The Duke of Orleans was at Jemappes. The Duke of Orleans has borne the tricolor flag under the enemies' fire, and can again bear it. We will have no other colours. The Duke of Orleans has accepted the Charter as the people understand it. He will hold his crown from the people."

Such was the proclamation and announcements, in which young men, who did not even know the Duke of Orleans, turned and prepared the public mind to accept him. Laffitte, however, knew the Prince well, and from the first had looked to his accession as the only solution of the crisis. The person most ardent for the enthronement of the Duke of Orleans was M. Thiers, who had turned his pen to the polar-star of his ideas. But it was not the efforts of any one friend, even though that friend were a Thiers or a Laffitte, that could make the Duke of Orleans

King. For this a combination of circumstances was required, which became imperative and pressing, and which in a few hours, indeed, left no choice to the Duke of Orleans himself, or to moderate and even loyal men, but to rally to his name and his cause as the sole escape from anarchy and absolutism, or from that mixture of both, which so often prevails under the name of popular government.

CHAPTER XVI.

ALTERNATIVES ON THE FALL OF CHARLES X—THE DUKE OF ORLEANS, THE REPUBLIC—MISSION OF THIERS TO NEUILLY—THE PEERS PROPOSE APPOINTING THE DUKE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL—UNIVERSAL ADHESION, EXCEPT FROM THE YOUNG REPUBLICANS—THE DUKE COMES TO PARIS, ACCEPTS, AND PROCEEDS TO THE HÔTEL DE VILLE—MARCH OF THE PARISIANS ON RAMBOUILLET—ABDICATION AND DESERTION OF CHARLES X.

WHEN the events which replaced the house of Bourbon on the throne of France in 1814 and 1815 were recounted in this history, it was sought to be shown that personal influence had far less effect in determining choice or changes than ingenuity has chosen to discover or malice to suggest. Louis XVIII. returned to occupy the throne of his ancestors, not because Alexander willed it, or Wellington suggested, but because the nature of things prescribed it. To a body of statesmen and commanders there was no other solution or choice possible. Napoleon, by his policy, even more than by his military failures, had rendered himself and his family impossible for the time. The same may be said of Charles X. in 1830. It is admitted that had he made seasonable concessions he might have preserved the throne. No doubt; but he could not have made concessions. Charles X. could not contemplate constitutional government, except with a

monarch like Charles I. or Louis XVI.; that is, under circumstances of rare and exceptional occurrence. Constitutional government was for him written and comprised in those few pages of French and English history, and in no others. To make concessions appeared to him to be the first step to the scaffold; and no power could have altered his conviction, allayed his fears, or restored him to the confidence that is necessary to good faith. It is cruelty to such a Prince to keep him on the throne; it is a commencement of that same cruelty which subsequently punished acts and policy, on his part inevitable, with the scaffold. Charles was impassible; but his son, the Dauphin, entertained the same ideas. The heir and grandson had been carefully intrusted to priests and nobles, who taught the selfsame lesson. There was no rational politician in France who must not in 1830 have admitted the necessity of getting rid of Charles and his race.

The intellectual Opposition and the middle-class Liberals never imagined, however, that a people could achieve so complete a triumph over an army. Even of the first popular advantages over the soldiery they feared a reversal; and up to any hour on Thursday, Charles X. would have found the leading Liberals tractable. But when even the fair suggestions made by them through Vitrolles, of the appointment of Mortemart with Liberal colleagues, and a revocation of the ordonnances, were not quickly and gratefully acted upon, even such men as Perrier perceived that nothing could be hoped from Charles X. and his son. Such concessions as pressing events might wring from them would be made with a bad grace, with the purpose of merely gaining time, and with the view towards renewing the struggle at a more con-

venient opportunity. Charles X. was impossible. And Perrier and Gerard now found that he was not only impossible from his own character, but from the violence of the popular repugnance and contempt which burst forth from all around and within the Hôtel de Ville, and which showed that the combatants of July were determined to have at least some fruits of their victory, some sign and proof of it in the setting aside of a monarch who had so mistaken his people and outraged their rights and their privileges.

But the very natural and just hostility to Charles X., which Perrier and Gerard saw at the Hôtel de Ville, led to what alternative? To a republic. Lafayette had got astride of his old American ideas, and flattered himself that the reign of not merely Charles, but of all kings, had passed in France. Such a prospect was by no means pleasant to such men as Perrier and Sebastiani, and it was alarming to the deputies who met at Laffitte's. Parties in France are in the habit of denouncing monarchy or republic as the object of their fears and their disgust. But it is not of monarchy or republic that they speak. They merely allude to the parties likely to predominate under the one or under the other. Under the legitimate monarchy, it was the Blacases, the Villèles, and the Polignacs, the Cardinal Latils and the Abbé Tharins, who became masters of all patronage and power. But under the government which Lafayette was already substituting for it, patronage and power would have fallen to a few young and wild Garbonari, who surrounded the old general, and who pretended to do in 1830 what they subsequently tried in 1848, that is, seize and carry on the government of France, with an army of victorious insurgents to preserve order and restore tranquillity to the State.

A republican system of government in a country where all intelligent men and classes rally to it, and where the classes below these have full faith and attachment to it, cannot differ very much from a monarchy; but in a country where the people comprehend things only as they are represented by families or names, a republic is manifestly impossible. Scatter broadcast amidst a population such sentiments as a proud recollection of the Revolution and its deeds, a deep adoration of Napoleon and his exploits, the worship of the old Church and its creed, which lingers in the French departments of the west; suppose the intellectual classes sharing in these sentiments, and ready to make political capital out of them; contemplate a republic in such a country reposing, too, upon the unintellectual aspirations, the brute instincts of the people. A republic in France must necessarily be the rule of the least intellectual over the most so. As long as that is the case, the intelligence of France will be against a republic; will defeat its advent, as it did in 1830, and prefer any tyranny to it, as it showed in 1848.

The first persons who had faith in the Duke of Orleans as the future King of France were Laffitte and Thiers; representing, one the commercial interests, the other the intellectual aspirations of the country. Laffitte had sent a friend on Tuesday to be assured of the presence of the Duke of Orleans at Neuilly. Though nothing passed but compliments, the Duke was frightened. He dreaded St. Cloud on one side, the Parisian insurrection on the other. To escape both, he ran off and hid himself at Raincy. Thiers devoted his pen, his journal, his activity, to the Duke of Orleans, without warrant, without mission, without a word from that personage. The

captors of the Tuileries declared the throne vacant in M. Thiers's opinion. To proceed further, and to fill it by the Duke of Orleans, it was necessary to behold and have the assent of that supercautious personage. Thiers obtained a note of introduction from Laffitte, and proceeded with Scheffer to Neuilly. They were ushered into the presence not of the Duke, but of the Duchess, the future Queen Amelie, whose mind, a stranger to political considerations, was actuated by her piety and fidelity to the elders of the Bourbon family. At M. Thiers's expression that the throne was vacant, and was at the service of the first Bourbon prince who had the courage to seize it, the Duchess recoiled in horror: her answer was an angry reproach. M. Thiers had not another word to utter, when Madame Adelaide, the sister of the Duke of Orleans, the companion of his misfortunes, and the confidante of his thoughts, entered. On learning what had been said, she re-echoed what had been the common expression of her brother,—"Do you what you will with him, provided you do not force him to emigrate again." But Madame Adelaide also repelled the idea of her brother snatching the Crown. "Let not Charles X.," said she, "fall the victim of a palace intrigue. Our family has always partaken of the popular sentiment; there can be no doubt on that subject; but let not the fall of the dynasty be our work. For all Europe might once more interfere, and our liberties and all else would be placed in jeopardy."

To this M. Thiers replied, that Europe must be well aware that it was not the ambition of the Duke of Orleans which overthrew Charles X. All parties were unanimous in getting rid of him; but there was no unanimity as to who should succeed. Some spoke of the Duke

of Bordeaux; others of the Duke of Reichstadt; others, again, would have a republic. The Duke of Orleans evidently gave most guarantees to liberty and to monarchy. He would be preferred by all, and accepted by Europe. But he must not delay. All that the Duchess could reply was that she would acquaint the Duke. But Madame Adelaide boldly declared that the Orleans family would come forward and adhere to the Revolution if called upon. She herself was Paris-born, and was ready to proceed to Paris at once with General Sebastiani or M. Laffitte. "Madame," observed Thiers, "you save the Crown for your family."

The frank promises and adhesion of Madame Adelaide were represented by M. Thiers, who hurried back to Paris, as those of her brother. They were soon known at Laffitte's, and at the benches of the Chamber, where the deputies were sitting in vain, waiting for the Duke of Mortemart. While all were in suspense, M. Hyde de Neuville thought he should contribute to the preservation of the Crown to Charles X., or at least to an accommodation with his family, by proposing the nomination of a Commission of Deputies to consult with a Commission of Peers, in taking the steps necessary to reconcile all interests and preserve the Government. The members chosen were Augustin Perier, Sebastiani, Guizot, Delessert, and Hyde de Neuville. These, the men most favourable to Charles X. who could be chosen, repaired to the Peers, where, in presence of M. de Mortemart himself, and supported by M. de Broglie and several members of the Upper Chamber, they proposed giving the post and authority of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom to the Duke of Orleans.

Amidst the numerous narratives which have appeared of these events, and of the part taken by each personage in them, it has not appeared who first proposed the scheme which at once set aside M. de Mortemart and his ordonnances. The assembled deputies did not foresee this resolve when they chose those few of their members most favourable to Charles X., and not Constant and other men inclined to the Duke of Orleans. In fact, it was the opinion amongst the deputies who remained, that the Commission would agree with De Mortemart, and with the Peers would recognize the ordonnances. Constant said so. But such was not the case. Several of the leading and liberal men amongst the Peers, such as the Duc de Broglie and M. de Caraman, gave it as their opinion that if the Chamber recognized M. de Mortemart as Minister, and considered the ordonnances as withdrawn, the people would not obey them; and M. Lafayette, at the Hôtel de Ville, would discrown them. This observation was the result not of intrigue, but of simple truth. Chateaubriand, indeed, contradicted it, and so did the Duc de Mortemart; but Chateaubriand was as usual in the clouds, and no one paid the least attention to him. Some one mentioned the Lieutenant-Generalship of the Duke of Orleans, and it was grasped at as the measure which united all opinions, and met all difficulties.

The Duc de Broglie, a nobleman, who would not have lent himself to any intrigue, or to a substitution of one branch for another, and whose sole aim must have been the safety of liberty and of the State, was the most prominent to recommend the vote; and, indeed, it was time. M. de Sussy had been despatched by M. de Mortemar, to bring the ordonnances of Charles X. to the Chamber. Laffitte, the

President, refused to receive them; and soon after, M. Odillon Barrot appeared in the costume of the National Guard, begging to be heard, in order that he might inform the deputies of the opinions of General Lafayette. These were, that the Crown should not be granted or conferred until the conditions required by the people had been discussed in a General Assembly, and presented to the new monarch, to be accepted by him as a condition of his ascending the throne. De Sussy, unable to procure even the reception of Charles X.'s ordonnances by the President of the Chamber, repaired with them to the Hôtel de Ville, where he procured little attention to his mission or his ordonnances, but where it strangely happened, he was the witness to the first struggle between those ultra-Liberals who were rallying to the Duke of Orleans, and the young republicans with whom they then definitively broke.

It was strange enough that the Bourbons of the Restoration had shown vigour and found support so long as they had formidable enemies in existence. They had put down Imperialism to that degree that scarcely one Bonaparte voice was raised in 1830. Republicanism had been revived in the secret councils of the Carbonari, in which Manuel was supposed to recommend the Duke of Orleans and constitutional monarchy, Lafayette a republic. Lafayette had remained since 1822 a very dormant republican; and the young friends, whom he had known and employed in the period of conspiracy, now flocked round him, and claimed of his consistency the proclamation of his beloved system of government. But Lafayette, all republican as he was, could not but see that the only republicans of the time were a few hot-headed youths, some half-pay officers implicated in conspiracies, and one or two students of the

Polytechnic School. He might himself be the Washington, but where was even the Jefferson of the new republic. He was man of the world enough soon to see that a republic was impossible; that the middle class, lawyers, statesmen, deputies, politicians, men skilled in every branch of public affairs, and capable of conducting them, heard mention of the word republic all with terror and distrust. There are some writers who represent the promotion of the Duke of Orleans to the Crown as the selfish act of the *bourgeoisie*, or the middle class, anxious to increase their wealth, and to exclude the people from all share or profit in the revolution which they had made. But it was not as a *bourgeoisie*, but as men of intelligence, that the entire political and educated class in 1830, as at a later date, dreaded alike the tyranny of the ignorant priesthood and famished aristocracy on one side, and of a popular class quite as ignorant and as famished on the other. If the republic was brushed away in 1830, as the mere brute force of it was swept away by cannon in 1848, it was not so much for its poverty or inferior rank that it fell or was set aside, it was that it wanted capacity, and knew not how to exercise that rule and the predominance to which it pretended.

Lafayette, therefore, with a sigh, was obliged to admit that a republic was impossible, and the Duke of Orleans indispensable. His only aim was to render this palatable to his young republican friends, by demanding all the liberties and guarantees which a nation or its popular party could require from the new monarch. The young republicans were, however, impatient. They had just drawn up a protest, denouncing the deputies who assembled at Laffitte's or the Chamber, as but *provisional representatives*, and stating that such representation chosen by a narrow

body of electors had no right to give the nation either constitution or dynasty, and that the people ought to be consulted in the great matter of establishing one or the other. The deputation bearing this peremptory summons, surrounded Lafayette, and he was endeavouring to parry their attacks and allay their enthusiasm by words, when M. de Sussy made his appearance. Lafayette sent word that he might enter, but De Sussy asked for a private interview. The General said he kept no secret from his friends. De Sussy's arrival had, in fact, come most apropos to turn the conversation from the object of the address or the protest. De Sussy entered with the ordonnances of Charles X, revoking those of the 26th, and appointing Mortemart. They seemed to be centuries old. The hot youths who were already denouncing the Duke of Orleans as standing in the way of a republic, proposed nothing less than to fling the envoy of Charles X. out of the window. "Down with the Bourbons!" was the immediate cry. "My good friends," exclaimed Lafayette, "this gentleman comes not from St. Cloud, but the Luxembourg, and with a mission from my relative, M. de Mortemart." Some one then took up the ordonnances and read them: whereon Lafayette regretted the pains that Charles X. had taken to have these papers drawn up and signed. The people had themselves rejected the ordonnances. He would have nothing to do with any Ministry of Charles X.; it was too late. Lafayette then begged of General Lobau to conduct De Sussy to the municipal body. He was some time escaping from the pursuit and attention of the young republicans, who seemed to have left Lafayette in order to beard and torment De Sussy. They thus obtained small satisfaction from the General; whilst Odillon Barrot, who had returned

from the Chamber, and was aware of the nature of the resolutions passed there, put an extinguisher upon the hopes of the youths by telling them that the Duke of Orleans was the best of republicans.

Whilst the envoy of the new Minister of Charles X. was thus buffeted about, and denied recognition, the deputies, on the proposal of the Commission just returned from the Peers, voted almost unanimously, "that the only mode of restoring order and peace was to appoint the Duke of Orleans to the function of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom." This vote was followed by another, being an invitation to the Duke of Orleans in words drawn up by Benjamin Constant. They were as follows:—

"The meeting of deputies at the present time in Paris, has thought it urgent to beg his Royal Highness the Duke of Orleans to repair to the capital, in order to exercise the functions of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. They express the wish to retain the national colours. They moreover feel the necessity of instantly setting about the task, in the approaching session of the Chamber, of procuring for France all the guarantees indispensable for the full and entire execution of the Charter."

It was evening by the time this was voted, and it was instantly carried by twelve deputies to the Palais Royal: but the Duke was not to be found, and all the answer to be obtained was that the Duke would be ready on the morrow to receive the deputation.

Thus was Friday, the 30th, passed in the capital. At St. Cloud, the Dauphin, after visiting the different posts of his army, and welcoming a regiment of the Guard from Normandy, retired to meditate upon the campaign which he was to undertake against Paris. Marmont, who had

not abandoned his military duties, was rendered anxious by the concourse of insurgents flocking to Versailles. They were in possession of that town. Their parties filled the woods even behind St. Cloud. The 50th regiment, quartered on the road to Versailles, marched off thither in full desertion. Marmont felt it his duty to advise the King to quit St. Cloud, which could not be defended, and withdraw to the Loire. Other Generals gave him the same advice, and represented that, with the troops from the camp of the north and those which Bourmont might bring from Africa, a formidable stand might be made. Charles X. replied, that with respect to warlike operations, they must consult the Dauphin; as to his quitting St. Cloud, he must first await the result of Mortemart's mission. Finding neither will nor discernment in the King, and almost equal distraction in the Dauphin, Marmont drew up an order of the day, to be read to the troops, engaging them to remain firm in their posts. The inducement which he held out was that negotiations were going on, that serious combats were over, and that their only duty was to protect the persons of the royal family.

The order of the day, which was a complete capitulation, and which, however well meant, was another of Marmont's ill-conceived and unwarrantable fatalities, was brought by General Talon to the Dauphin. Both were indignant, the Dauphin especially. Talon could explain it by no other supposition than treason; and the Dauphin, never clear-headed, was full of the idea suggested to him when Marmont appeared. The Prince restrained himself sufficiently to summon Marmont to enter his cabinet, and when they were alone, the Dauphin gave vent to his suspicion and his choler. Lamartine alone relates what happened in the

cabinet of the Dauphin. The latter, after a wild apostrophe, asked the Duke of Ragusa if he sought to betray them also? Marmont involuntarily laid his hand on the hilt of his sword, at which movement the alarmed Dauphin rushed to seize Marmont's weapon. He did so, drew it, and in the act of grasping it, cut his hand. He then called for his guards, and ordered Marmont to be arrested. This undignified and burlesque scene covered, in the eyes of the soldiers who saw, and of all who heard it, the last hours of sinking royalty with contempt and ridicule, instead of leaving full course to the compassion and sympathy which might have attended their departure. The aged King endeavoured to do away with the effects of his son's folly. He soothed Marmont, and compelled a kind of reconciliation; but Marmont refused the proffered hand of the Duc d'Angoulême, and no doubt felt all that his first desertion to the Bourbons had cost him. Should the time ever come when the events and the personages of a day become fit subjects for tragedy, the story of Marmont will afford the most apt illustration of the consequence of military treason.

On the night of Friday, the Duke of Orleans, imperatively summoned by Laffitte, came to the Palais Royal, having announced that he would receive and reply to the offer of the Deputies on the morrow. At the same time, M. de Mortemart, summoning his secretary Mazas, enjoined him to hasten to St. Cloud, gain admittance at the palace, and deliver to the King the advice by no means to quit it. It would be attacked on the morrow, but not seriously. If the King remained at St. Cloud, an arrangement might be hoped. M. de Mortemart, soon after he despatched this message to Charles X.,

was summoned to the Palais Royal. There he was led to an apartment at the top of the house, where, on an old matting, lay the Duke of Orleans, weary, anxious, fevered, and uncertain. The first impulse of the Duke was to excuse himself, to declare that he had been brought by force to Paris, that he would suffer himself to be cut in pieces rather than accept the crown; but that the Deputies had declared him Lieutenant-General. Would the Duc de Mortemart, as envoy of Charles X., recognize him in this quality? M. de Mortemart replied that he could not. The interview was interrupted by a band or deputation of insurgents who had forced their way into the palace, and insisted on speaking to the Duke. He would only receive the chief; and their chief came to say that the people were ready to take the Duke for King on one condition, which was, that he would have nothing to do with the Peers and Deputies, who were all a set of scoundrels.

Whilst the Duke of Orleans was receiving Mortemart, the inhabitants of the chateau of St. Cloud were alarmed by bands of insurgents approaching for the purpose of attack. The Duchess of Berri became terrified for her children, sought out the Duc d'Angoulême, and besought him to send away the Court from St. Cloud. The Duke, not unwilling to have the Princesses and his father removed to a place of greater safety, caused Charles X. to be awakened, and instant preparation made for his withdrawing with the Princesses to the Trianon, a royal palace in the vicinity of Versailles. Charles X., who had resigned himself to his fate, and who had merely marvelled at having had no tidings of De Mortemart, consented; and before two o'clock, that is, before Mazas could reach St. Cloud, the royal family had left it, and were on their way to the Trianon.

The morning of Saturday, which found Charles X. at Trianon, had not brought resolution to the Duke of Orleans. Dupin and Sebastiani had both been early in his apartments, and they had not succeeded in persuading the Duke even to accept the offer of the Lieutenant-Generalship. In fact, the Duke had given M. de Mortemart, at parting, a letter for Charles X., couched in the strongest terms, and containing the fullest promises of fidelity. When the deputation from the Chamber, therefore, were ushered into the presence of the Duke, he assured them how sensible he was of the expressions contained in the address. He had not hesitated to come to Paris at such a call; but to accept the Lieutenant-Generalship required consideration. He had ties of relationship with Charles X. He had friends to consult. Besides, there was no need of precipitation; at St. Cloud they did not think of attacking. The Duke concluded, that he would make known his determination later.

On this unsatisfactory answer, Berard observed that the Duke was ill-informed. He talked of repose and delay, when they were on a volcano, the ground burning beneath their feet. The Duke was struck, whilst the deputy continued to say, that no one was afraid of St. Cloud, or of the legitimate monarch. The fear was of Paris, where numbers of hot and enthusiastic people had already prayed Lafayette to put himself at the head of a republic. It might be proclaimed from one moment to another. Sebastiani interrupted him by saying, that the danger was exaggerated, that the Prince would triumph the moment he presented himself. Berard rejoined, that he might triumph if he presented himself now that the populace held the Duke of Orleans as Bourbon; that the young victors of the Three

Days, the intelligent portion of them, were wild for a republic. If these were not anticipated, it might be difficult to overcome them. It might be too late in another hour. These remonstrances had their effect, and in about an hour the following declaration was drawn up:—

"INHABITANTS OF PARIS,

"THE deputies of France, at this moment assembled in Paris, expressed the desire that I should come forward to exercise the functions of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. I did not hesitate to come and partake your danger, and to place myself in the midst of this heroic population, and do all in my power to preserve you from civil war and anarchy. Re-entering the city of Paris, I bore with pride those glorious colours which you have resumed, and which I myself long wore. The Chambers are about to meet. They will adopt means for insuring the reign of the laws, and maintaining the rights of the nation. The Charter will henceforth be a truth.

"LOUIS PHILIPPE D'ORLEANS."

This reply, carried to the Chamber, was received with enthusiasm, and was ordered to be printed; and Berard, with Guizot, Villemain, and Benjamin Constant, were appointed to prepare to follow it up by a declaration of the Chamber.

The Chamber had found a solution of the existing difficulty satisfactory to itself. Not so the Hôtel de Ville. The reluctance of the Municipal Commission to proclaim a republic, and its reception of the envoy of Charles X., created suspicion. It was necessary to remove them, at least by a frank repudiation of that monarch. Accordingly, the Hôtel de Ville addressed the citizens of the capital in a proclamation, announcing that—

"Charles X. has ceased to reign. Unable to forget the origin of his authority, he ever considered himself the foe of our country and of its liberties, which he could never comprehend. After having insidiously attacked our institutions by hypocrisy and fraud, he believed himself strong enough to destroy them openly, and drown them in the blood of the French people. Thanks to your heroism, his crimes, as well as his power, are at an end. A few minutes sufficed to annihilate that corrupt government, which was nothing but a permanent conspiracy against the liberty and prosperity of France. The nation alone is erect, adorned with its national colours, which it has conquered by its blood. It must have a government and laws worthy of it."

This proclamation gave general satisfaction, which could not be said of the reply of the Duke of Orleans to the deputies. It was felt it was Bourbon; it spoke of the old Charter, as if that would now satisfy the people. Word was brought of the rising storm to the deputies, and those engaged with the new and more liberal address were requested to hurry with it; whilst Laffitte sent word to the Duke that he must mount on horseback, and accompany the deputies to the Hôtel de Ville. The Duke declared himself ready. It was the great trial, the decisive step; but if courageously taken and happily gone through, it won the crown no less. M. Guizot had the chief hand in the declaration of the deputies.* The proclamation being

* Frenchmen (ran this document), your country is free. Absolute power raised its flag; the heroic population of Paris struck it down. Paris attacked, has rendered triumphant by arms that sacred cause which the election had previously made to prevail. A power usurping our rights and disturbing our repose menaced at once liberty and order. We regain the possession of both. There are no fears for our old rights, nothing to prevent our securing those we desire. A government to insure us these blessings is the first necessity of the country. Frenchmen, those of your

approved of, and signed by ninety-one deputies, who immediately set out with it to the Palais Royal, for the purpose of accompanying the Duke in the all-important visit or procession to the Hôtel de Ville.

M. Berard, who preceded the deputies, and who passed the intervening time in conversation with the Duke, has left a circumstantial account of every word and every act. At length the procession set forth, over barricades, through the burning sun of July. There were some dissentient voices, but on the whole the Duke was well received, shook hands with thousands, and fraternized with all he met. Laffitte, in his sedan chair, followed as best he could. The trying moment seemed that of mounting the large steps which at that time led to the Hôtel de Ville, and which were thronged by armed and vociferous men. The Duke said, "that he was an old National Guard of 1789, coming to visit his commander of that time." The armed men were actuated by no hostile feeling to the Duke. He entered the Hôtel, and was received by Lafayette. Laffitte then read the declaration

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deputies who were in Paris, have met and invited a Frenchman, who never fought but for France, to be Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. It is the best means of completing a peace, the success of a most legitimate defence. The Duke of Orleans is devoted to the national and constitutional cause. He has always defended its interests and professed its principles. He will respect our rights, as he holds his own from us. We will have the sanction of law for all the guarantees necessary to render freedom durable. We will have the re-establishment of the National Guards with the choice of its own officers, the intervention of citizens in the formation of municipal and departmental bodies, the jury alone to pass sentence on the press, the responsibility of Ministers and ministerial agents, the army secured in its grades, the re-election of deputies on receiving place. All institutions will receive every development required, in concert with the chief of the State. Frenchmen, the Duke of Orleans has himself spoken in a language befitting a free country. The Chambers are about to assemble; he tells you they will provide the means for enforcing the reign of the laws, and the maintenance of national rights. The Charter will henceforth be a truth.

of the Chamber, to which the Prince replied, "As a Frenchman, I deplore the blood that has been spilled, and the injury offered to the country. As a Prince, I am happy to contribute to the happiness of the nation."

Of the Republicans there was not one to stand forth at such a moment, and either protest or demand guarantees. The man, who called himself General Dubourg, and who seemed only there to fill whatever place no one else would fill, advanced, and with great gravity and courage said,—

"Prince, you have taken serious engagements. Do not forget them. Should you do so, we are the people to compel you to adhere to them."

These were the most honest and sincere words spoken on the occasion; and they were accordingly sufficient to stamp the utterer as ill-bred and insane. The Duke of Orleans replied, that "he was a honest man, whom no one had ever occasion to remind of his engagements." Lafayette then advanced, and placing a tricolor flag in the Duke's hand, led him by the other to the balcony of the Hôtel de Ville. There the Duke waved his flag, and then embraced Lafayette. This mute oratory had its effect. The populace which filled the square applauded, and shouted "Long live the Charter and the Duke of Orleans!" and every gun was fired in honour of the glorious event. The change of dynasty was naturally accomplished in this scene.

Whilst Louis Philippe of Orleans was thus mounting the throne by the steps of the Hôtel de Ville, all the hopes which Charles X. had to depend were expiring between St. Cloud and the Trianon. The Dauphin had remained behind to rally the army, and his first order was to defend the bridges. But the regiment to which he addressed these orders replied by inactivity and silence. They were

determined not to fight for the Bourbons. The Duke was indignant and loud in apostrophes. It was in vain. The very Swiss handed over their cartouches to the people, and refused to fight. The Dauphin, therefore, had no alternative but to retreat towards the Trianon, with such regiments of the Guard as were still faithful. At the Trianon the King was once more surrounded by his Ministers, and they remained during the silence of M. de Mortemart. Guernon de Ranville and Polignac were again full of the idea of rallying the troops and retreating upon Tours. The arrival of the Dauphin, and the certainty that the troops could not be depended on, put an end to these last illusions; and the King was obliged to dismiss his Ministers through M. Cappelle and bid them seek their own safety apart from his in flight. It was from the Trianon that the first emigration set forth, when Mad. de Polignac parted from Marie Antoniette: it was from the Trianon that the last emigration of the legitimate and courtly Royalists set forth. The sentence passed in one century upon the cause, had been definitively repeated and corroborated by another. The King and Dauphin retreated to Rambouillet; whilst the Duchess d'Angoulême, surprised in the south of France by the events of July, hastened to join them.

The reassembling of the Royal family, after the failure of all hopes and all efforts, and amidst the desertion of all friends, led to the solemn consideration of what course was best for them under the circumstances. The result of this family deliberation was the following letter, addressed by Charles X. to the Duke of Orleans:—

"My Cousin, *Rambouillet, August* 2.

"I am too much grieved by the evils which afflict and menace my people not to seek every means of

preventing them. I have therefore taken the resolution of abdicating in favour of my grandson, the Duke of Bordeaux. The Dauphin, who participates in my sentiments, renounces also his right in favour of his nephew. You will thus have to proclaim, in your capacity of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, the accession of Henry V. to the Crown. You will take all the measures which suit you to regulate the form of Government during the minority of the new King. I limit myself to making known to you these dispositions as a means of avoiding many evils. You will communicate my intentions to the diplomatic body, and you will make known, as soon as possible, the proclamation by which my grandson is recognized King. General Foissac Latour will take charge of this letter. He has orders to come to an understanding with you in favour of those who accompany me, and for the arrangements suitable for me and the rest of my family. We can afterwards arrange the other measures necessary on a change of reign.

"I am, &c.

"CHARLES LOUIS ANTOINE."

It will ever remain a reproach to the family of Orleans, in the breasts of those who keep alive the fire of ancient loyalty, that he did not risk all, obey the injunctions of Charles X., and accept power as the Regent, or the guardian, for his nephew. To those who consider loyalty no longer a religion, who believe that power is not, like property, transmissible by indefeasible right, the Duke of Orleans stands excused for not attempting what would have certainly raised great obstacles in the way of the Government, if, indeed, it did not at once destroy and render impossible the accord that had taken place.

Charles X. was at Rambouillet, without a friend or a party. How was Louis Philippe to carry on the Government by placing himself in the shoes of a prince so utterly lost and abandoned, and basing his authority on a principle which, endowed with all power, had so egregiously failed?

The Duke of Orleans had despatched Commissaries to Rambouillet at the same time that Charles X. despatched his abdication by General Foissac Latour. Charles X. would not receive the Commissaries; he awaited the result of his abdication and the proclamation of Henry V. General Foissac was unable to execute his commission until he had obtained the aid of M. de Mortemart. The reply to it was, an order to six or seven thousand of the Parisian insurgents to march upon Rambouillet; and the Commissaries, being Marshal Maison, M. de Schonen, and Odillon Barrot, set forth, and were preceded or supported by the insurrectionary army under the command of General Pajol.

It was a strange *pêle-mêle*, this revolutionary army, of men in uniform or *en blouse*, on horseback, on foot, in carts, setting forth to enforce that dethronement which had been already achieved at Paris. Some forty thousand of this straggling army reached the environs of Rambouillet. Repelled by the advanced posts, one of their chiefs, of the name of Poque, was shot in the heel. The King, when he heard of it, ordered him to be brought to the palace to have his wound dressed. Whilst their army was bivouacking in the forest, the four thousand men of the Guard still maintaining the park and protecting the chateau, the Commissaries returned; and this time, at the request of Marmont, Charles X. received them. He was at first

unwilling to listen, until Marshal Maison declared that there were sixty thousand armed Parisians determined to advance to the attack of Rambouillet, and that the Commissaries came there to protect the King. Odillon Barrot disliked this mode of frightening the monarch, like a child, with exaggerated accounts of danger; but he asked his Majesty, for the sake of those who followed and surrounded him, to avoid a useless catastrophe. "Your Majesty and your sons have abdicated." Here the King said, "Yes, but we reserved the right of the Duke of Bordeaux." "Whatever are his rights," added M. Barrot, "they are best consulted by avoiding the spilling more blood." "What can I do?" asked the King, of Marmont. The latter advised him to abandon resistance. The Commissaries having withdrawn, to allow the King leisure for reflection, his Majesty sent for Marshal Maison, and addressed him, "You are a soldier. On the word of one, I ask whether what you have just said is true? Are there sixty thousand Parisians threatening Compiègne?" Marshal Maison did not shrink from repeating that there were. The King ejaculated, that he had better depart; and then he recurred to his grandson and to the conditions of his abdication. Maison, whom Charles X. had made a Marshal, observed that he could not listen to any political remarks in the absence of his colleagues; adding, that it was difficult to keep one's self free from suspicions, especially in persons situated as he was. The King looked at the Marshal, and told him he might withdraw. He then consulted Marmont, who discussed the chances of resistance. It was difficult, in such a position as Rambouillet, surrounded with forests, in which neither cavalry nor artillery could act. How far the troops could be

depended on remained doubtful. Marmont recommended submission. Charles followed the advice, and withdrew immediately with the troops to Maintenon. There he dismissed his army, telling the Guard and the other regiments to make their submission to the Lieutenant-General. The *Gardes du Corps* and some gensd'armes were alone to escort him to Cherbourg, which Charles had chosen as the place of his embarkation and the commencement of his exile. Charles bade adieu to his Guards on the 4th of August. On the previous day, the 3rd, the Duke of Orleans went in full solemnity to the Chambers, and, taking advantage of the conditional abdication of Charles X. to present it as an unconditional one, informed the Legislature that the King and the Dauphin had both signed such an act, which would be deposited with the Chamber the moment it was constituted. Whilst Charles X. and his family continued their route to Cherbourg, the Chamber of Deputies, on the 7th, disdaining to take advantage of the conditional abdication, declared that, in consequence of the violation of the Charter and the events of the Three Days, the throne was vacant *de jure* and *de facto*, and that certain alterations being to be made in the Charter, and clauses added to it, the Duke of Orleans, on the promise of his accepting and swearing to the Charter thus amended, was voted and declared to be King, under the title of King of the French. Of 252 deputies, but 33 voted in the negative.

Charles X., each morning of his long journey to Cherbourg, received the *Moniteur*, and read the successive accounts of the elevation or usurpation of his relative. He made no comment, displayed no bitterness, but, with

his family, resigned himself to what he considered the decree of Heaven. The aged monarch took an affecting farewell of his body-guard; and, with son and niece, daughter-in-law and grandson, set forth amidst the silent respect of the people of Cherbourg for that same Holyrood which had been his residence during his first emigration.

THE END.

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
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